Maryna Bilynska, Ph.D (Public Administration), South Ukrainian University named after Ushinski, Professor
Zurab Garakanidze, Ph.D (Economics), Georgia, D. Agmashenebeli Defense Academy, Professor

Abstract: The article discusses the facts of the energy confrontation between the Russian Federation and the European Union and the proposals with which Georgia and Ukraine, as candidate countries for EU membership, can respond to the challenges of the European Union’s energy security in the conditions of the upcoming cold winter.
The first step towards cutting off gas supplies, and even the Russian gas monopoly itself, was taken a couple of months after the start of the Russian war against Ukraine. In particular, from April 27, 2022, the Russian Gazprom completely stopped gas supplies to the company Bulgargaz, due to the latter’s refusal to pay the fee in Russian rubles. In response, in June 2022, the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which is part of the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and passes through Georgia, began trial deliveries of Azerbaijani gas to Bulgaria – steps were taken to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas. Gas supplies to Bulgaria through the Bulgaria-Greece Interconnector* – IGB of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), located in the same EU “corridor”, were carried out in a test mode until the end of June 2022, and from July 2, 2022 to the end of 2023, the contractual volume of 1 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas was already supplied, which increased to 5 billion cubic meters by the end of 2026. The increase in supplies continues.
However, some EU countries continue to receive Russian Gazprom gas through the Turkish Stream pipeline. Moreover, due to the inflexible “Semi-Sanctionist” positions of European institutions, several of them have extended existing gas contracts until early 2027, and several of them have even increased the volumes of Russian gas received until the end of 2027. There are reserves, the use of which as energy security levers will further enrich the energy security “arsenals” of Ukraine, Georgia, and the European Union.

Keywords: Southern Gas Corridor, sanctions, Gazprom, European Union, war, energy security.

Russian war against Ukraine under the EU “Semi-Sanctions” and the BSSCP

New EU levers

Russia’s Gazprom, despite officially ceasing its gas transit through Ukraine to Europe from January 1, 2025, still managed to reach Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, and the Czech Republic.

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* Connecting point – Authors

A sharp and radical polarization occurred between the four countries mentioned above in 2025–2026 in terms of their dependence on the Russian state monopoly Gazprom. The official cessation of gas transit via Ukraine from January 1, 2025, and the new REPowerEU regulations adopted by the European Union in 2025–2026 (which prohibited the so-called “spot market” purchases) the Central European countries were divided into two camps: although the Czech Republic and Austria almost completely eliminated or minimized the consumption of Russian gas, Hungary and Slovakia used the EU so called exemptions and maximized imports from Gazprom. The dynamics of gas consumption by country in 2025-2026 looks like this (Table 1):

Dependence on Gaprom in 2025–2026

Table 1

Hungary — dependence on Gazprom has increased again in the last 2 years;

The situation is as follows: Hungary remains the largest importer of Russian pipeline gas in the European Union.

Dynamics in 2025-2026: After the Ukrainian route was closed, Hungary fully operationalized the alternative southern route. Through the TurkStream pipeline, Budapest signed additional agreements with Gazprom to maximize supply.

The result: 70-80% of the country’s gas consumption is still Russian. By the victory of the new government, Hungary fully used the exception valid until the end of 2027 for long-term contracts – V. Orbán always threatened to veto Brussels’ energy bans.

Slovakia — dependence on Gazprom has increased sharply (they are predicting a leap in growth in 2026);

The situation is as follows: the suspension of Ukrainian transit in 2025 caused temporary problems for the country, but R. Fico‘s government nevertheless set a course towards Moscow.

Dynamics in 2025-2026: In March 2026, the Slovak state-owned company SPP amended and renewed its contract with Gazprom. If in 2025 Slovakia received only 33% of its gas consumption from Russia, from the spring of 2026 the country increased this figure to 100%.

Reason: The Slovak side claims that, given the crisis in the Middle East and the decline in gas supplies in Europe, Gazprom’s gas is the most economically advantageous for them.

Result: almost all Free pipeline capacity in Slovakia has been fully utilized.

Austria — dependence has decreased sharply and is still falling permanently. The situation is as follows: until the end of 2024, Austria was dependent on Gazprom for more than 80% of its imported gas.

Dynamics in 2025-2026: In November 2024, Gazprom officially cut off gas supplies to Austrian giant OMV due to an arbitration dispute. This forced Vienna to switch to alternatives under force majeure.

Result: Austria successfully implemented a contingency plan — with the help of Norwegian gas, German-Italian routes and the Rotterdam LNG terminal, the share of Russian gas was reduced to a minimum. In addition, in 2026, the Austrian state energy company OMV began developing Austria’s largest domestic gas field in the last 40 years, which finally eliminates import dependence.

Czech Republic — Import dependence has been completely eliminated.

Situation: The Czech Republic, which was almost 100% dependent on Russian gas before the Russian war against Ukraine, has become a regional leader in energy diversification.

Dynamics in 2025-2026: In early 2025, the Czech Republic completed alternative Western oil and gas infrastructure projects, including the expansion of the TAL-PLUS gas pipeline.

Result: According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Czech Republic has completely stopped importing Russian gas. It has switched to receiving Norwegian gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from terminals in Germany and the Netherlands.

By what specific mechanism will the EU force Hungary and Slovakia to terminate long-term contracts by 2027? How did Gazprom’s supply cut off in Austria affect domestic tariffs and the energy market?

The EU measures to overcome resistance from some member states

The EU has resorted to a special legislative and legal strategy to overcome the resistance of Hungary and Slovakia. Instead of standard sanctions, Brussels has used mechanisms that have deprived Budapest and Bratislava of their veto power. The specific mechanisms by which the EU is forcing these two countries to terminate their contracts with Gazprom are as follows:

1. Legal “saw”: trade and energy legislation (bypassing the veto);

How it works: Under the EU rules, imposing external sanctions requires the unanimous consent of all (27) countries, which allowed Hungary and Slovakia to block it.

Mechanism: The EU has framed the ban on Russian gas not as a sanction, but as a regulation of the internal energy market and trade policy (based on Articles 194 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Result: This type of legislation only requires a qualified majority. Consequently, the Council of the European Union approved the law anyway, despite Hungary and Slovakia voting against it.

2. Calendar of gradual legal prohibitions.

The regulation adopted by the European Union sets strict, legally binding deadlines, the violation of which will be considered as violation of European law:

Short-term contracts: All short-term (spot) contracts for pipeline gas have been banned.

Long-term LNG contracts: Complete ban takes effect from January 1, 2027.

Long-term pipeline contracts (which are of greatest concern to Hungary and Slovakia): banned from September 30, 2027 (in exceptional cases, in the event of a storage filling problem, from November 1, 2027 at the latest). This means that any contract with Gazprom valid from the fall of 2027 will automatically become illegal in the EU.

3. Strict Provenance Checks

How it works: Hungary and Slovakia have tried to circumvent the restrictions by “re-exporting” gas (for example, by buying Russian gas from Turkish or Azerbaijani companies).

Mechanism: The EU has implemented a mandatory origin control mechanism at border crossings. Importers are required to provide full documentation that the gas was not produced on Russian territory.

4. Enforcing national diversification plans

Mechanism: As part of the REPowerEU roadmap, the European Commission has forced all member states to submit rigorous national diversification plans. Hungary and Slovakia have been required to demonstrate how they intend to prepare their infrastructure for alternative (e.g. Norwegian or Western LNG) gas.

Hungary and Slovakia’s response: Budapest and Bratislava have called the mechanism a “legal trick.” The Hungarian government has already formally appealed the decision to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and Slovakia will soon join it. Slovakia says that early termination of the contract with Gazprom (which runs until 2034) would cost the country between $11 billion and $16 billion in fines, and both governments are preparing to launch a legal battle.

The results of the study show that the dependence of Central European countries – Hungary and Slovakia – on Russian gas has increased, while the dependence of Austria and the Czech Republic abussing on the Russian state monopoly Gazprom has disappeared, which was reflected in the less critical position of the governments of these countries towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Impact of Black Sea high-voltage submarine cable (BSSCP) on gas supply to Georgia and Ukraine

The Black Sea high-voltage submarine cable (BSSCP – under construction) does not directly affect the physical supply of natural gas, although it plays a significant indirect role in the balance of gas supplies to Georgia and Ukraine, and regional energy security.

This 1,155 km long, 1,300 MW project directly connects Azerbaijan and Georgia with Romania (an EU member). Its main effects on the gas sector are as follows:

1. Impact on Georgia’s gas supply.

Replacing gas in electricity generation: Georgia relies on thermal power plants and natural gas (mainly Azerbaijani) for electricity during the winter. The ability to import cheap or surplus power from the European power system via cable would reduce the load on thermal power plants and save the country’s domestic gas resources.

Alternative uses for Azerbaijani gas: Azerbaijan aims to convert the Caspian Sea’s “green energy” (wind and solar) into electricity and transport it via cable to Europe. This would allow Baku to conserve its own natural gas and sell it to Georgia or Europe via direct pipelines (e.g., the South Caucasus Pipeline, part of the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor) instead of generating electricity.

“Green Hydrogen” Perspective: According to the plan of the Ministry of Economy of Georgia, the development of a Green Hydrogen pipeline is being considered in parallel with the cable, which aims to partially replace traditional natural gas consumption in the future.

2. Impact on Ukraine’s gas supply .

Diversification of gas-fired generation: Ukraine is facing an acute energy shortage amid Russian aggression and infrastructure destruction. Electricity flowing to Romania via the Black Sea cable increases the energy sustainability of the entire region (including Ukraine’s neighbors Moldova and Romania). This allows Ukraine to receive more electricity from the European grid (ENTSO-E) and use less natural gas to power its own thermal power plants.

Reducing dependence on Russian gas: The project, which has been granted strategic (PMI) status by the European Union, is a strategic part of a Europe-wide shift away from Russian fossil fuels, including gas.

A “green energy” corridor from the Caspian region to Europe

The events taking place in the world, the Covid pandemic, the economic crisis, and the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine have revealed how important a country’s economic independence is, and one of the main aspects of which is energy independence.

Currently, Georgia does not have a power system with the capacity to meet its own demand, so the country spends about $70 million a year on electricity imports. At the same time, demand is growing every year, and if its own generation does not increase, Tbilisi will have to pay $600 million in electricity imports by 2030, which is quite a large amount.

Georgia needs a concrete plan and effective steps to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, produce enough electricity to meet its own needs, and export it to Europe. This goal is addressed by the ambitious, innovative, and expensive “Black Sea Submarine Cable Project” (BSSCP) considered a “project of the future,” which has great economic and political significance for the country. This strategic designation connects EU energy systems directly with non-EU partner countries to advance shared climate and security goals.

At the end of 2022, namely on December 17, the governments of four states – Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania and Hungary – signed an important document in the Romanian capital. It was a strategic cooperation agreement on the advancement and transportation of environmentally friendly energy. One of the central elements of this agreement was an initiative called the “Black Sea Submarine Cable Project”.

“The strategic project of the 21st century”, “Georgia’s greatest initiative”, is what is called the “Black Sea Submarine Cable Project” (BSSCP), the innovative idea of which belongs to Georgia. The project should connect the energy systems of Georgia and Europe, which will allow the countries of the South Caucasus and Europe to benefit from expanded export opportunities, as well as contribute to their energy security. The mentioned project is a guarantee of energy independence for Georgia and a kind of dividend with political weight.

The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project (BSSCP) is one of the most strategic and ambitious energy and digital connectivity initiatives in the South Caucasus and South-Eastern Europe, involving parallel power and fiber-optic submarine cable connections in the Black Sea, with termination points in Georgia and Romania. The increased electricity trade through the interconnection is expected to support the development of renewable energy in the South Caucasus and the decarbonization of energy supply, increasing energy security and reliability of electricity supply on both sides of the interconnection. Digital interconnection will reduce internet connection costs, increase bandwidth and the scale of international digital connectivity within the Black Sea.

In addition to Georgia and Romania, Hungary, Azerbaijan and, potentially, other countries of South-Eastern Europe, primarily Ukraine, will participate in the development and financing of the Black Sea submarine cable project. The Georgian government has requested World Bank support in the preparation and implementation of the Black Sea submarine cable project.

The project involves the construction of a 1,195 km long, 1,000 MW, 500 kW high-voltage electricity transmission network, 1,100 km of which will be on the Black Sea bed and 95 km on the land of Romania and Georgia. The starting point of the cable will be Anaklia – “Jvari 500” substation, where the Black Sea submarine cable is planned to be connected to the Georgian power system. The cable’s final destination is the Romanian port of Constanta, from where electricity will be distributed to the European market.

In Georgia and Romania, offshore and coastal electrodes, transformer stations and land and overhead power lines will be installed. In particular, a high-voltage direct current power transmission system cable (land cable) and high-voltage alternating current power transmission system lines (HVAC – overhead power lines). The submarine cable will connect these countries, passing through the Black Sea and the exclusive economic zones of Turkey and Bulgaria. In Romania, only one 400 kV HVAC power/transmission line is planned to be constructed (from the transformer station to the selected AC substation). In Georgia, two 500 kV HVAC power/transmission lines are planned to be constructed: from the Anaklia transformer station to the Jvari substation and from the Anaklia transformer station to the Tskaltubo substation. Based on the route/layout analysis presented in the route and location study, the preferred land option was selected for the Romanian side between the two alternatives. Then, the preferred substation, land and overhead transmission line corridors were selected between the two alternatives.

In the case of Georgia, one onshore site has been selected. However, two alternatives for the location of the converter station are still under evaluation, along with their onshore cable alternatives. For the HVAC transmission line, three alternatives are still under evaluation. For the Anaklia-Jvari connection, only one route has been identified – the Anaklia-Tskaltubo HVAC transmission line. In Georgia, the cable landfall point is located near Anaklia, while the converter station alternatives are approximately 17 km and 24 km from the coastline and will be connected to the onshore corridor by an HVDC underground cable. The length of the HVDC cable route varies from 17 to 25 km, depending on the location of the converter station. Similarly, the Anaklia-Jvari HVAC transmission line alternatives range in length from 39 to 46 km, depending on the location of the substation and their route. The Anaklia-Tskaltubo HVAC transmission line includes an overhead connection from only one substation (considered the most suitable by the GSE), with a total length of 74.5 km. Finally, the Georgia (basin) electrode will be located close to the coastline, approximately 5 km south of the landfall point. Its connection to the electrode is not yet specified and is under consideration. The preferred alternative is one where one of the medium voltage cables runs parallel to the coastline (coastal connection), and the other medium voltage cable runs a few km from the coastline.

The cable has the capacity to install a fiber-optic cable, which is an additional direct means of establishing a telecommunications and Internet channel. This means the possibility of creating an additional channel for telecommunications traffic between the following regions: Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, Central Asia. For this purpose, a similar fiber-optic cable is being laid between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea. Real work on arranging a fiber-optic connection has begun there. This information was disseminated by the Kazakh representative in Azerbaijan, Alim Bayli (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 2024). The project of a fiber-optic connection passing through the Caspian Sea envisages the establishment of a fast Internet connection on the seabed between Azerbaijan and the states of Central Asia. The initiative aims to create a digital trade route between Europe and Asia via Azerbaijan by laying major communication lines that will enable the transmission of huge amounts of information across the Caspian Sea. This “green energy” corridor project will be implemented in several stages. The first stage involves only detailed infrastructure planning – studies necessary for construction: Geophysical and geotechnical surveys of the Black Sea bed, to identify the corridor for the electrical and fiber optic cable system (two main technical studies to be carried out as part of the feasibility study). As well as legal and financial consultations, technical support, capacity building and knowledge sharing to support financial negotiations, institutional capacity building and stakeholder engagement, both at the Georgian and intergovernmental levels, for the purpose of conducting preliminary technical studies of the project, environmental and social impact assessment.

The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project (BSSCP) envisages the construction and operation of a complex infrastructure consisting of various structural elements located in different biophysical environments and on the territory of several countries. In addition, the information from the “Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” will be used to obtain environmental and construction permits from the relevant state agencies of the countries participating in the project. Thus, the “Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” of the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project (BSSCP) envisages several deliverables to simplify administrative procedures. All deliverables are consistent with the World Bank’s environmental and social standards, international maritime regulations, the World Bank’s Environmental, Health and Safety Guiding Principles and international best practices in the field. In addition, country-specific deliverables should be consistent with the national legislation of the participating countries and the requirements of international treaties to which these countries are parties.

A comprehensive study and appraisal of the project, with the supporting role of the Ministry of Economy of Georgia and the active cooperation of the World Bank, was carried out by the Georgian company “State Electricity System” (The Electrosystem – GSE), launched an initiative. The feasibility study of the “Black Sea Submarine Cable Project”, by invitation the Electrosystem, will conduct the Italian consulting firm CESI. The contract signed with CESI as a result of an international tender includes a feasibility study and consulting services for the construction of a submarine power transmission line and digital connection between Georgia and Romania. The study will identify the prospects and optimal strategies for the practical implementation of the project, the cable route, environmental protection and social screening issues, etc. The Italian company began the study in May 2022 and completed by the end of 2024.

Georgian State Electrosystem is developing a partnership with the Romanian energy network management company – Transelectrica. The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia disseminates information about the aforementioned “initiative” by conducting consultations with the relevant structures of the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Romania, and Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE) – with the relevant energy structures of the listed states.

During the development of the project, the risk factor of impact on the environment and social components was analyzed, which was analyzed according to the following main stages:

– Identifying threats related to the project;

– Assessment of the spread of hazards to the planned work (i.e. events that are more or less likely to occur). There may be a probability;

– Assessment of possible outcomes of events.

After analysis, events that could negatively impact the construction and/or operation phases were identified and grouped into 6 hazard categories:

1) anthropogenic threats;

2) Technological threats;

3) Natural hazards;

4) Environmental threats;

5) Dangers from the presence of hazardous materials;

6) Health and occupational safety.

Anthropogenic threats

Man-made hazards include all negative events associated with both voluntary and involuntary human activities, such as theft, damage to aggregates, terrorist attacks, cable damage, collisions between ships during cable laying or maintenance work, road accidents, due to the proximity of roads and cities… The main consequences of man-made hazards concern economic damage caused by loss or damage to assets.

Technological threats

The final term “technological hazards” refers to both events related to asset failure (for example, due to mechanical breakdown) and process disruptions due to changes in parameters in sensitive areas of substations (which in the most serious cases can lead to fires and explosions).

Natural hazards

Natural hazards include ecological phenomena of particular importance and intensity, such as underwater landslides, earthquakes, floods, and forest fires.

Environmental threats

This category includes all events that may cause habitat change, with consequent negative impacts on marine and/or terrestrial flora and fauna. For example, spillage of fuel or lubricants from vehicles in the contamination zone, unforeseen incidents accompanying maintenance work during construction phases.

Dangers associated with the presence of hazardous substances

During the construction or operation phase, hazardous substances and mixtures, particularly diesel fuel, may be released from onshore construction sites, which could cause explosions and fires, potentially damaging systems, personnel and the surrounding environment.

Health and safety hazards

All events that may occur in a cable and associated infrastructure, both onshore and offshore, during both the construction and operational phases, with more or less serious consequences for the health and safety of personnel. The consequences of such events include all injuries, damages and accidents to personnel.

The “Black Sea Cable Project” requires significant financial resources. After the project was introduced, the European Union expressed its readiness to allocate 17 billion euros for the Eastern Partnership Economic and Investment Strategy. In addition, 2.3 billion euros will be allocated for the initiative, which involves laying an electricity transmission cable on the Black Sea bed between Georgia and the European Union.

However, the EU contribution alone is not sufficient for full financing. It will be necessary to identify and coordinate additional financial sources, including international financial organizations, interested countries and major energy companies. The success of the project will depend on the effective pooling of financial resources mobilized from different geographical and institutional sources.

The next stages will also be financed by the state with the support of the same institution. The total budget of the project, according to preliminary calculations, is 2.3 billion dollars.

Project-related risk – Every undertaking, initiative or idea is accompanied by implementation risks and factors that may hinder any well-planned project. It is clear that the “Black Sea Submarine Cable Project” is no exception and there are several types of risk factors related to it:

– Project scale: the submarine cable is very long (1100 km), which leads to so-called “lossy operation” during transmission. A similar project is the North Sea Link, which connects Norway and Great Britain. The length of this cable is 750 km, due to which approximately 3.4% of the energy is lost. Accordingly, this loss will increase proportionally with the increase in cable length.

– Physical vulnerability of the project: as we know, the cable must pass along the bottom of the Black Sea, and a certain part of the Black Sea is controlled by the Russian Federation. Accordingly, there is a danger of sabotage on the cable by the Russian side using underwater special equipment.

– The complexity of underwater cable construction: Black Sea is on average 2 km deep, and the construction of a cable at this depth is associated with great difficulties and huge costs. As is known from the recent past, many mines have been thrown onto the coast. So, the Black Sea can offer many unforeseen “surprises”.

The BSSCP and the European Energy Community

The European Energy Community, of which Georgia has been a member since 2017, is an organization whose main goal is to spread European energy legislation and market principles. For the European Energy Community, Georgia is an interesting country with renewable energy potential. Through the “Black Sea Cable Project” electricity of the entire South Caucasus region will be able to exchange with the European energy system, and in the future – Ukraine and Moldova. There is infrastructure already done between the two countries – Georgia and Azerbaijan: 500, 300 and 330 kilovolt lines, which, as soon as the project starts, will bring great opportunities for Azerbaijan, as it has recently been trying its best to export its own electric energy resources to the western export market. Energy resources include the thermal power plants in Azerbaijan, and resources generated as a result of the development of power plants and planned wind energy. There is a growing demand for green energy in Europe. In the BSSCP Georgia should not only have the function of a conductor, it should produce renewable energy that will be exported, which, unfortunately, is currently impossible. The country has only utilized 22% of its hydropower potential, and the potential of wind and solar energy should also be taken into account.

Georgia can export electricity only in the summer, during excess generation. That is why it is planned to study and utilize renewable resources to the maximum extent in the near future. The construction of hydro, solar and wind power plants has begun. By 2027, 12 hydro power plants will be built, with a total capacity of 157 MW. It is planned to build a combined cycle thermal power plant with a capacity of 350-430 MW in the Gardabani region. The project is attracting private investors who will provide design, construction and further operation of the plant.

In parallel, the construction of over 1,000 kilometers of new power transmission lines across Georgia is planned in the coming years. The aim of this initiative is to increase the reliability of electricity supply and increase the capacity of the existing transmission network.

It is also planned to strengthen the lines connecting with neighboring countries. The project is important in terms of exporting excess electricity produced in Georgia to the EU market, since the latter is a stable, guaranteed buyer. Therefore, there may be no more space left in the grid for transit electricity and it will be fully utilized by transiting sources produced by Georgia, which is the only and best prospect.

Another benefit of this project will be that the cable has the resources to install a fiber-optic cable, which provides additional direct access to establish a telecommunications and Internet channel. The project will allow the countries of the South Caucasus to trade with Europe based on hourly electricity market prices. This initiative represents an important perspective for the entire region. The 2-hour time difference with Europe creates favorable conditions for South Caucasus. When the peak of electricity consumption in Caucasus decreases, it begins in Europe at that time, which is an optimally used factor. In addition, Caucasus countries are given the opportunity to take advantage of the low-cost energy resource of the European night period.

In addition, the potential for the project to expand to the east is evident. In particular, the construction of a transmission line on the bottom of the Caspian Sea will make it possible to integrate Asian countries into a single energy grid. For example, connecting Azerbaijan to the energy system of Kazakhstan. The use of different energy consumption regimes in different time zones will also be an extremely important factor in this case, which strengthen the energy security of Europe and the Caucasus, eliminate dependence on the Russian energy market, stimulate renewable energy production, and increase transit capacity between the specified regions.

Conclusion

The BSSCP construction will transform Georgia into a Transcaucasian electricity hub and there will be a step towards economic independence. The project will strengthen the energy security of the Europe-Ukraine-Moldova-Caucasus region, s.c. WBSA (Wider Black Sea Area), develop the renewable energy sector, and increase transit capacity between the specified regions.

The BSSCP is a highly strategic project that will bring energy security not only to Georgia, but also to the WBSA and Europe. The fiber-optic connection, which will be part of the Black Sea Submarine Cable project, will increase broadband data traffic and contribute to reducing telecommunications prices, both in Georgia and in the South Caucasus. The initiative will significantly increase energy security in both Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. It will support the development of the renewable energy sector and expand energy transit routes between specific regions. This will allow the South Caucasus states and Romania to benefit from increased export potential.

With the recent sharp increase in internet usage, additional internet access points are of particular importance for the South Caucasus. The project will create an opportunity for the region to become a digital hub while reducing its energy dependence on other countries.

Today, the economic feasibility of the project has been practically confirmed and is moving into the implementation stage, which is a major step forward on the path to its implementation. According to preliminary data, the completion and commissioning of the BSSCP is planned for 2030. However, the exact date will be determined after the completion of the project’s technical-economic, Black Sea bottom, environmental and social assessment studies.

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