PhD Professor Basile NEACSA

When, in 1989, the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe shook the world, putting an end once and for all to the dictates of the proletariat, one of the reasons why the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe sacrificed thousands of lives and endured the deprivation of their freedoms for nearly half a century was freedom of expression.

Beautiful, noble, uplifting, human.

Enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights – Article 10, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Article 11, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Article 19, at the beginning of the 21st century, freedom of expression is slowly but surely becoming a scarcity in the European Union. What is making this possible?

In 2018, the European Commission (EC) initiated and introduced a self-regulatory code, the “Code of Conduct on Disinformation” (CCD)¹, which provided a relatively flexible yet restrictive framework regarding press freedoms, particularly those of the digital press. Essentially, the CCD established the following objectives: eliminating financial incentives for those who spread disinformation (they are prohibited from advertising on the platform), transparency in political advertising (who pays for ads), reducing manipulative practices by online platforms (such as multiple accounts, fake identities, and bots that amplify information), and providing users with more effective tools to recognize, report, and understand disinformation (faster fact-checking).

This initial self-regulatory measure was justified by Russia’s occupation of Crimea, as well as the increasingly active role of artificial intelligence in our lives. The regulation was consolidated in November 2022 through a law, the Digital Services Act (DSA). The implementation timeline was set for 2024, with the law taking effect on July 1, 2025. Given the multitude of regulations in the media sector (27 regulations), which had roughly the same content across multiple administrative levels, it was decided that all these regulations, including the CCD, would be brought under the umbrella of the DSA.² (The integration of the CCD into the DSA was made in accordance with Article 45 of the DSA, approved by the European Commission and the European Council for Digital Services (EBDS)³ on February 13, 2025, effective July 1, 2025).

The only piece of legislation that had not been absorbed – the law defining the legal framework in this sphere – was the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

From all this legislative ballet that has unfolded over the years, we can see that initiating a process of self-regulation can lead to the enactment of a European law. But

there is another key thing to consider. In addition to being able to initiate legislation, the Commission is the only body that can adopt implementing measures under the delegated powers set forth in that act. In our case, after the initial proposal for the regulation was introduced, the DSA drew in the major online platforms (Facebook, Google, Mozilla, Twitter, TikTok), the advertising industry, and professional associations, as well as civil society actors, to endorse and sign the act. But since implementing measures fall solely within the EC’s jurisdiction, the initial draft text underwent substantial changes along the way under the Commission’s authority. Even though online platforms, the advertising industry, and part of civil society no longer agreed with it, they could no longer retract their support. This was all the more true since the DSA had become European law in 2022 (online platforms and key players in the advertising industry had signed the agreement between 2018 and 2020).

As a result, fines began to pile up (X, formerly Twitter, was fined 120 million euros), and companies were forced to make significant concessions if they wanted to remain active on the European market (as was the case with TikTok).

This strategy has been tested over time and has repeatedly yielded results, although to a lesser extent in terms of shaping the EU’s political strategy regarding the “Green Deal,” enshrined in the European Climate Law.

From an analysis of the legislative texts mentioned above, as well as those included in the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU”⁴ and the EMFA, we observe that freedom of expression is defined as “a right for all” .

In contrast, the DSA will introduce specific roles regarding access and procedures for certain “accredited” actors, but, in principle, it does not limit the general right to freedom of expression.

Hence the term “accreditation” emerges as a concept made available to the administrations of member states and the European Broadcasting Media Services Council (EBMS). This implicitly entails an evaluation process that results in some being accredited and others not, thereby restricting freedom of expression. And those who “accredit” – that is, those who verify claims made in the media – are either a state body or the EBMS, which in turn comprises entities structurally dependent on funding from the European Commission, as is the case, for example, with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN)⁵. Both organi-zations, as founding members of EBMS, count among their members Agency France-Presse (AFP) and Deutsche Presse-Agentur, some of the world’s leading “independent” news agencies. So those who grant accreditation – subsidized by the European Commis-sion – are at the same time competitors in the information market with the entities they accredit. Are we not facing a conflict of interest here?

The remaining accredited civil society organizations (applications for accreditation under the DSA may be submitted until July 10, 2026) are organizations:

• predominantly left-wing or far-left (HateAId in Germany, UNIA in Belgium, whose grant from the Belgian government was revoked on the grounds of irrational discourse);

• that play a marginal role in the communication process at the European level (Central Bank of Ireland);

• with controversial leaders (the “Elie Wiesel” National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania)⁶;

• niche organizations (the Jesuit Association for Refugees in Romania, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France…);

• that have close ties to the European Commission or have expressed (unwritten but tacit) support for a political party in a member state;

• public and private organizations with significant social impact, below 40% (International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, International Fund for Animal Welfare, Save the Children…).

In this tense and fairly confusing context, on January 9, 2026, Polish President Karol Nawrocki declined to sign the law requiring Poland to implement the DSA. He is the only prominent political figure in the EU who has had the courage to openly oppose it. Other European countries have delayed or failed to complete the process of transposing the law into national legislation before their national parliaments, without, however, categorically rejecting the DSA⁷.

The European Commission has now brought proceedings against these countries before the Court of Justice of the European Union due to delays or ineffective transpo-sition of the DSA into national law.

However, there are also countries that can serve as models for the European Commission in terms of implementing the DSA. For example, Romania, which transposed the DSA into national law in record time and even designated the National Authority for Administration and Regulation in the Field of Communications (ANCOM) to oversee and ensure the enforcement of the Digital Services Act at the national level. Recent events in 2024 pushed the country to rapidly adopt the DSA to ensure its legitimacy in the eyes of its own people, justifying the measures taken as “coming from Brussels.”

Currently facing a governance crisis – amid the rise of the opposition party AUR – the current government and the presidency in Bucharest are attempting to limit the public’s access to information through the DSA Law.

But the situation is beginning to spread across Europe and even to neighboring countries. Macron’s France is doing everything it can to prevent Marine Le Pen’s “National Rally” party from winning the next election; Merz’s Germany is concerned about the results of Alice Weidel’s “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) party, and Starmer’s England sees Nigel Farage’s Reform Party leading the polls.

The measures taken to halt the rise of these parties, both at the national and European levels, are, to say the least, controversial. Baseless legal proceedings are being initiated to eliminate opponents (which demonstrates that the state of the rule of law is in an advanced state of decay – France); funding to which these parties are legally entitled is being cut off (Germany, France), information is being censored and rallies are being canceled (Germany), and arrests are taking place on the grounds of spreading disinformation (England). Indeed, power is seized, not surrendered, but in these cases, the DSA is used as a tool to homogenize and steer the electorate in a certain direction.

In other words, the exchange of ideas will become increasingly poorer, and future society will be populated more and more by imbeciles – at least, that is how the EU of tomorrow is taking shape. Against the backdrop of these events, it should come as no surprise that the EU media will report on and debate only the laws adopted in Brussels; we will hear only the statements made at the ruling party’s “14^th Congress” – which will be attended by people brought in by bus from neighboring countries – and musical performances and rallies will be banned or permitted only if they perform the party anthem, while fines will multiply for media outlets that do not conform to the official line.

Against this overall picture, the only pessimistic note for European politics comes from outside the EU. The United States is the DSA’s main critic, with President D. Trump issuing statements threatening economic retaliation in response to European regulations in the digital sphere (Le Monde, March 9, 2025). Will the fearless American president succeed in domesticating the beast that devours ideas, known in Europe as “censorship”?

Wouldn’t it be wiser for the EU to strike a balance between freedom of expression and content that promotes hate, incites violence, or spreads misinformation?

The freedom of expression should be restricted only in accordance with rigorous standards and not controlled from Brussels. History has shown us that, more often than once, restrictions have had exactly the opposite effect of what was intended. I cannot recall a single moment in European history when Europeans tolerated ideological slavery and censorship for an extended period. Europe must remain a continent of freedoms, a global model, just as it strives to be in other areas it promotes (gender equality, social protection, workers’ rights, environmental protection…).

“I do not agree with what you have to say, but I’ll defend to death your right to say it”- Voltaire

July 7, 2026