Since 2012 the post soviet space geopolitics is mainly focused on the development of the two competing integration projects; Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) launched by Russia and EU Eastern Partnership (EP) program started in 2009 in Prague with offering of Association Agreements (AA) between EU and six former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
The main focus of this paper is to explore Armenia’s position toward these two projects as well as to explain the decisions made by Armenia’s leadership on choice. First of all it should be noted that since gaining independence in 1991, the cornerstone of its foreign policy has been the complementarities (multi-vector foreign policy) and the desire to build partnerships both with the neighboring states and with power centers involved in the regional geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
Thus the decision taken by Armenian leadership to join the Eastern Partnership Program and launch the negotiations with EU over the signature of the Association Agreement with DCFTA was totally in the framework of the Armenian multi-vector foreign policy. Armenian position was clear; Association Agreement should not create obstacles for the further development of the Russian-Armenian strategic alliance as well as impose any constraints on Armenia’s foreign and security policy.
Meanwhile, Armenia during the period of 2011-first half and 2013 had not elaborated the option to join Customs Union.
The negotiations between EU and Armenia finalizing AA have come to a successful end in summer 2013. Both sides made public statements confirming that negotiations were concluded successfully and that parts are ready to initialte AA in November during the Eastern partnership Summit in Vilnius.
After Vilnius Armenia and EU are trying to elaborate a new framework for future relations with possible negotiation and signature of a less ambitious agreement on bilateral cooperation with sole emphasis on issues of democratic reforms, human rights, rule of law, science and education contacts. But till now there are no clear indications of main points of possible new agreement.
Thus we may argue that Russia successfully implemented the campaign of covert intimidation against Armenia compelling him to abandon EU deal and enter the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union mainly using the security concerns of Armenia as well as economic dependence from Russia. Meanwhile it should be emphasized that Armenia per se was not a strategic goal for Russia and Armenia’s case was used primarily for making pressure against Ukraine at the second half of the 2013.