Prof. univ. dr. BasileNeacsa
Following the mid-term elections in the United States, changes are likely to affect primarily US domestic policy and, to a certain extent, foreign policy. How might these changes play out in practice?
A defeat for the Republican camp does not necessarily spell the end of Donald Trump’s influence. The President retains significant means of action, particularly in the diplomatic, trade and military spheres. It is therefore important to distinguish between his weakened position in Congress and his ability to continue to push through his priorities.
One thing is certain: faced with a Democratic-controlled Congress, Trump would find it more difficult to push through major legislation, reforms or budgets. The Democrats could put the brakes on some of his initiatives, without, however, having complete freedom to implement their own agenda. This is why the President boasts that he will be able to use his right of veto.
This situation would thus look like a conflict-ridden ‘cohabitation’ between the White House and Congress. The central question would then be that of compromise. Would Trump agree to make concessions to the Democrats in order to achieve certain outcomes? Or would he prefer to maintain the confrontation in order to mobilise his voters and pin the blame for deadlocks on his opponents? In the latter scenario, the United States could face a period of legislative paralysis. This would not mean a complete halt to government action, but it would make decisions requiring agreement between the two branches of government more difficult. Without a supportive majority, Trump might seek to govern increasingly by executive orders and administrative decisions. This approach would allow him to pursue certain priorities, particularly in the areas of immigration, regulation and trade. It would, however, have its limitations: an executive order does not always replace a law and may be challenged in the courts. Furthermore, should the disagreement between the President and Congress bring all activity to a standstill, impeachment proceedings could be initiated, and evidence of financial gain by some members of his family could prove difficult for Trump to refute.
It should also be added that over the next two months, until 3 January 2027 – the date on which the new US Congress will take office – Trump will be able to do as he sees appropriate and act with great haste.
A foreign policy still dominated by the ‘America First’ principle
On the international stage, a weakening of his domestic position would not necessarily lead to a decline in Trump’s responsiveness. On the contrary, he might seek diplomatic outcomes capable of bolstering his image as a leader capable of striking deals. Thus, relations with China, Russia and European countries would remain key areas for exerting economic and political pressure.
This approach forms part of what we might call the Trump doctrine; the doctrine is based on prioritising the national, economic and security interests of the United States. Under this approach, international commitments and alliances must be assessed first and foremost in terms of what concrete benefits they bring to the country. Cooperation is not necessarily rejected, but it becomes more conditional: it must yield a tangible advantage for Washington. Bilateral agreements, sanctions, customs duties and direct pressure play a central role in this approach.
Furthermore, to put his doctrine into practice, Trump has employed transactional diplomacy, in which each partner is asked to make concessions in exchange for support, access to the US market or a security guarantee. Thus, the balance of power has become an essential negotiating tool. It is precisely this combination of selectivity, pressure and unpredictability – which forms part of Trump’s doctrine – that is causing concern amongst certain partners.
Ending conflicts to build a political legacy
In my view, Trump will do his utmost to secure agreements on Ukraine and Iran before the end of his term in office. It would be in his interest to leave behind an image of a president who has scaled back costly commitments and achieved results where others (the Biden administration, the EU) would have failed. This quest for a political legacy could lead him to prioritise swift negotiations and compromises presented as American victories. At the same time, it will discourage him from embarking on new military adventures. In any case, de-escalation could offer economic benefits: reducing certain uncertainties, improving trade, and mitigating the risks weighing on the energy sector or on investment. However, these benefits would depend on the content of the agreements and their implementation. The desire to avoid further interventions does not, therefore, in itself rule out new confrontations.
Europe’s ongoing struggles with uncertainty
For Europe, this period could be characterised by persistent economic and geopolitical uncertainty. Tariffs, conditions for access to the US market and the distribution of defence spending would remain sources of tension. Europeans will have to adapt to a partner who may demand further concessions, whilst its support becomes less predictable.
In this context, the political affinity between the Trumpist movement and certain European nationalist parties could also come to the forefront. A distinction must, however, be made between ideological convergence, public support and genuine electoral interference. To claim that Washington will provide massive support to all these parties would be a prediction, not an established fact.
Debates on the rule of law and national sovereignty would also risk intensifying. Some politicians accuse the European institutions of applying their principles selectively. For example, in Poland and Romania, Brussels has shown us that it is prepared to go to any lengths. In Poland, it backed a coup d’état organised by Prime Minister Tusk, whilst in Romania it turned a blind eye to the successful coup d’état in 2024.
The upcoming elections in Europe, at the end of this year and in 2027, could shift the balance of power, particularly if governments more aligned with Trump’s views come to power. In Spain, this month’s elections point to the Spanish right as the clear winner, which will lead to a coalition with the nationalist party VOX, thereby breaking the so-called ‘cordon sanitaire’.
In any case, the effects of the elections on the European Union would still depend on the coalitions formed, the policies actually adopted and the ability of Member States to reach compromises (see the case of Italy).
Conclusion
A Republican defeat in the mid-term elections would not mean the end of Trump’s influence, nor an immediate change in all US policies. It may well usher in a period of internal confrontation, accompanied by ever-shifting diplomacy.
In my view, the issue at stake would be less the survival of Trump’s doctrine than its transformation under pressure. A president weakened in Congress might seek greater results on the international stage. For Europe, the challenge would then lie in maintaining transatlantic cooperation, whilst strengthening its capacity to defend its own interests.
Professor Brussels
Basile Neacsa. 4 November 2026