The renewed blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is again exposing the fundamental flaw in Western strategic thinking. The West still holds the persistent belief that the Islamic Republic of Iran remains a coherent, negotiable state actor. In the last few weeks, we have seen Washington talking, while Tehran responds. At any time, the reaction of European diplomats is to be cautiously optimistic. However, beneath the surface of formal diplomacy, it seems to be forgotten that there is a fractured power structure in which the very actors controlling escalation, the not-to-be-named power brokers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are neither fully aligned with, nor necessarily bound by, the commitments of Iran’s civilian government.

The mistake in assessing a U.S.–Iran deal is ignoring Iran’s internal fragmentation. Acknowledging this complexity should make policymakers feel the necessity of nuanced strategies that go beyond surface-level negotiations.

During the last decades, and again right now, Western policymakers have relied on a state-centric model of diplomacy, which inherently assumes that sovereign governments retain monopoly control over coercive instruments, aka military force, proxy networks, and economic disruption. The Iranian model, however, clearly shows that this is not reality. The IRGC, originally conceived as a guardian of the revolution, has developed and evolved over the last few decades into a parallel state, with its own economic empire, intelligence apparatus, and foreign policy agenda. At the same time, and even more pivotal, it has its own operational autonomy in theatres stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Levant.

This structural divergence is not new, and should be known to diplomats, analysts, and power brokers around the world, but it has now reached a tipping point. The current Hormuz blockade is no longer a geopolitical bargaining chip wielded by Tehran’s negotiators, who are linked or employed by the Iranian government. The current blockade, however, is clearly a demonstration of leverage by actors whose strategic objectives are not aligned with de-escalation. When assessing the IRGC, control over Hormuz is not merely a tool of negotiation; it has become a core pillar of regime survival, regional influence, and internal legitimacy.

Diplomacy’s illusion now starts to unravel.

From Washington’s perspective, it is clear that engagement remains compelling, as a possible deal can be presented as a restoration of partial stability to global energy markets and a reduction in the current risk of direct military confrontation. At the same time, even in the coming days and weeks, it reintroduces Iranian oil and gas flows into an increasingly constrained global system. Europe, as the main weak spot of all, facing structural gas insecurity and industrial fragility, is at present neither willing nor incentivized even to consider a diplomatic off-ramp.

But this logic assumes that Tehran can deliver.

Facts on the ground, or actions in Hormuz and other places, show that the Tehran government is unable to deliver. More and more, it becomes clear that the fragmentation of authority within Iran has reached a level where even if the civilian government were to agree to concessions, especially in relation to the country’s nuclear activity, regional proxies, or maritime disruptions, Tehran lacks the full enforcement capability to guarantee compliance. Partly caused by the military destruction by the USA and Israeli onslaught on Iran, the  IRGC’s decentralized command structure, which was already set up before the war, but which is clearly present among its naval and regional units, allows for calibrated escalation independent of formal policy.

The reality of the above means that a deal signed in Vienna, Muscat, or Islamabad could coexist with a situation of continued harassment of shipping, intermittent closures of Hormuz, and proxy attacks across the region. While the West, especially the USA and Europe, would declare success and global markets would initially stabilize, reality would, however, reassert itself within weeks.

The consequences of such a mismatch are profound.

A first consequence of this is that it undermines trust at the most fundamental level. Shipping companies, insurers, and energy traders will not operate on diplomatic declarations; they operate on risk assessments and reality on the ground. The renewed Hormuz disruptions have already triggered a structural shift in behavior. Due to higher war-risk premiums and the withdrawal of coverage by some insurers, major shipping companies, especially tanker operators, have rerouted vessels. This is happening even if it means a high cost, all to avoid the Gulf. The assumption of safe passage, which was once the bedrock of global energy logistics (before Hormuz), has eroded!

A diplomatic deal that fails to change these underlying risk perceptions will be functionally irrelevant, or just for the “buhne”.

Secondly, the fragmentation of global energy flows is being accelerated. Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are being forced to reconsider their export geographies, as most of their pipelines to the Red Sea, the expansion of Fujairah as a bypass hub, and even accelerated investments in downstream capacity outside the Gulf, are increasingly being pushed and are not strategic options, but necessities. The implicit message is clear: Hormuz can no longer be relied upon as a stable artery of global trade.

The long-term implications of this shift are severe. The global energy system, already under strain from geopolitical tensions and the energy transition, is entering a phase of structural reconfiguration. In the coming months and foreseeable future, supply chains will be redesigned not for efficiency, but for resilience. All of this will be at a cost, resulting in higher prices, increased volatility, and reduced flexibility.

Third, and perhaps most dangerously, it increases the risk of miscalculation.

Where analysts and advisors should take care is that the coexistence of formal diplomacy and informal escalation is currently and will continue to create a highly unstable equilibrium. A U.S.–Iran deal, if perceived as insufficient or illegitimate by IRGC factions, will most probably trigger acts of sabotage designed to undermine it. Conversely, continued disruptions in Hormuz, even after a deal is signed, could provoke a military response from the United States or its allies, leading to rapid escalation.

This dynamic is not hypothetical. It is embedded in the current power structure in Iran.

When analyzing current developments, it is clear to all that the IRGC’s strategic calculus is fundamentally different from that of the civilian government. While the latter seeks economic relief and international legitimacy, the former prioritizes only the regime’s (IRGC) security, ideological continuity, and regional dominance. Any deal that will or could constrain the IRGC’s operational freedom, not only in the nuclear domain but also in maritime activities, will be perceived as a threat, not an opportunity.

This raises a critical question: why would the IRGC allow such a deal to succeed?

The only answer to it all is hiding inside of internal Iranian politics, which Western policymakers have consistently underestimated or even bluntly ignored. The Islamic Republic is not a monolith, but has been a clearly contested system for years, in which different factions compete for influence and resources. Due to the current crisis, the onslaught of the USA-Israel, and the weakness of Iranian proxies, the internal power struggle has been intensified. Economic pressure, social unrest, and external threats have created an environment in which hardline elements within the IRGC are gaining ascendancy.

For these actors, especially the IRGC and its cohorts, even the Basiji, confrontation is not a risk to be avoided; it has become the only means of consolidating power.

The blockade of Hormuz, therefore, serves multiple purposes. Externally, it signals Iran’s ability to disrupt global markets and impose costs on its adversaries. Internally, it reinforces the narrative of resistance, as promoted since the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini, while it also justifies the central role of the IRGC in defending the revolution. Any move towards de-escalation is seen as clearly undermining, or even risking, the overall narrative.

This is the paradox at the heart of the current crisis: the very actions that make a deal desirable for the West are the ones that make it unacceptable for the actors who hold real power in Iran.

For Europe, its current position is extremely precarious. The continent’s energy vulnerability, exacerbated by the loss of Russian gas and the increasing reliance on LNG, makes it highly sensitive to disruptions in the Gulf. Europe, at the same time, doesn’t even have the grasp or the real hard-power capabilities to influence events in Hormuz directly. Its strategy is therefore heavily dependent on diplomacy, which is entirely based on the assumption that there is a reliable negotiating partner within Iran.

That assumption is increasingly untenable.

The risk for Europe is not just economic, but strategic. By investing political capital in a deal that cannot be enforced, European governments risk further eroding their credibility, both domestically and internationally. At the same time, a clear failure of any deal will leave Europe exposed to a prolonged period of energy insecurity, with limited options for mitigation.

Washington, while not facing a vulnerable energy situation, is facing a different set of challenges. The Trump Administration’s operations and military actions are now facing a situation in which the credibility of its global security guarantees is at stake. The free flow of commerce through critical maritime chokepoints has long been a cornerstone of U.S. strategic doctrine. The closure of Hormuz, even intermittently, is now challenging the latter doctrine. A deal that does not restore freedom of navigation would therefore be seen as a strategic failure.

In any case, which also should be understood and not misinterpreted, the alternatives are equally problematic. Military escalation, by any side, carries significant risks, including the potential for a wider regional conflict and severe disruptions to global markets. Washington is clearly at present caught in a dilemma: diplomacy that cannot deliver, or force that could spiral out of control.

The above makes one thing crystal clear: the notion of a comprehensive U.S.–Iran deal appears increasingly detached from reality. In the most optimistic, rosy scenario, a deal can achieve only a temporary, partial understanding that will reduce tensions at the margins but leave the underlying structural issues unresolved.

In a worst-case scenario, the pursuit of such a deal could create a false sense of security, delaying the necessary adjustments to strategy and policy.

All parties will now ask the same question: what would a more realistic approach look like?

First, a fundamental reassessment of Iran as a negotiating partner is needed, which doesn’t mean abandoning diplomacy altogether, but rather recognizing its limitations. Any agreement must be evaluated not only in terms of its formal provisions but also in terms of its enforceability within Iran’s fragmented power structure.

Second, there is a shift needed from the reliance on a single chokepoint to a more diversified and resilient energy system. This includes not only alternative routes and infrastructure, but also a broader rethinking of energy security. This is needed especially in a world where geopolitical risk is becoming the norm rather than the exception.

Third, a new, more integrated approach to maritime security is needed, entailing military presence, technological innovation, and cooperation with regional partners. It is no longer sufficient to target the elimination of risk, which is an impossible task, but rather how to manage it in a way that preserves the functioning of global trade.

Finally, this is the most important part; it will require all parties to be willing to confront uncomfortable truths. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as we know it right now,  is not a unitary actor capable of delivering on comprehensive agreements. The IRGC is not a peripheral player, but the central node in Iran’s strategic behavior.

All parties that ignore this should understand that doing so doesn’t mean it will disappear. It merely ensures that policy will continue to be based on assumptions that no longer hold.

The Strait of Hormuz is not just a geographic chokepoint; it is a mirror reflecting the contradictions of the current international system. A system in which hybrid actors, fragmented authority, and the increasing interplay between domestic and international dynamics are challenging traditional models of statecraft.

In such a system, the search for simple solutions is not just futile but is extremely dangerous.

A U.S.–Iran deal may still be signed. Diplomatic momentum, political necessity, and economic pressures could converge to produce an agreement. But without a clear understanding of who holds power in Iran and how that power is exercised, such a deal will be built on sand.

And in the volatile waters of Hormuz, sand does not hold for long.

Foresight: When the Guards Take the State

The most plausible at present, but least discussed, scenario is not a diplomatic failure but an internal rupture. A de facto IRGC consolidation of power, short of a formal coup but equivalent in effect, will strip civilian institutions of their remaining authority and centralize decision-making within hardline military networks. Under these conditions, Hormuz will shift from a bargaining lever to a permanently weaponized chokepoint. In name negotiations with Washington will continue but will be strategically irrelevant in practice.

In this scenario, Iran evolves into a dual-track actor: a diplomatic shell engaging the West, and a militarized core dictating reality on the ground. Escalation becomes modular, selective closures, calibrated attacks, and deniable proxy actions, all designed to extract economic rents while avoiding full-scale war. For global markets, this is worse than outright conflict: a persistent grey-zone disruption that erodes predictability, deters investment, and locks in structurally higher energy and shipping costs.

For the United States and Europe, such an outcome would render traditional diplomacy obsolete, forcing a shift toward containment, maritime control, and systemic decoupling from dependencies on the Gulf chokepoint.