Dr. Vasile Simileanu
Abstract: The relationship between the Global South and the Collective North is not one of absolute opposition. Many states in the Global South maintain dense economic and security ties with the West, while BRICS and the SCO are not anti-NATO military alliances. Rather, they function as platforms for hedging and for negotiating a more balanced multipolarity. Critics in the Collective North view these developments as an erosion of the liberal order; advocates in the South perceive them as a correction of historical asymmetries. The truth likely lies somewhere in between: a slow, contradictory process of redistributing influence, in which the “wind of change” is blowing, yet has not yet become a storm.
Keywords: Global South, Collective North, BRICS+, SCO, China, United States, multipolarity, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Xi Jinping, Donald Trump, international order.
The title “The Wind of Change?” should not be understood as a definitive assertion, but as a geopolitical rhetorical question. Is the world changing, or is power merely being redistributed within the same architecture?
This question matters because, over recent decades, the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Western technological superiority, and the capacity for military projection have constituted major components of that structure.
The challenge of 2026 consists in the condensation of trends that have been taking shape for more than a decade. The SCO Summit in Bishkek, the BRICS+ Summit in New Delhi, the signing of the Mecca Defence Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the scheduled meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are unfolding against the backdrop of the consolidation of alternative financial institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These events are not isolated. They form part of a broader dynamic of power redistribution between what has come to be called the Collective North — the ensemble of institutions, alliances and norms historically dominated by the United States and its Western allies — and the Global South, a heterogeneous constellation of emerging, developing and non-Western states seeking autonomy, representation and institutional alternatives.
This competition is not a direct military conflict, but a structural rivalry across multiple registers: institutional, financial, technological, regional security and normative discourse. The period 2026–2040 will be decisive in determining whether this rivalry stabilises into a negotiated multipolar system or degenerates into a conflictual fragmentation of the international order.
At present, however, several processes are unfolding simultaneously:
• the consolidation of BRICS and its expansion to new members and partners;
• the transformation of the SCO and BRICS+ into expanded political, economic and security platforms;
• the growth of Turkey’s strategic autonomy in Central Asia, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean;
• the affirmation of Saudi Arabia as a regional actor with global ambitions;
• the repositioning of Pakistan between China, the Islamic world and the West;
• the intensification of cooperation between China, the states of the Middle East, Asia and Africa;
• the development of alternative financial, commercial and technological mechanisms;
• the competition for infrastructure, energy, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and data.
Consequently, what is changing is not necessarily the existence of a “centre of power,” but the number of centres capable of influencing the world system.
In this sense, the contemporary world increasingly resembles less a pyramid and more a network of dynamic networks.
Power is distributed among: the United States – China – the European Union – the CIS – India – the Gulf states – Turkey – Japan – South Korea – Brazil – Indonesia – Iran – South Africa, as well as among numerous regional actors and multilateral organisations.
Traditional geopolitics viewed power primarily through the prism of territory. Whoever controlled a territory, a border, a sea, a port or a strategic point held a geopolitical advantage. From Mackinder and the Heartland to Spykman and the Rimland, geographical space constituted the principal explanatory variable.
This transformation can be described through the concept of the reticular geometry of power. The reticular geometry of power represents the distribution, connection and circulation of geopolitical capacities through a network of centres, nodes, corridors and peripheries, in which power results not only from the resources held, but also from the capacity to control the connections between resources, markets, technologies, information and infrastructures.
Applied to the relationship between the Collective North and the Global South, the reticular geometry shows that the two spaces do not form two opposed and homogeneous blocs, but two ensembles of interconnected nodes, with differing degrees of density, centrality and autonomy. Power no longer circulates exclusively from the centre to the periphery. It circulates through:
• commercial corridors;
• energy infrastructures;
• ports;
• straits;
• financial networks;
• supply chains;
• digital platforms;
• data infrastructures;
• artificial intelligence technologies;
• military alliances;
• flexible partnerships.
From this perspective, the SCO and BRICS+ are important not only because of the number of participating states. Their significance lies in the fact that the two organisations penetrate the global power network through alternative nodes.
The Collective North remains dominant militarily (NATO, bilateral alliances), financially (the dollar, the Bretton Woods institutions) and technologically (standards, frontier innovation, control over strategic value chains). Nevertheless, its capacity to unilaterally impose the rules of the game has eroded. Multiple crises — the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East, the fragmentation of supply chains and technological rivalry — have accelerated the search for alternatives.
The Collective North still maintains a high density of internal linkages and systemic centrality through:
• Central nodes: the United States (the dollar, capital markets, frontier technology, military alliances), the Bretton Woods institutions, NATO, the G7.
• Dense linkages: integrated financial markets, common technological standards, security alliances with collective defence clauses, data and innovation flows.
• Reticular advantage: control over “switching nodes” — the reserve currency, credit ratings, sanctions regimes, artificial intelligence and semiconductor standards. Whoever controls these nodes can influence the connection costs of all others.
Nevertheless, the Northern network displays vulnerabilities: dependence on external supply chains, the erosion of internal consensus, and the rising costs of maintaining centrality (sanctions, export controls, technological rivalry).
The concept of the “collective North” must be used with caution. The United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Canada do not form a completely homogeneous bloc. There are commercial, energy, technological and even geopolitical differences among them.
Yet a common infrastructure exists:
• financial institutions;
• military alliances;
• technological standards;
• supply chains;
• intelligence cooperation;
• political and economic institutions built after 1945.
This infrastructure continues to represent one of the principal sources of Western power.
At the same time, the rise of BRICS+, the SCO and new regional alliances indicates the emergence of alternative centres of coordination.
The Global South does not form a homogeneous network. It is an ensemble of sub-networks with differing densities and centralities.
• Emerging nodes of centrality: China (industrial capacity, infrastructure, AIIB, connectivity initiatives), India (demographics, digital technology, strategic positioning), the Gulf states (energy, sovereign capital), Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey.
• Linking institutions: BRICS+, SCO, NDB, AIIB, regional alliances (the Mecca Agreement, African mechanisms, ASEAN+). These function as “hubs” that increase the density of South–South linkages.
• Linkages in formation: local-currency financing, interregional infrastructure projects, alternative payment platforms, South–South technology transfer, common discourses on multipolarity and sovereignty.
The particularity of the Southern network is its heterogeneity. The interests of China, India, Saudi Arabia and many African states do not fully coincide. Consequently, the network is less dense and less hierarchical than that of the North, yet more flexible and harder to sanction as a unit.
The Global South responds through three types of instruments:
• New-type multilateral institutions: the SCO and BRICS+ function as platforms for coordination and for legitimising a multipolar discourse. They are not strict military alliances, but spaces for negotiating interests and constructing a collective identity.
• Alternative financial mechanisms: the NDB, although still modest in volume (approximately USD 43–44 billion approved), represents a South–South financing experiment, with an emphasis on local currencies and the absence of strict political conditionality. The AIIB, larger and more professionalised, shows that Asia-led institutions can attract capital and compete with traditional banks, even while adopting many of their practices.
• Regional security alliances: the Mecca Agreement (Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan) introduces a collective defence clause among three Muslim powers with distinct military, energy and nuclear resources. It signals that states of the Global South are diversifying security guarantees beyond the American umbrella. The Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan agreement must also be analysed through the lens of a broader trend: the regionalisation of security.
In previous decades, the security of the Middle East and South Asia was strongly connected to the American presence and guarantees.
The new reality is more complex. Regional states are developing:
• their own military capabilities;
• national defence industries;
• regional agreements;
• simultaneous relations with China, Russia, the United States and Europe;
• security mechanisms that do not depend exclusively on Western alliances.
This does not mean the disappearance of the United States from the region; on the contrary, its importance remains substantial, but the external strategic monopoly over regional security is becoming more difficult to maintain.
The Xi–Trump meeting of September 2026 illustrates the global tension: bilateral dialogue remains indispensable for stability, yet it unfolds against the backdrop of a gradual erosion of the North Atlantic monopoly over global governance. It is in this context that the forthcoming meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump must be understood.
The summit is scheduled for Washington on 24 September 2026 and takes place at a moment when China is seeking to consolidate cooperation within the Global South, while the United States is attempting to preserve its central role in the international economy, technology and security. Preliminary negotiations focus on tariffs, critical minerals, trade, artificial intelligence and bilateral economic relations.
Apparently, it is a bilateral meeting. In reality, the implications are far broader. Xi does not come to Washington solely as the president of China. China presents itself simultaneously as:
• an Asian power;
• a global economic power;
• a technological actor;
• the world’s principal manufacturing economy;
• a central member of BRICS;
• a central actor in the SCO;
• a strategic partner for a significant part of the Global South.
Therefore, the Xi–Trump dialogue can be viewed as a meeting between two models of organising power.
The meeting concerns the capacity of the two major powers to influence the rules of a world that is becoming less controllable by a single centre.
Scenarios regarding the US–China relationship
• Scenario I – Controlled competition
The United States and China accept that rivalry cannot be eliminated but must be managed. The following are maintained:
• trade;
• diplomatic dialogue;
• limited cooperation on AI;
• military contacts;
• negotiations on critical minerals.
In this scenario, BRICS+ and the SCO continue to grow, but do not become anti-Western alliances. The world evolves towards competitive multipolarity.
• Scenario II – Strategic fragmentation
US–China rivalry expands into:
• AI;
• semiconductors;
• cloud;
• critical minerals;
• infrastructure;
• finance;
• trade;
• space.
BRICS+ develops alternative financial and commercial systems.
The SCO expands its economic and security cooperation.
The Gulf states, India, Turkey and other intermediate powers attempt to avoid choosing a single camp.
The result would be a world with several parallel geopolitical ecosystems.
• Scenario III – Reconfiguration of the world order
The deepest scenario does not presuppose the victory of the South over the North or vice versa. It presupposes the emergence of a world in which: Washington, Beijing, Brussels, New Delhi, Moscow, Riyadh, Ankara and other capitals become interdependent nodes of the same global network.
In this variant, organisations such as BRICS+ and the SCO do not replace Western institutions. They compel them to negotiate more. This may constitute the true structural transformation.
At the same time, for the period 2026–2040 the following regional and global impact manifestations may be expected:
a) Fragmentation and pluralisation of the financial architecture
By 2040, a consolidation of parallel financial systems is probable. The NDB and AIIB will continue to grow, but their pace and impact will depend on the capacity to mobilise private capital and to increase the share of local currencies. If BRICS succeeds in scaling the NDB and developing alternative settlement mechanisms, the dollar dependence of emerging economies will gradually diminish without disappearing. The most plausible outcome is not a “dollar collapse,” but a world with multiple reserve and invoicing currencies (the dollar, the yuan, the euro, and possibly a digital currency or a BRICS basket).
This pluralisation will reduce the unilateral pressure instruments of the collective North (financial sanctions), yet it will increase the risks of market fragmentation and of inefficiency in the global system.
b) Reconfiguration of regional security
Alliances of the Mecca type may proliferate, because formats with fewer state actors are flexible and yield results in a short time. In this sense, states in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia will seek security arrangements that do not force them to choose definitively between Washington and Beijing. The SCO may evolve towards a more substantial Eurasian security role, while BRICS+ will remain predominantly economic and diplomatic.
The Collective North will respond by consolidating existing alliances (NATO, AUKUS, QUAD) and by efforts to attract “swing” states from the Global South. Competition for partnerships in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia will intensify. The major risk is the emergence of clearer spheres of influence, with conflictual intersection zones (the South China Sea, the Middle East, the post-Soviet space).
c) Technology and standards as a field of rivalry
By 2040, control over artificial intelligence, semiconductors, green energy and digital infrastructure will become a central determinant of power. The Global South, particularly China, India and certain Gulf states, will attempt to reduce dependence on Western technologies and to promote alternative standards. The Collective North will seek to maintain technological superiority through export controls, industrial alliances and regulation.
The probable outcome is a partial dualisation of technological ecosystems, with interoperability costs and risks of a “splinternet” and of fragmentation of strategic supply chains.
d) Normative discourse and the legitimation of order
The competition is not only material, but also ideological. The Collective North will continue to promote a rules-based order, human rights and liberal multilateralism. The Global South will emphasise sovereignty, non-interference, development and more equitable representation in global institutions. BRICS+ and the SCO will function as platforms for the production of alternative discourse.
By 2040, a total victory of one discourse over the other is unlikely. More plausible is a tense coexistence of multiple sets of norms, with zones of consensus (climate, global health, trade) and zones of deep conflict (sovereignty, rights, security).
For the analysed period (2026–2040), we forecast the following scenarios:
• Scenario 1 – Negotiated multipolarity (medium-to-high probability)
The North and the South succeed in maintaining channels of dialogue and in partially reforming existing institutions. The NDB and AIIB grow, yet cooperate with traditional banks. Regional security alliances remain limited and non-antagonistic. Technological rivalry is managed through arms-control agreements and common standards. The system remains conflictual, yet functional.
• Scenario 2 – Locked fragmentation (medium probability)
Competition intensifies. Relatively closed economic and technological blocs form. Sanctions and export controls proliferate. Rival security alliances consolidate. Global institutions (the UN, WTO, IMF) lose relevance. The world divides into spheres of influence with reduced interdependence.
• Scenario 3 – Asymmetric realignment (lower but possible probability)
The Collective North succeeds in attracting a significant part of the Global South through superior economic and security offers, limiting the rise of alternative institutions. Alternatively, the Global South (under Chinese and Indian leadership) achieves a more rapid consolidation of its own instruments, significantly eroding the position of the North.
Strategic implications:
• For the Collective North, the principal challenge is adaptation: accepting a relative multipolarity without renouncing structural advantages. Rigidity may accelerate fragmentation.
• For the Global South, the challenge is coherence. Internal diversity (divergent interests among China, India, the Gulf states, Africa and Latin America) limits the capacity for collective action. Without institutional consolidation and without an increase in financing and innovation capacity, the multipolar discourse remains largely aspirational.
• For “swing” states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, etc.), the period 2026–2040 offers a window of maximum autonomy. The capacity to navigate among centres of power without definitive alignment will determine their relative position.
For Romania and the European Union, this transformation has direct importance.
Romania lies at the intersection of several spaces (the Tricontinental Zone, about which analyses have been conducted since 2003): the EU – NATO – the Black Sea – the Balkans – Ukraine – the Caucasus – the Middle East.
In a world in which power becomes reticular, geographical advantage can be transformed into strategic advantage only through infrastructure:
• ports;
• transport corridors;
• energy;
• digitalisation;
• military infrastructure;
• connectivity with the Black Sea;
• relations with Turkey;
• relations with Central and Eastern Europe.
In this sense, Romania cannot view the transformation of the Global South merely as a distant problem. It directly affects:
• energy security;
• trade;
• infrastructure;
• Black Sea security;
• relations with Turkey;
• policy towards the Middle East;
• the transatlantic relationship;
• the EU’s positioning towards China and India.
Conclusion
The competition between the Collective North and the Global South is not a zero-sum game, nor is it a cooperative one. It is a structural rivalry that is gradually reconfiguring the distribution of power, of legitimacy and of the instruments of global governance. The events of 2026 — from Bishkek and New Delhi to Mecca and Washington — show that the process is already under way.
By 2040, the world will almost certainly be more multipolar than today. The central question is not whether the Collective North will remain dominant, but to what extent it will succeed in integrating the rise of the Global South into a functional system, or whether it will choose confrontation that risks further fragmenting the international order. The answer will depend on the strategic choices of the principal actors over the next fifteen years.
Can the collective North retain its central position in a world in which the Global South is acquiring ever more centres of initiative, resources, technologies, alliances and negotiating capacities?
The answer will not be decided by a single summit.
It will be decided by the evolution of a multitude of relationships.
And herein lies the true significance of the “wind of change”: not the disappearance of the old order, but its transformation from an architecture dominated by a few centres into a reticular architecture in which power circulates through multiple nodes.
Perhaps the world of 2040 will be neither American, nor Chinese, nor “of the Global South.” It may be a world in which no one can any longer claim to hold alone the centre of the map.
And this is, probably, the most important geopolitical change of the early twenty-first century.
Bibliography:
1. Organizația pentru Cooperare de la Shanghai, documentele și rezultatele summitului de la Bișkek, 31 august–1 septembrie 2026.
2. BRICS 2026, Guvernul Indiei, documentele summitului de la New Delhi.
3. Reuters, privind summitul BRICS și declarația de la New Delhi, septembrie 2026.
4. Direcția de Comunicare a Președinției Turciei, Acordul de apărare comună Turcia–Arabia Saudită–Pakistan, 7 august 2026.
5. Guvernul Arabiei Saudite, Declarația Summitului de la Mecca pentru apărare comună, 7 august 2026.
6. Ministerul Apărării al Turciei, prima reuniune a Comitetului Politic și de Apărare Strategică, 31 august 2026.
7. Wesley Alexander Hill, SCO Summit Produces Surprising Winners, The Diplomat, 2026.
8. Ding Xiaoxing, SCO at 25: Empowering the Global South, promoting global governance, CGTN, 2026.
9. Al Jazeera Staff, BRICS summit 2026: What are the key takeaways?, Al Jazeera, 2026.
10. Atlantic Council experts, Why Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey just signed a defense pact, Atlantic Council, , 2026.
11. Jonathan A. Czin, What Trump Doesn’t Understand About Xi, The Atlantic, , 2026.
12. Reuters/AP/Financial Times, informații privind pregătirea întâlnirii Xi Jinping–Donald Trump din 24 septembrie 2026.