Europe’s Security Dilemma The Limits of the Transition from American Protection to Strategic Independence 2016–2026

Prof. dr. Giuseppe Gagliano

President, Centro Studi Strategici Carlo De Cristoforis
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7304-8596

Abstract

The transformation of European security does not amount to a linear transition from American protection to strategic independence. Between 2016 and 2026, the European Union strengthened its instruments for military cooperation, financing and industrial support, while NATO retained its central role in collective defence. These processes developed simultaneously: greater European ambitions did not entail moving beyond the Atlantic Alliance.

This study examines that dynamic through a qualitative analysis of public European and transatlantic documents. Its interpretive framework combines neorealism and alliance theory, focusing on four dimensions: threat perceptions, dependence on the principal ally, the availability of military capabilities, and political and institutional integration.

The central argument is that Europe is primarily seeking to change the terms of its dependence. Attainable autonomy consists of the ability to assume greater responsibilities, control certain essential resources and preserve operational options when American support is limited or directed towards other priorities. Its achievement nevertheless depends on translating economic resources and joint programmes into timely decisions, available forces and sustainable industrial capabilities.

Introduction

The fundamental question of European security concerns more than the amount of resources allocated to defence. It concerns the ability to decide how those resources should be used, for what purposes and with what degree of dependence on external actors.

A group of states can substantially increase its military budgets without acquiring a corresponding degree of autonomy. This occurs when procurement remains fragmented, decisive capabilities depend on the principal ally, or the political agreement required to employ available forces is absent. The distinction between expenditure, capability and freedom of decision is the starting point of this research.

The central research question is therefore: under what conditions do European security investments reduce dependence on the United States, and under what circumstances do they merely change the distribution of its costs?

Three complementary questions follow. Does a shared threat necessarily generate European integration? Can industrial cooperation precede and encourage political cooperation? Does a greater European contribution to NATO strengthen allies’ freedom of choice, or consolidate a strategic structure still centred on American capabilities?

The period examined begins in 2016, the year of the EU Global Strategy, and includes the 2026 documents consulted. The end date does not imply an assessment of an already completed calendar year.

The method is an explanatory case study based on comparative reading of strategic documents and the reconstruction of major decision-making sequences. The analysis distinguishes between statements of intent, adopted instruments and publicly documented operational results. It does not employ interviews, classified information or comprehensive quantitative coding of the document corpus. Its conclusions therefore concern observable trends rather than an exhaustive measurement of European military readiness.

The study’s interpretive contribution is to treat autonomy as a variable relationship. Europe can become more autonomous in certain areas, remain dependent in others and deliberately accept particular interdependencies.

1 The Theoretical and Historical Foundations of European Security

1.1 The Security Dilemma and Alliance Dependency

From a neorealist perspective, states operate in a system without a higher authority capable of reliably guaranteeing their security. They must therefore rely on their own resources or build alliances.

Both options carry costs. Strengthening national capabilities requires investment and can increase the insecurity of others. Reliance on an ally enables burden-sharing but creates a vulnerability: the protector’s priorities may diverge from those of the protected state.

The security dilemma describes the process through which measures conceived as defensive can be interpreted by other actors as offensive preparations. It does not mean that all perceptions are equally well founded or that aggressor and victim bear equivalent responsibility. Rather, it highlights a problem of interpretation and uncertainty management that persists even when clearly identifiable violations have occurred.

Alliance theory adds two risks: abandonment and entrapment. In the first case, a state fears that its ally will fail to intervene when needed. In the second, it fears being drawn into a crisis that does not serve its interests.

For Europeans, these concerns can coexist. American protection appears valuable in the face of an immediate threat; at the same time, the concentration of essential capabilities in Washington’s hands limits available alternatives.

A paradox follows: the more urgently a state perceives a danger, the more it may prefer an already credible guarantee to the construction of an autonomy that remains incomplete. An intensifying threat does not therefore necessarily produce emancipation from the dominant ally.

1.2 NATO and the US Security Umbrella

NATO has provided its European members with a collective defence structure in which the American contribution has played a central role. This centrality concerns not only deployed forces but also the combination of deterrence, planning, reinforcement capacity and strategic resources.

The nuclear dimension makes this asymmetry particularly evident. NATO identifies its strategic nuclear forces, especially those of the United States, as the ultimate guarantee of allied security. It also recognises the contribution of the independent British and French forces and their separate centres of decision-making. The existence of multiple arsenals does not, however, amount to a European Union nuclear deterrent.

It is also necessary to distinguish three entities that are frequently conflated: geographical Europe, the European Union and NATO’s European component. They do not include the same states and do not possess identical powers.

The United Kingdom, for example, remains essential to any assessment of continental security despite no longer belonging to the Union. France possesses national nuclear capabilities, but their European character does not entail shared control by EU institutions.

The Alliance’s historical legacy also involves path dependence. Training, weapons systems, infrastructure and procedures are designed to operate together. Changing them takes time and can generate transitional costs. Autonomy cannot therefore be assessed solely by comparing Europe’s economic output with that of the United States.

2 Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

2.1 Changing Threat Perceptions and Transatlantic Relations

The 2016 Global Strategy helped establish strategic autonomy within the Union’s political vocabulary. In subsequent institutional explanations, the concept means the ability to act autonomously when necessary and with partners whenever possible. This formulation does not presuppose a break with the American alliance; it seeks to expand European options.

The subsequent sequence nevertheless shows that this ambition faces two distinct pressures. The first is the deterioration of the threat environment in Europe’s neighbourhood. The second is the possibility that the United States may give greater priority to other strategic interests.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the centrality of territorial defence. NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted that year, identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security. The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration confirms this approach and underlines the strengthening of the Alliance through Finland’s and Sweden’s accession.

The European response thus exhibits a dual movement: greater interest in capabilities of its own alongside the consolidation of NATO. The accession of new members illustrates the attraction of an existing guarantee when security appears endangered.

On the American side, the 2022 National Defense Strategy distinguished between China, the principal reference point for long-term strategic competition, and Russia, an immediate and acute threat. This distinction already demonstrated that US priorities could not be confined to Europe’s defence.

In 2026, an official statement by US European Command announced an adjustment of the American contribution to the NATO Force Model, linking it to the objective of giving Europeans primary responsibility for their conventional defence. This is a concrete indication of rebalancing, without automatically amounting to the termination of the Atlantic security guarantee.

The analytical implication is important: American demands for greater European responsibility may create room for autonomy, but they can also impose new burdens before Europeans have closed their capability gaps.

2.2 The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policies

European integration proceeds through instruments with different functions. Permanent Structured Cooperation, established in December 2017, organises commitments and joint projects among participating states. It does not automatically transfer control over their forces to a European authority.

The 2022 Strategic Compass introduces an operational vision organised around acting, securing, investing and partnering. Its objectives include a rapid deployment capacity of up to 5,000 troops. The document reiterates complementarity with NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for those states that belong to it.

The institutional progress account published in 2026 states that this capacity became operational in May 2025 and describes advances in exercises, resilience and cooperation. These developments indicate a real strengthening of European instruments, but they do not establish the availability of a structure equivalent to that required to sustain a prolonged continental war autonomously.

The distinction is between crisis management and large-scale territorial defence. A limited capability can be useful for evacuations, stabilisation or bounded interventions. Defence against an adversary with substantial forces and advanced capabilities instead requires sustained logistics, reserves, infrastructure protection and combat systems on a different scale.

European integration is therefore not static. It is selective: it advances more readily in cooperation, incentives and supporting instruments than in the transfer of political authority over the use of force.

3 The Limits of Europe’s Strategic Independence

3.1 Military and Technological Dependence

An armed force is not simply an inventory of platforms. It is a chain of functions: understanding the situation, deciding, communicating, striking, protecting itself, resupplying and restoring lost capabilities.

Autonomy must therefore be assessed across the whole chain. Possession of aircraft or ground vehicles is insufficient if ammunition, maintenance, timely information or protected communications are unavailable. A shortfall in one essential function can limit the usefulness of all the others.

European defence readiness documents recognise capability gaps and the need to strengthen production, stockpiles, mobility and cooperation. In June 2026, the European Council identified priorities including counter-drone systems, early warning, air defence, deep precision strike and space assets. The inclusion of these priorities does not by itself measure the extent of each shortfall, but it identifies areas where governments themselves consider faster progress necessary.

Technological dependence may also persist throughout a system’s lifecycle. Upgrades, spare parts, weapons integration and authorisations can affect the timing and cost of deployment. This does not automatically make foreign procurement inappropriate. It does require assessing the overall strategic cost in addition to the initial purchase price.

Nuclear deterrence is a separate problem. Expanding European responsibility for conventional defence does not settle the question of who guarantees a response to extreme forms of coercion. Credibility depends on the political interest in intervening and on the adversary’s perception, not merely on the material possession of an arsenal.

3.2 Political and Institutional Divisions

Political constraints frequently precede technical ones. Joint employment of military capabilities requires agreement on the threat, objectives, acceptable risks and conditions for ending an operation.

Geography shapes these assessments. A state more exposed on the eastern flank may prioritise territorial defence; another may concentrate on maritime security or instability in the southern neighbourhood. Such differences do not make a common strategy impossible, but they require compromises over resource allocation.

Confidence in the American ally can also vary. For some governments, a bilateral relationship with Washington appears to provide a more immediate guarantee than a European agreement that has yet to be built. This preference does not necessarily reflect a lack of solidarity: it may express an assessment of risk and urgency.

Institutionally, Common Security and Defence Policy decisions are generally adopted unanimously, with limited exceptions. This rule protects states in a central area of sovereignty, but it can make action more difficult when interests diverge.

The problem is not confined to voting procedures. Even faster authorisation would be insufficient if states failed to provide forces, resources and political backing. Credible autonomy requires prior commitments, accountability mechanisms and democratic consent.

Coalitions of willing states can overcome some obstacles. They enable action without waiting for every participant, but they do not necessarily constitute a policy of the Union as a whole. They can generate useful capabilities while also widening differences between groups of countries.

3.3 Defence Industry and Economic Capacity Issues

Europe possesses substantial economic resources and industrial expertise. The challenge is to convert them into coordinated production that is available when needed and sustainable during a crisis.

The 2024 European Defence Industrial Strategy reports that, between the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion and June 2023, 78% of the acquisitions considered came from suppliers outside the EU, with the United States accounting for 63% of the total. This figure refers to a specific period marked by urgency. It should not be extrapolated automatically to Europe’s entire military inventory or to all subsequent purchases.

The finding nevertheless illustrates a plausible mechanism. When needs are immediate, states prioritise systems already available. Such choices can improve defence rapidly while consolidating supply relationships that may last for decades.

For 2030, the industrial strategy proposes targets for more collaborative procurement and greater use of European production. These are policy objectives, not outcomes already achieved.

The difficulty is not purely financial. States protect national employment, expertise and companies; they request different specifications for similar equipment and may change quantities and schedules. These practices reduce demand predictability and obstruct economies of scale.

The European defence readiness package presented in 2025 requires the same careful reading. The figure of approximately €800 billion represents potential mobilisation, contingent in part on national decisions. It is not a single European fund that has already been appropriated. SAFE provides for up to €150 billion in loans to support member states’ investment, with particular emphasis on common procurement. Loans, fiscal space and grants are not equivalent instruments.

From a geoeconomic perspective, defence expenditure can strengthen expertise and productive capacity, or increase imports and dependence on foreign maintenance. The outcome depends on where investment goes, the terms of contracts and the continuity of orders.

4 The Future of European Security Independence or the Transformation of Dependence

4.1 The Future of NATO–EU Relations

Relations between NATO and the European Union need not be understood as competition between organisations destined to replace one another.

NATO provides the principal collective defence framework for its members. The EU can contribute through financing, industrial support, infrastructure, economic resilience and political cooperation. Complementarity produces results when the capabilities developed address coherent requirements and can actually be deployed.

The June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague established a commitment to invest 5% of GDP by 2035, divided between at least 3.5% for core defence requirements and up to 1.5% for broader security and resilience investment. The target therefore does not relate entirely to weapons purchases.

Such an increase could support a stronger European pillar. It does not, on its own, guarantee greater decision-making autonomy. If investment finances disconnected national capabilities and leaves essential strategic functions unresolved, Europe could bear a larger share of the costs without changing the structure of its dependence to a comparable degree.

The assessment should be operational: which activities will Europeans be able to perform without an indispensable American contribution? For how long? With what stocks and under what political authority?

4.2 Europe’s Potential for Strategic Autonomy

Autonomy can be divided into four dimensions.

Dimension	Assessment criterion
Decision-making	Ability to define objectives and authorise action in time
Operational	Ability to conduct and sustain particular missions
Industrial and technological	Control over supplies and functions considered essential
Strategic	Ability to preserve alternatives when allies’ priorities diverge

These dimensions do not necessarily advance together. A competitive industry can coexist with an inability to agree on the use of force. Equally, common decisions may be taken without sufficient resources to implement them.

Three scenarios help interpret future developments. They are analytical possibilities, not certain predictions.

First scenario — Greater European responsibility within NATO. European states strengthen conventional defence while certain American guarantees and capabilities remain central. Autonomy grows selectively, particularly in managing regional requirements. The risk is that the transfer of burdens proceeds faster than the availability of the means to carry them.

Second scenario — Fragmentation under pressure. States raise expenditure but procure separately, protect their own industries and rely on bilateral relationships. Aggregate capabilities improve, yet their joint usability remains limited. A crisis may consequently make American coordination indispensable once again.

Third scenario — Deeper selective integration. A group of states shares supporting capabilities, stockpiles, maintenance, training and planning for agreed missions. A federal army does not necessarily emerge, but the ability to act through stable commitments grows. The challenge becomes connecting this group to the rest of the Union and avoiding a permanent divide between participants and non-participants.

The most realistic path towards greater autonomy probably runs through less visible but decisive capabilities: transport, communications, air defence, ammunition, maintenance, infrastructure and reserve production capacity. Their importance lies in making other military instruments usable.

Conclusion

The analysis of documents covering 2016–2026 suggests that European security is undergoing a redistribution of responsibilities rather than a replacement of the Atlantic architecture.

The first conclusion is that a shared threat can simultaneously produce European integration and reinforce dependence on the principal ally. Urgency favours recourse to existing capabilities; building autonomy takes longer.

The second is that increased expenditure is useful but insufficient. Its effect depends on procurement coherence, industrial availability, control of strategic functions and the ability to sustain force employment.

The third concerns institutions. Europe cannot become a strategic actor merely by adding national budgets together. Shared priorities, workable procedures, democratic accountability and credible commitments to provide capabilities are necessary.

The fourth is that autonomy and alliance are compatible. The transatlantic relationship can become less asymmetrical if Europeans acquire concrete options. A broader distribution of costs, however, does not automatically entail a broader distribution of authority.

The hypothesis most consistent with the evidence consulted is therefore partial and differentiated autonomy: greater European conventional responsibility, growing industrial cooperation and persistent dependencies in strategic areas. Success will be measured by the ability to address a crisis even when Washington has other priorities, rather than by departure from NATO.