Leavitt: Trump is ‘VERY CLEAR’ on this…

Contents

BREAKING NEWS: Iran Claims VICTORY; Trump Postpones Attacks; Hezbollah and Houthis Are Ready | TBN Israel 1

News from Ukraine | Excellent! Russians forced to retreat from a strategic area. 1

Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum… 1

Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum… 2

Update on the war in Ukraine: Kyiv describes the position on the front line as “the strongest in the last year”  3

Trump News in Brief: Pentagon Replaces Navy Secretary Amid U.S. Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz  5

Pentagon announces Navy secretary’s departure, marking the departure of another top leader. 7

“Impossible” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid “flagrant” violations of the ceasefire, Iran says. 8

The Strait of Hormuz is the scene of “gunboat diplomacy” , as the U.S. and Iran race to impose the most effective blockade. 11

EU agrees to release €90 billion loan for Ukraine after Hungary lifts its veto. 13

Australia–Japan Naval Agreement: Contracts Signed for a ~10 Billion Australian Dollar Program (Mogami-class frigates for the RAN) – Maritime Security Forum… 15

38 years ago, an Iranian naval mine caused major damage to the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts – Maritime Security Forum… 16

Lessons Learned (the USS Samuel B. Roberts incident and associated operations) 18

A Brief History: Prime Chance and Praying Mantis (1987–1988) – Lessons on “Low-Cost” Maritime Warfare  20

Lessons for the European Union from Recent Conflicts (Iran/Ukraine): Implications for Security, Defense, and Industry – Maritime Security Forum… 22

IMO has developed a plan for the evacuation of ships from Middle Eastern waters – Maritime Security Forum    23

A defense technology company reported a successful test: firing a laser weapon from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier – Maritime Security Forum… 24

U.S. drone company unveils two new USV concepts – Maritime Security Forum… 27

New maritime scam offers a fake Hormuz passage for cryptocurrencies – Maritime Security Forum… 29

The War China Won Without Fighting – Maritime Security Forum… 30

War in Iran Triggers Unprecedented Energy Shock: Disruption to Global Supply Exceeds Historical Crises – Maritime Security Forum… 34

BREAKING NEWS: Iran Claims VICTORY; Trump Postpones Attacks; Hezbollah and Houthis Are Ready | TBN Israel

News from Ukraine | Excellent! Russians forced to retreat from a strategic area

Developments in the Middle East – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, developments in the Middle East have been dominated by the escalation of the maritime confrontation between Iran and the United States in the Strait of Hormuz, the deadlock in U.S.-Iranian negotiations regarding the extension of the ceasefire, and the worsening security situation on the Israeli-Lebanese border. The period under review indicates a region in a state of extreme , where diplomatic initiatives coexist with naval incidents and exchanges of fire.

The most significant event of the past 24 hours was Iran’s seizure of two commercial vessels attempting to leave the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters reports that the vessels in question are the cargo ships MSC Francesca (flying the Panamanian flag) and Epaminondas (flying the Liberian flag). According to the agency, IRGC naval forces accused the ships of lacking the necessary authorizations and of tampering with their navigation systems. The ships were escorted to the Iranian coast, and the crews were reported to be safe. This is the first seizure of commercial vessels by Iran since the start of the current crisis.

In the same incident, three other commercial vessels were targeted by gunfire near the transit corridor. Reuters reports that three vessels were hit by gunfire, though no casualties among the crews have been confirmed. Information indicates that the shots were fired during maritime interdiction operations carried out by the IRGC. These incidents led to further transit suspensions and the repositioning of several commercial vessels to waiting areas in the Gulf of Oman.

Meanwhile, the United States has expanded its naval blockade against Iran. Reuters reports that the U.S. Navy intercepted at least three Iranian oil tankers—the Deep Sea, Sevin, and Dorena—in Asian waters near India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. The vessels were carrying Iranian crude oil, either partially or entirely. According to the cited sources, one of the tankers was escorted by U.S. ships after attempting to continue its commercial route. U.S. Central Command previously confirmed that dozens of ships were forced to stop or turn back under the blockade regime.

From an operational standpoint, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains nearly paralyzed. Reuters reports that over 230 oil tankers and commercial vessels are stranded or delayed, and insurance costs have risen sharply. Normally, approximately 20% of the oil and liquefied natural gas transported by sea globally. The current blockade is considered one of the most severe maritime energy disruptions in recent decades.

In the energy markets, Reuters reports that the price of Brent crude has risen to approximately $99.56 per barrel in recent hours, driven by the persistent risk to energy flows in the Gulf and the lack of a swift diplomatic solution. Stock markets in the Gulf have reacted negatively: Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh have seen declines, with investors concerned about the prolongation of the maritime blockade and the risk of the conflict escalating.

On the diplomatic front, negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain deadlocked. Although the U.S. administration previously announced a unilateral extension of the ceasefire to allow for further discussions, there has been no confirmation in the last 24 hours of a new round of direct negotiations. Several sources indicate that Iran does not intend, for the time being, to participate in the proposed talks in Pakistan, citing the continuation of the U.S. naval blockade.

Official U.S. statements have sought to downplay the severity of the naval incident. According to media reports cited in news feeds, the White House stated that Iran’s seizure of the two commercial vessels does not constitute a direct violation of the ceasefire because the ships were neither American nor Israeli. This position suggests Washington’s desire to avoid an immediate military escalation, while maintaining economic pressure on Tehran.

In the Israel–Lebanon file, the ten-day ceasefire remains formally in effect, but tensions persist. Reuters and other regional sources report new limited exchanges of fire and sporadic Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon, including incidents resulting in civilian casualties. At the same time, Beirut is preparing a request to extend the ceasefire for upcoming talks with Israel, a sign that the current framework is considered insufficient for lasting stability.

Gulf states are monitoring developments with grave concern. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are avoiding conflicting statements and emphasizing freedom of navigation and the stability of energy markets. Meanwhile, Turkey has warned, through statements by President Erdoğan, that the regional war is beginning to affect the European economy and the continent’s security.

Maritime Security Forum

Developments in Ukraine – Maritime Security Forum

Over the past 24 hours, the situation in Ukraine has been characterized by continued large-scale Russian airstrikes on civilian and energy infrastructure, intense fighting across the main sectors of the eastern front, and new Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory targeting oil, logistics, and industrial facilities. Information available from international sources indicates a sustained high operational tempo, with no decisive strategic shifts, but with constant pressure across all dimensions of the conflict. (reuters.com)

In the air, the Russian Federation continued the combined use of Shahed drones, cruise missiles, and guided munitions against several Ukrainian regions. Air raid sirens were activated successively in the north, center, and south, and local authorities reported repeated interceptions by air defense systems. The attack pattern remains that of successive waves, intended to overwhelm defensive systems and force the dispersion of air defense resources. In recent similar cycles, Reuters reported hundreds of drones launched in a single operational window, confirming the continuity of Russian saturation tactics.

The Kyiv region remained under air alert throughout the night. Air defense systems were activated, with explosions associated with interceptions reported. Although no major damage comparable to previous attacks has been confirmed, maintaining pressure on the capital aims for both military and psychological effects, forcing Ukraine to keep key defensive systems around the country’s political and administrative center.

In the east, the city of Kharkiv and surrounding areas continued to be subjected to strikes by drones and guided munitions. The region is one of the most frequently targeted due to its proximity to the border and its industrial role. Damage to urban and energy infrastructure was reported, as well as local utility outages.

In the south, the Odessa area and Black Sea-related infrastructure remain constant targets. Ports, logistics depots, and transport networks are being targeted to disrupt exports and domestic supply chains. Meanwhile, the Danube sector, including the Izmail area, continues to be closely monitored following recent strikes on port and railway facilities.

On the ground, the most intense fighting persists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The areas around Pokrovsk, Lyman, Kupiansk, and adjacent sectors remain the scenes of nearly continuous Russian attacks. Russia is using assault infantry, heavy artillery, glide bombs, and tactical drones to achieve limited advances. No major operational breakthroughs or decisive territorial changes have been confirmed in the last 24 hours, but pressure on the Ukrainian defense remains constant. (reuters. com)

Ukrainian forces continue their elastic defense tactics: controlled local withdrawals, pinpoint counterattacks, and the massive use of FPV drones to neutralize Russian assault groups. Ukrainian units are increasingly integrating drones into their brigade structures for reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, and immediate strikes on tactical targets.

In the south of the front, the Kherson region remains subject to close-range strikes. Tactical drones, artillery, and mortars operated from the eastern bank of the Dnieper continue to strike civilian vehicles, infrastructure, and Ukrainian positions. The area is one of the most dangerous for the civilian population remaining in the city.

Within the Russian Federation, Ukraine has continued its campaign to strike energy infrastructure. A major target remains the Black Sea oil port of Tuapse, where Reuters reported fires and casualties following repeated drone attacks. The facility is crucial for exports and refining, and striking it aims to reduce Russian logistical and energy capacity.

In addition to Tuapse, energy infrastructure in the southern and along the Black Sea coast remains under pressure. The Ukrainian strategy targets refineries, fuel depots, oil terminals, and military maintenance facilities to increase the economic costs of the war and disrupt supplies to Russian forces.

In the technological sphere, the conflict remains dominated by drone warfare. Russia uses swarms of inexpensive drones to overwhelm defenses and identify targets, while Ukraine employs FPV drones, maritime drones, and long-range systems for deep strikes. The robotization of the battlefield continues through the use of unmanned platforms for ammunition transport, evacuation, and reconnaissance.

On the political and foreign military front, Ukraine continues to appeal to allies for anti-aircraft munitions, Patriot systems, interceptors, and industrial support. European nations are discussing the expansion of joint munitions and drone production, with the focus on air defense, considered critical in the current phase of the conflict.

Maritime Security Forum

Update on the war in Ukraine: Kyiv describes the position on the front line as “the strongest in the last year”

Drones minimize Russia’s numerical advantage on the battlefield, says the foreign minister; Moscow is resisting pressure from Turkey to arrange talks between Zelenskyy and Putin. What we know on day 1,520

Warren Murray along with Guardian editors and news agencies

Thursday, April 23, 2026, 02:39 CEST

Ukraine’s position on the front lines is “the strongest” it has been in the past year thanks to its superiority in drones and improved air defense, said Andriy Sybiha, the foreign minister. Agence France-Presse reported that an analysis of data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) showed that Russian troops made almost no territorial gains on the front line in March—the first time this this has happened in two and a half years.

“We have minimized the Russians’ advantage in terms of manpower through the use of drones,” Sybiha added. “For us, the situation on the battlefield means strengthening our negotiating position. We can shoot down up to 90% of the targets striking our cities … Ukraine’s on the battlefield is indeed the strongest, or the most solid, it has been in the past year.”

A Russian attack killed two people and wounded eight in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, regional authorities said Thursday. “One person is still missing,” said Oleksandr Ganzha, head of the regional administration. Two children, aged nine and 14, were among those taken to the hospital, Ganzha said, after an apartment building, a store, and a car were hit.

Turkey is trying to revive negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and bring their leaders together at Kiev’s request, the office of Turkish President Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s office said on Wednesday. Erdoğan told NATO chief Mark Rutte, in a meeting in Ankara that “we are working to restart negotiations and begin discussions at the leadership level.”

Sybiha, the Ukrainian foreign minister, confirmed that Ukraine is insisting on face-to-face talks between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin. While Turkey has been asked to facilitate this, Ukraine would consider any location outside of Russia and Belarus. “We are now calling for a meeting that would give new impetus to diplomacy,” Sybiha said.

Russian news agencies quoted Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov as saying that Putin would meet with Zelenskyy only “for the purpose of finalizing agreements”. In contrast, the Kremlin called on the U.S. to send Donald Trump’s delegates, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, to Moscow again. The two have repeatedly listened to Putin’s maximalist demands, to which Witkoff showed flexibility, and achieved no results, while refusing to visit Kyiv and listen to Ukraine’s perspective. Peskov stated that Russia is ready for any new discussions regarding a resolution to the war with American negotiators “even tomorrow.”

A woman and a child were killed in the Russian city of Syzran, an oil refining hub located about 1,000 km (621 miles) from the border with Ukraine, after a Ukrainian drone struck their apartment building, the regional governor said Wednesday. Russian media reported that a Rosneft oil refinery is located on the same street as the damaged building.

Russian drones attacked infrastructure in the Black Sea port of Odessa, damaging damaging docks, warehouses, railway infrastructure, port operators’ facilities, and a ship, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba said Wednesday. Preliminary reports indicated that no one was injured and that the port remains operational.

Kuleba said that a Russian drone attack on a marshalling yard at the Zaporizhzhia-Live station in the southern Zaporizhzhia region killed a locomotive engineer, while the chief engineer was hospitalized.

EU agrees to unblock €90 billion loan for Ukraine after Hungary lifted its veto

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• EU member states have reached an agreement on releasing the €90 billion (£78 billion) loan that Kyiv urgently needs and a new package of sanctions against Moscow, after Ukraine resumed pumping Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia, prompting Budapest to lift its veto. Jon Henley writes that Cyprus, which holds the rotating EU presidency, said member state ambassadors agreed to launch “written procedures” for the final approval of the loan and the sanctions package, with the official signing of both scheduled for Thursday afternoon noon.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/23/ukraine-war-briefing-kyiv-hails-frontline-position-as-strongest-in-a-year

Trump News in Brief: Pentagon Replaces Navy Secretary Amid U.S. Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

John Phelan “is leaving the administration, effective immediately,” the Pentagon announced, while Undersecretary Hung Cao takes over the role – key U.S. political news from April 22, 2026, in brief

The Guardian team

Thursday, April 23, 2026, 04:09 CEST

The Pentagon announced Wednesday that the Navy’s top civilian official, John Phelan, Secretary of the Navy, is stepping down.

In a statement posted on social media, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said that Phelan “is leaving the administration, effective immediately.”

Hung Cao, the Under Secretary of the Navy, will become acting Secretary of the Navy, Parnell said.

Reuters, citing an anonymous source, reported that Phelan was fired by the Pentagon.

The Pentagon announces the Navy secretary’s departure, marking the departure of another top leader

The sudden departure comes just one day after Phelan addressed a large crowd of sailors and industry professionals at the Navy’s annual conference in Washington, D.C., and spoke with reporters about his agenda.

Phelan’s departure comes, also just a few weeks after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth dismissed the military’s top officer, General Randy George. Hegseth has also dismissed several top generals, admirals, and other defense leaders since taking office last year. As with many of the other dismissals, Pentagon officials did not provide a reason for Phelan’s departure.

Phelan is leaving just as the U.S. Navy has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and is targeting ships linked to Tehran around the world, during a fragile ceasefire in the war with Iran.

_{Read the full article}

Iranian forces have seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz, amid doubts over the continuation of peace negotiations with the U.S.

Iranian forces have seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz, as the U.S. and Iran have intensified efforts to impose blockades on the waterway.

The standoff over the strait—through which about 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passed in peacetime—has raised doubts about the resumption of stalled peace talks.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator, said Wednesday evening that reopening the Strait of Hormuz would be “impossible” as long as the U.S. and Israel commit “flagrant violations ” of the ceasefire, including the U.S. naval blockade, “holding the global economy hostage,” and “Zionist warmongering.”

_{Read the full article}

Trump’s Approval Drops in Recent Polls

Three political polls indicate that public approval of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. economy, immigration, and the conflict with Iran is declining, setting off alarm bells for Republican candidates aligned with Trump, six months ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. Polls conducted by Reuters-Ipsos, Strength in Numbers-Verasight, and AP-NORC showed that the president’s approval rating stands at around 36%, 35%, and 33%, figures that are approaching his lowest recorded levels.

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Democrats Call on Kash Patel to Take an Alcohol Abuse Test

Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee have launched a formal inquiry into the alleged drinking habits of FBI Director Kash Patel, asking him to complete a standardized alcohol abuse assessment and submit the results to Congress. Democrats on the committee have asked Patel to take the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT)—a 10-question World Health Organization screening tool used to identify harmful drinking patterns—along with a sworn statement attesting to his answers. Lawmakers have also requested all security clearance questionnaires that Patel has completed since taking office.

_{Read the full article}

White House Close to a Deal Worth Up to $500 Million to Rescue Struggling Spirit Airlines

The White House is finalizing a funding package to help the U.S. low-cost airline Spirit Airlines, which could receive loans of up to $500 million, amid rising costs that continue to affect the company. News of the potential deal comes as Spirit and other companies face rising fuel costs due to the war with Iran.

_{Read the full article}

What else happened today:

A federal judge in Massachusetts on Tuesday struck down several Trump administration measures that were slowing the development of clean energy, including the requirement that all solar and wind energy projects on federal lands and waters be personally approved by Interior Secretary Doug Burgum.

Billionaire cryptocurrency entrepreneur Justin Sun sued World Liberty Financial on Tuesday, the digital currency venture co-founded by Donald Trump and his sons, claiming that World Liberty illegally froze his holdings of tokens issued by the company.

Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. faced intense questioning Wednesday from several U.S. senators during a hearing focused largely on how the administration has responded to the measles outbreak and the spread of vaccine misinformation.

The The Pentagon aims to increase funding more than a hundredfold for a program involving autonomous drones, according to budget documents released this week, signaling a major shift toward a war based on artificial intelligence.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/ us-news/2026/apr/23/trump-news-at-a-glance-latest-today

Pentagon announces Navy secretary’s departure, marking the departure of another top leader

The departure of John Phelan, the Navy’s highest-ranking civilian official, comes a week after Pete Hegseth fired the commander of the Army

The Guardian team and agencies

Thursday, April 23, 2026, 01:27 CEST

The Pentagon announced Wednesday that the Navy’s top civilian official, John Phelan, the Secretary of the Navy, is stepping down.

In a statement posted on social media, Sean Parnell, a Pentagon spokesperson, said that Phelan “is leaving the administration, effective immediately.”

Hung Cao, the undersecretary of the Navy, will become acting secretary of the Navy, Parnell said.

People familiar with the dynamics within the Pentagon told The Guardian that Phelan was fired. Phelan had an increasingly strained relationship with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and other members of the leadership, who appeared to openly favor Cao for the position.

Sources said that Hegseth had, in fact, blamed Phelan for not acting aggressively enough against Senator Mark Kelly after he appeared in a video advising soldiers to ignore “illegal orders” .

It appears that Phelan also clashed with Hegseth’s deputy, Stephen Feinberg, whom the New York Times and CNN reported disagreed with how Phelan was handling shipbuilding initiatives.

The sudden departure comes just one day after Phelan addressed a large crowd of sailors and industry professionals at the annual naval conference in Washington, D.C., and spoke with reporters about his agenda.

Phelan’s departure also comes just a few weeks after Pete Hegseth fired the military’s top officer, General Randy George. Hegseth has also fired several high-ranking generals, admirals, and other defense leaders since taking office last year. As with many other firings, Pentagon officials did not provide a reason for Phelan.

Phelan is leaving just as the U.S. Navy has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and is targeting ships linked to Tehran around the world, during a fragile ceasefire in the war with Iran.

Phelan did not serve in the military nor did he hold a civilian leadership position within the military before Donald Trump nominated him for the of secretary at the end of 2024.

Phelan was a major donor to Trump’s campaign and founded the private investment firm Rugger Management LLC. According to his biography, Phelan’s primary exposure to the military came from an advisory role he held at Spirit of America, a nonprofit organization that has supported the defense of Ukraine and Taiwan.

The Associated Press was unable to immediately reach Phelan’s office for comment.

Cao led an unsuccessful campaign for the U.S. Senate in Virginia, attempting to unseat Democratic Senator Tim Kaine in 2024. He received Trump’s support in the crowded Republican primary.

Cao is a Navy veteran with 25 years of experience who served in combat zones. His biography includes fleeing Vietnam with his family as a child in the 1970s. In a campaign video for his Senate bid, he compared the communist regime in Vietnam during the Cold War to the administration of former President Joe Biden.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2026/Apr/23/trump-news-at-a-glance-latest-today

“Impossible” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid “flagrant” violations of the ceasefire, Iran says

Iranian forces have seized two ships in this strategic waterway, while Washington and Tehran maintain separate blockades

• Middle East Crisis – Live Updates

Oliver Holmes and news agencies

Wednesday, April 22, 2026, 11:19 p.m. CEST

Iranian forces have seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz, while the U.S. and Iran have intensified their separate blockades of the waterway.

The standoff over the strait — through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes in peacetime — has raised doubts about the resumption of stalled peace negotiations.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and chief negotiator, said Wednesday evening that reopening the Strait of Hormuz would be “impossible” as long as the U.S. and Israel commit “flagrant” violations of the ceasefire, including the U.S. naval blockade, “holding the global economy hostage,” and “Zionist warmongering.”

He added in a post on X that the U.S. and Israel “have not achieved their objectives through military aggression, nor will they achieve them through intimidation.”

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated earlier that its naval forces had stopped two ships attempting to cross the strait and brought them ashore.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported that the IRGC accused the two ships—the MSC Francesca, flying the Panamanian flag, and the Epaminondas, flying the Liberian flag—of “attempting to sneak out of the Strait of Hormuz.”

The Epaminondas is operated by Greece, and Greece’s foreign minister confirmed that an attack had taken place against a Greek-owned cargo ship.

A UK-based maritime security monitor reported attacks on ships in this waterway on Wednesday, including an incident in which a ship was boarded by an Iranian gunboat “which then fired on the ship, causing serious damage to the deck .”

The seizures mark the first time Iran has taken control of ships since the start of the conflict, which began on February 28, and come after the U.S. fired upon and seized an Iranian cargo ship and boarded an Iranian oil tanker in the Indian Ocean.

In the latest of a series of policy shifts, Donald Trump threatened violence on Tuesday, just hours before announcing that he was unilaterally extending the ceasefire.

On Wednesday, the White House spokesperson said Trump was “pleased” with the naval blockade and “understands that Iran is in a very weak position.”

“The cards are in President Trump’s hands at this point,” Karoline Leavitt told reporters, adding that the U.S. is “completely strangling their economy through this blockade, losing $500 million a day.”

The U.S. president has failed to manage the global economic and diplomatic crisis that erupted due to the war, which has not led to the overthrow of the anti-American regime nor to the cessation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Instead, it led to Tehran’s forced closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which triggered a spiraling global economic crisis.

Faced with calls to reopen the waterway, Trump pressured Iran to end the blockade, but failed and subsequently decided to impose his own blockade, leading to further spikes in fuel prices and threats of long-term inflation.

Asian countries dependent on Gulf oil were severely affected, facing with shortages of fuel, fertilizers, and other raw materials passing through the straits. Although the West is better protected, it is not immune.

Germany, Europe’s largest economy, halved its growth forecast for 2026 on Wednesday to 0.5%, while Greece announced an additional €500 million (£434 million) in aid for households and farmers.

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said: “The national economy is holding up and performing better than expected. However, the stress of supermarket shopping, childcare costs, more expensive fuel, and caring for the elderly remains.”

The head of the UN maritime agency has appealed for help for thousands of sailors stranded in the Gulf due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 20,000 seafarers and 2,000 ships have been stranded, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Over the weekend, Iran stated that it had received new proposals from Washington, but also suggested that a significant gap remains between the two sides. Pakistan acted as a mediator, but a luxury hotel in Islamabad, which had been cleared for further talks, remained empty on Wednesday. Iran never publicly accepted the invitation, and the U.S. delegation led by Vice President JD Vance never left Washington.

A Pakistani official briefed on the preparations told Reuters: “We had everything ready. We were all ready for talks; the stage was set. If you ask me honestly, it was a failure we didn’t expect, because the Iranians never refused; they were willing to come and join, and they still are.”

During his first term as president, Trump withdrew from an agreement that limited Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. He disliked the pact, which had been signed by Barack Obama, and was dissuaded from diplomacy by Israel, Iran’s mortal enemy.

For years, Israel has pressured the U.S. to bomb Iran, but no administration in Washington agreed, considering it counterproductive and fearing the chaos now unfolding.

In addition to the bloodshed bloodshed and instability, Israel and the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah have been fighting on a second front in Lebanon.

Despite a fragile 10-day ceasefire set to expire on Sunday, Israeli strikes killed five people in Lebanon on Wednesday, Lebanese state media reported, including journalist Amal Khalil.

Khalil and photographer Zeinab Faraj were reporting on events near the town of al-Tayri in southern Lebanon when an Israeli strike hit the vehicle in front of them.

They fled to a nearby house, which was then targeted by another Israeli strike, according to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health.

Rescue teams managed to retrieve Faraj, who had a head injury. When they returned to help Khalil, a stun grenade blocked their access to the damaged building, a Lebanese military official said. She was later found dead by civil defense personnel, who pulled her body from from under the rubble.

In a statement before Khalil’s death was confirmed, the Israeli military said it had received reports that two journalists had been wounded in its attacks and denied that it had prevented rescue teams from reaching the area.

Hezbollah said it launched an attack on northern Israel in response to what it called “flagrant” violations of the ceasefire.

At least 2,454 people have been killed in Lebanon as a result of Israeli attacks since the start of the war, according to Lebanese authorities.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said Thursday that preparations were underway for negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The talks are significant, as the two countries have not maintained diplomatic relations with one another.

For decades, Israel has repeatedly bombed, invaded, and occupied Lebanon, while the Lebanese government has failed to keep Hezbollah , which has fired rockets into Israel.

Reuters, the Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse contributed to this article.

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/22/iranian-forces-ships-seized-strait-of-hormuz-us-peace-talks

The Strait of Hormuz is the scene of “gunboat diplomacy” , as the U.S. and Iran race to impose the most effective blockade

Patrick WintourDiplomatic Editor

Iran’s goal is to keep the squeeze on the global economy, even as some argue it could run out of oil reserves by Sunday

• Middle East Crisis – Live Updates

Wednesday, April 22, 2026, 5:48 p.m. CEST

Donald Trump’s indefinite postponement of the plan to bomb Iran’s bridges and power plants on Tuesday evening is widely described as leaving the conflict in a state of uncertainty, but this is far from the truth.

Pakistan insists that the prospect of negotiations in Islamabad has not evaporated, and positive messages are still being exchanged, but in the meantime, the theater of operations has shifted from land to sea.

Both sides are racing to demonstrate that they can enforce the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz more effectively than the other. It has become a form of gunboat diplomacy, carried out in the world’s most important geopolitical waterway.

Iran, by attacking and seizing commercial ships attempting to cross the strait, is trying to send the message that it can maintain a stranglehold on the global economy.

The U.S., through its blockade of Iranian ports, is pursuing a more immediate goal. Through sanctions and naval actions, it is attempting to bring about the collapse of the Iranian economy, as Tehran runs out of space to store the oil it produces and cannot export due to the blockade.

It is a test of strength in which both sides believe time is on their side.

Gholamhossein Mohseni-Eje’i, head of the Iranian judiciary, stated: “The enemy is not in a position to impose a timeline on us.”

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that within a few days, “the storage facilities on Kharg Island will be full, and Iran’s fragile oil wells will be shut down. Restricting Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s main sources of revenue.”

This is consistent with an analysis by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD). The FDD, a strongly anti-Iranian regime think tank, argued that the strait is not a game-changing weapon for Iran, but a source of weakness.

The argument is that Iran will run out of oil storage space by Sunday, April 26.

On the RealClearDefense website, Lance B. Gordon, a retired naval officer, stated: “Forcing Iran to halt production due to a lack of storage space would risk long-term damage to the reservoirs, including loss of permeability, water cone formation, and formation compaction—effects that could permanently reduce future production and cash flow.”

A forced shutdown could could permanently eliminate 300,000 to 500,000 barrels per day.

Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the FDD, says the strategy is now a ceasefire on one side and increased pressure on the other, including increased pressure by U.S. Central Command through the seizure of ships.

The combination of the blockade, the enforcement of sanctions , and the implicit threat of new attacks is unfolding in parallel with the negotiations.

Iran insists that it understands and can thwart this U.S. strategy, in part by refusing to resume negotiations until the U.S. blockade is lifted.

The cargo tracking firm Vortexa reported that at least 34 tankers linked to Iran have bypassed the U.S. blockade since it began, with 19 leaving the Persian Gulf and 15 entering from the Arabian Sea.

Kharg Island, through which 90% of Iran’s oil exports pass. Photo: Alamy

Six tankers that left the area were carrying approximately 10.7 million barrels of Iranian crude, generating estimated revenues of $910 million (670 million pounds) at a discount to Brent crude.

Second, Iran need not look far for signs that its own blockade of the strait is working. The price of oil, pushed down by Trump’s social media posts, remains the key indicator for Iran and stands above $100 per barrel.

But there are other signs—the cancellation of 20,000 Lufthansa flights due to the cost of jet fuel, vacancies in hotel bookings this summer, oil reserve levels at the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, the price of copper and condoms, the cost to European treasuries of mitigating energy inflation, and even the number of Senate “gains” Democrats are now targeting in November.

In this global war, the mood of Tennessee voters regarding how Trump is handling the economy matters just as much in Tehran as it does in the White House.

Seeing his country join the league of great powers, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s aerospace forces, Majid Mousavi, stated: “Iran’s southern neighbors should know that if their territories and facilities are used in the service of enemies to attack the Iranian nation, they must say goodbye to oil production in the Middle East.”

But Iran also suggests it has other cards to play. The Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, wrote about the potential for disrupting internet cables.

It noted the concentration of Gulf countries’ communications infrastructure in the Strait of Hormuz and stated that any disruption to it would lead to a catastrophe for the region’s digital economies.

However, escalating the war in this way could cause tensions within Iran, which is already exhausted by war. Trump claimed he had detected signs of a deeply divided Iranian leadership and that this was why Tehran had been unable to respond to U.S. proposals.

The extent of this division is hotly contested, but what is undeniable is the pressure on ordinary Iranians. The ongoing internet blackout —a self-imposed security measure—forces thousands of entrepreneurs, often young people, out of work every day.

There are also calls—which will likely be ignored—to use the ceasefire as an opportunity to have a broader discussion within Iran about how the country responds, rather than leaving the discussion to a security elite.

Reformist writer Ahmad Zeidabadi argued on Wednesday that extending the ceasefire should be an opportunity.

“Instead of aggression, accusations, and fear-mongering—which have become our primary mode of political action as Iranians—we must create a safe, free, and civil space to discuss the country’s available options in the face of this crisis, so that, ultimately, the best and most rational decision can be made and announced with sincerity and full courage.”

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/22/strait-of-hormuz-gunboat -diplomacy-us-iran-blockade

EU agrees to release €90 billion loan for Ukraine after Hungary lifts its veto

Agreement reached on emergency loan after Ukraine resumed Russian oil shipments to Hungary and Slovakia

Jon Henley Europe Correspondent

Wednesday, April 2, April 2, 2026, 5:19 p.m. CEST

EU member states have reached an agreement to unblock a €90 billion loan (78 billion pounds) that Kyiv urgently needs and a new package of sanctions against Moscow, after Ukraine resumed shipping Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia, prompting Budapest to lift its veto.

Cyprus, which holds the bloc’s rotating presidency, stated that member state ambassadors agreed to launch “written procedures” for the final approval of the loan and the sanctions package, with the official signing of both scheduled for Thursday afternoon.

The EU agreed in December on the loan, vital to keeping Ukraine afloat this year and next, but Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, backed by Slovakia, vetoed it in March due to a dispute with Kyiv over a damaged oil pipeline.

Orbán, who lost to a center-right opponent, Péter Magyar, in the April 12 elections, accused Ukraine of deliberately delaying repairs to the Druzhba pipeline, which transports oil to Hungary and Slovakia, both of which are heavily dependent on Russian oil.

Kiev stated that the pipeline, which has a capacity of 1. 2 to 1.4 million barrels per day and has become one of the most politically charged infrastructure projects in Europe, was severely damaged by Russian drone attacks and was being repaired as quickly as possible.

The Hungarian oil company MOL stated on Wednesday afternoon that it had been informed by the Ukrainian operator of the Druzhba pipeline that crude oil was arriving via the pipeline from Belarus and that “it is expected in Hungary and Slovakia by tomorrow at the latest.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the news as “the right signal under the current circumstances,” adding that both “support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia” are necessary for Moscow to end the war.

Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine is fulfilling its obligations in its relations with the EU, including regarding the Druzhba pipeline, and that it is now important for the European support package “to become operational quickly.”

The dispute over the loan, which aims to cover two-thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs in 2026 and 2027, has been delayed, as well as the new sanctions against Moscow that the EU had hoped to adopt on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Orbán’s crushing electoral defeat, after 16 years in power, has fueled EU hopes that the funds will be released, but officials have expressed concern that the bloc may have to wait until Magyar takes office in May before the loan can be approved.

Orbán had the power to block the loan, even though he—like the governments of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, which share a similarly friendly stance toward Moscow—has secured exemptions, meaning none of the three countries will participate in the joint loan.

The EU will grant Ukraine two interest-free loans, each worth 45 billion euros, in 2026 and 2027, of which 28 billion euros will be earmarked for military spending and 17 billion euros for general budgetary needs each year. The money will be borrowed from capital markets, backed by the EU budget.

Economists have stated that, without the EU loan, Ukraine could start running out of money by June. European Commissioner for Economic Affairs Valdis Dombrovskis said Tuesday that the first payment will likely be made in late May or early June.

Ukraine is not expected to repay the money from its own funds, will only be due once Russia begins paying reparations after the war ends—potentially using the estimated €210 billion in assets from its central bank frozen in the EU.

The scheme was designed last year as a way to use frozen Russian funds to help Ukraine without actually confiscating the money, a measure that Belgium and several other EU member states considered legally risky.

According to a draft, the 20th EU sanctions package against Moscow includes additional maritime and energy restrictions aimed at limiting Russia’s ability to export oil, as well as measures to crack down on the financial sector and trade and industrial bans.

Over 40 additional ships are set to be added to the list of 600 ships banned from EU ports, and a comprehensive ban will be introduced on maritime services, such as insurance, brokerage, and technical management related to the transport of Russian oil.

Approximately 120 individuals and entities, including 20 Russian regional banks, have been added to the sanctions list, with travel and transaction bans and asset freezes designed to complicate domestic and cross-border settlements for Russian companies .

Cryptocurrency platforms and digital assets will also be targeted, as will banks in third countries that facilitate trade in restricted military goods, and goods worth approximately 930 million euros have been added to the import and export bans.

Separately, the German government stated that the German subsidiary of the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft had informed it that the flow of oil from Kazakhstan through the Druzhba pipelines to a refinery in eastern Germany would be halted starting May 1.

The PCK refinery near the Polish border, one of the largest in Germany, supplies fuel to much of the Berlin region, but Berlin government spokesperson Stefan Kornelius stated that this change “will not significantly restrict the refinery’s operations.”

,,, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/22/eu-unblocks-loan-ukraine-new-sanctions-russia-hungary-lifts-veto

Australia–Japan Naval Agreement: Contracts Signed for a ~10 Billion Australian Dollar Program (Mogami-class frigates for the RAN) – Maritime Security Forum

Australia and Japan have signed contracts triggering the implementation of a military agreement estimated at approximately 10 billion Australian dollars (about 7 billion USD), under which Japan will supply the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with a new generation of surface combatants. The news was reported by Reuters, and the program is described as a major step in deepening defense cooperation between the two U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific.

The documents were signed by Defense Ministers Richard Marles (Australia) and Shinjiro Koiz umi (Japan), who reaffirmed, through a memorandum, the political commitment to the program’s delivery and to strengthening bilateral defense cooperation.

The agreement is described as Japan’s most significant foreign military sale since the relaxation of its arms export regime in 2014, signaling Tokyo’s gradual shift toward a more active role in regional security and toward defense industrial partnerships beyond the strictly domestic framework.

From a strategic perspective, the agreement marks an intensification of the Australia–Japan security relationship and reflects Tokyo’s intention to diversify its defense partnerships beyond its traditional alliance with the United States. The context cited is the growing influence and military presence of China in the Indo-Pacific, perceived by Canberra and Tokyo as a threat to freedom of navigation and regional balance.

The prime contractor is Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), which will build three modernized Mogami-class multi-role frigates for Australia. According to the cited information, these first ships are to be built in Japan, starting in 2029, as the initial phase of the program.

Following the delivery of the first batch, the program calls for a transition to “onshore” construction: another eight frigates will be built in Australia, through the gradual transfer of production to the Henderson shipyard, near Perth (Western Australia). This phase aims to develop local industrial capacity and reduce dependence on foreign production in the long term.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense publicly announced that the two ministers welcomed the finalization of the contracts for the “general-purpose” frigates and confirmed their intention to strengthen bilateral military cooperation, including in the areas of defense industry and technology.

The frigates are designed as multi-role platforms, with a mission set that includes anti-submarine warfare, surface ship engagement, and air defense—capabilities necessary for operating in vast maritime areas and for protecting naval task forces and commercial traffic.

Canberra indicates that the new vessels will help protect commercial shipping lanes and defend Australia’s northern approaches through an increased presence in both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. In practice, the frigates will support a more robust naval posture, tailored to a region where distances are vast and the risks of maritime interdiction are rising.

The agreement is set against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and the expansion of China’s military footprint, a factor frequently cited in regional debates on security, trade, and freedom of navigation. In this context, the frigate program is presented as a deterrent and a means of strengthening interoperability among partners.

Sources (for the Australia–Japan agreement on the Mogami-class frigates):

· Reuters, “Australia, Japan Sign Contracts to Start $7 Billion Warship Deal” (April 18, 2026) – republished, for example, on U.S. News.

· ABC News (Australia), “Japan, Australia sign deal for first three Mogami frigate warships” (April 18, 2026).

· Al Jazeera, “Australia and Japan sign contracts for $7bn warships deal” (April 19, 2026).

Maritime Security Forum

38 years ago, an Iranian naval mine caused major damage to the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts – Maritime Security Forum

The stern of the guided-missile frigate Samuel B. Roberts, after being severely damaged by an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf, is towed to Dubai for repairs on April 15, 1988. Naval History and Heritage Command

Thirty-eight years ago, an Iranian naval mine caused major damage to the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts, which was on a mission to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. The explosion punctured the hull, compromised the structural integrity (keel), flooded critical compartments, and sparked fires on multiple decks. The frigate avoided sinking primarily due to effective damage control carried out by a well-trained and well-coordinated crew.

The incident has become a classic case study in naval academies: instructors use it to demonstrate that procedural discipline, repetitive training, and crisis leadership can turn a catastrophic damage incident into a manageable event. However, despite this lesson, the threat of naval mines is often treated intermittently, with an institutional tendency toward “amnesia” once operational pressure subsides.

The attack on the USS Samuel B. Roberts occurred after a warning signal was partially ignored. In early 1987, as part of an effort to protect oil transport in the Persian Gulf, Washington agreed to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers ( registered under the American flag) through a theater dominated by asymmetric tactics. The first convoy of Operation Earnest Will was marked by a revealing incident: the supertanker Bridgeton struck a mine. Although its double hull allowed the voyage to continue, the escort ships, which were far more vulnerable, were forced to operate “under the cover” of the damaged tanker—a symbolic reversal of the logic of escort.

According to an official history of the U.S. Navy, the assumption that Iran “would not dare” to mine commercial routes was quickly disproved. More importantly, the incident revealed a capability gap: although the escort mission had been planned, the United States did not initially have sufficient resources dedicated to mine warfare in the area. Consequently, subsequent convoys were postponed until specialized assets (mine warfare helicopters and minesweepers) could be deployed, in an effort to reduce the operation’s structural vulnerability.

Paradoxically, this shortfall arose despite the fact that naval mines have historically been one of the most effective maritime weapons (particularly during World War II). Once confronted with the operational reality, the Pentagon responded in two ways: (1) open deployments of countermeasure platforms and aircraft, and (2) a discreet component focused on interdiction and capture, embodied in Operation Prime Chance—one of the first major missions associated with the new U.S. special operations ecosystem.

As part of this operation, naval special forces (including SEAL teams) conducted patrols and boardings from rented makeshift bases (barges), while elite aviators operated Little Bird helicopters from naval platforms. The combination of night surveillance, high mobility, and interdiction actions allowed for the neutralization/capture of several vessels involved in mining activities, temporarily reducing the pace of attacks.

However, special operations did not completely eliminate Iran’s ability to reset mines and exploit windows of opportunity. On April 14, 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a recently laid minefield. The incident was followed by the attribution of responsibility to Iran and a swift response: on April 18, 1988, the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis, a short-lived retaliatory campaign in which they struck Iranian targets in the Gulf and engaged Iranian naval units before the escalation was halted at the political level.

The “asymmetric” ” of the threat is clearly evident in the cost equation: repairing the frigate took approximately 18 months and cost about $90 million (the equivalent of several hundred million in today’s terms), while the mine—based on an old design with low production costs—would have cost on the order of thousands of dollars. In other words, a simple and inexpensive means generated disproportionate operational and financial effects.

The natural question after 1988 was whether the U.S. Navy would decisively strengthen its traditionally underfunded mine hunting and neutralization capabilities so that they would be commensurate with the risk. In practice, this strengthening remained incomplete. Over the years, numerous war games and strategic assessments have highlighted the same vulnerability —the urgent need for credible and rapidly deployable countermeasures—but the pace of investment has fluctuated with political attention and budgetary priorities.

Currently, the Strait of Hormuz remains a strategic pressure point: Iran can disrupt commercial shipping not only through missiles or drones, but also through “humble” means, such as naval mines, which remain an effective component of its arsenal. The short deployment time, difficulty of detection, and psychological effect on commercial operators make mine laying an attractive option for an actor seeking low costs and high impact.

A recurring lesson is the vulnerability created by the premature withdrawal of specialized assets. In a recent episode, the decision to redeploy Avenger-class minehunters was followed shortly thereafter by the resumption of mining activities in the strait. According to press reports, initial assessments underestimated Iran’s willingness to attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz in response to military pressure, confirming once again how easily the same operational lesson can be “relearned.”

Painfully, history tends to repeat itself when niche capabilities (such as mine countermeasures) are treated as “optional” and are scaled back precisely during periods of apparent calm. The case of the Samuel B. Roberts remains relevant today: a determined adversary can use inexpensive means to impose major costs on a technologically advanced force, and defensive success depends as much on training, organization, and foresight as it does on sophisticated platforms.

Lessons Learned (the USS Samuel B. Roberts incident and associated operations)

· Mine countermeasure capabilities are critical, not auxiliary: their absence at the onset of a crisis can cripple the mission, even when modern escort ships are available.

· The cost is asymmetric: a cheap mine can cause damage, logistical disruptions, and disproportionate repair costs; planning must start from this reality.

· Crew training saves platforms: damage control, procedures, and repeated drills dramatically reduce the likelihood of losing the ship after a severe initial event.

· Operational persistence matters: continuous presence (patrols, ISR, interdiction) is more effective than episodic interventions; the adversary quickly exploits windows of opportunity.

· Combining conventional forces with special operations can increase effectiveness: night surveillance, mobility, and targeted engagements can reduce the rate of mining, but do not replace the systematic neutralization of the threat.

· Decisions regarding (re) deployment must be aligned with risk assessments, not just budget cycles: withdrawing specialized assets before the situation stabilizes increases the likelihood of the threat reemerging.

· Rules of engagement and rapid attribution are essential: the ability to identify the perpetrator and act proportionately influences deterrence and limits uncontrolled escalation.

· General lesson: Determined adversaries find inexpensive ways to affect technologically advanced forces; resilience results from a mix of technology, doctrine, stockpiles, and organizational discipline.

But let’s also talk a little about demining operations

Operation Prime Chance (August 1987 – June 1989) was a secret U.S. military operation during the Iran-Iraq War, intended to protect American oil tankers in the Persian Gulf from Iranian mines and attacks. It marked the unofficial debut of USSOCOM, involving AH-6 Little Bird helicopters equipped with night vision gear and special forces.

• Context: Part of the broader escort operation “Earnest Will,” launched after an American oil tanker struck a mine.
• Forces Involved: Included Navy SEALs units, Special Boat Teams, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) –

• “Night Stalkers”.
• Key Actions: The helicopters operated from frigates and barges, using night vision goggles (NVG) and infrared targeting systems to detect Iranian ships laying mines.
• Notable Event: The discovery and attack of the Iranian ship Iran Ajr while it was laying mines, capturing the crew.
• Result: Ensured the safe passage of commercial vessels and demonstrated the effectiveness of special operations in maritime environments.

Would you like more information about a specific component of the operation, such as:

• The AH-6 Little Bird helicopters used?
• The specific role of the Navy SEALs?
• The impact on U.S.-Iran relations?

Here are detailed insights into specific components of Operation Prime Chance (August 1987 – June 1989):

1. AH-6 and MH-6 “Little Bird” helicopters

These compact helicopters, nicknamed “Killer Eggs” , were essential to the mission’s success due to their ability to operate at night at very low altitudes.

• Tactical Roles: The MH-6 units served as observers, using advanced infrared systems (FLIR) and night vision goggles to detect Iranian ships. Once the target was identified, they guided the AH-6 attack helicopters.
• Equipment and Armament:
  • They are equipped with M134 Minigun (7.62 mm) or GAU-19 (.50 cal) and Hydra 70 rocket launchers.
  • The use of night vision goggles and FLIR systems was a combat first for these platforms, allowing crews to fly just 9 meters (30 feet) above the water to evade radar.
  • The helicopters could be quickly configured for transport, and could be loaded onto or unloaded from a C-130 aircraft in just a few minutes.

2. The Specific Role of the Navy SEALs

SEAL teams (particularly SEAL Team 1 and SEAL Team 2) provided the maritime assault component of the operation.

• VBSS Missions: They conducted Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations on vessels suspected of laying mines.
• The Capture of the Iran Ajr: The most famous operation took place on September 21, 1987, when SEALs boarded the Iranian vessel Iran Ajr after it had been immobilized by AH-6 helicopters.
• Intelligence: On board the Iran Ajr, SEALs discovered 9 mines and a logbook documenting Iran’s illegal mining activities, providing the U.S. with irrefutable political evidence.
• Security on Barges: Teams lived and operated from mobile maritime bases (barges such as the Hercules and Wimbrown VII), ensuring their defense against attacks by Iranian speedboats.

3. Impact on U.S.-Iran Relations

The operation marked a significant escalation and demonstrated the U.S. determination to use direct force.

• Deterioration of Relations: Prime Chance directly exposed Iran’s mining activities, leading to increased diplomatic isolation of Tehran.
• Precursor to Operation Praying Mantis: Evidence gathered by SEALs on the Iran Ajr allowed the U.S. to link Iranian mines to the damage sustained by the USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988, which triggered Operation Praying Mantis —the largest U.S. surface naval battle since World War II.
• Validation of USSOCOM: The operation’s success demonstrated the value of the new United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), officially established just a few months earlier, in April 1987.

Maritime Security Forum

A Brief History: Prime Chance and Praying Mantis (1987–1988) – Lessons on “Low-Cost” Maritime Warfare

1) Context and Objective

In 1987, amid the Iran–Iraq War and the escalation of attacks on neutral shipping (the so-called “Tanker War”), the United States launched Operation Earnest Will (July 1987) to escort oil tankers and maintain freedom of navigation. In parallel, Operation Prime Chance (August 1987–June 1989) was initiated, a discreet component focused on detecting and preventing mine laying and asymmetric attacks, which helped consolidate the new Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), created in April 1987.

2) Operational Environment: Why the Persian Gulf Favors Asymmetric Tactics

Although the Persian Gulf appears on the map to be a relatively open basin, for “heavy-tonnage” commercial shipping routes are constrained by shallow waters, islands, shoals, oil platforms, and traffic lanes. This geography transforms the area into a “glove ” in which a coastal actor can launch attacks using inexpensive means (mines, fast boats, coastal missiles), forcing escort vessels to operate predictably and with a short reaction time.

3) The Threat and the Concept of Response

The commander of U.S. forces in the area, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, summarized the problem as follows: to succeed in the northern Gulf, intensive patrols were needed to prevent the laying of mines. The main adversary was the Iranian “coastal fleet”: small boats used by the Revolutionary Guards for mining and rapid strikes against commercial vessels, including with unguided rockets, RPG launchers, and machine guns. The logic was simple: low cost for the attacker, disproportionate costs and risk for the escort and commerce.

4) Forces and organization: “combined” operation and mobile maritime bases

Prime Chance combined conventional forces with special operations (special operations aviation, SEAL teams, fast boat units, marines, and elements of the Navy). Missions were initially launched from command ships and frigates, and later from improvised mobile maritime bases (civilian barges converted into operating platforms), positioned in international waters near Farsi Island. The choice of barges generated bureaucratic controversy (vulnerability to air attack), but offered a practical advantage: a persistent presence near areas of interest, with lower cost and operational signature than a permanent deployment of large ships.

Prime Chance was a joint special operations and conventional force operation that utilized personnel from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) – 160th SOAR, or the “Night Stalkers” – SEALs, Special Boat Units, Marines, and Navy. Prime Chance began with missions launched from Bernsen’s flagship, the command ship USS La Salle (AGF 3), and the frigates USS Jarrett (FFG 33) and Klakring (FFG 42) . Additional missions were planned to be staged from two large oil platform construction barges—Hercules and Wimbrown VII—located in Bahrain, which were converted into mobile sea bases (MSBs). Once operational, they would then be deployed to international waters near Farsi Island in the northern Gulf. The conversion of the barges, and in particular their planned deployment location, sparked a bureaucratic storm among traditionalists in the Pentagon, who opposed the concept of a mobile sea base. Program chiefs of staff, critics of the plan, argued that the MSBs would be irresistible targets, dangerously vulnerable to air attack. With memories of the in 1983 on the Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, still fresh in their minds, some went so far as to call the barges “Beirut Barracks.”

5) Summary Timeline (1987–1988)

· Aug.–Sept. 1987: Establishment of patrols and the concept of mine interdiction; preparation of platforms (barges) as mobile maritime bases.

· Sept. 1987: Identification and cessation of mine laying by the vessel Iran Ajr; capture of the crew and recovery of evidence (mines/logbook).

· Oct. 1987: The Farsi Island incident (exchanges of fire with Iranian vessels) and the intensification of surveillance/patrol operations.

· Oct. 1987: Operation Nimble Archer (striking oil platforms used as support/observation points).

· Apr. 14, 198 8: USS Samuel B. Roberts strikes a mine; the ship is severely damaged but saved by effective damage control.

· Apr. 18, 1988: Operation Praying Mantis – U.S. naval retaliation: striking platforms and engaging Iranian naval units; significant reduction in attacks on commercial shipping thereafter.

6) Results and Costs (“Cost-Asymmetric” Logic)

The campaign demonstrated how quickly a low-cost means (naval mines) can produce disproportionate effects: severe damage, logistical blockages, high repair costs, and political pressure for escalation or de-escalation. At the same time, the response required costly and scarce capabilities (mine hunting, surveillance, helicopters, clear rules of engagement), plus coordination between conventional forces and special operations.

7) Lessons for maritime security (current relevance)

a) “Low-tech” threats remain strategic: mines, fast boats, and low-cost attacks can constrain vital routes and impose high costs on the defender.

b) Persistent presence and early warning matter: patrols, sensors, ISR, and the ability to act quickly reduce the miner’s freedom of maneuver.

c) Mine hunting is a niche but critical capability: if underfunded, the adversary gains a disproportionate advantage.

d) Rules of engagement and governance: a lack of clarity regarding what can be protected and when force can be used increases the risk of escalation or ineffectiveness.

e) The connection to the present: the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) logic is also found today in the mine–drone–coastal missile combination; protecting maritime routes requires a mix of expensive solutions (air defense, ships) and scalable solutions (anti-drone measures, countermeasures, logistical redundancy) .

But the Iranian government refused to back down. On October 22, it launched an attack on the Sea Island oil terminal in Kuwait, which handled one-third of the country’s oil exports. It also intensified its anti-shipping campaign, carrying out 27 attacks in November and December, which sank one commercial vessel and caused two others to suffer a total loss. The increased attacks continued until 1988.

Maritime Security Forum

Lessons for the European Union from Recent Conflicts (Iran/Ukraine): Implications for Security, Defense, and Industry – Maritime Security Forum

The text below is reworded from the European Union’s perspective: with an emphasis on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the Strategic Compass, and the strengthening of the European defense industrial base.

From the EU’s perspective, these conflicts confirm that European security can no longer be treated as a “hypothetical scenario,” but rather as a public policy that must be implemented through EU instruments: crisis management (CSDP), protection of infrastructure and society (resilience, countering hybrid threats), coordinated investments and partnerships (particularly with NATO and “like-minded” partners) . The EU’s Strategic Compass already provides direction through 2030, and the Defense Industrial Agenda aims to reduce fragmentation and increase production capacity. Within this framework, “lessons” can be translated into concrete measures for Member States and EU institutions.

1. Cohesion and interoperability win wars; shared capabilities ensure deterrence.

2. Stockpiles and production rates are just as decisive as technology.

From the EU’s perspective, “inventory” (ammunition, missiles, interceptors, spare parts) and the ability to replenish it quickly are becoming key indicators of military resilience. Sophisticated systems (air and missile defense) must be complemented by scalable and relatively inexpensive solutions (e.g., anti-drone countermeasures) , as well as by multi-year contracts that provide the industry with a stable signal. EU initiatives to boost production and joint procurement (such as the instruments for stimulating ammunition production and for joint procurement) are relevant precisely to reduce the risk that member states will end up in a “shortage economy” in the first months of a crisis.

3. Strengthening the European defense industrial base is a prerequisite for strategic autonomy (open).

The EU starts from a structural reality: the fragmentation of demand (27 different budgets, requirements, and timelines) leads to industrial fragmentation and external dependencies. For this reason, the European defense industrial strategy aims to increase the proportion of “joint and European” procurement, reduce the number of equipment types for the same missions, and create more robust supply chains (raw materials, propellants, explosives, components). For Member States, this involves shifting from one-off procurements to joint programs covering the full life cycle (development–production–maintenance–modernization) and using EU funding as a “multiplier,” not as a substitute for national budgets.

4. In a crisis, time is a capability: mobility, prepositioning, and rapid response matter.

For the EU, the lesson is that forces and assets must be “in place” before the crisis: military mobility (infrastructure, authorizations, transport), prepositioning, theater stocks, and command-and-control capabilities. The EU’s rapid deployment capability (operational objective) and CSDP missions can complement national and NATO postures, but only if supported by joint planning and exercises. At the same time, the protection

critical infrastructure and the response to hybrid threats (cyber, sabotage, information manipulation) must be integrated into defense plans, as they can slow down mobilization and erode public cohesion.

5. Partnerships and solidarity must be operationalized: rules, access, contributions, and burden-sharing.

From the EU’s perspective, “alliances ” means both political cohesion and practical readiness: consultation mechanisms, procedures for access to infrastructure and airspace, legal interoperability (status of forces, transit), as well as proportional contributions to common objectives. The EU has a distinct role from NATO: it can aggregate demand, reduce market fragmentation, can finance industrial capacity growth, and can integrate non-military dimensions (sanctions, trade, energy, societal resilience). At the same time, EU–NATO complementarity remains essential: the EU is increasing its capacity for action, while NATO remains the collective defense framework for most member states.

Conclusion (EU framework): To turn lessons into real capability, the EU needs (1) joint planning and exercises, (2) stockpiles and accelerated production, (3) joint procurement and standardization, (4) mobility and prepositioning, (5) predictable partnerships, particularly with NATO and “like-minded” partners . In practice, this means better-coordinated investments among member states and the coherent use of EU instruments to reduce fragmentation and critical dependencies.

Maritime Security Forum

IMO has developed a plan for the evacuation of ships from Middle Eastern waters – Maritime Security Forum

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has proposed an operational framework for the evacuation of commercial vessels from Middle Eastern waters, particularly the Persian Gulf region, in response to a request from the IMO Council. The initiative aims to reduce risks to seafarers and to facilitate, under controlled conditions, the departure of vessels that have been stranded in the area due to escalating maritime security tensions.

The IMO emphasized that this evacuation framework is voluntary and is designed to respect and uphold the rights and freedoms of navigation enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law. The mechanism is intended for commercial vessels subject to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) that are currently stranded/held in the Persian Gulf and wish to leave the region in a coordinated and safe manner.

From a practical standpoint, the evacuation would utilize the eastbound traffic lane of the existing and agreed Traffic Separation Scheme to reduce interaction with high-risk areas and allow for an orderly flow of transit. In such a framework, traffic management and departure sequencing (e.g., based on vulnerability, cargo, duration of stay, and crew condition) become essential elements for safe navigation in a narrow and heavily monitored maritime space.

To support implementation, the IMO announced that it has worked closely with relevant states and industry partners to identify affected ships and develop an operational list of eligible vessels. This list is to be maintained and updated

by the IMO as part of its oversight and coordination role, so that the evacuation proceeds based on a common operational picture (number of ships, positions, logistical needs, humanitarian priorities).

Before the plan can be implemented, the IMO makes the operation of the framework contingent on a minimum set of safeguards: the parties involved must explicitly commit explicitly undertake to refrain from any attack on maritime assets during the evacuation and to keep military assets at a distance from ships in transit, to avoid incidents, escalations, or misinterpretations. Furthermore, the framework requires practical coordination (communications, routing, transit windows, logistical support) to ensure an acceptable level of predictability in a volatile context.

IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez emphasized that the evacuation cannot begin without a sufficiently safe transit environment: there must be no credible threats of attack nor maritime hazards that could affect the ships (including naval mines), as any incident would compromise both the protection of crews and the legitimacy of the proposed humanitarian mechanism.

Sources (selective):

· International Maritime Organization (IMO), IMO condemns attacks on shipping, calls for safe-passage framework in Strait of Hormuz, press release (March 19, 2026).

· Baird Maritime, IMO develops plan for evacuation of ships from Middle East waters (April 22, 2026).

· Marine Log, 20,000 seafarers are trapped in the Middle East: IMO calls for safe evacuation framework (March 20, 2026).

· Business Standard (Bloomberg), IMO prepares evacuation plan for hundreds of ships stuck in the Persian Gulf (April 21, 2026).

Maritime Security Forum

A defense technology company reported a successful test: firing a laser weapon from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier – Maritime Security Forum

AeroVironment’s palletized laser weapon system, installed on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush. The system was successfully demonstrated aboard the aircraft carrier in October 2025, when it tracked, engaged, and neutralized multiple target drones. US Navy

Defense technology company AeroVironment (AV) announced that it had successfully demonstrated, under maritime conditions, its high-energy laser system, the LOCUST® Laser Weapon System (LWS), installed in a palletized (containerized) configuration on the flight deck of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush (CVN

-77). According to the company’s statements, the test was conducted in October 2025 and aimed to validate the operation of a “plug-and-play” system on a large naval platform without complex structural modifications to the ship.

The demonstration was conducted in collaboration with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) . During a live-fire exercise (live-fire), the palletized laser system (P-HEL) detected, tracked, and engaged multiple drone-type aerial targets, which it neutralized. The test is presented as a milestone for the rapid integration of directed-energy weapons into force protection and anti-drone defense missions in the maritime environment.

AV claims that the demonstration confirms the platform-agnostic nature of the LOCUST family: the same technological core can be used on both fixed or mobile land platforms as well as on moving naval platforms. From an integration perspective, the system is designed with roll-on/roll-off capabilities (it can be quickly installed and removed), and power can be supplied either by recharging its own batteries or through direct power from the host vessel. Operationally, this architecture promises a reduced logistical footprint and the possibility of a virtually extended defensive “range,” limited primarily by the availability of electrical power.

In public statements, John Garrity, vice president of directed energy systems at AeroVironment, described LOCUST as an “all-domain” protection solution against emerging drone threats, highlighting the advantage of rapid installation on naval platforms without lengthy integration work. The is that such systems can complement traditional defenses (kinetic munitions and missiles) with rapid and precise effects, featuring very short reaction times against small aerial targets.

Beyond the kinetic effect, the company emphasizes easy integration: the system can be brought on board as a standalone module, can operate long-term using the ship’s power, or can function autonomously via its own battery bank, limiting the need for consumables and reducing installation complexity. In terms of operational concept, this would allow for the temporary deployment of the capability (for example, during rotations or in high-risk areas) without tying the ship down in costly upgrades.

AV also states that LOCUST uses open interfaces and a common system architecture (laser weapon system architecture) that can meet the requirements of multiple U.S. service branches, facilitating interoperability and component reuse. If this approach proves successful in operation, it could reduce the fragmentation of counter-UAS solutions and accelerate the transition from demonstrations to distributed operational capabilities.

Sources (for the section on the LOCUST/

LWS):· AeroVironment, “AV Successfully Demonstrates LOCUST Laser Weapon System Aboard USS George H.W. Bush,” press release distributed via Business Wire / Yahoo Finance (April 21, 2026).· Xavier Vavasseur, “AV demonstrates LOCUST Laser Weapon System aboard Aircraft Carrier,” Naval News (April 21, 2026).· Fatima Bahtić, “US Navy fires laser weapon from aircraft carrier, destroys drones in ‘historic’ test,” Naval Today (April 21, 2026). · Will Xavier, “Technology firm reports successful test firing of laser weapon from US Navy aircraft carrier,” Baird Maritime (April 22, 2026).Maritime Security ForumThe US Navy will integrate, for the first time, Patriot missiles on combat ships – Maritime Security ForumImage of a U.S. Navy warship launching a Lockheed Martin PAC-3 MSE missileThe U.S. government has awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to develop, integrate, and test the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor missile into the Aegis naval combat system Aegis.With this step, the U.S. Navy becomes, for the first time, a user of the PAC-3 MSE—an interceptor already in service with the U.S. Army and used by 16 partner nations.The company notes that the new contract is based on a framework agreement signed with the “Department of War” to accelerate the production and delivery of interceptors, with Lockheed Martin projecting record deliveries in 2026.Prior to government funding, Lockheed Martin states that it invested its own funds to integrate the interceptor with Aegis and the Mk 41 vertical launch system, in line with maritime defense priorities.The PAC-3 MSE uses the “hit-to-kill” principle, which destroys the target through kinetic energy, not fragmentation. According to the company, the interceptor can engage ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as hypersonic threats and other aerial targets.Chandra Marshall, vice president of Multi-Domain Combat Solutions at Lockheed Martin, noted that the integration expands the A Aegis’s ability to engage threats “in layers,” for a more comprehensive defense in contested environments.Maritime Security Forum“Golden Fleet” Proposed for $1.5 Trillion U.S. Defense Budget – Maritime Security ForumShipbuilding Boom: 18 Warships, the largest since 1962A Trump-class warship rendering of the U.S. NavyThe Pentagon released additional details on Tuesday regarding President Donald Trump’s defense budget request for fiscal year 2027, totaling approximately $1.5 trillion. According to media reports, this would represent the largest annual increase in defense spending in the postwar period (since World War II), signaling an acceleration of investments in modernization and in capabilities deemed critical for strategic competition.

A new element in the budget architecture is the introduction of a category called “presidential priorities”, which groups funding for: the Golden Dome missile defense system, “drone dominance” (drones and counter- , artificial intelligence, data infrastructure, and strengthening the defense industrial base. The message conveyed by U.S. officials is that these lines of effort should accelerate the transition from fragmented programs to portfolios of scalable capabilities.

By comparison, the previous year, the White House requested a national defense budget of $892.6 billion USD, to which it later added $150 billion through a supplemental request, pushing the total past the $1 trillion threshold for the first time in history. The new proposal for 2027, however, significantly raises the bar, both in terms of volume as well as in terms of political ambition.

In the area of shipbuilding, the proposal includes over $65 billion for the acquisition of 18 combat ships and 16 support ships, built by major U.S. contractors General Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries, as part of the initiative known as “Golden Fleet”. Officials presented the package as the largest shipbuilding request since the early 1960s, signaling an effort to rapidly expand the fleet and strengthen production chains.

On the air component, the Pentagon is expected to increase purchases of Lockheed Martin F-35s to 85 aircraft per year and allocate approximately $102 billion for aviation acquisitions, research, and development (a reported increase of about 26% over the previous year). At the same time, investments in next-generation systems are mentioned, including the development of the Boeing F-47, as well as a request for $6.1 billion for the Northrop Grumman B-21 bomber.

Regarding unmanned systems, officials described the request as the largest U.S. investment to date in the drone war and in counter-drone technologies. The package would request $53.6 billion for autonomous platforms and logistics in combat zones, plus $21 billion for munitions, counter-drone solutions, and other advanced systems.

One item likely to draw Congress’s attention is funding for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG): from approximately $225 million previously, the budget would increase to approximately $54 billion. According to reports, most of this amount would be allocated to the application and scaling of existing technologies (not long-term fundamental research), and the DAWG would essentially have taken over the previous Replicator initiative.

Regarding munitions,

the proposal includes extending multi-year contracts for several programs, arguing that longer-term commitments provide predictability for both large defense industry companies and small and medium-sized suppliers in the supply chain. In theory, this tool should stimulate investment in production capacity and reduce the risk of “bottlenecks” during a crisis.

Regarding human resources, the proposal would include a differentiated pay raise: 7% for enlisted personnel in lower ranks, 6% for mid-level ranks, and 5% for senior ranks. Additionally, plans call for expanding the force by approximately 44,000 service members in fiscal year 2027, following the addition of over 20,000 in 2026.

Notably, the proposal would not include dedicated funding for the conflict with Iran. A senior official indicated that, due to the budget process timeline, a supplemental budget request may be necessary to cover short-term operational costs and resupply needs resulting from operations.

The total of approximately $1.5 trillion is presented as consisting of a funding request of about $1.15 trillion (base budget) and an of approximately $350 billion, which would be adopted through a reconciliation legislative mechanism, similar to the format used the previous year. This structure aims to provide flexibility for accelerated investments in capabilities and the defense industry.

Sources (for the U.S. FY2027 defense budget / “Golden Fleet”) :

· Reuters (Mike Stone), “Trump’s $1.5 Trillion Defense Budget Includes $750 Billion for Ships, Jets and Golden Dome,” republished by U.S. News (April 21, 2026).

· The White House, “Fiscal Year 2027 Topline” (fact sheet), April 2026.

· USNI News, “Pentagon ’s New $65.8B Shipbuilding Request is Highest Since 1962” (April 3, 2026).

· CSIS, Seamus P. Daniels, “Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion FY 2027 Defense Budget Topline” (April 10, 2026).

Maritime Security Forum

U.S. drone company unveils two new USV concepts – Maritime Security Forum

BlackSea Technologies’ new high-speed USV design BlackSea Technologies

BlackSea Technologies has announced the launch of two new small unmanned surface vessel (USVs), intended to expand the company’s portfolio in the segment of modular and highly autonomous platforms.

According to the company, the first concept is a modular USV, designed to accommodate different payloads depending on the mission, and the second is a high-speed platform,

designed to bridge the gap between very small tactical craft and larger unmanned combat vessels—that is, to offer a faster, more robust intermediate option for combat-oriented applications.

The modular variant is geared toward increasing payload capacity and autonomy/range , without sacrificing deployment speed. An important practical feature is the requirement for containerization: the company states that the platform was designed to fit into a standard 20-foot container, which simplifies strategic transport, storage, and rapid deployment to distant theaters.

For the high-speed platform, the company specifies a length of approximately 13.1 meters and a maximum speed of over 45 knots, parameters that suggest a focus on missions with high reaction and maneuverability requirements.

BlackSea Technologies states that this platform can carry a payload of approximately 4,536 kg (including fuel, depending on configuration) and can support missions such as mine countermeasures and surface warfare, indicating potential use in distributed “sensor/effector” roles.

The development also involved industrial partners. For the modular USV, the company mentions collaborations with Lockheed Martin (integration of launchers) and Echodyne (radar). For the high-speed platform, contributions from Volvo Penta (propulsion) and Seakeeper (gyroscopic stabilization) are mentioned, indicating an architecture based on mature commercial subsystems adapted for military use.

The company backs up its credibility with the track record of its previous platform, the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC): BlackSea Technologies claims to have delivered over 350 units and that these have accumulated tens of thousands of operational hours during naval deployments—a relevant argument in a field where the difference between “demo” and actual use is often decisive.

For the modular variant, BlackSea further notes that the design is geared toward rapid reconfiguration: most payloads could be swapped out in a few hours to transition from one mission to another (e.g., maritime surveillance, logistical support, surface warfare, or MCM missions) without long periods of downtime.

Overall, the high-speed platform is presented as a “multiplier” for distributed operations, offering an intermediate solution between very small USVs (with limited range and payload) and large unmanned vessels (more expensive and harder to deploy rapidly) .

Conclusions

1) Modularity + containerization point to a pragmatic direction: rapid deployment, simpler integration into existing logistics chains, and the ability to scale up presence in areas of interest without immediately committing large, expensive platforms.

2) The mentioned mission set (particularly mine countermeasures and surface warfare) suggests that these USVs are designed to increase the density of sensors and effectors in the maritime domain—a response to “low-cost” tactics that impose disproportionate costs (mines, drones, fast boats).

3) The reference to over 350 units delivered and tens of thousands of operational hours (GARC) is directly relevant: production maturity and operational experience tend to carry more weight than specifications on paper when naval forces move to procurement and sustained use.

Sources

· Alan Bosworth, Another US drone firm launches two new USV designs, Baird Maritime (April 21, 2026).

· BlackSea Technologies, BlackSea Technologies Launches Chaser and Comet USVs at Sea-Air-Space 2026 (April 20, 2026).

· BlackSea Technologies, BlackSea Unveils New Family of Modular USVs (MASC) – press release (September 2025).

· Fatima Bahtić, US naval tech firm rolls out new MASC USVs, Naval Today (September 24, 2025).

Maritime Security Forum

New maritime scam offers a fake Hormuz passage for cryptocurrencies – Maritime Security Forum

A new fraud attempt exploits the operational confusion surrounding the Strait of Hormuz: according to a warning issued by the Greek maritime risk management firm MARISKS, some shipping companies have received messages promising “safe passage” through the strait in exchange for payments in cryptocurrency. The messages specifically target shipowners whose vessels are stranded west of the crossing point, at a time when information about transit conditions is fragmented and contradictory.

The context is one of heightened security: the United States has maintained a blockade on Iranian ports, and Iran has temporarily lifted and then reimposed restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz—a corridor through which, under normal conditions, approximately one-fifth of global trade in oil and liquefied natural gas passes through. In this context, any promise of a “guaranteed corridor” becomes attractive to operators, but also easily exploited by fraudulent actors.

Amid ceasefire negotiations, authorities in Tehran have floated the idea of transit fees/“tolls” for commercial vessels wishing to pass safely. MARISKS warns, however, that the messages analyzed are not linked to an official mechanism: they are formulated to mimic an “authorization” and to put pressure on waiting companies.

In the alert sent to shipowners, MARISKS noted that unknown actors, who claim to represent Iranian authorities, are demanding “transit fees” in cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin or Tether/USDT) in exchange for a so-called

“clearance” for passage. The firm emphasizes that such payments should not be made and that any communication of this type should be treated as a potential security incident (fraud + operational risk).

“These messages are a scam,” MARISKS stated, noting that they do not originate from Iranian authorities.

As of the time of publication, there has been no immediate official comment from Tehran.

Meanwhile, the crisis has caused a significant bottleneck: hundreds of ships and approximately 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf, increasing commercial pressure, supply risks, and vulnerability to misinformation or scams.

On April 18, Iran briefly opened the strait, subject to inspections. Several ships attempted to transit, but at least two —including an oil tanker—reported that Iranian vessels fired shots, causing the ships to retreat and return to anchor.

MARISKS indicated that there are indications that at least one of the ships that attempted to exit the strait and was hit by gunfire may have been influenced by fraudulent messages (for example, by creating the false impression that the transit had been “arranged” and was safe).

Reuters noted that it could not independently verify the information or quickly identify the companies that received the messages—an important detail, as such fraud campaigns are difficult to attribute and can be rapidly replicated in various forms.

In the wording cited by MARISKS, the message promised that, after submitting certain documents and undergoing an “eligibility assessment” by the purported Iranian security services, the recipient would be informed of the “fee” to be paid in cryptocurrency (BTC or USDT), after which the vessel could transit “without hindrance ” at a pre-arranged time. The message’s structure is typical of impersonal scams: it invokes authority, introduces an apparently official process, and demands a payment that is difficult to recover.

Conclusions

· Operational and cyber risks overlap: at a chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz, false messages can lead to hasty decisions (transit exits) with immediate physical consequences.

· Crises create “demand” for informal services: discussions about transit fees and verification procedures can be easily imitated, and payment in cryptocurrencies (BTC/USDT) reduces the chances of recovery.

· Best practice recommendation: any offer of “safe passage” must be validated through official channels (flag state authority, shipping agent, P&I club, naval coordination centers/UKMTO, government channels), not through unsolicited messages.

· Need for internal procedures: companies should treat such messages as an incident (reporting, preservation of evidence, blocking payments, assessing the impact on the routing plan and crew safety).

Sources

· Reuters, “Scam Messages Offering Ships Safe Transit Through Hormuz, Security Firm Warns” (April 21, 2026) – republished by U.S. News.

· Baird Maritime, “New maritime scam offers fake Hormuz passage for cryptocurrency”

(April 21, 2026).

· CoinDesk, “Crypto scammers offer safe passage through Hormuz; at least one ship may have been conned” (April 21, 2026).

Maritime Security Forum

The War China Won Without Fighting – Maritime Security Forum

The question raised by this episode is not merely whether the United States has emerged “weakened,” but whether the security environment around it has become more stable or, on the contrary, more chaotic.

While Washington was expending cruise missiles in an intense campaign and watching its vice president shuttle between capitals to manage the diplomatic crisis, Chinese leader Xi Jinping chose an approach that was seemingly mundane but strategic: to stand aside and let events take their course.

In short: he did as little as possible.

It was not, however, “nothing.” China condemned the U.S. strikes, discreetly continued its imports of Iranian oil, and reportedly supported, alongside Pakistan, efforts to bring Tehran to the negotiating table for a ceasefire—at least according to statements attributed to President Trump. Otherwise, Beijing watched as the rest of the world reassessed its risks, alliances, and dependencies. In the author’s view, this combination of minimal action and maximal positioning has offered China the best conditions in recent years to reap strategic benefits without exposing itself directly.

The implicit conclusion: the actor that could have gained the most did not fire a single shot gun.

The “military gift” that nobody asked for

The first issue, the analysis argues, is one that should keep Pentagon planners on their toes: the accelerated consumption of high-tech munitions and its ripple effects.

According to the text, the U.S. reportedly used approximately 80% of its JASSM-ER cruise missile inventory in operations related to Iran, depleting stocks in the Pacific. In the same narrative, the campaign has put pressure on Tomahawk and Patriot reserves, THAAD interceptors, and drones—a sign that “stores ” can run out faster than they can be replenished.

The effect would already be visible in redeployments: THAAD elements would have been withdrawn from South Korea, and Patriot batteries would not have been available for other theaters, including support for Ukraine. The central message remains that, although U.S. military power is vast, it is not infinite—and a protracted campaign could shift attention and resources away from the Pacific toward the Gulf.

In this reading, Beijing would not have had to do anything to achieve this result: the dynamics would have been generated by Washington’s own decisions.

The second “gain” would have been informational: a rare window into how the U.S. military operates in modern combat—from the use of AI in the targeting cycle, to the rotation of aircraft carrier groups, to how cheap drones can wear down expensive interceptors. For Chinese planners concerned with a Taiwan scenario, observing actual operations may be worth more, in terms of learning, than exercises or satellite imagery.

The text further argues that when President Trump asked NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners for military support to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the response was, in essence, negative. In the same vein, the text mentions public rebukes directed at Japan, South Korea, and Australia for refusing to join the U.S.-led strikes, which would have exposed a fracture within the coalition.

In this interpretation, the allies would have seen the U.S. redeploying missile defense assets from Asia and shifting naval resources from the Pacific to the Gulf. The message perceived in Seoul, Tokyo, Canberra, or Taipei would have been an uncomfortable one: security guarantees may come with practical conditions, and the availability of capabilities depends on the priorities of the moment. Beijing would not have “learned” this lesson, but it might invoke it in the coming years.

How the energy equation could shift in China’s favor

The classic premise was that a war disrupting the Strait of Hormuz directly impacts China —the world’s largest oil importer—given that a significant portion of its energy imports transits this chokepoint. When the strait closed on March 4, this assumption seemed confirmed.

Except that the picture would have been more nuanced.

In the short term, the author argues, China would be relatively protected: strategic oil reserves would be high, and the share of renewables and nuclear energy would have exceeded 20% of total consumption, having surpassed oil as the second-largest energy source. Furthermore, the degree of energy self-sufficiency would be around 85%.

More importantly, the disruption would have accelerated an existing trend: when oil and gas become “weapons,” import-dependent countries accelerate their transition to alternatives. In this landscape, China would control an overwhelming share of global supply chains for solar, wind, and electric vehicles. The longer the Strait of Hormuz remains unstable, the more pressure there is to invest in “clean” energy —and this may indirectly mean greater dependence on components manufactured in China.

In support of the idea of economic gravity, the analysis cites a dataset from the Lowy Institute (January 2025), according to which 145 economies currently trade more with China than with the United States.

The energy disruption would not have reversed this trend, but could have deepened it.

Low-cost diplomacy

On the diplomatic front, the text argues that Beijing quietly supported Pakistan’s efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table in Islamabad, while American rhetoric remained tough. In the same vein, the text notes President Trump’s public acknowledgment of China’s role in bringing Tehran closer to a ceasefire agreement. The result: diplomatic credit gained with minimal exposure and visible costs.

At the same time, China condemns the strikes but maintains and expands its economic ties with Gulf states and strengthens its partnership with Russia, while also taking a pragmatic stance on the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. The message is one of “portfolio”: diverse transactional relationships, focused primarily on trade and market access.

This would not be an inconsistency, but a strategy: China does not need to choose sides to benefit. Instead, it would need the war to end without disrupting global trade and without producing a regional arrangement that excludes Chinese influence. A ceasefire facilitated by Pakistan—supported “behind the scenes” by Beijing—could satisfy both conditions.

A major effect would have been “demonstrative” : exposing the limits of American coercive power—not only in the region, but also in the eyes of actors calibrating their strategic alignment. According to the text, governments from Riyadh to Jakarta would have seen the U.S. enter a war without a robust domestic consensus, straining its alliances, depleting ammunition in the Pacific, and securing a fragile ceasefire. The conclusions, in this reading, almost present themselves, without Beijing having to “lobby.”

“The AI Window”: Investments, Data Centers, and Geopolitical Risk

The analysis also introduces a less visible dimension: AI infrastructure. Massive investments in data centers and technology acquisitions in Gulf states—by companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, or Nvidia—would have become riskier following strikes on targets associated with this ecosystem. In contrast, China is said to already possess significant domestic computing capacity and does not critically depend on expansion in the Gulf to scale up.

If this Western infrastructure slows down, the argument is that Beijing gains time and space: every dollar tied up in delayed projects is a dollar not building an alternative. In the race for computing power—one of the defining competitions of the coming decade—a Gulf perceived as unstable could reshape investment decisions, narrowing the gap between Western infrastructure in the region and China’s, for reasons more related to geopolitics than to export controls.

The limits are real

The text does not portray China as an “absolute beneficiary

.” On the contrary, it emphasizes that Xi would not seek merely to diminish the U.S., but to maintain an order stable enough for the global economy to function. Beijing would not automatically interpret every American failure as a gain; rather, it would wait, observe, and calculate whether the environment is becoming more stable or more chaotic.

The reason is pragmatic: China’s economy remains structurally dependent on external demand—Europe absorbs a significant portion of Chinese exports. A prolonged energy shock, pushing Europe and the U.S. into recession, would reduce orders and amplify internal vulnerabilities. In the cited analysis, a standard model would indicate a decline of approximately 0.5% in China’s GDP for every 25% increase in the price of oil.

Therefore, according to the text, Chinese officials reportedly conveyed that Beijing wishes to see a swift end to the conflict. A prolonged war, which keeps the Strait of Hormuz disrupted and pushes major economies toward a slowdown, would not be a Chinese “victory,” but a shared loss—even if the short-term benefits may be asymmetrical.

The distinction is important: China would have gained from the war, without having designed it for that purpose. Beijing’s preference would remain a level of stability sufficient for trade flows to continue and influence to accumulate gradually. War would have offered short-term tactical advantages, but it could threaten the conditions for long-term growth—and this ambivalence would explain the strategic caution.

The Big Picture: Who Loses, Who Gains

In this narrative, the war produced a long list of losers: Iran, the indirectly affected Gulf states, economies affected by the energy shock, and a U.S. that reportedly spent billions and consumed critical ammunition. In the energy market, the International Energy Agency (IEA) described the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz as “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market”, as transit through the strait plummeted compared to pre-conflict levels.

By contrast, China reportedly avoided direct military involvement, reducing its exposure to human and material costs, while observing and exploiting opportunities to position itself.

In the author’s view, Beijing closely monitored U.S. operations and their side effects: missile defense redeployments, tensions with allies, and a growing global push toward energy alternatives where China holds an industrial advantage. Furthermore, the text argues, China has reportedly gained diplomatic credit for its support of the ceasefire process, while simultaneously maintaining its public message of “peace and stability.”

Even so, the ceasefire remains described as fragile, and negotiations continue. However, the analysis concludes,

the strategic balance of the past few weeks has shifted in a direction that does not favor Washington.

Conclusions

· The advantage of “non-involvement”: in certain crises, gains can come from positioning and exploiting secondary effects, not from direct intervention.

· The cost of modern warfare: the rapid consumption of precision munitions and interceptors puts pressure on stocks and forces redeployments that affect other theaters.

· The demonstrative effect on alliances: public tensions with partners and decisions to prioritize resources can alter the perception of the credibility of commitments.

· Energy and transition: shocks at chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz accelerate investment in alternatives, and industrial advantage in supply chains becomes a tool of influence.

· Stability as an interest: short-term benefits may be offset by macroeconomic costs, which is why major powers often seek “sufficient stability,” not chaos.

Sources

· Rameen Siddiqui, “Xi’s Free Masterclass: The War China Won Without Fighting,” Modern Diplomacy (April 21, 2026) – republished on Other News.

· Lowy Institute, Roland Rajah & Ahmed Albayrak, “China versus America on global trade” (Data Snapshot, January 2025).

· International Energy Agency (IEA), Oil Market Report – March 2026 (March 12, 2026).

· Reuters Graphics, “How the Strait of Hormuz closure affects global oil supply” (March 11, 2026).

Maritime Security Forum

War in Iran Triggers Unprecedented Energy Shock: Disruption to Global Supply Exceeds Historical Crises – Maritime Security Forum

The ongoing conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has triggered what analysts describe as the most significant disruption to oil and gas supplies in modern history.

The war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has struck a direct blow to the “lifeline” of the world: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered a major shock in the oil and gas markets, which many analysts describe as the most severe in modern times. Essentially, we are not just talking about a few days of volatility, but about a disruption that simultaneously affects physical flows (deliveries), prices, insurance, shipping routes, and confidence in the functioning of global energy trade.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned that this episode, superimposed on the “tail” of the 2022 European gas crisis (following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) , is shaping what could be the most severe global energy crisis in decades. To ease price pressures and offset supply losses, IEA member states have agreed, among other measures, to an exceptional release of strategic reserves.

Inevitably, the shock has reignited comparisons with the major crises of the 20th century: the 1973 oil embargo, the 1978–1979 Iranian Revolution, and the 1991 Gulf War. The difference, however, analysts point out, is that today’s markets are more interconnected, and the Gulf region exports not only crude oil but also significant volumes of refined products and natural gas—so the shockwave is spreading faster and in more directions.

A broader and more complex shock than in the past

Unlike the “classic” crises, the current disruption is not limited to crude oil. The blockage in the Strait of Hormuz has simultaneously affected natural gas, LNG, refined products (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel), as well as seemingly distant supply chains, such as fertilizer supplies. In practical terms, this means that the pressure is felt not only at the pump, but also in transportation costs, food prices, and the stability of energy- and petrochemical-dependent industrial sectors.

The stakes are higher precisely because markets have changed. In recent decades, demand has grown, energy trade has become globally “just-in-time,” and Gulf states have moved up the value chain: they no longer export only crude oil, but also refined fuels. The region’s major refineries now supply significant quantities of diesel and jet fuel to Europe, Asia, and Africa—and when these flows stop, the effect is immediately felt in costs and availability.

A critical point is LNG: the disruption of a significant portion of Qatar’s production amplifies the shock in a world far more dependent on gas than in the 20th century. For many economies, gas has become the “safety net” of the energy transition; precisely for this reason, a simultaneous disruption in oil and gas supplies has a greater potential to turn into an economic and social crisis.

The scale of the supply loss: over 12 million barrels per day

According to estimates cited by the IEA and Reuters, the peak supply loss exceeded 12 million barrels per day—approximately 11.5% of average annual global demand (around 104 million barrels per day). As a “daily shock,” this would be the largest on record, mainly because the Strait of Hormuz has gone from a corridor with massive flows to a “single thread,” and bypass capacity is limited.

By comparison, the peaks of frequently cited historical disruptions were smaller:

· ~4.5 million barrels per day during the 1973–1974 oil embargo;

· ~5.6 million barrels per day during the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979);

· ~4.3 million barrels/day during the Gulf War (1991).

In other words, the daily magnitude of the loss is unprecedented—but the full picture depends on duration and how quickly routes and production can be restored.

Duration and cumulative impact: from “shock” to crisis

While the daily shock indicates how severe the immediate impact is, the cumulative loss shows how deeply the crisis penetrates the economy: the longer the conflict lasts, the more “lost” barrels accumulate

“lost,” logistical delays, and ripple effects.

In the cited article, the conflict is estimated to last about 52 days, and the cumulative loss at approximately 624 million barrels—a figure comparable to the total losses from the 1973 embargo (estimated at between 530–650 million barrels).However, in the long term, the Iranian Revolution remains the benchmark for the “marathon”: between 1978 and 1981, cumulative losses are estimated at over 4 billion barrels, even though part of this was subsequently offset by production increases in other countries.The major difference today is the logistical “bottleneck”: even producers with available capacity (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates) cannot quickly make up for the loss, because the problem is not just production, but transportation. With traffic through the Strait of Hormuz nearly blocked and alternative routes limited, the flexibility that has helped markets during historical crises is drastically reduced.Where it’s felt most acutely: Asia and Africa, then the rest of the worldThe first signs of strain have appeared particularly in Asia and Africa, where dependence on Gulf imports is high and fuel shortages emerge more quickly. In the ’70s, the embargo hit the United States and Europe hard, with shortages and lines at gas stations; today, the distribution of demand and refining capacity has shifted, and the “epicenter” of immediate effects is often seen in the importing markets of the Global South.The change is structural: global demand has risen, a larger share of consumption is in Asia, and trade in refined products has become much more significant. That is why disruptions are no longer “just about oil,” but about the entire chain—from refining to transportation to final prices.Comparison with recent crises: the lesson of 2022The energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shook Europe to its core, particularly in the gas sector. In terms of “daily” oil loss volume, the impact was smaller than that now attributed to the Strait of Hormuz blockade; yet the lesson from 2022 remains relevant: when energy becomes a geopolitical tool, the effects quickly feed into inflation, industry, and public budgets.In Russia’s case, part of the exports was rerouted, which mitigated the cumulative impact over time. In the case of Hormuz, rerouting is much more difficult, as the blockade affects a narrow geographic point, and transport alternatives have limited capacity.Analysis: a “systemic” crisis, not just a price spikeEssentially, the war in Iran is causing a different kind of energy shock: one that is simultaneous, multi-market, and has systemic implications. Whereas in the past the problem was usually “crude oil,” now gas, refined products, and industrial inputs are all being blocked, which multiplies the points of vulnerability in economies.

Worse still, even where production exists, it cannot be “delivered”: exports through the straits are nearly paralyzed, storage facilities are filling up, and some Gulf refineries are scaling back or halting operations due to a lack of export outlets. In a global market, the lack of mobility of barrels can matter just as much as the lack of barrels.Another difference from the past is speed: modern supply chains are deeply integrated, and energy is a cross-cutting input (transportation, agriculture, chemicals, healthcare). When a shock strikes multiple points at once, the effects spread faster and farther, from commodity costs to social stability.Ultimately, duration is everything. If flows do not return to normal relatively quickly, cumulative losses may end up rivaling the most severe historical episodes—and some economies will be forced to cut consumption (“demand destruction”) or accelerate the substitution of imports. In such a scenario, the energy shock transforms from a price crisis into a crisis of economic security.The underlying conclusion is uncomfortable: despite diversification, the global economy remains exposed to maritime chokepoints. Hormuz shows how quickly a local geopolitical risk can become a problem of inflation, economic growth, and political stability on a global scale.The crisis inevitably pushes the discussion toward resilience: strategic stocks, alternative routes, refining capacity, as well as accelerating the transition to more diversified energy systems. But the war also highlights the limits of the transition: until dependence on hydrocarbons decreases substantially, such blockages remain capable of causing major shocks.Conclusions· Hormuz remains a systemic risk: a bottleneck at a single point can simultaneously affect oil, gas, refined products, and non-energy sectors (e.g., fertilizers).· The “magnitude” of the shock has two sides: the daily loss may be unprecedented, but the final severity depends on the duration of the disruption and the pace of transport resumption.· Resilience is not just about production, but logistics: the ability to bypass a bottleneck and the availability of tonnage/insurance become just as important as the barrels produced.· Energy policies will be reconfigured: crises of this type accelerate both the use of strategic reserves and investments in diversification (including low-emission energy). · Risk of “demand destruction”: if prices remain high, consumption falls, and the impact shifts from the energy market to the broader economy (inflation, industry, growth).Sources (for the section on the energy shock):· Sana Khan, “Iran War Triggers Record Energy Shock as Global Supply Disruption Surpasses Historic Crises,” Modern Diplomacy (April 22, 2026).· Alex Lawler, “Explainer: How the Iran war oil and gas supply shock compares with past disruptions,” Reuters – republished by U.S. News (April 22, 2026).· International Energy Agency (IEA), Oil Market Report – March 2026 (March 12, 2026). · Reuters Connect, photo: “An LPG gas tanker at anchor as traffic is down in the Strait of Hormuz, in Shinas, Oman,” photo by Benoit Tessier (March 11, 2026).Maritime Security ForumMalacca Transit Fee: How Iran Opened Pandora’s Box for International Straits – www.euronaval.roDoD, Public domain, via Wikimedia CommonsIndonesia proposes a fee for ships crossing the Strait of Malacca. Singapore pushes back. And Tehran—which has turned the Strait of Hormuz into a war-payments counter – is likely smiling with satisfaction: the precedent it set is beginning to spread.News: Jakarta wants money from ships crossing MalaccaAccording to the Jakarta Globe, Indonesian officials have publicly raised the issue of imposing a transit fee on commercial ships crossing the Strait of Malacca – one of the world’s busiest maritime thoroughfares. Pro proposal, still informal and in the stage of political statements, comes at a time of peak global tension: the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed for more than seven weeks, after Iran instituted a traffic control regime that includes both direct attacks and an informal transit fee of up to $2 million per ship.The Indonesian statement did not go unnoticed. Singapore —whose foreign minister stated categorically on April 7 that ‘there is no right of transit to be granted by the coastal state; it is a right, not a privilege’ – promptly rejected any discussion of tolls in Malacca. The Coordinating Minister for National Security, K. Shanmugam, drew a direct and somewhat uncomfortable parallel: ‘The narrowest point of the Strait of Malacca is less than two nautical miles wide. That of the Strait of Hormuz is 21. So, Malacca is ten times narrower. How should we respond if someone told us: civilian ships must pay a toll to pass through, or else face missiles, mines, or drones?’Context: From Hormuz to Malacca – a dangerous precedent

To understand why the Indonesian proposal deserves serious attention—beyond the level of a political statement—we need to take a step back to the triggering event: the U.S.-Israel war against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026.

Since then, the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly 20% of global oil and gas trade normally passes—has been transformed by Iran from a free international shipping lane into an instrument of active geopolitical pressure. The IRGC (Revolutionary Guard) has launched 21 confirmed attacks on commercial vessels, laid mines in the strait, and issued warnings prohibiting the transit of ships linked to the US, Israel, and their allies. At the same time, the Iranian parliament voted on a plan to impose transit fees —estimated at $2 million per ship.

This amount is not arbitrary. With normal traffic of about 150 tankers per day, the fee would generate approximately $20 million daily—that is, over $600 million monthly from oil transport alone. Iran proposed sharing the revenue with Oman, which controls the southern shore of the strait. Oman refused.

KEY DATA: Approx. 20% of global oil trade transits through Hormuz (pre-war: ~150 tankers/day). Proposed fee: ~$2 million/ship. For the Strait of Malacca: 102,525 transits in 2025—an all-time record—equivalent to ~280 ships/day.

Background: Why Hormuz Matters for Malacca

The issue is not that Iran has imposed a fee—it is that this fee, which is illegal under UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), has in practice been paid by dozens of ships. The logic is brutal: insurers require operators to eliminate all possible risks before guaranteeing coverage. A $2 million fee is, for an oil tanker carrying hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo, a relatively small sum.

Significantly, President Donald Trump spoke openly on April 8 about a possible “joint venture” with Iran to tax transit through the Strait of Hormuz. This statement—regardless of its exact intent—sent a devastating signal to countries bordering other international straits: if the U.S., the traditional guarantor of freedom of navigation, is discussing monetizing straits, why shouldn’t others do the same?

Analyst Logan McMillen, in an editorial published by Asia Times, logically summarizes the geopolitics of the new regime: ‘The Malacca coastal states have for decades been at a disadvantage in subsidizing global supply chains. They bear the full maintenance costs of one of the world’s most important maritime arteries—regular dredging, signaling, patrolling—without being able to collect tolls.

Why should they continue under these conditions?’

Malacca: How High the Stakes Are

The Strait of Malacca is a 900-kilometer-long stretch of water that narrows to less than 2 nautical miles at its narrowest point—nearly ten times narrower than Hormuz. About 25% of the world’s traded goods and over 40% of global energy trade (oil, LNG), including 70% of the energy imports of Japan, China, and South Korea, according to Caixin Global.

In 2025, the Strait of Malacca recorded, for the first time in history, over 100,000 transits of ships over 300 GT—an all-time record, according to the Nippon Maritime Center, which compiles data from the Malaysian Department of Marine. Specifically : approximately 280 ships per day, including 74 container ships, 60 tankers, and 57 bulk carriers.

Any disruption to this traffic would have an impact greater than what the Hormuz crisis has already caused in the global energy market. The Strait of Malacca is administered by three coastal states—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—each with distinct positions and geopolitical interests that will begin to diverge significantly in 2026.

COMPARISON: Hormuz: 21 nautical miles at its narrowest point, ~20% of global oil trade. Malacca: less than 2 nautical miles, ~25% of global trade, ~40% of energy trade.

Three coastal states, three positions

Singapore: No, period.

Singapore is existentially dependent on free navigation. Its port is the second busiest in the world. Any toll regime in the straits would pose a direct threat to its economic model. It is therefore not surprising that Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan and Coordinating Minister Shanmugam spoke the harshest: ‘ There is no right of transit to be granted by the coastal state. It is not a privilege. It is not a fee to be paid.’ Singapore has also refused to negotiate with Iran over fees for the Strait of Hormuz, unlike other Asian states.

Malaysia: Ambiguous and Pragmatic

Kuala Lumpur has taken a more nuanced position: it has chosen to negotiate with Iran regarding transit through the Strait of Hormuz—a departure from Singapore’s approach

— and has not made firm public statements against the Indonesian proposal. Malaysia is home to Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, two of the world’s top 20 ports. Its interests are complex.

Indonesia: The Geopolitical Player with Its Eyes on PowerPresident Prabowo Subianto explicitly articulated the geostrategic position: ‘Do you realize how important Indonesia is? How strategic is our position? Approximately 70% of East Asia’s energy and trade passes through our waters—Malacca, Sunda, Makassar.’ This rhetoric of leveraging an advantage is not innocent. It coincided with the announcement of a Major Defense Cooperation Partnership (MDCP) with the U.S., signed on April 13, 2026, through which Washington requested unrestricted overflight rights in Indonesian airspace—a request that Jakarta rejected internally, although it publicly confirmed the negotiations.In this turbulent domestic and regional political context, the proposal for a transit fee in Malacca takes on a dual significance: on the one hand, a trial balloon to gauge the international reaction; on the other, a domestic policy tool at a time of budgetary pressure (the central government has reduced transfers to Jakarta by 15 trillion rupiah in 2026).Read also: The Great Chessboard and Naval Power: Brzezinski in the Current ContextWhat international law says: UNCL OS and Its LimitsThe 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is clear: ships have the right to free and unimpeded transit through straits used for international navigation. Articles 37–44 explicitly prohibit the imposition of any fees for mere transit. Coastal states may impose fees only for “specific services” (pilotage, emergency towing, etc.) .The problem is that this legal framework has loopholes: neither Iran nor the U.S. has ratified UNCLOS. Iran signed it in 1982 but issued an interpretative declaration stating that the provisions on transit apply only to states parties —meaning they are not general customary law. Tehran has thus, for decades, built a legal basis to deny the right of free transit. And now it has effectively used it.In the case of the Malacca Strait, however, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have all ratified UNCLOS and would be in a much weaker legal position if they imposed fees. A direct fee would constitute a clear violation. However, as analyst McMillen notes, there is a more subtle indirect scenario: stricter environmental or operational regulations, fines for minor non-compliance, mandatory services — essentially a de facto tax cloaked in legal garb.Read also: Energy Security in International Politics: Resources, Geopolitics, and PowerThe Trend: Is Monetizing the Straits Becoming a Legitimate Option?The squaring of the circle in 2026 is that the international maritime order built on the free transit of straits—guaranteed by American military power and codified in UNCLOS —is simultaneously eroding from two directions. First: the U.S. itself, through Trump’s statements on Hormuz, has signaled that it does not consider the monetization of straits an absolute red line. Second: Iran has demonstrated that de facto tolls are paid, regardless of legality.The cumulative effect is that a number of riparian states are reevaluating the cost cost-benefit of complying with international law. Turkey already charges nominal fees in the Bosphorus (under the Montreux Convention, which permits them). The Suez Canal—an artificial – generates $700–800 million monthly for Egypt. The Panama Canal brings in approximately $4 billion annually to the Panamanian budget. Why should the Malacca states bear the full cost of 900 kilometers of dredging, patrolling, and signaling to provide free transit through the world’s busiest maritime corridor?This question, which until 2026 was purely rhetorical, is beginning to receive concrete political answers. If the Indonesian proposal takes legal form, it will be the most significant precedent in international maritime law in recent decades—even greater than the Iranian toll, precisely because it would come from a state that has ratified UNCLOS.ANALYSIS: Iran broke the taboo. Trump partially legitimized it. Indonesia has tested the limits. If Malacca follows Hormuz, the global system of free navigation—built over seven decades—begins to crack. Not through a rupture, but through a series of precedents.Read also: The Suez Canal blockage was an accident—the next one might not beConclusion: Who pays the priceCommercial ships and, ultimately, consumers. Any transit fee—whether at Hormuz or Malacca —translates into higher shipping costs, which directly impact prices for fuel, consumer goods, and raw materials. The Hormuz disruption in the first seven weeks has already created significant inflationary pressures on global energy markets.

In this context, Singapore’s response is not merely a legal stance, but a matter of economic survival. And a warning that Jakarta would do well to heed before a trial balloon becomes public policy.Primary source: Jakarta Globe, ‘Indonesia Floats Ship Tax in Malacca Strait as Singapore Defends Free Passage’. Additional sources: Reuters, Seatrade Maritime, RFERL, Asia Times, Al Jazeera, CNN, Chatham House, Wikipedia (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis), Caixin Global, FMT.Source: here