Admiral (rtr) Aurel POPA, PhD^
Rear Admiral (rtr) Sorin LEARSCHI, PhD^

[This article continues from GeoPolitica Magazine no. 107 (2/2025)]

THE ROLE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES,
PRECISION WEAPONS AND UKRAINIAN TACTICS

A key factor in Russia’s naval collapse was the ingenious way in which Ukraine, starting from a position of apparent naval inferiority, managed to use new technologies and unconventional tactics to gradually annihilate the Russian fleet. This section analyses the key elements: precision anti-ship missiles, drones (aerial and naval), Western-supplied intelligence, and how Ukraine has integrated all of these into a coherent strategy of reverse Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) against the Russians.

Coastal anti-ship missiles and precision strikes

Neptun missiles (Ukraine)

The Moskva cruiser was sunk with two R-360 Neptun rockets, developed by Ukrainian industry (Luch Design Bureau). The Neptun is a modernised derivative of the Soviet Kh-35 rocket, with updated electronics and extended range (over 200-250 km). Although Ukraine had few launchers, it was able to use them decisively against its most valuable target. The strike was aided by surprise and probably jamming / distraction (there is speculation that a Bayraktar TB2 flew over Moskva as decoy, catching the attention of the crew as the missiles arrived at sea level). In any case, the success showed that even a country without a fleet can use anti-ship missiles (AShMs) to strike an invading navy. After Moskva, Neptun has been used (not officially con-firmed) in other situations, but attention has shifted to other weapons supplied by the West.

Harpoon missiles (Denmark/UK)

In May-June 2022, NATO countries sent Harpoon anti-ship missiles (AGM-84)

to Ukraine. These are established Western missiles, ~150 km range, active radar, 225kg warhead, flexible platform (launchable from truck, ship or aircraft). Denmark has sent Harpoon coastal launchers and the UK adapted rockets. With Harpoon, Ukraine extended the threat to Russian ships. The tug Vasili Beh was sunk by the Harpoon, and unofficial reports suggest that the destroyed Serna near the Serpents and other targets were also hit by Harpoon. The moral impact was major: the Russians knew of the Harpoon’s reputation (from the Falklands War and other conflicts), so the presence of this weapon forced them to withdraw even further away from valuable ships, fearing stealth attacks. Harpoons supplemented the Neptun capability, giving Ukraine a larger stockpile of reliable missiles.

Storm Shadow / SCALP missiles (UK / France)

These are not traditionally anti-ship, but aerial cruise missiles for land targets, but Ukraine has used them very effectively against ships in harbours. With ~250 km range and a combined guidance system (GPS + terrain contour + IR at the end), the Storm Shadow’s Storm Shadow has high accuracy and a ~450 kg warhead, optimised for bunker-busters. Supplied to Ukraine in May 2023, they have been a game-changer: the September 2023 attack on the submarine Rostov and the ship Minsk², as well as the November 2023 attack on the corvette Askold³ in the Kerci dock, were both carried out with the Storm Shadow (or French SCALP variant). The accuracy of these strikes demonstrates that cruise missiles can annihilate stationary naval targets even more effectively than guided bombs. Russian attempts to intercept them proved insufficient – Sevastopol’s anti-aircraft defences (S-300, Pantsir) were penetrated.

ATACMS ballistic missiles (USA)

In October 2023, the US supplied the first ATACMS missiles (MGM-140A variants with sub munitions, range ~165 km). These have been used with devastating effect on airfields (e.g. destruction of 9 helicopters at Berdiansk and Luhansk), but also against ships. At least in the case of Tiklon, it appears that ATACMS were used (possibly the unitary warhead variant if it existed, or a precision strike with M39 variants). ATACMS has ballistic trajectory, coming from above at high speed, making it difficult to intercept and hitting the decks of ships (where the armour is weak) The Russians have not faced such a threat to ships before. The use of ATACMS against the Ţiklon was surprising – basically, a system designed to hit land targets was adapted by the Ukrainians to naval targets. This innovation broadens the spectrum of the anti–ship arsenal: not only low cruise-profile missiles, but ballistic trajectories can also be lethal to stationary ships.

HIMARS hits harbour infrastructure

It’s worth noting that Ukraine has also used HIMARS launchers (70 km GMLRS missiles) to hit naval targets when they were within reach. For example, the attack on Novocearkassk at Feodosia (December 2023) was made possible by the Storm Shadow missile, but in July 2022 there was an episode when the Ukrainians hit the Herson bridge⁴ leading to Crimea with HIMARS. In the future, the new 150 km GLSDB missiles (glide bombs launched from HIMARS) could also target harbours.

Intelligence and assisted targeting

The successful use of these precision weapons has also depended on high-quality targeting information. It is common knowledge that NATO countries have provided Ukraine with surveillance data (satellite imagery, data from P-8 Poseidon aircraft, Global Hawk drones, etc.). Thus Ukraine knew the positions of Russian ships in real time many times. For example, the US was reported to have helped in locating Moskva (which was suggested in the press, though not officially, and provoked discussion). In addition, activists and OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) were playing a role – Oryx and other platforms were visually tracking confirmations. Indirectly, NATO created an “intelligence funnel” that allowed Ukraine, with its own forces, to strike as if it had the eyes of a superpower. A clear sign: immediately after each suc-cessful strike, the Western reaction has been muted, suggesting real but undeclared involvement.

Aerial drones and asymmetric warfare

Bayraktar TB2 drone

Purchased from Turkey before the war, Bayraktars became famous in the early months for destroying tanks and anti-aircraft systems. On the naval front, the TB2 had its moment of glory on Snake Island, where it sank Russian boats (e.g. a Serna-class Desant Class⁵ on 7 May 2022) and annihilated a helicopter on the island. The TB2 was also used for naval reconnaissance and probably in aid of Moskva targeting (distraction as speculated). Over time, Russia brought in more anti-drone systems, diminishing the effectiveness of the TB2. But they remain an example of how a relatively cheap drone can weaken a superior enemy with disproportionate casualties (TB2 cost several million $, Moskva was worth hundreds of millions).

Drone aerial kamikaze

Ukraine has also developed indigenous kamikaze aerial drones (e.g. UJ-22 Airborne model or other homemade ones) to strike targets in Crimea. Case in point: in August 2023, a drone hit a P-800 radar on the roof of a block in Crimea⁶. In the naval context, aerial drones have been used more to jam defences, e.g. in conjunction with naval attacks (the October 2022 attack on Sevastopol also involved aerial drones as a diversion). They put pressure on Russian defences, forcing them to consume anti-air missiles.

Reconnaissance drones and commercial satellites

Ukraine has also harnessed commercial satellite imagery and small reconnais-sance drones (such as the Leleka or Furia) to monitor Russian harbours. Knowing whether, for example, a ship is still at the dock or has sailed can make all the differ-rence in planning an attack.

Naval drones – a new era of war at sea

Perhaps Ukraine’s most innovative contribution to the art of naval warfare is the large-scale use of unmanned naval drones (USVs). In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, we are seeing the first decisive use of such means.

Ukrainian naval drone concept

The first prototypes appeared in 2022, and in 2023 Ukraine formalised the creation of a force of “maritime drones”. These USVs have a low-profile design, semi-submersible (partially submerged to be hardly detectable by radar), length ~5-6 metres, explosive payload ~200 kg. Propulsion is by thermal engine (sonic dismast-able). They are equipped with video cameras and remote data link. The unit cost is estimated at tens of thousands to several hundred thousand dollars – much cheaper than a ship or missile, allowing swarm attacks. Ukraine has christened them with names such as Sea Baby⁷ or uses the technical name Magura V5.

Drone swarm tactics

The successful attacks (Sevastopol October 2022, Novorossiysk August 2023, Ivanovets February 2024, Sergey Kotov March 2024) have in common the use of several drones simultaneously, coming from different directions, trying to saturate the defences. A ship has limited weapons against such an attack: on-board cannon (AK-630) or marine rifles. Anti-aircraft systems like the Pantsir-M are not designed for very small and fast sea-level targets. The Russians improvised – firing heavy machine guns from the bows of ships, or attempting evasive manoeuvres. But when 5-6 exploding boats come in, it’s difficult to stop them all. Even if 4 are destroyed, one hit is enough to incapacitate a big ship. The attack on the Ivanovets is emblematic: several drones evade the corvette’s fire and hit it. Another example is Olenegorski Gornyak: probably only one drone out of several hit its target in the end, but that one also took the ship out of the fight.

Long-distance operations

Naval drones have also demonstrated long-range capabilities. The attack on Novorossiysk is estimated to have travelled over 700 km (if launched from southern Ukraine). Some launches may also have been made from close to the targets, using clandestine cells (speculation about possible launches from civilian boats near Russian harbours). However, Sea Babies can navigate hundreds of kilometres, guided by GPS. They can be programmed to follow detour trajectories, possibly coming from offshore, where the Russians would least expect them. Thus, Ukraine was able to attack harbours in the heart of Russian territory (Novorossiysk, Tuapse) without having nearby naval bases – unthinkable in a classical paradigm.

Russian counter-measures

To counter naval drones, the Russians have:

1. Installed physical barriers, anti-submarine nets at harbour entrances, inflatable booms (booms), boats and barges placed as obstacles. Thus at Sevastopol, after the 2022 attack, they often kept a tugboat at the entrance with a chain between the breakwaters overnight.

2. Used radio-electronic jamming equipment to break the link between drone and operator. Some Ukrainian drones seem to have semi-autonomous mode (supposed on-board intelligence that continues the mission if it loses contact). However, jamming doesn’t guarantee stopping – if the drone is already close, inertia may bring it on target.

3. Deployed patrols and reconnaissance with planes, helicopters searching south of Crimea for “suspicious boats”. For example, the Russians reported destroying naval drones in the Black Sea in September 2023. But any such interception is difficult – they can’t survey the whole sea non-stop.

4. Exploited weather conditions, given that small drones are harder to operate in rough seas. The Russians may try to schedule naval activities only when the sea is rough (paradoxically, storms become their “ally”). But that’s not certain either – a drone can also sail in big waves, only with an increased risk of sinking.

Overall, naval drones have given Ukraine a tool to even the scales in Black Sea waters, similar to how cheap aerial drones (Shahed) have given Russia a tool to strike deep into Ukraine’s infrastructure. It is an example of the democratisation of military technology, where an unconventional, inexpensive system can neutralise valuable traditional platforms (warships).

One might think that, given their use by the Ukrainians in the Black Sea, sur-face drones loaded with explosives were “decisive” for a naval battle in the future. The reality is more nuanced. Indeed, although they kept the Russian fleet at bay, the drones were relatively rarely the cause of losses to the latter.

The majority of Russian ships destroyed or damaged were as a result of cruise missile attacks or those launched from shore or dedicated to land combat, with the strikes being carried out in harbours (approx. 30%). There were indeed maritime drone strikes, but they were marginal (16.7%) as was the effect of sea mines (13.3%).

Anti-ship missiles (Neptun and Harpoon), launched from the coast, have con-tributed to a 10% success rate, but we have to take into account the lack of Ukrainian ships and especially the shift in the range of the Russian Federation’s ships towards the eastern Black Sea basin.

The analysis was based on the following data:

Figure no. 11: Percentage of targets hit

Armament type	Targets hit	Percentage
Anti-tank weapon	1	3.33%
Littoral-Ship Rocket	3	9.9%
Land rocket	2	6.67%
Air-to-Ship Rocket	7	23.4%
UAV	8	26.7%
Sea mines	4	13.3%
Marine Drone	5	16.7%

The data are interpreted in the graphs below:

Group of Figures no. 12 is the author’s creation

Ukrainian “hybrid warfare” tactics in the naval field

Ukraine has combined these technologies in a strategy of constant harassment and surprise attacks:

1. Simultaneous multi-domain attacks

Many actions used combinations: naval drones + aerial drones, missiles + drones, sea attack + land diversion (for example, on the night of the attack on Sergey Kotov, Ukraine intensively bombed land targets in the south, so the Russians’ attention was divided).

2. Targeting Russian centres of gravity

Ukraine has methodically chosen high-value targets: Moskva (centre of gravity – anti-aircraft), Saratov (strategic transport), Rostov submarine (underwater cruise capabilities), Minsk / Novocearkassk (amphibious transport), Ivanovets / Askold / Tsi-klon (missile-carrying vessels). And then Fleet HQ (command centre). Basically, one by one he decapitated the key components of Russian naval power. The strategy is reminiscent of NATO’s concepts of “disarming strike” on the adversary’s A2/AD net-work, but here applied in reverse – Ukraine created an A2/AD against the invading fleet.

3. Maximising the psychological effect

Each success was publicised by Ukraine (and partners) to highlight Russia’s vulnerability. Example: after the Sevastopol HQ hit, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry triumphantly posted: “We promise there will be more”⁸. This psy-ops has demoralised Russian sailors. In wiretap reports, sailors complained to their families of fear, with some refusing to sleep on the ships (a case recounted at one point on Ukrainian channels). Incidentally, the Russians moved many crews away and dispersed their HQ staff after the attack.

4. Resilience and adaptability

Ukraine has also suffered setbacks (e.g. the attempt to retake the Serbs in late May 2022 resulted in the loss of a troop carrier in an air ambush, and some helicop-ters). But he learnt quickly: instead of a direct assault, he favoured “erosion” – repeated bombardments until the Russians were off the island. The same philosophy was applied to the fleet: first they cut off its “umbrella” (Moskva), then its “tentacles” (the pier, Bayraktar drones), then increasingly daring attacks. The incremental campaign was calculated to minimise Ukraine’s risks – it didn’t send men or ships to direct sacrifice, everything was remote or unmanned.

5. Co-operation with allies

By implication, the tactic implied close relations with the West. The fact that American sources confirmed (off the record) that the US did not explicitly tell Ukraine not to strike Crimea gave the tacit green light. Moreover, arms deliveries (Harpoon, Storm Shadow, ATACMS) were calibrated with successes on the ground. Each Ukrainian innovation was followed by additional support: after Moskva, the West started serious talks about anti-ship; after the drone strikes, UK/France sent SCALP; after the grain corridors held, the US sent ATACMS etc. It is clear that without Western support, Ukrainian successes would have been much more limited – but to Ukraine’s credit, it proved that it knows how to use that support effectively, which incentives partners to offer more.

All these technological and tactical elements have paradoxically made it possible for a country without a surface fleet (Ukraine) to “hit or disable one third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet” by 2023, forcing the rest of the fleet to withdraw⁹. It is a historic lesson in the art of war: asymmetry and innovation can defeat numerical and classical superiority. This is not new (examples: torpedoes and cheap naval mines sinking battleships in the 20th century), but scale and complexity show a leap forward. Modern naval warfare seems to be entering a phase where large platforms (cruisers, aircraft carriers) are extremely exposed unless they have total air dominance and impeccable air defences. Russia lacked both in the Black Sea: it had no naval aviation capable of cover (AWACS drones or full air superiority, because Ukraine’s air force was still operating and defending the coastline), and ship-based air defences proved insufficient in the face of target saturation and enemy intelligence.

Next, we will see how these practical lessons are beginning to influence Rus-sian naval doctrine and global military thinking about war at sea, and what changes are in the offing in the way fleets operate.

Main characteristics of the weapon/means of striking

Anti-tank weapon

The Skif anti-tank weapon, also known as Stugna-P or Stuhna-P, is a Ukrainian anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system developed in the early 2010s by Luch Design Bureau, a unit of UkrOboronProm. Skif’s original PN-S (ПН-С) guidance device was originally developed and manufactured by Peleng Design Bureau based in Minsk / Belarus.

Skif is designed to destroy modern armoured targets with combined or mo-nolithic armour, including Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA). Skif can attack both stationary and moving targets. It can be used to attack both from long range (up to 5 kilometres during daylight) and from a minimum range of 100m. It can attack point targets such as gun emplacements, lightly armoured objects and helicopters, but has also proved effective against craft at sea at effective range. The Skif has two targeting modes: manually aimed and automatic fire-and-forget, which does not use manual tracking of a target. In 2018, an improved export variant of Skif was tested by the Ukrainian military.

The Skif ATGM should not be confused with the Stugna 100 mm anti-tank missile.

R-360 “Neptun”

R-360 “Neptun” is a Ukrainian anti-ship cruise missile. It was designed by Kiev’s “Luci” Design Bureau in 2014-2020. In 2020 the RK-360MŢ “Neptun” coastal complex based on this missile was adopted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The missile is designed to destroy ships with a displacement of up to 5,000 tonnes and has a warhead with a mass of 150 kg. Its range is up to 280 km. The missile has a subsonic speed (900 km/h) and flies at very low altitudes – a few metres above sea level. The rocket can manoeuvre in flight.

The missile can be operated from three platforms: naval, land and air. In 2019, a land-based complex – RK-360MŢ was built, which consists of several machines: command post, launcher, transport and loading machine, etc. As a naval platform for this missile, “Doe” type stars were initially considered, but since 2018 Vespa type stars.

Harpoon anti-ship missile

The Harpoon anti-ship missile is a dedicated anti-ship missile. It has been developed in several advanced versions, including SLAM (Stand-off Land Attack Missile) derivatives for high-precision attacks on land targets. The Harpoon and SLAM will remain in service with the US Navy for the foreseeable future, but they have been fitted to the Turkish-built F211 – “Hetman Ivan Mazepa” and F-212 – “Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi” (ADA class) corvettes, but not yet delivered. Current US platforms for the AGM-84 are the Navy’s F/A-18, P-3C and S-3B F/A-18s and also some USAF B-52Hs. The AGM-84E4E/H/K SLAM is currently used only by the F/A-18.

After the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by Soviet-built anti-ship missiles, the US Navy saw the need to develop a dedicated anti-ship missile and, as a result, Harpoon’s primary mission became attacking surface ships. The development project was officially begun in 1968, and the ZAGM-84A missile designator ZAGM-84A was assigned in 1970 after the Navy issued a formal request for proposals.

In June 1971, McDonnell-Douglas was awarded the prime contract for Harpoon, and the first test rocket flew in October 1972. By then, it had already been decided to develop air-launched, ship- and submarine-launched variants of the Harpoon, called the AGM-84A, RGM-84A and UGM-84A, respectively. As the range requirement was increased to 90 km (50 Mm), turbojet propulsion was selected by McDonnell-Douglas. Harpoon production began in 1975, and the first version to enter service was the RGM-84A in 1977, followed by the AGM-84A on P-3 aircraft in 1979. UGM-84A became operational on attack submarines in 1981. There are also unarmed training versions of the AGM/RGM/UGM-84A, called the ATM-84A, RTM-84A and UTM-84A. The RGM-84A is usually launched from MK 140 (light weight) or MK 141 (shock-hardened) canister launchers, which contain four missiles, but MK 112 (ASROC) or MK 26 (standard) launchers can also be used. The RGM-84A has folding wings and fins that flip up immediately after the exits the launcher. For target acquisition and tracking, Harpoon-equipped surface ships use the AN/SWG-1 Harpoon fire control system.

The MK 117 digital fire control system has full integrated Harpoon support. So far, over 7,000 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (including production for foreign countries) and 1,000 SLAM variants have been built, of which Turkey has a substantial stock, which it wants to replace with indigenous anti-ship missiles. Production of anti-ship missiles continues for customers outside the US, while production for the US Navy will continue with the AGM-84K SLAM-ER ATA.

Figure no. 13. Harpoon missile variant specifications.

Specifications:	AGM-84D	RGM/ UGM-84D	AGM-84E	AGM-84F	AGM-84H/K
Length	3.85 m	4.63 m	4.50 m	4.44 m	4.37 m
Anvergence	91.4 cm				2.43 m
Diameter	34.3 cm
Weight	540 kg	690 kg	627 kg	635 kg	725 kg
Speed	Mach 0.85
Range	220 km (120 Mm)	140 km (75 Mm)	93 km (50 Mm)	315 km (170 Mm)	280 km (150 Mm)
Propulsion	Engine: Teledyne/CAE J402-CA-400 turbojet; 3.0 Booster (RGM/UGM-84 only): A/B44G-2 or -3 Solid Fuelled Rocket; 53 kN for 2.9 sec
Spotlights	221 kg WDU-18/B penetrating fragmentation-explosion				360 kg WDU-40/B Penetrant BF

 Figure no. 14. Range of the Harpoon spider

STORM SHADOW/SCALP-ER

STORM SHADOW/SCALP is a long-range, conventionally armed, deep-strike, air-launched, air-launched weapon designed to meet the demanding requirements of pre-planned attacks against high-value stationary or fixed targets such as hardened bunkers and key infrastructure.

The SCALP EG and Storm Shadow missiles are virtually identical in all respects, except that they are equipped with different aircraft interface components and software. The rockets are 5.1 m long, have a hull diameter of 630 mm, weigh 1,300 kg and have a range of 250-400 km. The SCALP EG/Storm Shadow is equipped with a TRI-60-30 Microturbo engine and a payload of 400 kg. The missiles are intended to have a shelf life of 12 years when fully fuelled and stored in sealed containers.

The SCALP EG/Storm Shadow is guided by a triple navigation system using inertial navigation, GPS and terrain reference navigation. These advanced navigation systems, combined with an infra-red seeker and automatic target recognition algo-rithms, allow the missile to effectively hit the intended point of impact under severe conditions.

Able to be operated day and night in all weathers, the weapon offers a highly accurate planned depth-attack capability. The STORM SHADOW/SCALP’s exceptional accuracy is due to its advanced navigation system that combines INS, GPS and terrain references. After launch, the weapon descends to terrain hugging altitude to avoid detection. When approaching the target, its on-board infrared seeker matches the target’s image with the stored image to ensure a precision hit and minimal collateral damage.

Rocket variant:

Figure no. 15. The SCALP rocket

Version	SCALP EG/Storm Shadow	SCALP Naval
Beat	550 kilometres	1,000 km (submarine launched, 1,400 km (ship launched)
Speed	Mach 0.95 (323 m/s)	Mach 0.95 (323 m/s)
Launch platform	Air Launched – Mirage 2000, Rafale, Su-24, Tornado, Typhoon, Gripen	Ship/submarine
Spotlights	1X400 kg HE Penetrate	Multifunctional 300 kg HE
Diameter	630 mm	500 mm
Weight at launch	1,300 kg	1,400 kg
Countries with missiles	France, Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom	France

Figure no. 16. The range of the SCALP rocket

OTR-21

The OTR-21 is a mobile missile launch system designed to be deployed with other ground combat units on the battlefield. While the 9K52 Luna-M is large and relatively inaccurate, the OTR-21 is much smaller. The missile itself can be used for precision strikes on enemy tactical targets such as checkpoints, bridges, depots, troop concentrations and airfields. The fragmentation warhead can be replaced with a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead. The solid propellant makes the missile easy to maintain and deploy.

OTR-21 units are usually managed in a brigade structure. There are 18 launchers in a brigade. Each launcher is equipped with two or three rockets.

The vehicle is amphibious with a maximum speed of 60 km/h and 8 km/h in water. The vehicle is NBC protected. The system started to be developed in 1968. Three variants were developed.

Bayraktar TB2 aerial research/sweeping drone

As part of its military modernisation programme, the Armed Forces of Ukraine procured 12 Bayraktar TB2s in 2019. In January 2019, Baykar signed an agreement with Ukrspetsproject, part of Ukroboronprom, to purchase six TB2s and 3 ground control stations worth $69 million for the Ukrainian military. Ukraine received the first batch of UAVs in March 2019. After the successful testing of the aircraft, the Ukrainian Navy placed a separate order for six TB2s, they were delivered starting in 2021, according to Navy officials. Meanwhile, Turkish and Ukrainian officials announced the establishment of a joint venture to produce 48 additional Bayraktar TB2s in Ukraine.

During a Russian military buildup in Crimea and near Ukraine’s borders, a TB2 conducted a reconnaissance flight over the Donbas region on 9 April 2021. This was the first operational use of the aircraft by Ukrainian forces in an active conflict zone. In October 2021, a TB2 drone was first used in combat during the war, targeting a Russian separatist artillery position, destroying a D-30 howitzer and stopping the shelling of Ukrainian troops near Hranitne. Later, the BT2 was used over the sea for scouting, correcting fire and hitting small craft using Mini Akıllı Mühimmat (MAM) guided bombs.

Mini Akıllı Mühimmat (MAM)

It is a family of laser and/or GPS/INS guided bombs produced by Turkish ma-nufacturer Roketsan.

MAM has been developed for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), light attack aircraft, fighter jets and air-to-ground missions for low payload air platforms. The MAM can engage both stationary and moving targets with high accuracy.

Figure no. 17. The Mini Akıllı Mühimmat (MAM) variant

Technical specifications	MAM-C	MAM-L	MAM-T
Diameter	70 mm	160 mm	230 mm
Length	970 mm	1 m	1.4 m
Weight	6.5 kg	22 kg	94 kg
Beat	8 kilometres	15 kilometres	30+ km (UCAV) 60+ km (light attack aircraft) 80+ km (fighter aircraft)
Search	Semi-active laser	Semi-active laser	Semi-active laser GPS/INS
Types of bulb	Multi-functional fire (blast fragmentation, incendiary and armour-piercing) Explosive explosion fragmentation	Tandem – effective against reactive armour Explosive explosion fragmentation Thermobaric	Explosive explosion fragmentation
Spotlights		Impact Close
Platform	Unmanned aerial vehicles and light attack aircraft	Unmanned aerial vehicles and light attack aircraft	Unmanned aerial vehicles, light attack aircraft and combat aircraft
Basis	Roketsan Cirit	Roketsan L-UMTAS	Roketsan TRG-230
Manufacturer	Roketsan	Roketsan	Roketsan

1. The MAM-L IIR features an infrared seeker instead of an SAL seeker, an RF data link, an extended operational range of over 25 km and a slightly increased weight of 23 kg, while retaining the basic model’s external appearance and warheads.

2. The MAM-T IIR has similar looking changes with an improved mid-body wing kit, increased weight of 100 kg, a claimed maximum range of over 50 km.

 Figure no. 18. The weight of the Mini Akıllı Mühimmat (MAM) variants

Sea mines

Contact mine R-421-75

The explosive power of this type of mine ranges from 80 to 160 kg of TNT equivalent. These mines can be used as drifting or anchored mines. Fitted with contact detonators, they explode on contact with anything strong enough to hit them.

Anchored mine type YaM or MYaM

A mine of this type weighs more than 150 kilograms, contains about 20 kilo-grams of TNT as an explosive charge and is equipped with a contact detonator. Storms or weak materials can tear these mines from their anchors, tethers or chains, causing them to drift with the current in an uncontrolled manner.

YaRM anchored mine

A mine of this type weighs 13 kilograms, contains about 3 kilograms of TNT as an explosive charge and is equipped with a contact detonator. These mines are used in shallow waters near riverbanks, lakeshores and coasts to counter landing craft and other amphibious vehicles.

In addition to these types of mines laid by Ukraine as part of its anti-desertification defences, there is also the danger of landmines from the landslides caused by the destruction of the Nova Kahovka dam in Ukraine.

 Figure no. 16. Transport routes¹⁰

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, large parts of the Black Sea coast have been mined by the warring sides. In addition, a significant number of land and river mines (see “anchored mine type YaRM” in the information box above) have been swept away by floods, such as the one caused by the destruction of the Kachowka Dam in June 2023. Most of the mines are anchored YaM type mines, which contain 20 kg of explosive material. This type of mine was developed during World War II and most of the stockpiles date back to the Soviet Union. They are ageing weapons that can break free from their anchors and tethers in storms or due to material weak-ness; once free, they turn into deadly floating bombs, ready to detonate on contact. The current carries the mines from the war zone in Romania and through Bulgaria to Turkey and the Bosphorus Strait. It is not possible to estimate how many naval mines have been laid and are currently floating. The potential danger from mines in the Black Sea is very high; the NATO Shipping Centre has repeatedly highlighted the dangers arising from these drifting time bombs.

Since the outbreak of war, the shipping industry has stepped up its security measures and local port authorities in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey provide daily updates on the situation. In November 2023, insurance companies responded by in-creasing war risk insurance premiums to 3% of a ship’s value. These premiums are typically well below 0.1 percent. In other crisis regions, such as the Red Sea, ships have to pay between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent of their value as additional war risk premium.

The naval forces of NATO Black Sea countries conduct regular de-mining patrols in the Black Sea. In 2023, Romania also acquired two demining vessels from the British Navy. In January 2024, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey agreed to work together to tackle the threat posed by naval mines in the Black Sea. They committed to coordinate their efforts to detect and destroy these sea mines.

Romania as well as insurance companies advise all ships to navigate with ex-treme caution, closely monitoring the water surface by setting up dedicated observation posts on board. In practice, this means that a crew member should be assigned to continuously watch the water surface for drifting mines – one of the few measures that can help prevent contact with these floating explosive devices. All suspected sightings should be reported immediately.

Minefields also pose a significant threat to Black Sea fisheries: fishermen report that mines have sunk to the seabed or drift just below the surface, where they can be caught in fishing gear. Several such incidents have occurred in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Fishermen are urged to be extremely cautious as mines, depending on their type, can detonate with even minimal contact.

Marine drones are detailed in ANNEX 2 [see GeoPolitica Magazine no. 109 (4/2025)]

LESSONS LEARNT AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR RUSSIAN AND GLOBAL NAVAL DOCTRINE

The collapse of the Russian Black Sea Fleet offers valuable lessons for Russia and other naval powers. The conflict served as a veritable “laboratory” of modern naval warfare, testing the limits of traditional technologies and the effectiveness of emerging concepts. We will discuss, on the one hand, the lessons for Russian naval doctrine (what Russia should change in its maritime approach), and, on the other hand, the global lessons – how other states view these events and what adaptations they might make to their own naval strategies.

Using BT2 against Russian invasion in 2022

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, TB2 drones were used by Ukraine’s armed forces against Russian forces and equipment. In January, before the invasion, the spokesman of the air force command, Lieutenant-Colonel Yuri Ihnat, said that “Ukraine has about 20 Bayraktar drones, but we will not stop here”. On 2 March, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced the arrival of additional TB2 drones. According to video footage released by the armed forces, TB2 drones have successfully destroyed a Russian command post, military vehicles – including tanks, IFVs and various types of trucks – surface-to-air missile systems (including Buk and Tor systems), self-propelled artillery, a multiple rocket launcher (MLRS), howitzers and an electronic warfare system on several occasions. The drone also destroyed two Russian fuel trains, patrol boats and a helicopter. On 24 February, the day of the invasion, four Bayraktar TB2 drones stationed at the Chuhuiv/Harkov airbase were abandoned and subsequently destroyed on the ground by Ukrainian forces amid reported Russian missile attacks. The Lugansk People’s Militia of the Lugansk People’s Republic claimed to have shot down two TB2 drones near Lugansk. On 27 February, the Ukrainian air force confirmed two TB2 strikes on Russian convoys in the Herson and Khytomyr regions. The head of the Ukrainian air force, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk, called the UAV system “life-giving”. The drone’s popularity in Ukraine led to a song, “Bayraktar”, which praised the drone while insulting the Russian military and its invasion. Ukrainian drones appear to be equipped with anti-jamming antennas. They apparently use MAM-C and MAM-L laser-guided bombs. Traditional search radars seem to struggle against the TB2 because of its low speed and small size, which gives it a small radar cross section. One radar that was destroyed on 7 May appeared to be actively scanning just before it was hit, although Russian units are turning off their own radars to reduce radar detection and targeting.

The drone can also be deployed in minutes and launched from a normal road. On 26 February 2022, two TB2 drones were shot down near Shchastia. On 17 March 2022, a TB2 Bayraktar TB2 was shot down over Kiev; Russia published images of the drone wreckage. A second TB2 drone was shot down on 29 March 2022 in eastern Ukraine. On 2 April, a third TB-2 drone was shot down. On 12 April 2022, a TB2 Bayraktar TB2 was reportedly shot down by the Russian frigate Admiral Essen off the coast of Crimea. On 13 April 2022, Ukrainian sources claimed that at least two R-360 Neptune missiles were responsible for sinking the Russian cruiser Moskva – causing an explosion on one of the exposed missile tubes on the deck of the ship. The drones, probably TB2s, were blamed for helping to decoy the cruiser’s defences.

On 26 and 27 April, three other TB2 drones were destroyed, two in the Kursk region and the third in the Belgorod region, Russia, by a Pantsir-S1. On 1 May, a TB2 drone with registration S51T was shot down in the Kursk region, Russia. TB2 losses totalled seven units visually confirmed. On 2 May, Ukrainian-operated Bayraktar drones attacked and destroyed two Russian Raptor-class patrol boats near Snake Island. On 7 May, a TB2 drone attacked and destroyed a Russian Mil Mi-8 transport helicopter while offloading passengers on Snake Island. In the same deployment, a TB2 drone destroyed a Tor missile launcher on island, while a second launcher was destroyed while being unloaded from a landing ship. This opened the way for a bombing raid by a Sukhoi Su-27 “Flanker” aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force against buildings on the island. On 23 May 2022, the wreckage of a Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2, tail number 75, was found in Romanian territorial waters by Romanian authorities. The drone was probably shot down during the attacks on Snake Island on 7 May.

On 28 May 2022, Lithuanian citizens raised $3.2 million, out of a unit cost of $5.37 million, to buy a single Bayraktar TB2 drone for Ukraine. On 2 June, Baykar said: ‘The Lithuanian people have raised honourable funds to buy a Bayraktar TB2 for Ukraine. After learning this, Baykar will give a free Bayraktar TB2 to Lithuania and ask that these funds go to Ukraine for humanitarian aid.” From the beginning of the invasion until the end of June, Ukraine received over 50 TB2s. On 28 June, Defence Minister Reznikov announced that Baykar would dedicate its full capabilities to meet the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces, fulfilling its requirement for “dozens more” aircraft. In July 2022, Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of Baykar, said in an interview that his company would never supply drones to Russia, as it supports Ukrainian sovereignty and independence.

Tactical lessons from the use of Bayraktar TB2 drones
in the Black Sea area

The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated the strategic potential of naval and aerial drones in maritime theatres. Ukraine made extensive use of Bayraktar TB2 systems to counter Russian conventional superiority and inflict significant damage on the Russian Federation’s naval infrastructure, logistics and maritime mobility.

Since the start of the invasion in February 2022, TB2 drones have been used to destroy or disrupt key Russian equipment including tanks, armoured vehicles, surface-to-air missile systems (Buk and Tor), self-propelled howitzers, patrol boats and even Mil Mi-8 helicopters during landing operations on Snake Island. Moreover, these drones were also indirectly involved in the sinking of the cruiser Moskva, contributing to the distraction and saturation of the ship’s defences.¹¹

Although several TB2 drones have been shot down in the Kharkiv, Lugansk, Kursk theatres or in the vicinity of Snake Island, the resilience of the systems and their ease of deployment have meant that Ukraine has been able to quickly replace lost units, including through successive deliveries from Baykar. By the end of June 2022, over 50 TB2s had been received by Ukraine.¹²

Drones have also proved effective against naval platforms. On 2 May and 7 May 2022, TB2s destroyed Russian Raptor speedboats and Tor launchers on Snake Island, creating an operational window for Ukrainian aircraft to strike Russian targets on the island. In addition, features such as the low radar cross-section and the MAM-C/MAM-L smart munitions allowed them to operate relatively undetected in contested spaces.

This experience shows that the Romanian Naval Forces should develop an autonomous air and naval flotilla, with similar capabilities, integrable into NATO ISR and C4ISR systems, but also capable of operating in A2/AD scenarios in the vicinity of contested areas (such as the extended Exclusive Economic Zone or the Snake Island).

Further use and vulnerability

Although at the beginning of the invasion Ukrainian drones, including the TB2, could be used to harass Russian forces, by the summer of 2022 they had become less effective in this role. The Russians, initially disorganised, were late in establishing adequate air defences, but once they did so, Ukrainian UAVs were shot down with increasing frequency. In addition to direct shoot downs, Russia has made extensive use of electronic warfare (EW) to jam and disrupt drone communications, prompting the Ukrainians to reduce their use of TB2. At the end of July 2022, a military expert explained that the low speed and average altitude of Bayraktar TB2 drones made them easy targets for Russian anti-aircraft defences, many of which have already been shot down.¹³

At the end of July 2022, a TB2 drone with the number U139 was shot down in the Belgorod region of Russia. On 2 August, another drone, designator 409, was destroyed in Ukraine, followed by the discovery of the remains of a TB2 drone in Herson on 2 September¹⁴. By July 2022, visually confirmed losses of Bayraktar TB2 drones totalled 14 units.¹⁵

On 15 January 2023, another Bayraktar TB2 was shot down using exclusively Russian electronic warfare systems. Later, on 22 January 2023, the remains of another destroyed TB2 drone were found in the Odessa region. The commander of the Russian Air Defence Forces, Lieutenant General Andrei Demin, claimed in April 2023 that Russia had shot down more than 100 Bayraktar drones since the beginning of the conflict.

On 23 February 2023, a Bayraktar TB2 crashed in the Kharkiv region due to a friendly fire incident. On 5 May 2023, the Ukrainian Air Force admitted to shooting down one of its own TB2 drones over Kiev after losing control of it, possibly due to a technical malfunction. There were no casualties. Later, on 12 May 2023, another TB2 drone was shot down by Russian forces near Marinka.

By June 2023, the role of the TB2 drones had changed significantly from direct attack to predominantly reconnaissance missions, staying out of range of Russian air defence systems and using advanced optical sensors to direct fire at other units and drones¹⁶. On 17 July 2023, another TB2 drone, designator T263, was shot down in the Herson region.

On 3 September 2023, Ukraine published footage of the destruction of a KS-701 patrol boat by a TB2 drone. This was the first confirmed offensive use of a TB2 drone after a long period of inactivity in direct attack missions. It is believed that the weakening of Russian air defences following Ukraine’s constant attacks would have allowed the offensive use of TB2 drones again. However, Colonel Volodimir Valiukh, a commander in Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, stated in October 2023 that TB2 drones are rarely and predominantly used in short reconnaissance missions due to the continuing threats posed by Russia’s sophisticated air defences and advanced electronic warfare systems, explicitly stating that “it is hard to find situations in which to use them”¹⁷.

According to data compiled by Oryx Blog, as of 25 February 2025, 26 Bayraktar TB2 drones have been visually confirmed as destroyed, either shot down in flight or neutralised on the ground by Russian forces.¹⁸

Lessons for Russian naval doctrine

Figure no. 17. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, which lost a third of the warships it had at the start of the war in Ukraine. Photo: Profimedia Images¹⁹

Russia, heir to the Soviet Navy, had a naval doctrine that combined elements of littoral defence (anti-access) with blue-water navy ambitions (exemplified by the Northern Fleet). The Black Sea Fleet was seen as the regional force of supremacy in a relatively closed theatre dominated by Russia. Events 2022-2025, however, revealed major shortcomings:

1. Underestimating the asymmetric enemy

Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that Russia underestimated its adversary. It relied on the idea that Ukraine, without ships, could not pose a serious threat at sea. This inverted²⁰ “sea blindness” (deaf blindness to threats ashore) has cost Moskva and others. Russian doctrine will have to seriously integrate the scenario in which an adversary without a conventional fleet can nonetheless deny access at sea by land-based means (coastal missiles, long-range artillery, drones). The Russians themselves had practised this concept (A2/AD based on coastal systems, such as their P-800 Bastion missile bastion in the Crimea), but found themselves in the opposite position.

2. Air defence for large ships

The sinking of the Moskva will be studied in naval academies (it is even said to be “a case to be studied in academies”²¹). It highlights multiple failures: from crew training (inability to respond effectively to the hit and put out the fire) to technical problems (possible failure of the main radar or absence of AWACS above). Russia will have to review how it equips its ships with sensors and close-in defence systems (CIWS). Moskva did not have a modern CIWS (only old AK-630 guns), and its short-range anti-aircraft missiles OSA were outdated. Had it had a modern Kashtan or Pantsir-M type system, perhaps the fate might have been different. It will also emphasise integrating data from other sources (satellite, coastal radar) directly to the ships – maybe Moskva didn’t get the alert in time. The Russians could accelerate their own drone projects to provide maritime surveillance, so as not to depend on expensive piloted aircraft.

3. Doctrine of Dispersion vs. Concentration

Typically, Russia deploys ships in fairly small groups (the Black Sea Fleet doesn’t have aircraft carriers or escort destroyers like the US Navy). With one powerful flagship and the rest smaller, the formula was vulnerable to decapitation. The lesson is that Moskva operated alone relatively close to the coast – too close for safety. Perhaps doctrine will stipulate not to get so close without complete coastal clearance. Besides, the Russians reacted by moving the fleet, so they adopted geographic dispersion as a defensive tactic (a concept contrary to offensive doctrine). In the future, they could plan redundant port infrastructure (more ports capable of accommodating large ships, as they were exploring with Abkhazia – Oceamcire – while inappropriate, it’s a signal).

4. The need for defence against naval drones

An entirely new element for the Russians is how to defend against swarms of USVs. The Soviets didn’t encounter this, so they had no dedicated doctrinal chapters. Now, it is clear that every military harbour must be protected not only against classic submarines and mines, but also against these fast drones. We are likely to see invest–ment in acoustic sensors in harbours, perhaps electrified nets or some kind of “small deterrent” – for example, they could experiment with high-powered microwave weapons that fry the electronics of nearby drones, or anti-drone drones (a kind of drone-robot interceptor). It is a new area of weaponry: anti-USV warfare. The Russians, like others, now have the motivation to develop it.

5. Rethinking the surface vs sub-surface fleet balance

Kilo submarines were the hardest to reach platforms for Ukraine until they hit dry dock with Storm Shadow. Some Russian analysts might conclude that sub-marines are the safer investment than corvettes/frigates that have been decimated. It is possible that, doctrinally, the Russian Navy will further emphasise submarines (they were already the pride of the Northern Fleet). In future plans, the Russian surface fleet (cruisers, destroyers) was suffering from lack of resources and sanctions any-way (can’t build big engines due to embargo). Thus, Russia is likely to scale down ambitions for large surface fleets and emphasise:

1. Conventional missile submarines (Kilo class and future Lada)

2. Multirole nuclear submarines (Yasen) capable of launching hypersonic anti-ship missiles (Zircon)

3. Coastal mobile missile platforms (Bastion, Bal) – already used to threaten NATO ships, e.g. the Russians fired Bastion in December 2022 on a civilian tugboat as a demonstration.

6. Improving naval aviation and integrating air and naval forces

After the ships withdrew, naval aviation took over combat roles. Russian doc-trine emphasised the importance of naval aviation, but the Black Sea Fleet did not have an aircraft carrier and relied on the air force’s (VKS) aviation in Crimea. One lesson is the need for better synergy between aviation and fleet. For example, to counter the attack on Ivanovets, the Russians would have needed helicopters in the air, ready to fire. Maybe they didn’t react fast enough. From now on, it’s likely that any Russian ship going to sea will be accompanied by a patrol plane or helicopter. Russia could invest in surface aerial drones (helicopter-type) that take off from ships, patrol radially and land – as an anti-USV safety cordon. The Russians will also em-phasise “deny NATO ISR” – i.e. how to prevent NATO from spying on their ships. They have already brought a special (jamming) ship to Sevastopol and are experimenting with signal jamming (such as smoke curtain and GPS spoofing²² around Crimea).

7. The human and moral element
   The painful lesson is conferred by the morale of the crews

After so many losses, the Russians will have to renew the sailors’ confidence. The training doctrine is likely to emphasise reaction to damage and combat discipline (there have been criticisms that the Moskva crew reacted slowly, many of them inex-perienced youngsters). Rigorous damage control-type training will likely follow, inspired by American sailors who have a tradition of fighting for the ship’s survival. Russian commanders will also be less willing to take risks. One effect already seen: the Russians were very cautious after April 2022, not sailing near Odessa at all. This “culture of caution” will remain, which is a notable change (traditionally, the Russian Navy valued heroism and aggression, the motto of the Northern Fleet was “First to Attack”).

8. Review planning in regional conflicts

Specifically, it is clear that any future Russian plan to attack a littoral state (be it Ukraine or any other) will have to seriously consider neutralising coastal threats beforehand. Russia failed to destroy the Neptun batteries in time or to secure the Odessa – Mykolaiv coastline. If they had occupied Odessa quickly, the maritime scenario would have been completely different (Ukraine would have had nowhere to deploy Harpoon / Neptun directly to the sea). Now, the Russians know that timing is crucial: let the enemy harden its shore, and your fleet becomes the target. For Russian doctrine, the war in Ukraine will impose:

9. More focus on coastal warfare: how to defend your fleet from shore attacks

10. Integration of new defence technologies: anti-drone, smart anti-mine

11. Realism about the role of the fleet: recognise that the fleet needs to be used in a calibrated way, otherwise it risks rapid losses (possibly less bluster with parades and “bulging muscles” – incidentally, in 2023 Putin held the Navy Parade in St Petersburg, far away from Crimea).

12. As a doctrinal innovation, the Russians will carefully study Ukrainian tactics

Ironically, the Russians have historically excelled at asymmetric warfare, but here they have been its victims. They can be expected to adapt and possibly copy: for example, they could develop their own naval drones (there are already reports that they are testing such in the Arctic), which they could use in the future (maybe not in this current conflict, but the concept will be adopted).

Global lessons and international implications

It’s not just Russia that is learning from this campaign, but the rest of the world – especially the big naval powers like the US, China, the UK, but also smaller countries looking for ways to defend themselves against superior fleets.

For NATO and the US

1. Confirming the effectiveness of Distributed Lethality and A2/AD: NATO has always viewed with concern Russian A2/AD bubbles (e.g. Kaliningrad, Crimea, Syria) designed to keep allied fleets at bay. Paradoxically, Ukraine has created an improvised A2/AD ‘bubble’ with mobile systems and has shattered the Russian fleet locally. This confirms that an adversary can deny access to a modern fleet with relatively cheap means. NATO will study what the Ukrainians have done, to apply in their own defence plans: for example, the Baltic countries could draw conclusions about coastal defences against the Russian Baltic Fleet. Poland is buying coastal missiles; Romania has expressed interest in anti-ship systems (buying Norwegian NSMs). Ukraine’s success lends credibility to these investments.

2. The need for countermeasures against their own vulnerabilities: The NATO fleets (aircraft carriers, destroyers) are much better equipped anti-aircraft than the Russian, but still vulnerable to drone swarms. The US Navy is already experimenting with LASERs and targeted anti-drone weapons; these programmes will gain momentum, with a real-life example of what can happen if a swarm saturates a naval group. NATO will also be watching the development of underwater drones – the Russians haven’t used them (apart from maybe mines), but there are fears that autonomous submarines could hunt aircraft carriers in the future.

3. Confirmation of the importance of intelligence and information superiority as the US and NATO have been testing their ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities in support of Ukraine without being belligerent. The results (e.g. surgical strikes in Sevastopol) show the strength of the Western sensor network. For the West, it is an argument to continue the development of integrated data networks between allies, because they have a force multiplier effect on friendly forces. One analyst notes: “Western navies should take note to learn from Russia’s shortcomings and Ukraine’s successes”²³.²⁴

For China and other naval powers

1. China, with its maritime ambitions (control of the South China Sea, possibly an invasion of Taiwan), probably watched the conflict closely. The situation is not identical (China has a much larger fleet and would have local air superiority in the Taiwan Strait if it attacked), but the lesson of drones and missiles is relevant: Taiwan could use swarms of USVs or mobile missiles to make a landing costly. China is already investing heavily in surface drones (a Chinese JARI drone that resembles Sea Baby in concept has been publicised). Also, the sinking of the Moskva is sending shivers down the spine of any fleet operator: the Chinese are asking: our aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong, how vulnerable are they to saturated anti-ship missiles? So they will focus on defences: more escort ships, integrated anti-missile system (even a mini-“Iron Dome” marine).

2. States with small fleets, but threatened by larger fleets (e.g. Gulf countries vs Iran, South Korea vs North Korea or vs China) will see in the Ukrainian example a confirmation of the “porcupine” strategy – the hedgehog: don’t compete directly, but make it painful for anyone who comes close. Purchases of coastal missiles, drones, smart mines will increase. Military industries can be expected to develop on-demand offerings: for example, Turkey is already promoting a kamikaze USV called the MARLIN inspired by the naval Bayraktar. Israel, known for technology, is likely to produce naval anti-drone systems and perhaps its own USVs.

3. Legal and ethical impact

The use of naval drones has raised questions of international law (is an unman–ned USV considered a warship? Can it be captured? What status do the crews operating them have?). These grey areas will require clarification in maritime conventions. Already, after the Novorossiysk attack, the Russians have labelled drone operators as “terrorists” in an attempt to delegitimise them – an argument rejected by Kiev, which says they were legitimate military targets. The international community will have to set the rules (like the aerial drone talks).

4. Redefining maritime superiority

As a general lesson: superiority is no longer just about tonnage and number of ships. An American admiral recently wrote that “the age of the large surface combatant might be waning”²⁵. This conflict seems to support it. Fleets can think of more small, modular, dispersed platforms – hard to eliminate all at once – rather than few large ones. This is already a trend, but events are accelerating it. For example, the US Navy is testing the Ghost Fleet concept – a flotilla of small autonomous ships. Conceptually, the Russian Navy could think similarly for the Black Sea: instead of another cruiser (they can’t afford one anyway), have a swarm of 20 missile-armed USVs to supplement.

5. Strengthening the Montreux Convention

Turkey used its Montreux prerogatives immediately (Feb 2022) to limit esca-lation²⁶. It was an example of responsible application of maritime law. Presumably the international community will maintain the convention as a pillar of stability – if the straits were open, the conflict could have escalated a lot (Russia would have brought more ships, NATO might have reacted). Future discussions on Montreux will take into account the lessons of the war: for example, an amendment could call for closer international consultations in such situations.

For Ukraine itself

Its successes have shown that investing in military creativity pays off. In the absence of a conventional fleet, Ukraine has virtually created a “silicon and explo-sives fleet”. After the war, Ukraine may not have the resources to build large corvettes or frigates, but it could standardise drone fleets as an element of coastal defence. Maybe we will see in Ukraine the 6th drone fleet… It is plausible that a hybrid model will emerge: a few big ships (for NATO flag and cooperation) plus an asymmetric arsenal (for deterring Russia). A bitter lesson for Ukraine, however, is that it could not completely eliminate the Kalibr missile threat. Even with the Russian fleet suffering, the submarines continued the chain of strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. Going forward, Ukraine will probably want better anti-submarine capabilities (perhaps fixed sonars, patrol planes, helicopters) to counter this latter threat as well.

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[This article will continue in GeoPolitica Magazine no. 109 (4/2025)]