The year 2024 is going into history as a period of restructuring and potentially destroying global order. After decades of living in a unipolar world led by the USA, current geopolitics and geo-economics are decided by a wide range of emerging global powers, all trying to take a bite of the Pax Americana rule of order. Without any discussion, China’s emergence as a global power is influencing the future, but it will not be a multi-polar power structure for long. Even if India, Russia, Middle Eastern, or Latin American powers are vying for a seat on the table, the coming years will be mainly a US-led coalition (the West) vs a China-led power block. Some see the new adversary already taking shape; the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) block is setting structures addressing not only the need for a new global economic order but also as a non-Western led economic-financial-military block. BRICS already has invited a long list of other emerging countries, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, or Argentina, to join, while others, such as Iran, Turkey, or Egypt, are considering becoming members too. The future at the start of 2024 for BRICS seemed to be very bright, as even mainstream Western countries (Turkey) or African giants were considering joining BRICS.
Based on an anti-Western geopolitical order principle, the principal founders of the BRICS strategy, China and Russia, were seen as the new strongmen of the non-Western world and champions of the so-called Global South. Moscow and Beijing were already addressing the set up of an independent financial system, which was no longer based on the US-led SWIFT system, developing a BRICS currency and opening up discussions for possible economic and military cooperation. Even though other leading nations, especially India, voiced their concerns, all lights were on green to take significant steps quickly. Many experts discussed and promoted the end of the Pax Americana, or the US-led economic and financial system. The end of the US-dollar or Petro-Dollar system looked to be a possibility not anymore to be disregarded by major financial institutions or even the WB, IMF, and others. Significant shocks to the decades-long geopolitical system were expected, with the first facts to hit the ground in 2024.
However, none of these geopolitical experts or doomsday geo-economical proponents realized what was happening. The Middle East (a Euro-centric word) was not only on fire but would be pulling a significant part of the fundaments of BRICS away with a series of Big Bangs. No politician in the West or East understood yet the significance of the October 7, 2023, Hamas massacre of 1200+ Israelis and the ensuing military operations by Israel against Hamas, Hezbollah, and even Iran.
Leading voices inside of BRICS would be confronted by a landslide geopolitical and military reshuffling of the cornerstones of both the BRICS and possibly the global role of Russia, China, and the USA in the future. A very dark assessment could even be that the Hamas atrocities and the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance (Iranian view) have led to a Pax America 2.0 while pushing a future reassessment of the Arab world about its long-term “Pivot to Asia.”
While Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Brussels are looking at military developments in Ukraine, which show a possible stalemate or ceasefire coming in the following months, the re-election of Donald Trump as president of the USA or China’s continuing encirclement of Taiwan, rapid developments inside the Middle East, especially in the Levant arena, are going to shape the foreseeable future maybe even more. The destruction of not only Gaza-based fundamentalist terrorist organization Hamas already pushed part of the existing power constellation in the Middle East to the brink of war. The continuing support of Iranian Shi’a proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon has led to an Israeli military reaction currently still partly underway. Still, it can be safely stated that the imminent threat of an Iran – Hezbollah assault on Israel is removed. At the same time, Tehran’s decision to become actively involved via two major missile attacks on Israel has also led to the removal of most of Iran’s air defenses and missile technology centers. The overall picture was still partly clouded but now has emerged in plain sight. The overall capabilities of the so-called Axis of Resistance (Iran – Hezbollah – Syria – Hamas – Houthis and Iraqi Shi’a militias) have been diminished. At the same time, the stranglehold of Iran on the Shi’a Crescent is weakened. The ultimate result is currently showing its face to the public. The rapid and surprisingly coordinated assault of Syrian-based extremists and militias on the Assad regime, holding power for over 5 decades, has resulted not only in the removal of the Ba’athist Alawi regime but also has pushed Iran and Russia, the two principal backers, over the edge. The future of Syria at present is unclear, as facts on the ground do not promise a smooth transition to a more stable and viable Syrian state.
The impact of the end of Iranian influence in Syria and the loss of Russian access to ports and military bases in the Levant is of much greater importance. For the first time since 1978-79, Iran’s influence is waning in the Middle East. The Shi’a fundamentalist regime, set up by Ayatollah Khomeini (Veliyat e-Faqih), is under severe pressure. Even during the Iraq – Iran war in the 1980s, Iran’s ruling elite was not under severe pressure. In the last 30 years, Tehran’s mullahs have been able to set up a vast and intricate network of proxies and illegal activities, all supported by the IRGC (the main Iranian military force), while opening up power bases in major Arab countries, especially Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The potential of a fully-backed Iranian onslaught on the other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and even the UAE, was on the mind of most analysts. Before the Hamas atrocities, Tehran’s power position even forced Arab leaders to reopen diplomatic channels with Tehran, as seen in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in the last years. Fear, not a term used by all of them, was the main driver, especially in light of the vast Iranian military capabilities and the potential threat of an Islamic nuclear bomb. These views could now be under severe scrutiny, looking at the weakened Iranian capabilities to project power via proxies caused by internal Iranian pressures. The loss of Damascus (Syria) should not be misunderstood. In all the leading Islamic extremist strategies, Damascus, the former capital of the Umayyad Empire, is the key to Jerusalem and the position of a new Islamic Empire. Not only are Sunni extremists following the latter, but Iran has always been looking at taking Damascus as the first price in the crown. The loss of Syria, not only removing the direct connection to the ultimate enemy, Israel but also destroying the logistical power base of its proxies, is a critical blow to the Khomeini – Khamenei expansion dreams.
The weakening of the Iranian regime, externally and internally, is ongoing. How far the latter will result in an “Assad scenario” is unclear, as internal repression and the position of the IRGC as a stalwart of the Khamenei powers is still strong. The current main concern is how the regime proponents react to the changing situation. Will they reflect and have a more inward-looking military-strategic approach, or will there be a more reactionary approach, possibly leading to a push to build a nuclear bomb asap? If the latter is taken as the leading strategic position, Israel and the USA will not be waiting; more military actions, especially under the Trump Administration, are very feasible.
At the same time, Russia’s role as a geopolitical and military power is severely undermined. The loss of Syria removes not only Russia’s access to the Levant but should also be seen as a significant blow to Putin’s dream of confronting NATO from all sides. The position of the Syrian port of Tartus should not be underestimated. At the same time, access to Syrian airports and military bases was (and is) crucial to Russia’s pivot into Africa and its stronghold on developments in the Middle East.
Putin will have to address the fact that Russia and Iran have not been able or willing to support the Assad regime in its last days. The Syrian conflict has clearly shown that the former Assad supporters have been overstretched. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has put most resources in the European theatre without leaving any real options to intervene in the rest of the world. Moscow currently lacks the capabilities to assist its allies in the fight for survival. Military sources, based on satellite images, stated that before the fall of Damascus, Russia moved its navy vessels from its Tartus naval base in Syria. The move is significant, as it has been only the 2nd time Russian navy vessels were removed. In early 2024, Russia was forced to move a vast part of its still-existing Black Fleet from Crimea. The latter was put in place after Ukraine stepped up its attacks on Russian naval resources with success.
The Syrian implosion, however, has put Russia in a corner again. For over 50 years, the Syrian port has been Russia’s main asset not only in the East Mediterranean, threatening directly possible NATO moves in the Middle East and Southern Europe, but also as a central logistical hub towards North Africa and the African continent. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Tartus has become Moscow’s main non-Russian asset. The port has been the base for two Russian Gorskhov class frigates, one Grigorovich class frigate, two auxiliaries, and an Improved-Kilo class submarine. Based on satellite information, Moscow has removed most of them.
Until now, even when looking at the Ukraine war, Russian naval assets have been able to move freely in international waters. Based on the Montreux Convention, however, which is enforced by Turkey, the latter prevents Russian warships from passing through the Turkish straits. If the Syrian port of Tartus falls into the hands of the extremist militias, Moscow is expected to redeploy the vessels to its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad. Both bases are, however, in the Baltic Sea, a central maritime area surrounded by NATO countries.
The current situation is a blow to Moscow’s overall geopolitical power projections. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Putin has been backing Assad, not only by reinforcing the regime but also by being an active part in countering the insurgency, as shown by the bombardments of Aleppo in 2016. The developments in Syria now clearly show that Russia’s air power is too occupied in Ukraine. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia’s capabilities to support its allies outside of the European arena, while the Lebanon war has removed logistics options for others. The loss of Syria will not only weaken possible Russian moves and interests in Africa (as a whole) but also show an unexpected weakness for its potential Arab allies and Iran. Until now, Russia’s elite looked at Syria as a capability to project power outside of the Russian arena. The fall of the Assad regime has now cut the strings held in Africa. Logistically and militarily, Syria played a significant role in this. Even though Moscow is looking at Algeria, Libya, or Sudan as a potential naval base, Syria has always taken precedence. Moscow’s Syria policies are also crucial for its ongoing military-economic alliance with Iran.
A full-scale reassessment of Moscow’s elite is ongoing, as its assets or power projections in Africa, mainly Burkina Faso, Libya, or Mali, are at risk. As stated in an article published on Oilprice.Com (https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Libya-a-New-Instrument-in-Moscows-European-Strategy.html), the North African oil and gas producer is seen as a Russian hub for Africa Corps personnel and heavy equipment. The end of access to Tartus is pushing Russian logistics to the limit.
It also removes or weakens at least the options available to Moscow to have a direct presence or threat projection in the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and even the Atlantic. The soft belly of NATO or major waterways (Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Horn of Africa) could be out of reach to the Russian navy and allies. Keep in mind that Russia has been extensively building up its Tartus assets since the invasion of Ukraine. The first moves were even made before the invasion of Ukraine; the Africa or Syria theaters blindsided analysts, but now understand that Moscow was preparing with doomsday scenarios in the Black Sea already. Putin’s dream of a naval port (or access) in the Red Sea is further away. Putin’s cronies have pursued access to Egypt (unsuccessful), Sudan (still open for progress), and the Horn of Africa countries, and in another reaction to the Syria – Russia Tartus dilemma, former US Army Europe commander Mark Hetling indicated that a loss in Syria would also put military threats in place to other Russian naval assets, such as the Black Sea and the Baltic. Hetling reiterated that Russia faces major geopolitical power problems without naval power projection capacity. Tartus is Russia’s Mediterranean power projection base, while the Black Sea and Baltic target European threats. As Hetling stated, “Putin is truly cornered”.
NATO military analysts have already reiterated that if Russia loses Tartus, the significance of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean is very low. The only other option, as stated before, is to increase its role in Libya while expanding its maritime presence in the General Haftar LNA forces region of East Libya. Since the last few years, the Russian navy presence in Libya has increased, as Moscow already decided to spread its risks. Russian naval visits to ports in Cyrenaica, particularly Tobruk, have increased. Tobruk is a central logistics hub for Russian military and Africa Corps members, either for Libyan operations or Africa. East Libya could also be a significant focus area for Russia’s Air Force.
NATO should take a very cautious but prudent course here. A build-up of Russian naval and air force in Libya is not only a destabilizing factor in the country itself but also puts Russian military assets much closer to NATO. From Libya, the distance to Europe is extremely close. It threatens the waters between North Africa and Italy, the primary option for NW-European maritime trade and navies to sail to the East Med (and China).
Taking all of the above, when discussing a potential power struggle between the West (USA – EU) and BRICS in the coming years, the first cracks in the China – Russia-led endeavor are apparent. In recent years, BRICS has been vying to fill a potential power vacuum based on an anticipated weakening of the Pax Americana and a stronger MAGA or isolationist USA geopolitical positioning. The fall-out of the Obama Administration, the first Trump Administration, and the geopolitical chaos during Biden opened the doors for a new economic-geopolitical block, BRICS. At the same time, the so-called Global South, comprised of former colonies of the West and emerging new economies, was also vying for a place on the table. The anti-Western sentiments still ruling most of them, as seen in Africa and some ultra-left-wing governments in Latin America forced the unipolar world to be reshuffled. BRICS, China, and Russia jumped into the void left by the USA and the mismanagement of the Europeans. Beijing and Moscow, the latter already sanctioned for its actions in Ukraine, also regarded it as the only rational option to increase their geopolitical power positions or at least block part of the Pax Americana.
Until now, the BRICS future has looked bright, as the attractiveness to others to join has been apparent. Even though the current alliance is still looking for a real strategy, the potential to form another economic block on the global stage is clear. The fact that major geopolitical and military powers are part of it, especially Russia, China, and India, also contributes to the current attractiveness to Middle Eastern parties or African emerging economies. As seen before BRICS, most non-Western aligned economies were already pivoting towards China, Russia, and India. To be part of an actual hard-hitting block is part of the ongoing discussions in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Tripoli, and others.
However, optimism (Global South) or fear (West) about a strong new player could change dramatically in the following months. The non-Western world is undoubtedly watching Russia’s struggle on all fronts. Currently, Putin’s leadership is under pressure, not only due to the ongoing war in Ukraine but also the Syrian debacle. As accurate (realism) power comes out of the barrel of a gun (Mao), Putin’s continuing military defeats or struggles are removing the shine of invisibility. At the same time, most Arab countries have been watching with anticipation the role Russia played the last years in backing not only Bashir Assad’s Syrian regime and the Islamic regime in Iran but also a long list of others, such as General Haftar Libya, or the military dictatorships in Africa. The current failures or outright defeats are not taken lightly by mainstream BRICS or potential members.
At present, BRICS is facing internal unrest. Russia’s leadership inside the coalition is crucial, as some see it as a potential counter to Chinese strategies. Moscow also has robust relationships with China and the other powers in play, such as India or upcoming members from MENA or African regions. This pivotal position is, however, now eroding. Not only is China assessing the actual power or potential of Moscow’s cooperation, as Beijing could be facing 3rd party risks from the USA or EU due to its support in Ukraine, but also in light of the demise of Moscow’s global access. India, the 3rd prominent BRICS leader, already has opened up to the West in a move to quell China’s hegemony, but also again in light of Western sanctions on Russia or trade tariffs of the new Trump Administration.
The internal unrest is to increase, as the Trump Card is being played already, but also looking at Putin’s struggle to survive in the coming years. Without the invincibility status it had before, an unstable Russia is not only an ally but could be a liability. For Moscow to face lower geopolitical power projection options, its BRICS leadership is also weakening. Putin is assessing not only all of the world’s ROWs but also the world’s ROWs, under the leadership of Beijing and India. Without a possible Russian mortar holding the other BRIC(K)S together, a strong 2nd global power block is not feasible. Beijing and New Delhi will not be willing to compromise their strategies and future for the ideas of the other Asian Tiger. China must also assess the damage caused by a weakened Russian presence in parts of its One Belt One Road countries. Without the protection of the Russian navy, air force, or militias, China’s security is under pressure, too. India will not rescue any Chinese assets in the Middle East, North Africa, or elsewhere. BRICS is shaking on its fundamentals, as geo-economics needs military policies, alliances, or actions.
The period 2025-2030 will decide the outcome of the so-called “Butterfly” effects put in place in 2024. The Hamas atrocities, instigated and supported partly by Iran and others, most of them even vying for BRICS membership in the future, have led not only to a reshuffling in the Middle East or Levant but have had detrimental effects on the future of BRICS. Without needing to fire one bullet, the West has been able to derail part of the unipolar strategies behind BRICS and remove part of the anticipated power centers involved. Iran and Russia are in the corner. China’s dream of leading a non-Western alliance of the willing, even challenging the global dollar system and Pax Americana, must be redefined or put on ice for a long time.
The only Black Swan in plain sight is not showing its accurate colors, Turkey. The second largest military force in NATO, still vying for EU membership, is playing a dubious but potentially precarious role. As shown already in the current Syria problem, the Erdogan regime is actively involved in not only removing possible anti-Turkish opposition in the country, especially the Kurdish rebel forces and PKK but also is pushing for a pro-Turkish Islamic nationalist regime. Some analysts even indicate a push for a pro-Turkish Great Turkey movement. By removing opposition and Russia from its southern borders, Turkey has a vast space to maneuver its ambitions. One of them could be to be joining BRICS. Turkish officials told the media in September that Turkey had officially applied for a BRICS membership. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan already voiced the latter dream in July 2018. A potential membership falls within the grand scheme of Erdoganism, targeting a supra-regional power position in which it will also rule or influence Central Asia and the Middle East. Nationalism is already evident, as shown by pro-Turkish groups involved in the removal of Bashir Assad.
Turkey’s membership in the BRICS community would be controversial and tricky for regional and global power projections. Turkey is a NATO member and fully engaged in any military coordination or potential actions of the Western military alliance. It is also still officially trying to join another major economic and financial block, the EU. By moving towards BRICS, Turkish membership in NATO and the EU could be void or under immense pressure. Theoretically, it would be the first NATO member to join an economic, political, and potentially military block led by China and Russia. Still, the move should not be surprising, as Erdogan’s main geopolitical views are much closer to BRICS. In the eyes of the Turkish leadership, BRICS could be seen as mitigating any constraints put in the way by NATO and the EU. At the same time, supporting its perceived strategic autonomy is also an option. The coming months or years will show if Erdogan wants to push this option or tries to barter new deals for Turkey only.
Western powers should, however, not take the latter lightly. Already, Turkey is going its own way about Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and even Russia. Until now, the NATO member has kept to all its obligations; however, it has become a significant wildcard. Setting up a future without Turkey should be discussed and assessed, especially to counter potential repercussions in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and the Middle East. A soft response from European leaders or the Trump Administration will only give Erdogan more reasons to pursue his dreams.