Maritime Security Forum
The testing of counter-UAS solutions in Constanța must be analysed in the context of the rapid evolution of unmanned aerial threats. Modified commercial drones, FPV systems, loitering munitions and low-cost autonomous platforms have demonstrated in Ukraine, the Red Sea and other theatres that they can produce disproportionate military and economic effects. For Romania, this development has direct implications: the Port of Constanța, offshore energy infrastructure, military facilities in Dobrogea and logistics routes to the eastern flank require layered, permanent protection that is interoperable with allied systems.
In this context, the comparison between the BlackTALON 982 Counter-UAS, developed by TCI International / SPX Communication Technologies, and the Sentinel Airborne Counter-UAS, developed by Alpine Eagle, is relevant because the two systems are based on different operational concepts. BlackTALON 982 is an integrated ground-based solution, utilising RF sensors, radar, electro-optics and radio-frequency jamming. Sentinel, by contrast, offers an air-to-air architecture, in which sensors and interceptors are mounted on UAS platforms, coordinated via software and edge AI.
| Public specifications – BlackTALON 982 Counter-UAS | ||
| Feature | Publicly available data | Operational relevance |
| Developer / Integration | TCI International and Enterprise Control Systems, part of SPX Technologies | Integration of RF sensors, radar, electro-optics, command and control, and RF jamming into a complete C-UAS solution |
| Primary role | Detection, localisation, identification, tracking and neutralisation via RF jamming | Suitable for the protection of military bases, airports, ports, critical infrastructure and government facilities |
| Architecture | Multi-sensor ground-based system, with active and passive components | Provides perimeter surveillance and the capability for multi-sensor confirmation prior to engagement |
| Frequency range | 20 MHz – 8 GHz, according to the SPX datasheet; some aggregator sources indicate variations in the range | Covers frequencies commonly used for command, telemetry, data links and navigation in commercial and tactical drones |
| Nominal detection range | Up to 10 km, depending on the environment and the target’s radar signature | Enables early warning around fixed or semi-mobile targets |
| RF pointing accuracy | Typically 2°–5°, depending on the antenna and environment | Supports threat direction finding and correlation with other sensors |
| Radar coverage | 360° azimuth | Highly relevant for the protection of perimeters such as ports, bases or depots |
| Electro-optical sensor | Elevation approximately -50° to +60°; maximum reported movement speed of 60° per second | Enables visual verification, video tracking and the reduction of false alarms |
| Jamming | Directional, multi-band and multi-channel RF jammer | Can disrupt C2, telemetry or navigation links, but effectiveness is reduced against autonomous or jamming-resistant drones |
| Deployment options | Fixed, mobile, transportable and, in certain configurations, portable | Allows adaptation to bases, ports, convoys, events or temporary targets |
| Public specifications – Sentinel Airborne Counter-UAS | ||
| Feature | Publicly available data | Operational relevance |
| Developer | Alpine Eagle, a European defence technology company | Offers a scalable, software-defined airborne C-UAS solution |
| Operational concept | An air-to-air network of airborne sensors and interceptors coordinated via Sentinel-OS | Shifts the detection and interception line further away from the protected target |
| Targeted threats | Small drones, micro-UAS, FPV and loitering munitions, particularly UAS in Groups 1 and 2 | Relevant for the protection of convoys, critical infrastructure, ports and border areas |
| Airborne radar | K-band radar, 24.45–24.65 GHz; 10 Hz update rate | Enables the tracking of small targets from an aerial position, with fewer obstacles than ground-based sensors |
| Radar field of view | Approximately 120° azimuth and 80° elevation | Provides sectoral coverage for aerial patrol and mobile surveillance |
| Detection range | Up to approximately 4 km against small drones; some specifications indicate 2.5 km direct and extended range in a network | Provides early warning at relevant tactical ranges |
| Engagement / interception range | Public sources mention interception or extended guidance capabilities of the order of 25–30 km, depending on configuration | Can support the distributed defence of areas larger than a single protected point |
| Airborne platform | Fixed-wing or multirotor VTOL configurations; some public data indicate a wingspan of 269 cm, an endurance of up to 2.5–3 hours and an extended operational range | Enables persistent patrol, mobility and coverage over complex terrain or infrastructure |
| Software and processing | Sentinel-OS, edge AI, sensor fusion and automatic classification | Reduces the operator’s workload and enables the coordination of multiple sensors and interceptors |
| Interoperability | Can be integrated with C2 systems, SHORAD, existing radars and standardised data exchange formats | The system’s value increases when integrated into a layered air defence architecture |
| Neutralisation | Air-to-air kinetic interception; some configurations may include direct impact or net capture | Provides a hard-kill alternative to jamming, useful against autonomous drones or those resistant to RF disruption |
| Testing and maturity | Featured in tests and evaluation programmes such as Project Vanaheim, as well as in contexts related to lessons learnt from the war in Ukraine | Indicates a focus on current threats, but performance depends on integration, rules of engagement, environment and industrial availability |
| Operational comparison – BlackTALON 982 vs. Sentinel | |||
| Criterion | BlackTALON 982 | Sentinel | Implication |
| Type of architecture | Ground-based, fixed/mobile, multi-sensor | Aerial, distributed, software-coordinated | The two solutions are complementary, not interchangeable |
| Main function | Detection, identification, tracking and RF jamming | Air-to-air detection, classification and kinetic interception | BlackTALON is useful for perimeter defence; Sentinel extends defence to a distance |
| Key advantage | 360° perimeter coverage and radar/RF/EO integration | Airborne line of sight, mobility and stand-off interception | A combined system can cover both the target approach and the early warning zone |
| Main limitation | Depends on the ground line of sight and the effectiveness of RF jamming | Depends on endurance, communications, UAS logistics and rules of engagement | C2 integration and redundancy are crucial for both |
| Type of neutralisation | Soft-kill via RF jamming | Hard-kill via airborne interceptors | Against autonomous drones, kinetic solutions are becoming more important |
| Relevance to Constanța | Protection of the port, bases, depots and fixed infrastructure | Aerial patrols, early warning and mobile protection of large areas | Port defence would require a combination of ground-based sensors, airborne sensors and a variety of effectors |
Prospects and implications
The first implication is that anti-drone defence can no longer be built around a single type of sensor or effector. Radio-controlled drones, autonomous drones, inertial navigation systems, FPV platforms and loitering munitions require a combination of RF detection, radar, electro-optics, artificial intelligence, jamming, kinetic interception and integrated command and control. From this perspective, BlackTALON 982 and Sentinel illustrate two complementary approaches: ground-based perimeter defence and mobile, airborne defence at a distance from the target.
The second implication concerns the Port of Constanța. In a crisis scenario, the port would simultaneously serve as commercial infrastructure, a logistics hub for allied support, a point of entry for fuel and equipment, and a potential target for reconnaissance or attack. Its protection cannot rely solely on patrols or conventional anti-aircraft systems. A layered architecture is required, comprising distributed sensors, fixed and mobile C-UAS systems, unmanned aerial patrols, electronic warfare, rapid identification procedures, and direct links to air and naval defence command-and-control centres.
The third implication concerns the Romanian Naval Forces. The drone threat is not only aerial, but also naval and informational: aerial drones can reconnoitre or strike ships in port, naval drones can attack port infrastructure, and inexpensive commercial systems can be used for surveillance, fire correction or defence testing. Therefore, C-UAS must be integrated with port protection, maritime surveillance, close-in air defence, mine countermeasures and cyber security.
In conclusion, the testing of systems such as BlackTALON 982 and Sentinel should not be viewed as a competition between two products, but as an indication of the direction in which critical infrastructure defence is evolving: sensor networks, automation, rapid response, multi-effector neutralisation and C2 integration. For Romania, the true value of these solutions will depend less on the isolated performance figures in the technical specifications and more on how they will be integrated with air defence, naval protection, port infrastructure and inter-agency response procedures.
Maritime Security Forum