Anatolii Holovka, PhD

Leading Research Fellow, National Institute for Strategic Studies

Chairman of the Board, Regional Risk Center for Analysis

Ukraine

rrac.com.ua@gmail.com

Introduction

One of the principal components of the foreign policy pursued by the government of Viktor Orbán and the currently ruling (as of December 2025) political force in Hungary, Fidesz (Hungarian: Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség), is the concept of reviving a “Greater (Pre-Trianon) Hungary.” This concept entails drawing into Hungary’s sphere of influence those regions that belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary until 1920–1921, before the signing and entry into force of the Treaty of Trianon.

Hungary’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, coupled with limitations in its material and resource capacities, has resulted in the reliance predominantly on humanitarian, socio-economic and informational instruments for the implementation of its foreign-policy interests. Within this context, official Budapest allocates significant attention to expanding cooperation with Hungarian communities residing in neighboring states, notably in regions of Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. Although these initiatives are framed as support for national minorities, they simultaneously possess the potential to influence the socio-economic and cultural dynamics of these territories.

It is worth noting that the implementation of the foreign-policy course described above by the Orbán government is conditioned by several factors, specifically:

1. It constitutes one of the instruments facilitating the attainment of a sufficient level of Budapest’s influence in neighboring countries and, simultaneously, strengthens its position in international politics (including at the EU level).

2. The course declared by Fidesz and the Orbán government toward protecting the interests of Hungarian communities beyond Hungary’s borders represents one of the sources of their electoral support and a mechanism for consolidating the party’s electoral “core.”

3. Against the backdrop of ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine (initiated in 2014; full-scale phase beginning in February 2022), the Orbán government has frequently advanced controversial initiatives. These include, inter alia, episodes involving the obstruction of certain formats of Ukraine–NATO cooperation, expressing reservations regarding financial assistance to Ukraine, refusal to provide military support in the form of equipment and arms transfers, etc. Official Kyiv and EU institutions interpret these actions as anti-Ukrainian policy, as measures that support the aggressor, and — in a broader sense — as factors undermining Europe’s political cohesion. Meanwhile, the Orbán government positions such steps as elements of protecting the rights of national minorities (primarily the Hungarian minority), as well as manifestations of a flexible foreign policy aimed at maintaining balanced relations with both Euro-Atlantic partners and Russia, particularly in the sphere of energy cooperation.

This study reflects the author’s interpretation of the selected issue and does not claim exhaustive objectivity. The primary objective of the article is to analyse the set of measures for supporting national communities implemented by Hungary (during the premiership of Viktor Orbán and the rule of Fidesz) as an instrument of its foreign-policy strategy, using the Zakarpattia region as a case example. Additionally, the study aims to propose a set of recommendations for advancing a constructive agenda in Ukrainian-Hungarian bilateral relations.

Case of Zakarpattia

It is worth noting that since the early 1990s, a horizontal network of humanitarian and economic ties and political and business contacts has emerged between Zakarpattia and neighboring Central and Eastern European states, including Hungary. This environment has become favorable for activating and strengthening cooperation, transforming it into a tool for achieving strategic development goals for communities and regions and for addressing common challenges in the economic, environmental, socio-cultural and other spheres.

Zakarpattia is the westernmost region of Ukraine and borders four European Union member states — Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. This status serves as a favorable factor for the development of cross-border cooperation, particularly given the applicability of cross-border and territorial cooperation programs. Within the scope of this article, attention is drawn to programs covering both Ukrainian and Hungarian territories, such as Hungary–Slovakia–Romania–Ukraine (HU-SK-RO-UA); transnational programs and macro-regional strategies (for example, the EU Strategy for the Danube Region). In this context, the participation of Ukrainian and Hungarian regions in formations such as the Carpathian Euroregion and the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation “Tisza” (uniting the Zakarpattia region and Hungary’s Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County) also merits attention.

At the same time, Zakarpattia is a multiethnic and multiconfessional region where Hungarians constitute the largest national minority by population, residing compactly in the southern and southwestern parts of the region. Historical legacy, cultural ties and the environment of active cooperation between communities on both sides of the border manifest at various levels — public-political (state authorities, local self-government), economic (trade, enterprise cooperation, joint investment projects), humanitarian (NGOs, educational and research institutions, cultural associations) and even everyday social interactions (interpersonal connections, family ties, etc.).

Considering these factors, it is possible to assert the interconnection between the development of Zakarpattia and geographically proximate territories of Central and Eastern European states, including eastern territories of Hungary, which may be conditionally considered part of a Carpathian macro-region. Accordingly, existing trends and challenges — for example, in the sphere of interethnic relations — influence not only the region’s development but also the state of good-neighborliness, and presently even more broadly, Ukraine’s European-integration prospects [5].

Issues related to Zakarpattia traditionally occupy an important place in Hungary’s foreign-policy strategy under Viktor Orbán, especially within the context of his declared policy of supporting ethnic Hungarians abroad. This direction is consistently emphasized by the Hungarian government and ruling Fidesz as a key element of their political course and serves as a significant factor shaping bilateral relations between Hungary and Ukraine. The focus on the region is not limited to cultural-educational and economic support of ethnic Hungarians but also includes various diplomatic initiatives, support for Hungarian political and civic associations in Zakarpattia, as well as targeted informational influence.

Key Directions of Hungary’s Policy

In the context of this article, it is appropriate to identify key measures undertaken by the Orbán government within its foreign-policy framework aimed at projecting influence onto neighboring regions.

(a) Political Sphere

The political dimension includes engagement and support for the activities of Hungarian political and civic organizations operating in the region. Such actions are complemented by initiatives aimed at enhancing the political representation of pro-Hungarian parties in local self-government bodies of territories adjacent to Hungary.

In the case of Zakarpattia, it is important to understand that Hungarian political and civic associations should not be viewed as fully subordinate to Budapest’s policies; moreover, they are not monolithic movements but consist of numerous political and civic associations. Nonetheless, Hungary’s influence on the Hungarian civic-political movement in Zakarpattia is difficult to deny. At a minimum, this influence is evident in public support expressed by Hungarian government representatives for candidates from Hungarian political associations during local elections in Ukraine. A notable example is the support voiced by Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó during the 2020 local elections. Overall, these political actions may be regarded as instruments of Budapest’s influence on Zakarpattia, which simultaneously generate political capital for Budapest in its relations with Kyiv.

On the other hand, influence on the Zakarpattia region may not be limited exclusively to soft-power instruments. For example, on 9 May 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine publicly announced — for the first time in its history — the exposure of a Hungarian military intelligence network operating in Zakarpattia. According to the SBU, the agent group collected sensitive information on military facilities, assessed vulnerabilities of ground and air defense systems and analysed population behavior patterns in the event of an entry of Hungarian troops [13].

These external-influence elements have been reflected in the social attitudes of Zakarpattia residents. This is demonstrated, in particular, by survey results collected at the regional level. The article draws upon two opinion polls conducted in late 2018 and in 2025 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, enabling an analysis of the dynamics of public opinion in this matter.

Survey results from late 2018 showed that more than half of respondents (51%) perceived Hungary’s policy toward Zakarpattia (funding schools, grants for entrepreneurs, construction of schools, etc.) as genuinely friendly assistance to the Hungarian minority of the region. Meanwhile, 14% regarded it as “preparation for possible territorial annexation,” and another 35% found it “difficult to answer” [8].

Survey results from 2025 — collected in the context of the full-scale Russian invasion (launched on 24 February 2022) — indicated a decrease in the number of respondents who considered Hungary’s support to be “friendly assistance,” down to 21%. Another 38% viewed such support positively “provided it is coordinated with Kyiv.” At the same time, 15% were convinced that “such a policy undermines Ukrainian identity,” and 5% believed that it “may constitute preparation for annexation” [9].

(b) Within the socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions of Hungary’s soft-power policy, several key instruments and areas of influence can be distinguished:

Economic influence and support for entrepreneurship. As previously noted, stable humanitarian and business contacts and regular cross-border cooperation practices have been established between the border regions of Ukraine and Hungary. Hungary accounts for approximately 47.9% of exports from Zakarpattia (as of January–September 2025) [6]. In parallel, Hungary implements a policy of supporting Hungarian enterprises and economic initiatives through targeted financial institutions (funds). In Zakarpattia, such institutions include the “Egan Ede” Fund, the Gábor Bethlen Fund and others. These structures provide financing (including grants) aimed, among other purposes, at strengthening the position of Hungarian businesses in the region and enhancing their competitiveness.

Between 2011 and 2019, the Gábor Bethlen Fund alone approved grants totalling at least EUR 1.1 billion for Hungarian minority organizations abroad, of which approximately 10% (over EUR 115 million) was invested in Zakarpattia [2].

• Social and humanitarian sphere. Provision of humanitarian aid and financing of social projects constitute another important direction. This encompasses the delivery of medicines and medical equipment, as well as the financing of renovation and restoration works in social infrastructure facilities (schools, kindergartens, medical institutions). These measures may also be viewed as instruments for cultivating loyalty among the local population and strengthening a positive image of the donor.

• Educational policy and language development. Hungary exerts an active influence on the educational environment by supporting Hungarian-language educational institutions. This includes not only facilitating the functioning of Hungarian schools and preschools, but also expanding assistance programs and investments in institutions of higher education.

• Cultural and artistic initiatives. Cultural diplomacy serves as a method of disseminating Hungarian culture and identity. Cultural and artistic initiatives operate as instruments of soft power that subtly strengthen cultural ties and reinforce the influence of the Hungarian cultural sphere in the region.

• Instrument of citizenship. The mechanism of dual citizenship (or simplified naturalization procedures) is used as a tool of influence. The practice of accelerated citizenship acquisition for ethnic Hungarians (introduced in the early 2010s) strengthens ties with Hungary by facilitating migration and shaping financial and political connections.

(с) Informational Component

The informational sphere is one of the most significant in assessing the current state of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations and the role of Zakarpattia in Hungary’s foreign-policy strategy.

Even a general analysis of publications in Hungarian media demonstrates that, at a minimum in the online sphere, an active anti-Ukrainian media campaign is being conducted. To this end, business groups loyal to the government purchased key participants in the media market and established the KESMA media holding. This holding currently includes nearly 500 outlets, online platforms and other media channels that disseminate government messaging across all platforms. In many cases, these pro-government outlets are maintained through state advertising financed from public funds [14].

According to the results of a study on the dissemination of political propaganda in Hungarian media conducted by the independent analytical group Mérték in February 2025, the “most influential actor” within KESMA (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány, Central European Press and Media Foundation) and the principal initiator of disseminating pro-government information (including anti-Ukrainian narratives) is the newspaper Magyar Nemzet [1].

In describing the case of Zakarpattia, it should be noted that highly resonant regional events are frequently used to advance the goals of Hungary’s information policy. The tensions elicited by such events become tools for securing “political dividends,” particularly in terms of mobilizing electoral support. In practice, this involves cultivating the image of an “external enemy,” which contributes to rallying voters around a political party or specific politician.

There are numerous instances in which media, politicians and civic actors in Ukraine and Hungary offer sharply diverging interpretations of the same incidents. For example, the arson of a church in the village of Palad-Komarivtsi, accompanied by provocative anti-Hungarian graffiti (July 2025), was framed in entirely different ways. Frequently, political or ideological views of particular politicians or parties are erroneously equated with the views of the entire population or even an entire ethnic community (e.g., conflating Viktor Orbán’s political course with the opinions of all ethnic Hungarians, including those residing outside Hungary).

At the same time, experts note a decrease in Hungary’s informational influence in Zakarpattia. The Hungarian analytical center Political Capital published a study in January 2024 examining the influence of Hungarian media on ethnic Hungarians abroad. The analysis covered Hungarian-language media in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, with particular attention given to Zakarpattia — the region with the largest Hungarian minority in Ukraine, where Hungarian-language media are present and Hungarian radio and television signals are widely accessible.

Key narratives examined across all four countries included:

• the notion that the West is responsible for the war due to “violating Russia’s sphere of interests,” arming Ukraine and triggering a severe economic crisis by rejecting peace and imposing sanctions;

• the idea that Russians embody “normality,” defending traditional values, whereas the West suffers from an “identity crisis.”

However, compared to neighbouring states with sizable Hungarian communities, the level of Hungarian informational influence in Zakarpattia is the lowest: for example, while the dissemination of such narratives in Hungarian-language media in Slovakia reaches 68%, in Zakarpattia it amounts to only 4% [12].

A separate factor is the “interest of a third party.” Since the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine — and especially since the launch of the full-scale invasion — the Russian intelligence network has directly or indirectly engaged in operations to foster instability along Ukraine’s western border, including attempts to artificially escalate social tensions. These subversive activities include dissemination of destructive narratives via social media and mass media, as well as activation of pro-Russian politicians and organizations. Illustrative examples include the arson attacks on the office of the Hungarian Cultural Association of Zakarpattia in Uzhhorod (February 2018), located near Hungary’s Consulate General. Investigations revealed that the attacks involved members of pro-Russian radical-right organizations, including the Polish “Falanga” movement and the political party “Zmiana” (arson of 4 February 2018), as well as individuals originating from the unrecognized Transnistrian region (arson of 17 February 2018) [5].

Conclusions and Potential Measures to Address Current Risks and Threats

The problems outlined in the article — and the potential escalation of tensions in Ukrainian-Hungarian relations — create long-term risks both for (1) the state of good-neighborliness and development of both countries and (2) cohesion within the EU and NATO. These risks are particularly acute amid ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and the broader context of global “political turbulence.”

Therefore, an adequate response and development of long-term measures to maintain regional stability are essential. These measures should include the following:

• First, it is important to promote an alternative concept: the formation of a favorable environment and institutional conditions for long-term interregional and cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Hungary at the level of regions and communities; strengthening cross-border humanitarian ties and business contacts in Central and Eastern Europe, which would also contribute to Ukraine’s European-integration objectives. Alongside already functioning interregional and cross-border associations involving territories of Ukraine and Hungary (the Carpathian Euroregion, EGTC “Tisza,” etc.), it is important to develop initiatives such as the “Carpathian Integration Initiative.”

• Promoting a positive agenda and appropriate information policy to counter the spread of hate speech. Given that “hate speech” has been significantly formed or amplified by media in recent years (especially in the context of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations), it is recommended to develop a “Professional Code of Conduct.” A cooperation agreement in the informational sphere could serve as a foundation for decreasing interethnic tensions in situations where conflicts are artificially provoked by individual politicians or radical political groups. It would also lay the groundwork for a platform enabling Ukrainian and Hungarian media to jointly produce content and conduct shared informational and educational initiatives, disseminating news and materials highlighting the positive aspects of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. For example, contemporary Ukrainian media highlight volunteer activities undertaken by representatives of national minorities (including assistance to internally displaced persons and war-affected populations), as well as the experience of military units in which ethnic Hungarians from Zakarpattia serve.

• Implementing measures to support interethnic interaction. This includes engaging NGOs, experts, academic institutions, universities, business representatives and other stakeholders in cooperation on minority-rights protection and cultural exchange. Such initiatives may include:

• Development of cultural diplomacy — strengthening regional cultural cooperation aimed at enhancing intercultural interaction, preserving minority identities and protecting their historical and cultural heritage.

• Cooperation between universities and educational institutions — exchange programs and joint initiatives in the sphere of education.

In general, it is important when forming policies and responses to the risks and threats described in the article to adhere to several principles, namely: focusing on building institutional and cultural environments for cooperation as opposed to confrontation; avoiding the conflation of the political course of the Orbán government and Fidesz with the position of the entire Hungarian community (including Hungarians residing beyond Hungary’s borders).

Moreover, the article does not address the electoral factor — specifically, the prospect of parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2026 (a subject warranting a separate scholarly article or analytical report). The outcome of these elections may significantly influence Hungary’s foreign-policy course, particularly in the event of a victory by political forces opposed to the Orbán government and Fidesz.

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