Delfina ERTANOWSKA^

“I do not think that Russia will ever become a reliable partner in the eyes of the rest of the world again. On the contrary, one could say that Putin destroyed the future of Russia with this war. We, on the other hand, have to get used to the idea that we live next to a terrorist pariah state and we must stay alert at all times… I do not know whether, if at all, the time will come when the Russian people will ask themselves and their leaders, “Why did we need this war?” Does Russia not have enough land, are they suffering from a lack of natural resources, or what the hell did they hope to achieve with this attack? Only the Russians themselves can answer this. All we can do is be better prepared while they try to ascertain those who are responsible”

Ingrida ŠIMONYTĖ – Lithuanian Prime Minister¹

Abstract. The article reviews the strategy in the Baltic sea area, in response to Russian military aggression against Ukraine. Strategies of the NATO alliance in the event of provocations and hybrid actions as well as a potential military threat to the eastern flank of the alliance were presented. Risks and Threats were also discussed, attention was paid to gaps and issues that should be improved.

Keywords: Baltic states, Baltic sea area, hybrid warfare, strategies, media and political propaganda

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia practically lost its military importance in the Baltic Sea area. The small access to the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad Oblast constitute a small percentage of the former influence from the times of the Warsaw Pact. The deteriorating, unmodernized Russian Baltic fleet, remnants of the Eastern Bloc era in the period from 1991 to the late 2000s, did not pose any threat to security in the Baltic Sea. Russia itself in the 1990s was also weak, corrupt, and engaged in many internal struggles. Unfortunately, NATO countries also weakened themselves and reduced their military spending and limited the combat capabilities of their armies, not seeing an external threat in Russia. Let us not forget, however, that even a weak Russia attacked its neighbors and launched armed aggression, as happened in Karabakh in 1990, where Russia motivated and supported Armenian forces to purge the Azerbaijani population, War in Abkhazia 1992-1993 – war between the rebellious republic and the Georgian state. A conflict that Russia openly supported with arms sales, and Russian troops personally occupied the city of Sukhumi.

The second version of the conflict occurred in 2008 and the Russian occupation of Abhazia and South Ossetia. A conflict whose scenario is very similar to that in Ukraine. The Transnistrian War 1991-92 in Moldova, and creation Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic PMR which they use to this day as a place for drug trafficking and human trafficking, but above all as a bridgehead for Russian troops. The Russian war against Ukraine in 2014 included the occupation of Crimea and the creation of the rebellious republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.

STRATEGIES

NATO’s expansion to Finland and Sweden strengthens stability in the region and increases tactical forces and capabilities. The Baltic Sea is becoming an internal NATO basin called “NATO Lake”, which significantly facilitates communication and carrying out “supposed” naval operations in this region.

Also moving significant forces to NATO’s eastern flank is a sensible move, including the permanent deployment of a German division in Lithuania², sends a clear signal to the terrorist state. The presence of the Bundeswehr is not only a psychological aspect but also a demonstration of the alliance’s actual commitment and increased forces in the Baltic Sea area.

Ministers of Defense in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also agreed in January to create a common Baltic defense zone on their borders with Russia and Belarus; consisting in creating a common defense line and a network of bunkers. According to the data provided by The Conversation Estonia will begin construction of 600 bunkers in early 2025. The nations will also cooperate in developing missile artillery, and ensuring that their equipment, ammunition and manpower is updated³.

Poland has committed to implementing the “Orka”⁴ which is based on the creation of an underwater defense line in the form of small submarines and underwater drones.

Finland’s presence in the North Atlantic Alliance will also help close the sky over the Baltic Sea if necessary.

An agreement was also signed on the construction of a joint air defense line using drones, the signatories of which were the Baltic countries and Poland.

The issue of the Suwałki corridor and the border between Poland and Lithuania with Belarus is also an important element. Joint maneuvers and exercises of both countries are taking place in this regard, and a lot of equipment and troops have been moved to this critical point. Another sensitive and dangerous phenomenon is the defense of the borders with Belarus, which is conducting a hybrid war against Poland and Lithuania. At this point there are more problems than solutions, such as the death of a Polish soldier murdered by one of the emigrants.

RISKS AND THREATS

As already mentioned, the Suwałki corridor is one of NATO’s key problems, although procedures to strengthen this tactical point are underway. However, the balance of forces and the real threat are high. If the alliance fails, it would cut off the Baltic countries from land access to Europe, and would also make it easier for Russia to move forces to the Kaliningrad Oblast and transport weapons.

Hybrid warfare
on the border between Poland and Lithuania versus Belarus

The migration crisis, of which Belarus is one of the main sponsors, is also leading to the radicalization of Europeans on a scale not seen since World War II, societies are even becoming fascistic⁵, as Polish commentator B. Węglarczyk states.

Similarly, attempts to take over certain territories of these countries (e.g. Narva in Estonia) under the pretext of protecting the Russian civilian population; behind the scenario described at the beginning of the article that took place in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine. This would contribute to the expansion of Russian terrorists, the creation of so-called republics, which each time become a bridgehead and breeding ground for Russian extremism⁶ and are hubs with resources and weapons for the army of the Russian Federation.

Quoting sky news “UK and other allies were focused on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan – countering insurgents and Islamist militants is a very different type of fight than a conventional war against a peer enemy like Russia”⁷. This sheds new light on certain problems in the understanding of war and the type of warfare.

The process of violating the airspace of NATO members and maritime territories, harassing maritime and civilian ships, sabotage and espionage has been ongoing for some time⁸.

Disinformation, information warfare, cyber attacks, cyber criminality extensively discussed by me in other articles, is not weakening, but is gaining strength. They are trying to prepare the ground for hybrid sabotage activities in these countries. Poland and Estonia have recently been in the crosshairs of cyber criminality and hacking by Russia, leakage and theft of sensitive data in public and strategic institutions, as well as a form of paralysis of the work of both countries.

Elections to the European Parliament and the increase
in the participation of extreme right-wing and left-wing parties.

Some of whose representatives openly support Russia’s actions, are against helping Ukraine, cooperate with and are financially dependent on Russian institutions and business, and also constitute a potential threat to the alliance because they have a real influence on the provision of weapons and EU aid in the event of an armed conflict, silent saboteurs, allies of Putin and Dugin’s ideology.

Victor Orban’s Hungary and its foreign policy in the EU and NATO, a country that has no access to any sea, also plays an indirect role in creating potential instabilities in the Baltic Sea area. His open hatred towards Ukraine and “friendship” with Putin casts a shadow not only on the credibility of aid in the event of a potential conflict, but also on his political declarations that Hungarian troops will not take part in the fights against the Russians, we are talking about Ukraine for now (which has not yet is a NATO member), however, this raises reasonable suspicions about the lack and blocking of the alliance’s assistance and response in the event of an attack on one of the countries of the eastern flank.

References

1. Dura, M. (2023). Polish “Orka” Submarine Procurement Gains Weight (and Bids). Defence24. URL:
https://defence24.com/industry/polish-orka-submarine-procurement-gains-weight-and-bids

2. Haynes, D. (2024). Ukraine war: Why the Baltic states on NATO’s frontline with Russia are urging their allies to ‘wake up’. Sky news. URL:
https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332

3. Kuck, J. (2024). An Assessment of the Impact of the War in Ukraine on the Baltic States. Europe Now. URL:
https://www.europenowjournal.org/2024/02/15/an-assessment-of-the-impact-of-the-war-in-ukraine-on-the-baltic-states/

4. Lindstaedt, N. (2024). Ukraine war: Russia’s Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato. The Conversation. URL:
https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-baltic-neighbours-to-create-massive-border-defences-as-trump-continues-undermining-nato-225944

5. Pawlak, J. (2024). Charting the Challenges in the Baltic Sea. War on the rocks. Texas National Security Review. URL:
https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/charting-the-challenges-in-the-baltic-sea/

6. Triebel, B., Rank, H., Dmytrenko, D. “Justice in a Lawless Space”. Statehood. Between Fragility and Consolidation. International Reports, №3/2022

7. Veebel, V. (2023). Strategic Challenges for Baltic States in Dangerous Times. Journal on Baltic Security. URL:
https://journalonbalticsecurity.com/journal/JOBS/article/117/text

8. Węglarczyk, B. (2024). “Europa się faszyzuje z powodu kryzysu migracyjnego”. Lejb Fogelman przepowiada apokalipsę. Onet.pl. URL:
https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/opinie/ceniony-prawnik-ma-czarna-wizje-dla-ue-europa-sie-rozpadnie/w9kge95