Admiral (rtr) Aurel POPA, PhD
Rear Admiral (rtr) Sorin LEARSCHI, PhD
[This article continues from GeoPolitica Magazine no. 108 (3/2025)]
LESSONS LEARNED APPLICABLE TO THE ROMANIAN NAVAL FORCES: STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES AND NEEDS FOR MODERNISATION
AND EQUIPMENT2
„The ultimate goal of maritime power is to ensure freedom of action at sea and deny the same freedom to the enemy.”
Sir Julian Corbett – British historian and naval strategist
The conflict in Ukraine and the aggressive expansion of the Russian military pre-sence in the Black Sea basin have reconfigured maritime security paradigms in NATO’s Eastern flank. In this context, the Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) is called to adopt an adaptive strategic path, based on the operational lessons learnt from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Learning from recent mistakes and successes becomes essential to calibrate the structural and operational efficiency of the FNR in relation to the new regional strategic requirements.
The analysis of the degradation of Russia’s naval capabilities in the period 2022-2025 and the assessment of the impact of these developments on Romania’s maritime defence posture converge towards several fundamental conclusions. First, the nature of maritime warfare has radically transformed, going beyond the paradigm of symmetric confrontations in favour of a hybrid reality, characterised by operational autonomy, extended mobility, advanced networking and doctrinal adaptability. Second, Russia’s inability to protect its naval infrastructure, anticipate asymmetric threats and integrate complex platforms into modern C2 (command and control) architectures is a warning to any littoral state with naval aspirations in the region.
For Romania, the lessons are clear: maritime survival and efficiency in the 21st century will not depend on tonnage or numbers, but on the quality of interoperability, the ability to anticipate and the degree of systemic resilience. The FNR (Romanian Naval Forces) must become a compact, agile and intelligent force, capable of integrating both national capabilities and the strategic and technological networks of NATO and the European Union.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE REGIONAL AND ALLIED CONTEXT
Vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure
The attacks by Russian forces on Ukrainian ports, in particular Odessa and Chor-nomorsk, have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the logistical and energy infra-structure in the maritime space. This lesson is directly applicable to Romania, which must invest as a matter of priority in air defence and anti-drone capabilities to protect the ports of Constanţa, Mangalia and Midia and the ports on the Danube. The protection of dual-use infrastructure in times of conflict becomes an essential element of national resilience.
The importance of integrated maritime surveillance
NATO-coordinated ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) operations in the Black Sea have emphasised the value of data fusion between land, air, sea and space platforms. For the Romanian Naval Forces, a strategic priority is the full integration of their own platforms into the allied C4ISR network to enable early warning, real-time decision making and information support in modern naval combat.
Relevance of asymmetric capabilities and tactical mobility
Russia has demonstrated an increased level of tactical adaptability, effectively utilising naval and aerial drones, smart sea mines and mobile coastal strike systems. These hard-to-predict and cost-effective asymmetric tools can disrupt conventional operations. The NRF must adapt its doctrine to include a fleet of fast, modular, low radar footprint naval assets capable of operating in a decentralised regime and in contested environments.
Civil-military co-operation in the maritime context
The Norwegian, Polish and British models have emphasised that maritime resilience cannot be achieved by military means alone. Joint civil-military planning is needed, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure and maritime logistics chains. In Romania, cooperation between the Romanian Navy, ARSVOM, the Administration of Sea Ports and the Department for Emergency Situations (DSU) needs to be strengthened through joint simulations, exercises and operational protocols.
Operational lessons from the Black Sea theatre
and implications for Romania
Purchase of modern multifunctional platforms
The transformation of the Romanian Naval Forces into a relevant actor in the Black Sea region requires adapting to new naval warfare paradigms, as tested and validated (or disproved) in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has high-lighted traditional naval vulnerabilities and accelerated the transition to a distributed, asymmetric and smart-network-based maritime doctrine.
New-generation multifunctional corvettes
The Ukrainian experience has shown that large, slow and poorly defended naval platforms (such as the Moskva) become easy targets in the absence of a modern air and drone defence system. The battleships of the future must include:
• Integrated air, missile and artillery defence systems (e.g. MICA VL, RAM, close defence artillery systems);
• multi-spectrum sensors (EO / IR, AESA radar, LPI);
• active electromagnetic defence (ECM, decoy launchers).
Key lesson: Survivability depends on early detection, mobility and autonomous layered defence.
Submarines and deep-sea deterrence
Russia, in the absence of Ukraine’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ships or helicopters) has effectively utilised its Kilo-class submarines to launch Kalibr missiles against land targets. However, their lack of tactical mobility and the absence of sonar dominance in the Black Sea limited their operational effectiveness.
Romania can exploit this strategic vacuum by acquiring an AIP submarine (Scor-pène class3 / 212CD) or other type with capabilities:
• advanced underwater ISR;
• launching submersible attack and research drones (UUV);
• launching missiles from immersion;
• support for special forces and clandestine operations.
Key lesson: submarines are no longer just attack platforms, but underwater nodes of stra-tegic networking.
Autonomous aerial and naval drones
Ukraine has managed to destabilise Russian naval dominance off Crimea with improvised, remote-controlled naval drones and UAVs equipped with reconnaissance and strike systems.
For Romania, this model confirms the need for:
• USV (naval surface UAV) flotilla with sensors and modular payload;
• Marine UAV with extended autonomy and closed-loop AI for immediate response to threats;
• capable vessels for aerial, naval surface or submarine drone operations;
• portable C2 platforms for distributed control of these drones.
Key lesson: speed, dispersion and artificial intelligence compensate for numerical inferiority.
OPVs and dual-capable patrol vessels
Ukraine’s maritime surveillance and control operations have been facilitated by fast, easy-to-maintain platforms capable of operating in highly contested environments.
Romania needs to acquire modern OPVs:
• with lightweight drone and helicopter decks;
• capable of multiple refuelling (for sustained operations);
• capable of integrating into regionally constituted naval groups of EU, NATO or Partnership for Peace vessels;
– interoperable with NATO maritime patrol systems.
Key lesson: permanent naval presence is not just about power, it is complemented by re-levant and resilient presence.
Reconfiguring frigates and digitising the existing fleet
Romania’s Type 22 frigates urgently need to be upgraded to cope with the new generation of threats. A lesson from the conflict: analogue platforms, not integrated in C4ISR networks and without drone protection, are obsolete in the first wave.
Recommendations:
• Integration of LPI radar and ESM sensors for electromagnetic spectrum;
• Implementation of modern CIWS (e.g. SeaRAM);
• Real-time connection to the NATO C2 network.
Key lesson: modernisation in the absence of connectivity does not provide superiority, only temporary survival.
Mine warfare and mine counter-mining capabilities
Smart mines placed by Russia have blocked harbours, shipping channels and trade routes.
Romania needs to create a specialised mine warfare component:
• mine-hunting vessels equipped with autonomous underwater drones;
• Marine LIDAR sonar sensors and magnetic detection systems;
• rapid intervention capability in critical harbour areas;
• developing / procurement of own smart mines and the ships and air assets to launch them.
Key lesson: sea mines are low-cost, high-impact strategic weapons that require dedicated, not improvised responses.
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PURCHASE OF OPVs
The Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) are faced with the need to rapidly adapt their capabilities, and the acquisition of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) platforms is an urgent and unavoidable strategic priority, also due to the fact that the acquisition of multirol corvettes is on the horizon.
In this context, MVNOs are an essential doctrinal element capable of ensuring:
• Permanent naval presence along the entire length of the national coastline;
• Surveillance and control of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);4
• Rapid reaction capability in maritime law enforcement, drone neutralisation, escort and critical infrastructure protection.
OPVs allow for variable armament and configuration, adaptable to diverse mis-sions – from patrolling, search and rescue, anti-smuggling, rapid intervention or low-intensity military action5. Compared to large platforms (frigates or corvettes), OPVs have low operating costs and increased logistical autonomy, ensuring the deployment of long-duration missions in the Black Sea environment. The characteristics of contempo-rary naval conflict – the proliferation of surface and underwater drones, smart mines, fast attack craft – require agile, resilient platforms equipped with modern sensors and rapid response capabilities. The emergence of risks in the Danube Delta, the Snake Island area and in the vicinity of offshore infrastructure clearly justifies the need for OPVs.6
The integration of OPVs would directly address the current challenges in the Black Sea area:
Operational area Strategic function OPV
The Danube Delta and its own coastline Surveillance, rapid response, river-sea control
Offshore Exclusive Economic Zone Protection of energy resources, escort,
continuous naval presence
Snake Island and surroundings Deterrence, maritime traffic control,
combating hybrid activities
Recent examples from NATO and EU littoral states confirm the trend towards the integration of OPVs as a central element of eastern flank naval strategies. Italy, France, Poland or Turkey have already adapted their naval strategies by integrating OPVs into their naval force structures7
The lack of VPOs in the structure of the FNR risks to make Romanian maritime control vulnerable and increase dependence on external partners and would expose the Romanian state to the following vulnerabilities:8
• Inability to permanently monitor the EEZ;
• Overloading frigates/corvettes on routine missions;
• Increased vulnerability to asymmetric and hybrid actions;
• Excessive dependence on NATO partners for the protection of its own maritime infrastructure.

The urgent procurement of a minimum of 4-6 modern OPVs for the Romanian Naval Forces is an irreplaceable strategic investment, justified by the operational realities in the Black Sea post-2022, NATO doctrinal standards and the need to protect Romania’s economic and security interests in an increasingly contested and unstable maritime environment.9

NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS
Modernisation of military shipyards and conversion of Mangalia
and Constanţa Sud ports into dual-use infrastructure
Naval industrial capacity is a determining factor in underpinning strategic auto-nomy and regional military resilience. In this respect, the modernisation of military ship-yards in Romania – especially in Mangalia – must be linked to the conversion of the ports of Constanţa Sud and Mangalia into dual-use infrastructures capable of serving both commercial and collective defence needs.
This kind of conversion involves:
a. Digitalisation of naval production chains, integration of advanced technologies for the construction and maintenance of combat and logistic support ships;
b. Adaptation of port infrastructure to NATO operational requirements (e.g. depths for large tonnage ships, militarised logistic terminals, fast refuelling and repair points);
c. Establishment of rapid storage and mobilisation facilities for military equipment in the vicinity of ports, with immediate regional projection capability;
d. Cyber and physical security of ports, including through public-private partnerships with relevant EU maritime operators.
These investments would turn Romania’s south-eastern area into a strategic hub for allied naval support in the Black Sea, with the potential to replicate the model in other areas of NATO interest.
Implementation of a NATO integrated logistics hub in the Dobrogea area
The Dobrogea area – with its port, road and rail infrastructure, as well as its proxi-mity to the Allied Eastern Front – is the ideal place for a NATO integrated logistics hub, designed for the rapid mobilisation of forces and resources in the context of crises in the Pontic and wider MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area.
Functions:
a. Strategic redistribution node for equipment and troops, connected to European military corridors (e.g. Rhine – Danube Corridor);
b. Integrated logistics command point, interoperable with multinational structures deployed in Romania (e.g. NATO Force Integration Unit, Multinational Division South-East);
c. Real-time support coordination centre equipped with digital and AI infrastructure for supply chain management in operational theatres;
d. Platform for multinational logistical exercises, included in the NATO annual calendar.
The Hub would strengthen Romania’s role in NATO’s logistical build-up and would directly contribute to increased force projection and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region.
Strengthening electronic warfare (EW) and naval cyber defence capabilities
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has brought to the fore an essential strategic truth: technological superiority is useless without protection of the electromagnetic spectrum and critical digital networks. In the Black Sea theatre, Russia has aggressively and effec-tively used jamming systems (Krasukha-4, Murmansk-BN, Tirada-2S) and targeted cyber attacks to annihilate tactical communications, induce glitches in adversary GPS systems, and block data transmission between ISR platforms and fire units.
Key lessons from the conflict:
a. Ukrainian drones (aerial and naval) have been neutralised on several occasions by Russian EM jamming, especially near Crimea.
b. Naval platforms equipped with C4ISR have become vulnerable in the absence of encryption and communications redundancy.
c. In the absence of a naval cyber ecosystem, port and logistics infrastructure has been subject to cyber-attacks causing operational delays and loss of critical data.
For Romania, the implications are clear:
Development of an integrated EW architecture for the Romanian Naval Forces:
• Equip main ships (corvettes, frigates) with active jamming equipment and naval and airborne target imitation systems (DRFM, GNSS spoofing, directed ECM);
• Installation of R-ESM/ELINT systems for early detection of enemy EM sources;
• Training crews in combat scenarios in GPS-denied environments.
Naval Cyber Defence (CyberDef-Maritime):
Implementation of a Maritime Cyber Operations Cell within the FNR, in collabo-ration with the Cyber Defence Command of MApN;
• Cyber hardening of command and control (C2) systems, armaments and on-board sensors;
• Introduction of naval environment specific Red Teaming Exercises within NATO joint exercises (e.g. Cyber Coalition, Locked Shields, Sea Shield, Opex Edt);10
• Creation of a national alert and response protocol in case of cyber attack on Ro-manian harbours and AIS/navtex systems.
Multinational co-operation:
• Interoperability between the EW/Cyber capabilities of the FNR and those of the naval forces of Poland, Turkey, Bulgaria and the UK;
• Participation in real-time data exchange and alert networks through NATO MARCOM and EU CyCLONe;11
• Promotion of a regional Maritime Cyber Resilience Hub concept with proposed headquarters in Constanţa, ensuring exchange of best practices, simulations and joint response to EM and cyber crises.
DOCTRINAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Against the background of the new strategic realities generated by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the degradation of Russian maritime capabilities in the Black Sea, the doctrinal adaptation of the allied naval forces in the region is becoming a priority. Romania, as a neighbouring state and NATO member, must bring its structures and training into line with the new Western naval operational paradigms.
a. Adoption of the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept
The application of DMO involves the dispersion of naval forces along multiple operational axes while maintaining real-time tactical and information co-ordination. This model increases resilience against concentrated attacks and allows flexible force projection under hybrid warfare conditions. DMO is already adopted by the US Navy and adapted within NATO, and is an essential doctrine for fifth-generation maritime warfare.
b. Enhanced participation in relevant multinational exercises
Exercises such as Sea Breeze, Poseidon and BALTOPS provide an ideal operational framework for testing naval capabilities in complex scenarios, from electronic warfare and anti-submarine warfare to harbour security and maritime logistics. Romania must increase its participation and initiative in these formats, including by hosting specialised modules in the Black Sea area.
c. The foundation of a School of Hybrid Doctrine and Naval Innovation, an institution with proposed headquarters in Constanţa and affiliated to an international aca-demic-military consortium, would ensure:
• Develop doctrines adapted to the hybrid maritime environment (drones, cyber warfare, naval disinformation);
• Knowledge transfer between theorists, practitioners and the naval defence industry;
• Training officers specialised in emerging concepts such as Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T), A2/AD countering and underwater critical infrastructure protection;
• Active integration in NATO and EU research and innovation networks.
This school could constitute a regional centre of excellence in emerging maritime doctrine with long-term impact on collective security in the region.
RECOMMENDATIONS TRANS REGIONAL
Adoption of a framework for extended NATO – EU naval cooperation
with neighbouring partners
The Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea are interdependent maritime security zones. Establishment of a NATO – EU – Partner Tri-Regional Maritime Platform for the Eastern Flank. It is recommended that a Tri-Regional Maritime Platform be established to link naval doctrines and rapid response initiatives among NATO member and partner states with an opening to the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterra-nean Sea. This platform would aim to:
1. The doctrinal and operational alignment of the naval forces of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Croatia, in co-operation with strategic Eastern partners – Ukraine and Georgia.
2. Expanded interoperability between naval and civilian forces (coasts, harbours, army, maritime administration), with a focus on critical infrastructure resilience, combined surveillance (C4ISR), intelligence sharing and strategic maritime traffic control.
3. Joint training and real-time data exchange through tactical exercises and cyber and hybrid simulation campaigns in coordination with NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).
4. Support collective security through a regional network of naval centres of excellence, including a possible Centre for Asymmetric Maritime Operations in Constanţa.
5. Complementarities of forces available for joint mission-centred actions.
This initiative would help strengthen cohesion on the Eastern flank and reinforce the maritime security architecture in an era of hybrid warfare, strategic competition and regional energy insecurity.12
Creation of a European Maritime Critical Infrastructure Defence Network
(EM-CN-CMIRN)
In the area of heightened vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure in Europe – such as gas pipelines, submarine communication cables, offshore platforms and naval logistic hubs – the establishment of a European Maritime Critical Infrastructure Defence Network (EM-CN-CM-CIMN) is becoming essential. This network would function as a coordinated mechanism for surveillance, protection, rapid response and information exchange, integrating the resources of Member States, European agencies and strategic industrial actors.
Inspired by existing initiatives at NATO and EU level to protect submarine cables in the North Atlantic and North Sea – such as NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell or the bilateral cooperation between the UK, Norway and Germany – RE-AICM would extend this operational framework to the European Union maritime space, with a focus on:
a. Monitor and protect maritime critical infrastructure through joint artificial intel-ligence platforms, satellites, ships and maritime drones;
b. Implement common resilience standards for private and public operators involved in infrastructure management;
c. Regular interoperability exercises between national navies, civil protection agencies and port authorities;
d. Setting up a European Maritime Incident Response Cell (EU-MAR-CERT) to detect, analyse and counter cyber or physical attacks on infrastructures.
The proposal contributes to reinforcing European strategic autonomy and aligns with EU priorities on energy security, defence of digital communications and protection of maritime supply chains.
Supporting the development of a “digital fleet” in the wider Black Sea area
In the geopolitics marked by Russian military aggression and the reconfigu-ration of the strategic balance in the Black Sea region, the transition towards a “digital fleet”, capable of operating autonomously, efficiently and interconnected in complex and contested environments, is becoming urgent. This digital fleet would integrate:
a. Naval patrol and attack drones capable of operating in denied access (A2/AD) conditions;
b. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) for sea mine detection, electronic spying and reconnaissance in hard-to-reach areas;
c. AI systems analysing real-time maritime traffic and underwater acoustic signatures for early warning and decision support;
d. C4ISR capabilities integrated (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) into the EU and NATO defence architecture.
Black Sea littoral states, such as Romania and Turkey, together with Poland (as a regional actor with experience in military technology development and transatlantic partnerships), should act as hubs of innovation and operational experimentation for the implementation of this new naval paradigm. The initiative could be supported by European funds (e.g. European Defence Fund, PESCO) and partnerships with the defence industry, including through the involvement of strategic players such as MBDA, Rhein-metall, Havelsan or emerging companies in the field of robotics and artificial intelligence.
It is a strategic direction that will enable the Black Sea region to break out of the vulnerability paradigm and become a European maritime military innovation laboratory, enhancing deterrence and rapid response to hybrid threats.
Strengthening doctrinal interoperability
through a Regional Maritime Hybrid Warfare Readiness Centre (RMARHRC)
The proliferation of hybrid threats and the systematic use of strategic denial tactics by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea area require the strengthening of doctrinal interoperability between allied and partner naval forces in the region. A viable solution is the establishment of a Regional Maritime Hybrid Warfare Readiness Centre for Hybrid Maritime Warfare (RMARHWC), with proposed headquarters in Constanţa, Romania – a geostrategically relevant port and military infrastructure already partially adapted to NATO requirements, capable of developing:
a. Joint training modules in electronic warfare, jamming tactics and neutralisation of enemy communications;
b. Applied courses on the use of naval and aerial drones in reconnaissance, surveil-lance and precision strike missions;
c. Advanced simulations of amphibious operations and rapid landings, with a focus on joint cooperation;
d. Specialised training for the detection, neutralisation and disposal of sea mines, including autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic systems;
e. Joint table-top and live exercises coordinated with experts from NATO centres of excellence and European military institutions.
The HPRMRC could be developed in synergy with existing initiatives such as the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Helsinki) and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (Crete), but would specifically address the needs of adaptation to hybrid maritime warfare in the Pontic context.
Through its functioning, the centre would not only contribute to increasing the joint response capability, but also to building a common body of knowledge and opera-tional practice in the Euro-Atlantic area, strengthening the strategic link between the Eastern flank and NATO’s central structures.
The Romanian Naval Forces must adopt a coherent modernisation strategy, based on the relevant lessons of the Russian – Ukrainian war and calibrated according to the current geopolitical dynamics of NATO’s Eastern flank. This strategy cannot be reactive or piecemeal, but must be multidimensional, integrative and long-term oriented.
POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR THE ROMANIAN NAVY – STRATEGIC MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
The war in the Black Sea has demonstrated that naval power projection no longer depends exclusively on tonnage, armour or armaments, but on the fusion of traditional capabilities with emerging technologies. We can see for exemplification the use of naval drones by Ukraine has highlighted the importance of autonomous systems in contem-porary maritime conflicts. The NRF therefore needs to extend its doctrine beyond classical approaches, taking stakes in areas such as.
a. Electronic warfare (EW) and naval cyber defence;
b. Autonomous systems and maritime drones, including the possibility to operate them on board ships;
c. Artificial intelligence applied in ISR and maritime traffic analysis;
d. Distributed maritime operations and active dispersion tactics.
We are facing a new paradigm that requires an institutional culture that integrates both technological innovation and doctrinal adaptability.
Allied and civil-military integration
No littoral state can manage the complexities of modern maritime threats alone. Romania must continue the full integration of the NRF into NATO C4ISR networks, as well as proactively participate in the development of integrated regional capabilities, especially with Turkey and Poland. Civil-military cooperation must be strengthened, both in the field of port defence and logistical infrastructure, and in the management of critical maritime resources. The resilience models tested in Norway, Poland or the United Kingdom demonstrate that an effective national maritime strategy is an inter-institutional one based on realistic rapid response scenarios. 13
Long-term projection and structural resilience
The NRF needs a coherent long-term vision, in which acquisition, training, doctrine and infrastructure projects are linked and logically sequenced. Romania’s recent plans to acquire new warships to strengthen its Black Sea fleet emphasise the importance of such a vision. Multifunctional corvettes, light corvettes, submarines, naval drones or EW capabilities should not be seen as isolated acquisitions, but as parts of a coherent and resilient naval ecosystem. We envisage:
a. Reforming naval military education through a hybrid doctrine and innovation school;
b. Participation of naval forces and shipyards in EU-initiated projects such as the European Patrol Corvette project;
c. Investments in dual-use infrastructure (Mangalia, Constanţa Sud);
d. A predictable legislative and budgetary framework to allow the gradual implemen-tation of the new naval architecture.
This is a decisive moment for Romania’s maritime future. The transformation of the Naval Forces is not only a military necessity, but a strategic imperative that will determine the Romanian state’s ability to act as a security provider in the Black Sea and guarantor of the Eastern flank in the coming decades.
CHANGING THE MODEL:
FROM PASSIVE DEFENCE TO ACTIVE DETERRENCE.
THE NEED TO REDEFINE THE ROLE OF THE ROMANIAN NAVAL FORCES
IN NATO’S MARITIME SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Central argument:
„NATO does not defend what a member state is not prepared to defend on its own.”14
Over the last thirty years, the development of the Romanian Naval Forces has been deeply marked by a doctrinal perception specific to the post-NATO accession period, characterised by a minimalist, defensive approach, which privileged the idea that membership in the North Atlantic alliance automatically equals guaranteed security of the national maritime space.
This pattern of almost exclusive strategic dependence on NATO has inevitably led to chronic under-funding of the Romanian naval component, stagnation of modernisation programmes and neglect of building its own naval deterrence and projection capabilities.15
The events unfolding in the wider Black Sea region in the period 2022-2025 – generated by the Russian-Ukrainian war – have demonstrated with undeniable clarity that the survival of a littoral state in the face of a direct military threat cannot depend exclusively on allied solidarity, but on its own level of preparedness, capabilities adapted to new forms of conflict and the existence of a credible naval force capable of generating unacceptable costs to any potential aggressor. Moreover, NATO doctrine itself implicitly confirms this strategic truth: The Alliance is strong to the extent that each member is itself strong, ready and able to resist until the collective defence mechanisms are fully activated16. Therefore, a paradigm shift is required in the planning and deve-lopment of the Romanian Naval Forces, from a symbolic or purely defensive presence model to a deterrent, adaptable force model, operationalised on the concept of Sea Denial, capable of protecting national maritime interests and actively contributing to the security of NATO’s south-eastern flank.
In this new paradigm, the acquisition in the first phase of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), together with the development of asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare capabilities, are no longer mere modernisation options, but become essential elements of a strategic architecture of active deterrence, adapted to the new geopolitical and doctrinal realities in the Black Sea.

Strategic conclusion
Romania must become in the Black Sea what Poland has become on NATO’s eastern land flank:
A resilience pivot state, capable of sustaining the first 7-10 days of naval conflict on its own, blocking, delaying, striking and turning any attempted aggression into an unacceptable strategic cost.
This is the future of smart, modern and deterrent naval forces.

THE NEED TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ROMANIA’S MARITIME SECURITY:
BETWEEN THE IMPERATIVES OF THE GEOSTRATEGIC REALITY
AND THE STRATEGIC OBLIGATION OF THE PRESENT
„In the absence of a clearly defined National Maritime Security Strategy, any development of naval capabilities risks remaining piecemeal, reactive and lacking an integrative vision.”

Romania is today the only NATO littoral state in the Black Sea that does not have a national strategy dedicated to maritime security – in the broad, inter-institutional and trans-sectoral sense of the concept.

In the dynamic and deeply volatile context of regional security in the wider Black Sea basin, Romania faces a fundamental challenge: the lack of a unified and officially recognised strategic vision for its own maritime space.
If in the past this absence could perhaps be justified by the relative stability of the regional environment and membership in collective security architectures (NATO and the EU), the conflict triggered by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022 has definitively invalidated the paradigm of passive expectation and exclusive dependence on the guarantees of a strategic ally.
Thus, it becomes not only timely, but urgently necessary, to develop and adopt a National Maritime Security Strategy for Romania – understood not as a marginal technical document, but as a fundamental integrating framework of security, defence, maritime economy and national resilience policies.
Moreover, the analysis of the contemporary naval conflict has shown that ma-ritime space is no longer strictly delimited by classical naval operations, but extends to a wide range of interests and strategic responsibilities, including: protection of offshore energy infrastructure, securing exclusive economic zones, freedom of navigation, defence of submarine communications, control of strategic maritime traffic and prevention of hybrid threats.
A National Strategy for Maritime Security would allow Romania not only to cor-rectly dimension its naval capabilities (including the urgent integration of OPV vessels), but also to coherently articulate the inter-institutional relationship between the military, civil and economic structures involved in the management of maritime space.
By adopting such a Strategy, Romania could go beyond the condition of an exclu-sively geographical maritime actor, assuming the status of a real strategic actor in the Black Sea – a state capable of defending its vital interests and of actively and credibly contributing to the collective security architecture of NATO and the European Union.
In the absence of such a vision, the development of the Romanian Naval Forces risks to remain a fragmented, reactive endeavour, lacking long-term strategic projection.
Therefore, the following strategic truth is required as a doctrinal and operational foundation:

Without a National Maritime Security Strategy, Romania remains a maritime actor geogra-phically, but not strategically.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:
CHANGING THE NAVAL WARFARE PARADIGM
Classic naval warfare, with large fleets clashing, did not occur in this conflict. Instead, we witnessed a type of ‘hybrid naval warfare’, where one side (Russia) used the fleet as an extension of its land force and suffered defeats mainly by non-naval means, and the other side (Ukraine) achieved naval victories without a traditional navy, using artillery and robotic tools. The fact is reminiscent of how new weapons have transformed warfare in other eras – for example, how torpedoes gave us aircraft carriers (example: the sinking of the battleship Prince of Wales by Japanese aircraft in 1941, an event that signalled the end of the battleship era). Now, drones and missiles may signal the end of the era of unprotected cruisers, perhaps even restricting the role of aircraft carriers in contested areas.
In the Black Sea, the end of 2023 brought an unusual situation in which neither Russia nor Ukraine could use the sea freely – the Russians for fear of attack, the Ukrai-nians because they had no ships and their harbours were under aerial threat anyway. A former French admiral said: “Today there are no Ukrainian or Russian warships in the Black Sea. Because [any] is detected, tracked and targeted if you want”17. This is “the first war to reach this point,” he remarks. It’s an important realisation: information supremacy and remote firepower have made the sea deadly for ships, as hostile an environment as the skies would be for slow bombers in other eras.
So, globally:
a. We can expect an acceleration of research into next-generation anti-ship weaponry: hypersonic missiles (Russia already has Zircon, China DF-21D anti aircraft carrier), supersonic drones, smart torpedoes. It will be a race between sword and shield: how to strike safer vs. how to defend better. The war in Ukraine gave a clear advantage to the sword (the offensive), the Russian shield proved outmatched.
b. Coalition Doctrines – NATO will analyse how it would work together in a naval conflict. Example: if one NATO state is attacked by drone swarms, how do the others react? It’s a new interoperability challenge.
The conflict has shown that maritime dominance is no longer guaranteed by histo-rical legacy or tonnage, but must be earned and maintained through constant adaptation and anticipation of new threats. Russia, which has enjoyed dominance in the Black Sea for centuries (with the exception of the brief post-1918 period), has learnt in 2022-2025 what it is like to lose that dominance to a much smaller adversary, but aided by technology and international support.
For Russian naval doctrine, this will likely generate a reflex of caution and an emphasis on asymmetric means (ironically, the Russians themselves will take lessons from asymmetric). For others, it’s a wake-up call: anyone relying on its navy’s strength must take into account threats from multiple domains – air, land, cyber – that can turn a fleet into a pile of beasts in a matter of months.
THE CONSEQUENCES WERE AND REMAIN:
• Strategic-military: Russia can no longer credibly threaten landings at Odessa or total control of the Black Sea. On the contrary, it has to defend its own harbours and convoys. The balance of power in the region has shifted: Turkey remains the main local naval power, and Russia no longer clearly outstrips it as before. (Turkish or even Romanian / Polish military power with NATO equipment can oppose Russian targets.) Ukraine, with Western support, has achieved a situation of denying Russians access to its neighbouring waters, which gives it a valuable asymmetric advantage.
• Economic-logistics: Moscow faces difficulties in securing its sea routes. The blockade imposed on Ukraine has been largely broken, and Russia sees itself partly isolated – it cannot stop Ukrainian trade without risk, while its trade, though continuing, is conducted under the spectre of threat and at increased cost. “Russia’s dominance in the Black Sea has been called into question”, which means that Russia’s economic security in the region is no longer guaranteed by the presence of its fleet either.
• Technological-tactical: The war validated the role of precision weapons and drones in the naval environment. It also illustrated the vulnerability of large ships to these threats. Through Ukrainian ingenuity, concepts such as naval drones have moved from theory to practice. The global military community will intensively analyse these innovations. A Wilson Centre report records that Ukraine “has sunk or disabled one-third of the Russian fleet, forcing the rest to move eastwards” using mainly drones and land-based missiles – which is remarkable. Ukraine’s allies have also learnt from Ukraine’s successes, seeing how their support can tip the balance and emphasising the importance of further strengthening Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.
• Doctrine: Russia will have to thoroughly revise its naval doctrine, integrating the harsh lessons it has learnt: from how to protect ships to recognising that naval superiority can no longer be taken for granted even in a “traditionally Russian” sea. At the same time, NATO countries and beyond will be drawing conclusions – how a seemingly inferior fleet can defeat a superior fleet will go down in strategy textbooks. This conflict is likely to become as influential a case study as the Falkland War (1982) or World War II in the Pacific in terms of lessons about naval technology and tactics.
• Geopolitically, the importance of the Black Sea as a strategic theatre has been re-validated. It is a region where European security, global grain trade and Russian power ambitions intersect. The war has shown that whoever controls (or denies the enemy control of) the Black Sea has a crucial advantage. For Ukraine, maintaining pressure on the Russian fleet remains vital to prevent attacks at sea and keep its export routes open. For Russia, regaining at least partial naval freedom of action (e.g. by concluding an agreement to limit attacks in the Black Sea) would be a goal – which is why they have sometimes negotiated the resumption of the Grain Treaty, hoping for exchanges that would allow them to put their fleet back in position.
• The naval campaign in the Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-2025 turned from a seemingly secondary episode (given that the initial focus was on land battles) into a decisive factor reshaping the balance of power. The strategic collapse of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet greatly reduced Moscow’s ability to achieve its original goals in the conflict, provided Ukraine with tangible and much-needed morale and economic successes, and demon-strated to the world that the era of unchallenged naval dominance may fade in the face of innovation and determination from a weaker but intelligent defender.

In the light of all this, Russia’s naval collapse in this conflict serves as a warning that in modern warfare, innovation and adaptability can defeat brute force, and underesti-mating a weaker opponent can lead to disaster. Russia is paying the price for these lessons in the Black Sea; it remains to be seen how it will act going forward and how the rest of the world will use these lessons to prevent future maritime conflagrations or be prepared when they arise.

Annex 1

TABLE WITH THE RESULTS OF THE ATTACKS ON THE BLACK SEA FLEET

Nr		Name	Date	Results	Place	What he hit
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	21.03.2022	Destroyed	Sea of Azov, near Mariupol	ATGM
		Large landing craft pr. 1171 (code “Tapir”) “Saratov”	24.03.2022	Destroyed	in Berdyansk harbour, Sea of Azov	Tochka-U
		Missile frigate Project 11356R Admiral Essen	05.04.2022	Deteriorated	north-west Black Sea	„Neptun” anti-ship missiles
		Project 1164 “Atlant” “Moskva” missile cruiser	14.04.2022	Destroyed	north-west Black Sea	2 “Neptun” anti-ship missiles
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	02.05.2022	Destroyed	Black Sea, Zmiinyi island area	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	07.05.2022	Destroyed	Black Sea, Zmiinyi island area	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Landing craft Project 11770 “Serna”	07.05.2022	Destroyed	Black Sea, Zmiinyi island area	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	07.05.2022	Destroyed	Black Sea, Zmiinyi island area	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Landing boat pr. 02510 BK-16	May 2022	Destroyed (requires further clarification)	Black Sea, Zmiinyi island area	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Salvage tug pr. 22870 “Vasily Bekh Saviour”	17.06.2022	Destroyed	Black Sea, near Snake Island	Attack 2 of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system
		Landing craft Project 11776 “Shark”	02.07.2022	Deteriorated	Sea of Azov, near Mariupol	Marine mine
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	24.07.2022	Destroyed (requires further clarification)		Bayraktar then 2 UAV attacks
		Patrol boat pr. 03160 Raptor	24.07.2022	Destroyed (requires further clarification)		Bayraktar, then 2 UAV attacks
		Patrol vessel (corvette) Project 22160 “Vasily Bykov”	04.08.2022	Deteriorated (to be clarified)	Black Sea near Sevastopol roadstead	maritime drone
		The sea minesweeper pr. 266M “Ivan Golubets”	29.10.2022	Deteriorated	Black Sea raid in Sevastopol	maritime drone
		Project 11356R missile frigate Admiral Makarov	29.10.2022	Deteriorated	raid in Sevastopol	maritime drone
		Project 864 Medium Reconnaissance Ship Azov	11.06.2023	Deteriorated	area south-east of Sevastopol	maritime drone
		Large landing craft pr. 775 “Olenegorsk Miner” of the Russian Northern Fleet	04.08.2023	Deteriorated	near Novorossiysk	maritime drone
		Chemical tanker Project 52 “Whitefish”, IMO: 9735335 (used in the interest of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)	05.08.2023	Deteriorate	near Kerci	maritime drone
		Small patrol boat pr. 640 KS-701	03.09.2023	Destroyed	north-west Black Sea	UAV Bayraktar TB2
		Missile submarine pr. 636.6 (code “Varshavyanka”) „Rostov-on-Don” B-237	13.09.2023	suffered significant damage	Sevastopol shipyard dock	Storm Shadow (SCALP-EG) probable cruise missile
		Russian Baltic Fleet large landing ship pr. 775 “Minsk”	13.09.2023	suffered significant damage	Sevastopol shipyard dock	Storm Shadow (SCALP-EG) cruise missile
		Hovercraft mic pr. 1239 “Samum”	14.09.2023	Deteriorate	Port of Sevastopol	maritime drone
		Patrol vessel (corvette) Project 22160 “Pavel Derzhavin”	12.10.2023	Deteriorate	Sevastopol Street	Sea mines
		Rescue tug “Professor Nicolae Muru”	12.10.2023	Deteriorate	Sevastopol harbour while towing the damaged patrol vessel Project 22160 „Pavel Derzhavin”	Sea mines
		Project of large hydrographic boat 23040G “Vladimir Kozytskyi”	26.10.2023	Deteriorate	Sevastopol harbour, during a survey of the water area for the presence of sea mines	Sea mines
		Maliy Project 22800 (code “Karakurt”) „Askold” missile ship	04.11.2023	suffered significant damage	Zaliv shipyard, Kerci	2 Storm Shadow cruise missiles (SCALP-EG)
		Landing craft pr. 11770 “Serna”	10.11.2023	Destroyed (requires further clarification)	Cape Tarkhankut area – Chornomorske village	maritime drone
		Landing boat pr. 11770 “Chamois” (possibly Project 11776 “Shark”)	10.11.2023	Destroyed (requires further clarification)	Cape Tarkhankut area – Chornomorske village	maritime drone
		The large landing ship Project 775 “Novocherkassk”	26.12.2023	Damaged then destroyed	Damaged – Berdyansk, Sea of Azov	24.03.2022 Tochka-U rocket
					destroyed the harbour of Feodosia	26.12.2023 Storm Shadow cruise missile (SCALP-EG)
		Project 12411 “Ivanovets”	01.02.2024	Destroyed	Lake Donuzlav, west coast of Crimea, near Yevpatoria	Maritime drone
		Large landing ship Project 775 “Caesar Kunikov”	24.02.2024	Destroyed	near Alupka, Crimea	Maritime drone
		Patrol vessel (corvette) Project 22160 “Sergey Kotov”	05.03.2024	Destroyed	near Kerci	Maritime drone
		Large landing craft pr. 775 Yamal	24.03.2024	Deteriorate (to be clarified)	Sevastopol harbour	Storm Shadow cruise missile (SCALP-EG)
		Large landing craft pr. 775 Azov	24.03.2024	Deteriorate (to be clarified)	Sevastopol harbour	Storm Shadow cruise missile (SCALP-EG)
		Medium reconnaissance ship pr. 18280 “Ivan Khurs”	24.03.2024	Deteriorate (to be clarified)	Sevastopol harbour	Storm Shadow cruise missile (SCALP-EG)

Annex 2
MARITIME DRONES
The integration of autonomous military systems in the air, on land and at sea is revolutionising modern warfare, delivering unrivalled speed, precision and firepower. In the skies, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer superior intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike capabilities. On the ground, autonomous combat vehicles amplify firepower, situational awareness and soldier protection. At sea, unmanned surface vessels (USVs) significantly improve naval operations, enabling sustained missions at a fraction of traditional costs. These advanced technologies are fast becoming central to future military strategies, and the programmes highlighted here represent just a glimpse of wider efforts to develop and deploy cutting-edge autonomous systems.
After the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, Ukraine quickly built up an impressive unmanned naval force to compensate for the lack of ships and submarines.
Using Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) armed with explosive charges, Ukraine managed to cause damage, namely 5 successful strikes, which account for 16.7% of the Russian Navy’s losses.
Video credit Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KO5djvv3CCs
They proved such a threat that the Russian fleet was initially forced to protect its ships in harbours, then withdrew its ships and submarines to the southern Crimea and the port of Novorossysk.
A new, more protected but smaller naval base is currently being prepared in occupied Abkhazia, in the port of Ochamchire.
This strategy gives Ukraine a degree of control over its waters that seemed un-attainable a few years ago.
The success is primarily the adoption of unmanned platforms. They have opened up the possibility of operations previously impossible with manned vessels. Unmanned vessels can be built more compactly and require fewer resources. However, the use of maritime drones has some limitations:
• The need for permanent, low-latency satellite communications;
• Continuous use of positioning systems with unaltered (noised) data;
• The hydro-meteorological conditions necessary to ensure safe navigation, these being small boats;
• Provide sufficient autonomy to be able to attack at long ranges;
The figures below show the multitude of types of Ukrainian drones (progressively developed and tested), but also the existence of a – lesser – Russian interest in this field.
Types of maritime drones developed by Ukraine
Source: http://www.hisutton.com/Russia-Ukraine-USVs-2024.html
Types of maritime drones developed by Russia
Source: http://www.hisutton.com/Russia-Ukraine-USVs-2024.html
The unmanned vessel revolution in Ukraine was only possible thanks to two-way, real-time satellite communications. Unmanned platforms had existed before, but broadband communications allowed direct human control. This ensures faster deploy-ment and instant adaptation to changing targets and missions. Starlink operates as the primary satellite communications provider, although Kymeta is also utilised. Automation and the use of artificial intelligence will lead to optimising their use and reducing the need for human command, thus reducing the amount of communications required, but this still seems to be in the future.
There are interesting developments in semi or fully submerged versions. These fall into the UUV or AUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle or Autonomous Underwater Vehicle) category, but they have to rely heavily on AI in the absence of direct and continuous communications.
Maritime drone Ukraine Mykola
Ukraine’s first USVs which were of the “Mykola” type, being used in September 2023, notably in the raid on Sevastopol on 29 October 2022. These USVs were used, along with UAVs, to attack the Russian navy in the harbour. Two warships, the frigate Admiral Makarov and the minesweeper Ivan Golubets were damaged.
Mykola Specifications: Length: 5.5 metres; Total weight: up to 1,000 kg; Range: up to 430 nautical miles (800 km); Autonomy: up to 60 hours; Battle payload: up to 200 kg; Maximum speed: 43 knots (80 km/h); Navigation methods: automatic GNSS, inertial, visual; Video transmission: up to 3 HD video streams; Cryptographic protection: 256-bit encryption Magura V5
The Magura V5 is the main type known to be in the service of the GUR (Ukrainian Defence Intelligence Service). The images were not made public until 24 May 2023, when they attacked the Russian Navy’s intelligence ship Ivan Khurs. This was significant because it occurred south of Crimea, showing the impressive range of the USV. The attack was unsuccessful, as was another attack on the intelligence ship Priazovye on 11 June.
The circumstances of these attacks are unclear, and it appears that some of the USVs may have been inoperable before they were attacked by Russian artillery. The new version is associated with the “Magura V5” designation. Since then, the Magura has been involved in several missions and has sunk several high-value Russian vessels.
Specifications Magura V5: Length: 5.5 metres; Breadth: 1.5 metres; Height above waterline: 0.5 metres; Speed: 22 knots cruising, 42 knots maximum; Range: 450 nautical miles (about 833 km); Payload: 320 kg; Communication: MESH network radio with an aerial repeater or satellite communication.
Toloka TLK-150 (Brave)
The Little Toloka TLK-150 is a natural evolution of Ukraine’s maritime drones, which are unmanned surface vessels (USVs) filled with explosives. Being an underwater vehicle, it is less prone to detection and harder to neutralise with gunfire. Its warhead is also impacting below the waterline, so it would be most likely to sink its target.
The design is obviously intended to function as a form of wandering torpedo. It consists of a typical tubular hull, but with a large keel and horizontal stabilisers amidships. Thrusters are mounted at the end of each horizontal stabiliser. Intuitively, they are used for both steering and propulsion. This should allow for significant agility. If the mast is always above water, then technically you could argue that it is a semi-submersible. In this case, however, that distinction may be unnecessary. It is an armed UUV.
The trade-off will be autonomy and speed. Also the communications mast, which may contain an electron-optical camera, which will need to be above the surface. Although it’s been shown publicly, it’s not clear if it’s in operational use. Several versions are ex-pected, including one that is 4 metres long and claimed to have an operating range of 1,200 km or 400 km.
Mums
Mamai was used by the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) in the attacks on the Ropucha Olenegorsky Gornyak-class landing ship Ropucha Olenegorsky Gornyak and the Sig tanker. Both attacks, far from Ukrainian-controlled territory, caused significant damage.
It’s named after Kozak Mamai (Mamai / Mamay Cossack), a Ukrainian folk hero and one of the standard characters in the traditional Ukrainian puppet theatre Vertep. The design is much larger than the canoe-like USVs (unmanned surface vessels) first seen in September 2022. Like Magura it is used by GUR (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine). However, its overall dimensions are still compact. The increased volume probably allows a large fuel load, giving a long range.
The design uses a planing hull that allows a maximum reported speed of 60 knots (110 km/h). One, sometimes two, satellite communication antennas are mounted and there is an electron-optical camera. The warhead is detonated by any of three impact sensors that are at the bow. These drones have proved reliable.
Sea Baby
Ukraine’s SBU operates the Sea Baby USV. It was used to attack the Kerci Bridge on 17 July 2023. The design is larger than the Mykola and Magura types, but overall quite small.
Sea Baby Specifications: Length: 6 metres; Width: 2 metres; Height above waterline: 0.6 metres; Speed: 49 Nd max; Range: 540 nautical miles (1,000 km) with additional fuel tanks; Payload: 850 kg; Propulsion: 2 inboard 200 hp engines driving twin water jets; Communications: Satellite communications.
In addition to the main cargo, the Sea Baby can carry RPV-16 thermo-baric missiles. Variations of two, four and six small missile tubes were seen. The missiles are unguided and have a range of about 1,000 metres. These weapons could serve multiple purposes. As well as being a primary way to attack a target, they could be used to defend against surface threats. During a contact-charge attack, missiles could be launched to distract or suppress defences. The latter tactic was used on some Japanese Imperial gunboats in World War II.
Sea Baby can be used to launch 6 x 122mm rockets. Several have been modified.
Improved Sea Baby, “Avdiivka”
The enhanced Sea Baby developed for the SBU was unveiled in early March 2024. A single 400-horsepower engine is used in place of the twin jet ski engines of the previous type. This allows for a 400kg (some reports heavier) warhead. It has a range of about 500 nautical miles and a top speed in the region of 48 knots. Its hardened hull can ride waves 1.5 metres high, while its draught is about 1 metre and height above the water 1 metre. Communications include both a Starlink directional antenna and a Kymeta satellite link. Although unconfirmed, it seems likely that, like the original Sea Baby, it can also carry missiles.
The large white antenna at the stern is Kymeta, while the smaller rectangular one is StarLink. Before it is the electro-optical / infrared sensor.
Stalker 5.0
Stalker 5.0 USV was unveiled at the 2024 International Black Sea Security Forum in Odessa. It is about 5 metres long and 1.2 metres wide and carries a payload of 150kg. The vessel uses a 60 hp outboard engine to reach top speeds of 40 knots. Range is 350-600 kilometres. The type is described as intended for reconnaissance and patrolling and can also be used for transporting supplies. The unit price is $60,000, making it cheaper than other models.
Underwater drone Marichka (AUV)
Marichka (МАРІЧКА) is a new autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) developed by AMMO Ukraine. Among the many large AUV projects around the world, it is probably the first born directly out of wartime needs.
The basic vehicle is 6 metres long and 1 metre in diameter. The construction is metal, all or most of the hull being a pressure vessel. A keel appears to exist along the bottom and there are towing rings, necessary for manoeuvring and possibly for towing to more distant ranges.
Ammo Ukraine touted the system as anti-ship, anti-pod, intelligence gathering and transport. Range is 1,000 kilometres. The unit cost is UAH 16 million, equivalent to $433,000.
At least one of the prototypes has an X-shaped rudder configuration. Note the nose cone on the floor at the front of the vehicle.
Armed AM-800 RHIB
An unidentified USV was discovered, floating upside down, in Romanian waters on 3 April 2024. The vessel uses an American-built Silver Ships AM-800 rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) as its base. The warhead came from a STYX anti-ship STYX missile. The ship has not been officially attributed, but seems most likely Ukrainian.
Magura ‘FrankenSAM’ Air Defence USV
It is a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel (USV) armed with an improvised air defence system with two AA-11 ARCHER (R-73) missiles. Produced by Magura and used by GUR.
Riverine Resupply USV
USV logistics prototype USV observed with two ammunition containers (American type, for 120 mm or 155 mm projectiles). The ship is very small, around 1.5 metres long and has a payload of 30 kg.
Unnamed Ukrainian Navy USV with FPV drones
On 7 December 2024, the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy (VMS ZSU), Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, distributed a video of a new surface drone (USV – unmanned surface vessel) being used in the Black Sea. The craft is unique among previously seen types in that it has a hangar for at least 4 quadrotor FPV drones. It also appears to have a hangar for laying mines above the transom.
Dandelion
Dandelion BBKN (БББКН “Одуванчик”) is a small USV developed by KMZ (Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant) in St Petersburg. The latest image suggests a very different design from the RK-700 Vizir USVs previously commercialised by the company.
Limited information is available. According to reports, it can reach 80 kilometres per hour (43 knots) and has a range of 200 km (108 NM). This would mean it has a shorter range than the Ukrainian types. Its payload of 600kg is similar. Most likely this would be a bow warhead, although many options can be considered. However, these specifications are remarkably similar to those published for the RK-700 Vizier design. So a reporting error is a distinct possibility.
Maritime drone Russia
Moraine 300S
The Murena 300S seems generally comparable to the Ukrainian types. The Murena (Moray Eel) is about the same size as the Ukrainian Magura V5 and Sea Navy models. The manufacturer, LLC KB Center for Unmanned Systems, promotes it for defence of naval installations, mine laying, mine clearance, patrolling and reconnaissance. On 19 Sep-tember 2024, it was on display to President Putin while armed with 220mm UMT light 220mm torpedoes.
The drone has a simple metal housing similar to the classic Soviet-era Progress series. Unlike most but not all Ukrainian models, it has an external motor.
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