Europe, and especially its political leaders and society, already believes its own fallacy that it has lived through a significant energy trauma. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, resulting in the unexpected but foreseeable collapse of Russian gas deliveries, was expected to function as a formative shock. It should have been taken as a textbook sample of a lesson in overdependence, complacency, and strategic naiveté. The official response in 2022, coming from Brussels and all the usual leaders, was a mantra of “never again. Still, while this has been repeated again and again, reality shows that only a couple of years later, Europe seems to make the same mistake again. The Old Continent, including the UK, finds itself drifting into a new and arguably more dangerous dependency. In contrast to a clear and present danger linked to an adversary, it is this time heading for the same trap put in place by a power whose alignment with European interests can no longer be taken for granted.

After removing Russian leverage over its autonomy, the European Union is now replacing that leverage with American centrality. Europe’s main historical ally, at least until the end of the Biden Administration, the USA has become very quietly but almost overwhelmingly Europe’s most influential external energy actor across gas, oil, refining, shipping, and finance. You can even argue that the USA holds the same power when looking at the energy transition itself. Until now, no one can say that this situation has been the product of conspiracy or malign intent; it is simply the cumulative outcome of crisis management, market logic, and geopolitical inertia, or a lack of foresight on the part of European leaders. In reality, the position of power still stays the same, even if it is accumulated by default. It, however, becomes a clear strategic liability when that same power (or the holder of it) spans molecules, infrastructure, capital markets, and a powerful, politically formed enforcement mechanism.

This situation, even though Brussels doesn’t want to admit it, is no longer just a gas story.

Europe’s most visible symbol of its exposure is liquefied natural gas (LNG). Since 2022, after decades of dependence on Russian natural gas, that role has been taken over by US LNG. The reliance on the US has almost become system-critical, no longer marginal or optional, but foundational. Europe uses American LNG volumes to balance winter demand, anchor price formation, reassure markets, and also to start stabilizing political narratives. Since 2022, European gas prices have been seen to respond as much to weather in Texas, Washington’s regulatory decisions, and the operational situation at US export terminals as to flows from Norway or North Africa.

Policymakers should have a real assessment of all, as this should put in place a definite pause. While the primary analysis will focus on gas, the deeper issue is energy-system exposure.

Without any doubt, and clearly visible on the surface, Europe’s energy security is increasingly shaped by US decisions across the entire value chain. Any determinations or strategies employed by Washington or US operators regarding upstream investment cycles, LNG export licensing, shipping and insurance regimes, sanctions enforcement, dollar-based pricing, or refining capacity have a direct and transparent effect. At the same time, US governance of emerging energy technologies is also misunderstood or underestimated. Europe’s dependency has moved from a situation of being concentrated in a single fuel; the current situation is more layered, structural, and embedded.

For all, natural gas was just the entry point.

Global oil markets are already showing how subtle this US leverage has become. At present, official statements from Europe all state that oil dependence is a solved problem. Brussels and its member states have been able, at least on paper, to replace Russian barrels, while markets have been adjusted and supplies continue to flow. When going deeper than the headlines, it becomes clear that this European view is dangerously superficial. Oil markets may be global, but the real power is concentrated, especially in control over spare capacity, sanctions enforcement, logistics, and finance.

Again, while Europe views OPEC as the usual point of blame, the United States now holds the power to exert disproportionate influence over all four.

While fundamentals have been historical instruments on which markets were formed or shaped, at present, sanctions are the most visible lever of US influence. Washington’s sanctions policy, which is increasingly enforced extraterritorially, now not only determines which barrels move or where and which tankers sail, but also where traders can operate. All are supported by insurers, chosen by the US, to underwrite risk. Europe is not merely aligned with this system; it is part of it all. It should be realized that we (Europe) are currently in a situation where when the Trump Administration tightens enforcement on Russia, Iran, or Venezuela, the Old Continent’s refineries, freight rates, and product balances adjust automatically. It seems we still don’t realize that this is being done, whether or not European governments agree with the timing, scope, or strategic logic.

To make things even worse, it should be noted again that the current spare-capacity politics have added another layer of fragility. The latter is partly based on, or linked to, the fact that Washington’s relations with key producers, mainly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq, are almost entirely transactional. Europe is currently in a position of receiving only, rather than being proactively involved. If the Trump Administration decides unilaterally to lean on producers to moderate prices, align sanctions, or signal geopolitically, the whole of Europe is feeling the impact. After being a significant oil and gas market power player for decades, it is now in the opposite position, with little independent leverage over global spare capacity. European governments should start to realize (and act) on their new position, which is that they are price takers in a system whose pressure points sit elsewhere.

Another layer of concern that is not yet understood in Brussels is that logistics and shipping complete the picture. Even though more complicated steps are needed to block and remove any sanction-breaking options for Russia, Iran, and others, it should be understood that Europe doesn’t call the shots anymore. Recent American actions against so-called “shadow fleets” are a clear sign of a growing willingness (by the Trump Administration) to enforce sanctions physically, not merely legally. Global shipping risks have been reshaped and intensified by acts such as boarding vessels, seizing ships, pressuring registries, and tightening insurance requirements. Europe is again on the receiving side only. Until now, European actions have not shown a realization that, as the continent’s oil imports rely on precisely these same lanes, insurers, and compliance structures, US actions are a real risk. The current, very active U.S. enforcement posture is increasing European costs and volatility. The latter is even in place if Europe (or European countries or operators) is not the intended target.

If we take finance, it all closes the circle.  The US dollar still rules all, as oil remains priced, hedged, and cleared predominantly in the US currency, while it is all shaped and pushed by US-influenced institutions. While Brussels talks a lot about euro-denominated energy trade, the reality is that it remains marginal. The US dollar grants Washington indirect but consequential leverage over the flows that Europe consumes every day. The market still acknowledges that energy power need not be exercised to be effective. The precise knowledge and awareness that the leverage exists is often enough.

For Europe, after being a global power before, refining is the sector where its vulnerability becomes most uncomfortable. The energy transition, the green deal, and other strategies have eroded Europe’s refining base, driven by environmental, economic, and political factors. When assessing the current situation in Europe, it is clear that the system is tightly balanced, regionally fragile, and acutely sensitive to disruption. It should be realized that in such an environment or market constellation, control over global refining margins, product flows, and asset ownership matter enormously.

While European media is looking at California and other green American states, it should not be dismissed that US influence is expanding, especially downstream. American companies and American-linked capital are increasingly central to downstream assets, especially in Europe’s wider neighborhood. US sanctions increasingly determine which crudes can be processed, but they also shape and decide which products can be exported. This ultimately determines which refineries remain commercially viable. European refiners are currently being forced to absorb adjustment costs, mainly when Washington targets barrels or routes.

As mentioned in my article on Lukoil’s fire sale, the current sanctions enforcement is also reshaping ownership. The forced restructuring of Russian-linked downstream assets across Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean shows how regulatory power is now used to rewire control over strategic infrastructure. Even though Brussels and its members can now claim to have cleaned up their balance sheets, the result seems more like increased exposure to U.S. regulatory reach. While refining margins are not really making headlines or top of policymakers’ minds, they remain the linchpin between crude markets and social stability. One prominent example is that diesel shortages do not remain technical for long.

Brussels seems to be reassuring itself with a forward-looking argument when dealing with energy. Repeated claims are made that the current dependence on U.S. hydrocarbons is temporary. Brussels and others still expect that the energy transition will dissolve geopolitics. The reality is that this belief is premature and potentially dangerous. Brussels has made the transition itself into a new vector of dependency.

A prime example of the latter is ammonia, a potential risk in the making. The Old Continent increasingly treats ammonia as a cornerstone of its future energy system. It sees or pushes it not only as a hydrogen carrier, a maritime fuel, or fertilizer feedstock, but increasingly also as a balancing mechanism for renewables. When looking at the facts on the ground in Europe, it is still not setting up an autonomous ammonia ecosystem. Capital, technology, project development, and financing are once again heavily US-centric. Market facts show that American firms dominate key electrolyzer technologies and project-finance structures. When looking at global investment flows, US policy frameworks, such as tax credits, subsidies, and carbon accounting rules, are shaping it all.

There is a misunderstanding or fallacy within Europe not to consider the possibility that Washington will prioritize domestic reindustrialization, strategic stockpiling, or energy nationalism. The latter should be addressed, as in a situation like this, European access could be tightened rapidly. Already, European developers struggle to compete with US subsidy regimes. Since the Biden IRA, projects have been migrating, while supply chains have tilted. If no action is taken, Europe again risks facing a new Russian Gas 2.0 situation, but this time it is green and American. It could be facing not only importing molecules but also American rules.

In the current geopolitical and alliance-political situation, this risk is constantly mitigated. The future US administration doesn’t need to weaponize energy. A more nationalist or transactional agenda can also be pursued by aggressively prioritizing domestic interests. Washington can still slow down LNG export approvals or tighten sanctions without consultation. Looking at Venezuela or Russia’s dark fleet, Europe needs to look at possible maritime enforcement escalation. The Trump Administration can still use subsidies to distort global markets.

Europe is currently looking to become a downstream consumer in a system it doesn’t control. The latter will undoubtedly be the case if Washington continues to treat energy access as an extension of statecraft. History has also shown that alignment today does not guarantee alignment tomorrow. A complex but straightforward truth seems still not to be understood in Brussels or London: energy power does not need to be abused to constrain; it only needs to be available.

Brussels’ main illusion, not based on historical facts at all, is that dependence on an ally is inherently safe. Yes, morally, a reliance on the US is not comparable with a Russian version. Strategically, the distinction is, however, insufficient. Energy security is structural; it should not be seen as ethical. Europeans should understand that allies disagree, but also that elections change priorities and domestic policies intrude on all. Energy systems, however, will be locked in exposure for decades.

Europe’s future is not only bleak or volatile, but it is also looking at a stacked asymmetry. Europe’s military security will remain heavily US-dependent, at least if no drastic measures are taken immediately. Europe’s technology ecosystem is intrinsically linked to America’s. Its financial system is dollar-centric, even as the Euro is gaining strength. In the coming years, its energy system is increasingly anchored to US decisions. Brussels should realize and act on the fact that this is not diversification; it is a clear sign of concentration.

Europe’s strategic autonomy does not require hostility toward Washington, but options. At present, there are, however, too few.

If Europe wants to change all this, it should pursue several key strategies. End the taboo on discussing US energy dominance; strategic risk assessment is not anti-Americanism. Brussels should put in place, without delay, an EU-level stress test of exposure to US energy decisions. This should entail not only oil and gas, but also refining, shipping, and renewable fuels. Such as a stress test, should also become routine.

Secondly, it should put in place a new strategy, recognizing that diversification must become operational rather than rhetorical. Main instruments for this will be to defend nuclear capacity where politically possible and to push for an acceleration of domestic production where feasible. Brussels should also refocus its attention on investing much more in storage, grids, and demand flexibility. Last but not least, diversification should be pushed with all force, meaning broadening external supply beyond a single dominant partner. Maybe this will be much more expensive, but it is needed.

At the same time, the third need is to integrate energy policy with foreign and security policy fully. Looking at sanctions, maritime enforcement, and supply-chain security as independent silos is not the way to go. Europe should assess every escalation pathway, as it will have energy consequences. At the same time, there needs to be increased focus on evaluating every energy decision for geopolitical risk.

Maybe the most politically sensitive or uncomfortable truth to accept is that Europe needs to recognize that the transition phase is uniquely dangerous. It may not be clear to policymakers and politicians that new dependencies form faster than old ones dissolve. This is especially the case when ambition outruns industrial capacity.

Last, but most dangerous for all energy transition parties, Brussels needs to accept an uncomfortable truth of gigantic proportions. The reality is that even that redundancy costs money; dependence, however, will cost sovereignty. Washington did not set out to dominate Europe’s energy system; Europe just let it all happen because it was acting under pressure and in crisis mode. This doesn’t make Washington the villain; it only shows that it could make European complacency a risk.

History and geopolitics have shown that energy power, once accumulated, rarely stays neutral. The whole system follows politics, crises, and opportunities. Russia has learned Europe the hard way. Allowing Europe to relearn this again, especially now, from an increasingly unpredictable ally, will be a strategic failure of historic proportions.