With this new article I hope to explain to the readers – who access the ThinLine portal, as correctly as possible, about the politics of sarcasm and political sarcasm in the elaboration of development strategies and programs and investments in defense capabilities and capacities , both at the European and, especially, national level – with reference to hybrid Romania! The case is complex, nuanced and extremely relevant for the current security context, and what I intend to detail further comes as a complement to the previous documentation in reference to the SAFE projects – https://thinkline.ro/proiecte-si-oportunati-pentru-economia-romaneasca and the strategic concept of “ advanced deterrence ” – https://thinkline.ro/provocari-si-implicatii-pentru-romania .

Sarcasm is generally a form of harsh, biting, mocking, or caustic irony. It is said the opposite of what is intended, with the intention of criticizing, ridiculing, or undermining, often with a bitter or superior tone. It is a “double-edged sword”: it can be a tool of intelligent attack, but also of emotional defense or manipulation.

Political sarcasm involves the use of this tool in public discourse, debates, negotiations or strategic communication to attack opponents, discredit ideas, mobilize supporters or mask real interests. It functions as a type of social control, allowing a kind of indirect criticism, avoiding direct responsibility (through the well-known statement: “ I was joking ”) and testing reactions. Only very intelligent and skilled people can approach such behavior, but not to understand that this is the behavior of the so-called “smart guys”… that is something else entirely what I am writing about!

The politics of sarcasm (or “politics through sarcasm”) refers to the way in which sarcasm becomes a systematic tactic in the political game: a power tool for imposing group/party interests, especially when open debates are risky (e.g. national security, large budgets, international alliances, public policies, lack of vision or long-term and very long-term country strategies, etc.).

However, in the field of defense, where decisions involve billions of euros, sovereignty, lives and alliances (NATO, EU), sarcasm often serves to: discredit opposing priorities (e.g. “defense investments vs. health/education”); create a mask for group interests (lobbying for contracts, industrial influence); manipulate public opinion through disinformation or irony and even international negotiations (undermining “European strategic autonomy”, etc.).

I now try to explain how sarcasm – which appears in political battles for resources, influence and narratives, functions in the development of defense strategies and programs… The development of strategies ( e.g. Romania’s National Defense Strategy 2025-2030, NATO Strategic Concept 2022, EU initiatives such as SAFE ) involves multi-level actors: governments, parliaments, military, industry, think-tanks, allies. Specific to the sarcastic species, we also encounter typical mechanisms, such as: incongruity ( i.e. something is praised, such as: “excellent idea to give more money to a third party!”, to emphasize the opposite for an ignored national priority ); a masked ad personam attack (ridiculing a politician/opponent as “naive”, “vassal”, “alarmist” or “parlor pacifist”); defensive self-irony (“we are a regional power… but the defense budget is a joke” – an exposé to ask for more money ); ironic disinformation (used in hybrid campaigns, e.g. fake news about “military dictatorship” or “entry into war”). 

At the European level, sarcasm appears in speeches: Eastern European politicians ( including Romanians ) ironize the “Franco-German dreams” of an independent European army as naive in the face of the Russian threat, especially in debates about EU strategic autonomy vs. dependence on NATO/USA. Western Europeans can use the niche of sarcasm like ” alarmist Eastern Europeans who will spend money on tanks instead of a green deal “. Another example: demands for 5% GDP for defense (beyond 2%) vs. unfulfilled promises. Another example of sarcasm: ” Europe promises a lot, delivers little – trust problem ” (as in the post-Trump discussions).

In investment programs (e.g. EU SAFE funds for the defense industry): the lobby of large companies uses sarcasm to discredit competition – “American purchases mean new colonization”, and “local industry means inefficiency”.

At the national level, in Romania, as the main focus, sarcasm is a tool in such battles and has a tradition of cross-party consensus on defense (NATO, USA, Eastern Flank), but with tensions on budget allocations, corruption, local industry (ROMARM) vs. imports and social priorities.

We can also orient ourselves by three relevant examples of sarcastic constructions: in the field of budgets and investments : criticism of the increase in spending (over 2.5% of GDP) as being “on the backs of pensioners”, or government sarcasm: “Defense investments are an economic engine” (each euro brings 3 back), mocking the opposition as “irresponsible”; in the sphere of group/party interests : examples in procurement (scandals ref companies like Elbit Systems), sarcasm discredits rivals (“we are an American colony” vs. “false patriots who block modernization”). Politicians use this to protect industrial or regional lobbies; hybrid disinformation actions : sarcastic fake news is broadcast about “imminent war” or “military dictatorship” to undermine trust in defense programs.

Now I am trying to “draw up” a guide to know how to correctly perceive and navigate when the master’s or doctoral student will issue judgments as an analyst, citizen or decision-maker. First, the substance is separated from the tone : sarcasm often hides real interests (contracts, votes, hybrid Russian/Chinese influence) and you ask yourself: Who benefits? What data supports the statement? Second, the context is what matters , because in defense, consensus is strategic (Russia threat), so excessive sarcasm signals polarization or a hidden agenda. Third, the impact is evaluated , meaning it can mobilize (e.g. anti-corruption in strategy), but it erodes public trust and cohesion. The guide, in short, closes with the set of analysis tools : identify the target (opponent, ally, public); check the incongruity (what is said vs. what is done); follow patterns (repetition = systematic tactics); When developing strategies, avoid sarcasm in official documents (it destroys credibility).

Next, let’s see what it would be like to correctly perceive a threat – related to the previous discussion about sarcasm. Political sarcasm and hybrid disinformation go hand in hand, with ironic narratives like “Romania is an American colony”, “NATO is getting us into war”, “corruption is more dangerous than Russia” or conspiracy theories that often mask real interests.

Here are some keys to discernment: verify sources and patterns (coordinated repetition on social networks); analyze who the message is for ; distinguish legitimate criticism (e.g. real corruption issues) from deliberate amplification for destabilization; anticipate that media education and institutional transparency are essential defensive weapons.

Ideas for sarcasm: use it controlled in public communication to counter disinformation; promote data-based debates (investment efficiency, national capabilities, NATO/EU integration).

Romania is holding up relatively well thanks to the cross-party strategic consensus on foreign policy and pro-NATO positioning, but internal vulnerabilities (corruption, polarization, cyber skills) remain exploited.

Hybrid conflict will not suddenly stop – it is the “new normal” of geopolitical competition.

Hybrid warfare in Romania represents a major strategic threat, especially in the context of the country’s geographical position (NATO’s Eastern Flank, the Black Sea) and Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is a form of conflict that combines conventional military means with non-military ones (disinformation, cyber attacks, economic influence, sabotage, instrumentalization of migration, etc.) to destabilize a state without triggering an open war. Hybrid warfare involves an integrated, “full spectrum” approach inspired by the Gerasimov doctrine (Russia). The main goal: weakening social cohesion, trust in institutions, decision-making capacity and NATO/EU membership, without triggering Article 5.

Main components in the case of Romania: disinformation and information operations – manipulation of public opinion through social networks (TikTok, Telegram), anti-NATO, anti-EU narratives, conspiracies; cyber attacks – DDoS, phishing, scans of critical infrastructure; political and economic influence through indirect support of political actors, energy pressure, corruption; as well as other tools such as the instrumentalization of migration, sabotage, espionage .

Regarding a concrete situation, Romania (2024-2026) was the target of intense hybrid campaigns, culminating in the 2024 presidential election: over 85,000 cyber attacks targeting the electoral infrastructure; over 25,000 TikTok accounts (many activated suddenly) and thousands of Telegram channels propelled a marginal candidate, through manipulated algorithms; the authorities (President Nicușor Dan, the Prosecutor General’s Office, SRI, DNSC) explicitly spoke about a hybrid campaign, coordinated from Russia, with at least 34 documented attacks in 2024; the Constitutional Court of Romania annulled the first round of the elections, an unprecedented event in the EU.

In 2025-2026, a set of reports (GLOBSEC, DNSC) warn that Russian hybrid warfare will intensify. The President of Romania admitted that the national services initially did not have the necessary competence to counter the threat in time. 

Vulnerable areas: critical infrastructure (energy, government, banks) – Dozens of Russian attacks documented by DNSC in 2024-2025, including DDoS and daily scans; society – polarization, economic frustrations, perceived corruption, which are exploited to create “anti-system” narratives; Black Sea – Russian militarization, threats to navigation, offshore infrastructure.

Below are some elements of Romania’s institutional response: The National Defense Strategy 2025-2030 explicitly includes hybrid warfare as a major priority (along with corruption as an internal vulnerability), and the president announced a frontal approach; DNSC (National Cyber ​​Security Directorate) shows that it monitors and responds to millions of cyber events annually; through international cooperation at specific levels in NATO, the EU (EUvsDisinfo), the USA; Romania also benefits from expertise from the Baltic or Nordic states; persistent challenges materialized in a slow initial reaction, lack of a culture of resilience at the population level, residual dependencies.

Practical advice for Romania : in the context of the Eastern Flank, the Black Sea and massive investments (including European), it is necessary to recognize sarcasm as an indicator of hybrid vulnerability. A mature strategy minimizes manipulation through transparency, civilian defense expertise and public education.

Political sarcasm is inevitable in democracy – it reflects competition for power.

The key is discernment: laugh at it, but analyze the interests behind it!

Dr. Liviu Mihai Dănilă  has had a remarkable military career, starting with the Military High School and ending in 2017, with his transfer to the reserve, with the rank of Brigadier General. In addition to his military experience, he holds, among others, a PhD in Military Sciences and an MBA in Strategic Management. He also holds the diplomatic rank of Minister Counselor and has worked as a TAIEX expert of the European Commission, contributing to the development of the Union Mechanism for Integrated Political Response in Crisis Situations. He currently holds the position of expert of the Center of Excellence in the field of maritime cyber security, within the Maritime University of Constanța (UMC), being also an associate university lecturer, both at the UMC and at the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy, the “Carol I” National Defense University and the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, and being also a member of the board of directors of the Association of Reserve Officers of Romania, affiliated with CIOR – NATO.