Cyril WIDDERSHOVEN^

The Red Sea has always been of interest to regional and global powers, especially after the construction of the Suez Canal. In recent decades, the sea has been occupying a peculiar role in international geopolitics, mainly assessed from an economic and trade perspective. The latter position was clear, but the Red Sea region was primarily go-verned by habit rather than doctrine. Total stability was just enough to take for granted; military action was only when dealing with or deterring piracy. The Red Sea security architecture was not based on explicit power balances but instead on a tacit under-standing among most of the parties involved. In recent years, the existing equilibrium has, however, been broken down. The current situation clearly supports the theory that we are looking at the emergence of a dense, competitive maritime space. The Red Sea is at present treated by regional powers not as a shared corridor but as an area for their respective national power projections. Under the surface, but when looking at it in plain sight, the shift’s center of gravity is almost totally linked to the rivalry between Egypt and Turkey. Even though this rivalry has not yet been articulated in clear terms, the potential for a clash or confrontation is immense, as it could draw in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates. This evolving rivalry raises concerns about regional security risks, including the possibility of escalation and broader conflicts involving key stakeholders, which policymakers should monitor closely.

In the eyes of Egyptian political and military leaders, the Red Sea is pivotal. A fusion of geography, history, and political economy shapes Cairo’s views. For the Egyptian economy and its regional power projections, the Suez Canal is not merely a transit route; it is a fiscal artery, a strategic lever, and a core symbol of sovereignty. The income ge-nerated by the Suez Canal is not only underpinning the country’s foreign currency inflows and stabilizing the balance of payments. It also provides the leaders of the strongest Arab countries’ regimes with a narrative of indispensability to global commerce. The Red Sea and all its ongoing developments are of existential importance to Cairo. Egypt’s government and military, which are definitely intertwined at all levels, are constantly assessing the influence of any actor capable of influencing traffic, insurance perceptions, or naval signaling along the corridor. In Cairo’s eyes, any change is essential, as it can and will affect Egypt’s domestic stability.

Based on the latter position, which has never changed since the establishment of the republic, Egypt’s strategic thinking on the Red Sea is a closed system.

In the eyes of Cairo’s military, the control of the northern gate at Suez needs to be complemented by dominance, or predictability, along the Bab El Mandab. Even though Egypt no longer seeks permanent military superiority in the Red Sea basin, it continues to push for primacy. Any Red Sea strategy of Cairo is linked to a need to shape out-comes and play a pivotal role in brokering security arrangements. At the same time, without openly addressing it all, Egypt also wants to prevent any external power from becoming indispensable without Egypt’s consent. All of these roles or requirements are included in its doctrine, which Cairo historically favors, but is also deeply conservative.

Egypt is also very sensitive to developments in the Horn of Africa. In Cairo’s eyes, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan are not distant theatres; they are considered buffers. As is clear, any instability in these countries poses a direct risk to the Suez Canal. Until the last couple of months, Cairo has viewed non-Arab involvement in the Horn primarily through a prism of counter-piracy and peacekeeping. At present, this position is eroding rapidly. Cairo is alarmed by the expansion of foreign military footprints. When looking at foreign footprints, especially those combining security, infrastructure, and economic leverage, the lights are orange. Turkey’s growing presence in the Red Sea is considered to be highly unsettling. Not that Ankara’s involvement and presence are overwhelming, but it is considered durable and adaptive. Recent incidents, such as [specific event or deployment], exemplify the increasing security challenges and the need for strategic risk mitigation by regional and global stakeholders.

When looking at Turkey’s analysis and approach to the Red Sea, it is almost entirely the opposite of Egypt’s views. At present, Ankara does not see or regard the Red Sea basin as a closed Egyptian sphere, but as a maritime continuum. The latter is a logical factor linking the Eastern Mediterranean, the Levant, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. For almost a decade, Turkey’s strategy has been based on this worldview, which is shaped and supported by its ‘perceived’ exclusion from Mediterranean energy arrangements, while facing strained relations with Western partners. It has also been discovered that influence can be expanded by building layered, dual-use engagement, rather than through headline naval deployments.

Turkey has set its sights on Somalia at present. Ankara’s military training base, port and airport operations, infrastructure projects, and energy agreements in and with Somalia are currently showing signs of an ecosystem in the making, while official state-ments still position it as a single outpost. According to NATO’s second-largest military power, all is being framed as developmental or stabilizing, but taken collectively, the strategy is clearly targeting permanence. Even though Somalia has willingly taken Ankara’s support, Turkey has now clearly embedded itself in the country’s security sector, logistics, and economic planning. Current and future embedding will make it hard for both sides to disengage. Ankara’s view is clear; it is a form of prudent statecraft. From Cairo’s point of view, it’s something else. Egypt is looking at Turkey’s involvement as a slow-motion encirclement of the Red Sea’s southern hinge.

The concept of legitimacy differs in Ankara’s logic from that in Cairo’s. Egypt views the Red Sea from a geographical perspective. Turkey’s strategy is based on security assistance and infrastructure. Even though this is not considered to be a revolutionary doctrine, it clashes straight away with Egypt’s insistence that Red Sea security should remain primarily in the hands of the littoral Arab states. The situation is not yet moving towards an overt confrontation; it remains marked by structural incompatibility. Both sides believe their own interpretation of defensive action while seeing the other’s action as destabilizing. These differing perspectives could lead to shifts in maritime security policies, including increased military deployments or alliances, which policymakers should anticipate and prepare to mitigate risks of escalation.

As frictions increase, there is a clear and present danger that friction will accu-mulate. Especially when realizing that Somalia is one vector, several others exist in the region as well. Most parties are already focused on Djibouti, which has become the world’s most crowded basing environment. The small Horn of Africa country will be part of dis-cussions, as its geographical position compresses decision-making time and increases the risk of miscalculations. At the same time, East Africa’s war-torn country, Sudan’s instability, is also worrying Egypt, Turkey, and others. Its internal destabilization already creates openings that external actors may exploit. There is increasing fear that the civil war, supported by a long list of regional power players, could trigger zero-sum reactions. Naval exercises, port visits, intelligence cooperation, and arms sales all need to be seen as potentially acquiring strategic meaning when interpreted through the lens of rivalry.

All developments in the Red Sea region are signs of how competition hardens without ever being declared. The area doesn’t need a naval battle to become a conflict zone. The real risk is that the Red Sea only needs overlapping security roles and income-patible doctrines. The above picture could be a fertile breeding ground for conflict, as escalation can occur through denial of access, ambiguous incidents, or proxy actions rather than direct clashes.

To make the Red Sea even more volatile and tricky, parties such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the UAE are also interested and willing to project power. They all have distinct interests, which, without further complications, could ensure that any Egypt – Turkey friction rapidly internationalizes. Saudi Arabia is at present the party holding the most consequential balancing position. While Riyadh and Cairo share the same strategic interests, the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, however, depends on secure maritime flows and uninterrupted energy exports. At the same time, Vision 2030 also targets Red Sea tourism in Saudi Arabia. When assessing the Egyptian and Turkish positions, the Kingdom is not seeking exclusivity of power. Still, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and advisors do not wish to replace Egypt’s primacy by Turkey. At the same time, as shown several times already, Riyadh doesn’t want to be constrained by Egyptian strategies or preferences.

At this time, the Saudi strategy is not only quiet but also transactional, some could say a Saudi version of Trump. While it is heavily investing along the Red Sea coast, developing naval capabilities, it is also diplomatically engaged with all relevant actors.

It invests heavily along its Red Sea coast, develops naval capabilities, and engages diplomatically with all relevant actors. If an Egyptian Turkish standoff were to occur, Riyadh would most likely be acting as a brake, not a spear. It is to be expected that the Riyadh power brokers would opt to use capital, diplomacy, and behind-the-scenes me-diation to end escalation. The main driver behind the Kingdom’s power is still not focused on confrontation but on using its options to make stability economically attractive.

For Israel, the Red Sea is a significant arena to watch. Its calculus is much narrower, but no less critical for all participants. Since the inception of the State of Israel, power-brokers (politicians and military) have always regarded the Red Sea as a security corridor first, with as a second options its commercial route value. As was shown already in 1967, access to the port of Eilat, freedom of navigation through the Bab El Mandab, and protection of maritime energy flows are considered vital. For a long time, Israel has been cooperating with Egypt as a pillar of Red Sea stability. The latter, clearly expressed by both, has included the Sinai and Gaza. To avoid over-reliance on Egypt, Israel has been hedging its options by increasing cooperation with Gulf states.

The above-mentioned diversification, however, complicates any single actor’s claim to stewardship. At present, or in the foreseeable future, Israel is not likely to side with Turkey against Egypt, but at the same time, it will resist any arrangement that could threaten its own position in the area. It will also actively oppose any possible in-fluence from adversary powers. It is to be expected that if Turkey’s posture is going to be perceived as an adversary, Israel will act defensively on all fronts. For the Israelis, increased cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, even if the latter remains hidden, means they are no longer relying on Egypt as their only partner for Red Sea security.

At present, greater attention should be paid to the UAE’s role. Abu Dhabi’s power projection is based on port concessions or security partnerships. Its overall investment strategy in critical infrastructure underpins its current position in the region. The leverage is there; there is no need to dominate the Red Sea. It seems the strategy focuses on shaping flows. At present, the UAE’s position on the Egypt–Turkey rivalry is apparent, as it is expected to align with Cairo. Still, the UAE’s real power lies in controlling infrastructure and investments that determine where trade flows when risk rises.

Taking all the current actors in the Red Sea littoral into account, it is clear that there is a growing possibility that any bilateral tension could be transformed into a multilateral puzzle. This so-called multilateralization holds a significant problem, as it no longer guarantees restraint. The current situation is heading towards a complexity guarantee, as each actor involved brings different red lines, escalation thresholds, or even different definitions of stability. To understand the future means taking into account that what one actor considers deterrence, the other could interpret as provocation or even an outright act of war.

The changes in the Red Sea have direct implications for maritime and energy markets. Until now, the value of the Red Sea has always rested on reliability rather than speed alone. However, looking at the above picture, if reliability erodes, even at present, maybe marginally, alternative routes cease to be temporary hedges. If reliability is questioned, alternative routes will become permanent features of trade planning. At the same time, it will affect insurance markets, as they are already showing the logic behind it. War-risk premiums respond to perception, not declarations. Reality is that a corridor, such as the Suez Canal or Red Sea, doesn’t need to be closed to become expensive. Unpre-dictability is already a significant factor.

Energy flows are particularly sensitive, especially in the Red Sea. There are high opportunity costs when LNG cargoes, refined products, and energy equipment, transiting the Red Sea, are delayed or rerouted. As has been shown in recent years, the politici-zation of the corridor will feed directly into energy pricing, investment decisions, and long-term supply contracts. If this is going to be for the long term, or if politicization and risks increase, the latter situation will definitely reshape trade patterns far beyond the region, from European gas markets to Asian refining margins.

Red Sea’s main power, Egypt, is at present facing a strategic dilemma. Historically, the Red Sea has been treated as its backyard, but that seems to be becoming untenable. After decades of an almost single-power situation, the current constellation has, however, become much more diversified. There are new or more powerful actors at play, such as Israel, Gulf countries, and Turkey, but also non-regional power players have set their eyes on the region. Cairo’s dilemma now entails a situation in which, if it concedes to this new reality, it risks diluting its leverage over Suez, its main geopolitical power base. To deal with this changing position and power base will be a key focus in Cairo’s strategic thinking.

For Ankara, the dilemma is the opposite. Turkey’s layered, below-the-threshold strategy is effective because it is currently avoiding confrontation. However, its expanding footprint results in greater visibility and reduced tolerance from others. Influence accu-mulated quietly can be lost quickly if framed as destabilizing. If Ankara wants to keep its current position, the Erdogan regime will need to balance ambition with restraint.

Looking at ongoing developments, a full-scale military confrontation is not yet on the horizon, but it will more likely be a prolonged period of managed rivalry. Overall, on all sides, it is to be expected that naval presence will grow, while port politics will harden. Most new and existing parties will justify security cooperation as a means of stabilization, but those excluded will condemn it all as encroachment. The Red Sea is now an area where access and influence are being calibrated continuously.

For all, but especially policymakers, the lessons at present will be uncomfortable but necessary. The Red Sea cannot be secured any longer by mere assumptions. The future will be based on the recognition that legitimacy is contested and power is fragmented.

From an industry perspective, the message is clear and hard: volatility is no longer an anomaly; it needs to be seen as a baseline. Routing strategies, insurance models, and investment decisions must be built around persistent uncertainty.