Eugeniusz Bilonozhko, PhD.
It is impossible to forbid one to love motherland for free.
BI-2 (Belarusian alternative rock band)
After February 24, 2022, every conscious Russian, not only the opposition, received an unequivocal answer to the fundamental Russian question: “Who is to blame?” – Putin. Consequently, new and old responses to another timeless Russian question, “What to do?”, began to emerge and will be discussed in this article. Unfortunately, even 30 years after the collapse of the USSR, we still have not received answers to the question, “How should we organize Russia?” However, the answer to whether we can successfully organize Russia will only come after Ukraine’s victory – an outcome no conscientious global citizen doubts, though the definition of “Ukraine’s victory” may vary depending on an individual’s or political actor’s ideological and political stance. The death of Alexei Navalny on February 16, 2024, further complicated the situation for the Russian opposition since the informal leader and symbol of the Russian opposition and the “Beautiful Russia of the Future” passed away. Another turning point came on August 1, 2024, when Russia exchanged its political prisoners for its spies. This exchange is particularly symbolic, as it harks back to the practices of the USSR at its peak. Today, it can be reasonably assumed that the Russian Federation no longer has opposition politicians or political activities that genuinely represent opposition.
“Who is to blame?”
Since Putin came to power, the Russian opposition has faced consistent persecution and marginalization. Events on Bolotnaya Square, the murder of Boris Nemtsov, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbas have marked significant turning points for the Russian opposition. However, it was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, and the subsequent revelation of atrocities committed by the Russian army in the outskirts of Kyiv – most notably the Bucha massacre – that compelled opposition figures, both in exile and within Russia, to clearly and unequivocally denounce Vladimir Putin’s criminal regime.
Until 2022, the issue of Crimea’s political status served as a marker for the political integrity of a Russian oppositionist. However, after February 24, 2022, merely acknowledging Russia’s war against Ukraine became a political act that could result in criminal prosecution. Consequently, while the Putin regime could maintain a pretense of political pluralism after 2014, the launch of a full-scale invasion marked Russia’s decisive shift toward totalitarianism[1].
Accordingly, opposition figures who remain in Russia can only face imprisonment. Among those currently in Russia are Alexei Gorinov, Yevgeny Roizman, Yevgeny Bestuzhev, Alexander Skobov, Boris Kagarlitsky, and Mikhail Krieger[2], all of whom are being persecuted by the Russian authorities for their statements about Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Assessing their political influence on Russian citizens is challenging, and evaluating their potential significance in the event of a political regime change is even more difficult. Nevertheless, their continued presence in the Russian Federation and their “consent” to endure imprisonment serve as a necessary symbolic foundation for their political careers. The significance and role of these individuals vary greatly, and it is impossible to predict the future political trajectory of each of the aforementioned figures under the current circumstances. While imprisoned, Alexei Navalny served as a symbol of the Russian opposition and a central figure for others to rally around. Similarly, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrei Pivovarov, and Ilya Yashin played pivotal roles. However, Navalny’s death and the expulsion of these opposition figures from Russia have fundamentally altered the situation. The symbolic role of politicians imprisoned in their homeland has shifted; they now resemble forced political exiles in the tradition of figures like Solzhenitsyn. At this stage, former political prisoners are only beginning their political activities in exile and will seek ways to connect not just with fellow exiles but also with Russians still residing in the country.[3].
Ilya Yashin held public meetings with representatives of the newest Russian political emigration.
The first public action by “forced political migrants” Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrey Pivovarov, and Ilya Yashin, alongside Yulia Navalnaya, was an anti-war march held in Berlin on November 17, 2024. According to local police, the event drew approximately 1,800 participants, many of whom traveled from other cities and countries[4]. On the same day, similar solidarity and protest actions were held in various cities worldwide to highlight Russia’s war against Ukraine and demonstrate that not all Russians support Vladimir Putin’s policies.
Ilya Yashin believes that this march has the potential to strengthen the political standing of its organizers.
Ukraine’s Ambassador to Germany Oleksii Makeiev characterized the protest as a PR campaign “whose target audience is not the Russian population, but the German media and politicians.”[5]
The Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) and Navalny Headquarters were unable to establish an effective anti-war network within Russia. Following the death of their leader, their future as a cohesive and impactful organization remains uncertain and highly debatable. It is important to note that Navalny’s opposition activities and those of his structures often operated as closed groups accessible only to chosen ones. While the social capital of Navalny’s Headquarters previously facilitated the creation of social networks and connections, the current political climate makes their operations within Russia impossible. Consequently, they no longer pose a significant threat to the Putin regime. The death of Alexei Navalny and the formalization of Yulia Navalnaya’s leadership have further exacerbated the crisis and isolation within the political emigrant community linked to Navalny. It is worth noting that the leaders of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), alongside Mikhail Khodorkovsky, are among the least engaged with the Ukrainian context. They actively seek to demonstrate that their political activities are in no way coordinated with official Kyiv.[6]
Thus, after February 24, 2022, any form of public or political opposition activity within the Russian Federation has become impossible. Political engagement is now limited to either passive or active anti-war resistance. Despite widespread media speculation about potential internal opposition to Putin among certain politicians, officials, or regional elites, we assert that the current Russian government holds full political (and, in the future, criminal) responsibility for military actions against Ukraine. We do not foresee a potential split among the elites or any significant elite confrontation. Following President Putin’s “election” in March 2024 and the subsequent changes in the government, it can be concluded that there is no elite rivalry within the Russian government structures that is not directly controlled or held accountable by Putin himself.
Any political emigration is inherently detached from the political landscape of its home country, and the detachment of the Russian political opposition deepened with each year of Putin’s rule. The turning point for political emigration from Russia came on February 24, 2022. For political and cultural figures, as well as some politically conscious citizens of the Russian Federation, remaining in the country became ethically unacceptable. In 2022, the Russian political opposition expanded, and, as a result, the rift between it and the now totalitarian political environment in Russia grew into an abyss.
In 2014, thousands of rallies opposing the annexation of Crimea could have taken place across Russia. In 2022, however, the Russian authorities imposed fines and arrests for distributing or displaying a map of the Russian Federation that excluded Crimea.[7] As a result, since February 2022, politically conscious and active citizens have begun to leave Russia[8] and declare their political views abroad.
Political opposition in emigration is ineffective and incapable of engaging in direct political struggle. Political opposition is often instrumentalized by external political actors or the intelligence services of the host country, or it focuses on theoretical reflections about the historical trajectory and future of the homeland left behind. Notably, Russian opposition, particularly Garry Kasparov, sought to warn the international community about imperialism and sovietism of Putin’s Russia. However, these warnings were largely ignored or dismissed by the West.[9]
Political figures like Garry Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky claim to have warned, while political journalists analyze past events for signs of the emergence of collective responsibility and widespread consent of hateful practices.[10]
In 2016, the Free Russia Forum (FRF) was established as an independent platform for the Russian opposition to discuss current issues of Russian and international politics, as well as scenarios for Russia’s exit from the political, economic, and civilizational crisis.
The FRF has become a formal platform for any Russian oppositionists, with the main criterion for participation to condemn the annexation of Crimea. In 2022, the FRF created the Russian Action Committee, and in 2022, the Free Russia Forum held three anti-war conferences.
In September 2022, the Congress of Free Russia took place in Vilnius, organized by the Russian Action Committee (RAC). The Congress adopted two key declarations: one supporting Ukraine’s victory and another outlining a vision for Russia’s future. Both documents emphasize the need for Russia to be demilitarized, compensate Ukraine for its losses, and withdraw from all occupied territories. Notably, the Congress participants refrained from advocating for the disintegration of Russia, instead highlighting the importance of restoring federalization principles and drafting a new constitution. There was also no call for armed resistance against Putin’s totalitarian regime. It is worth noting that Ilya Ponomarev, who had announced the manifesto of the National Republican Army (NRA) calling for armed action against Putin’s regime, did not attend the Congress.[11].
However, by the time of the third anti-war conference (November 30 – December 1, 2022), participants called on NATO and the West to provide Ukraine with all possible support, urging them not to remain passive or allow the conflict to be frozen. They likened the war’s characteristics to those of World War II, with contemporary Russia embodying the role of Hitler’s Germany. Unfortunately, neither the Free Russia Forum nor the Russian Action Committee managed to issue a clear call for the Russian people to overthrow the totalitarian regime by any means necessary.
Meanwhile, both formal and informal grassroots and network-based anti-war initiatives were presented at these conferences[12]. Russian analysts suggest that grassroots initiatives focused on helping Ukrainians or Russians may be the new Russian opposition. Amid ongoing military aggression, however, assessing the quantitative and qualitative effectiveness of anti-war actions and their potential to translate into political capital remains challenging[13].
In 2022 and 2023, the Forum for Peaceful Russia was held in Russia, organized by politician and lawyer Sergei Ross, the founder of the Collective Action Research Center. During these forums, participants sought to develop strategies for assisting Ukrainian refugees, defining areas of activity for civic activists both within Russia and in exile, and addressing environmental issues. The Forum for Peaceful Russia has expressed a desire to collaborate with representatives of Ukraine.
In June 2023, the Committee 2024 was established. In its manifesto and subsequent documents, the committee called for unified action to reject the recognition of elections in the occupied territories and the presidential elections in Russia, condemning them as a form of power usurpation. The committee includes activists and public figures from various political and social organizations, as well as volunteers serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In October 2023, the founding congress of the NGO “Deputies of Peaceful Russia” took place. This organization primarily brings together individuals elected to various positions in Russia since January 1, 2012. The NGO has held two meetings and issued a manifesto.[14].The NGO “Deputies of Peaceful Russia” is considered closely aligned with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and serve as a counterpart to the Congress of People’s Deputies.
In February 2022, the Anti-War Committee of Russia was established, bringing together a diverse group of Russian politicians and public figures, including Evgeny Chichvarkin,[15] Boris Zimin, and Marat Gelman. The Anti-War Committee of Russia has held three congresses, serving as a platform for Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s political activities. Among its notable achievements is the announcement of the Berlin Declaration[16]. It should be emphasized that no representatives from Navalny’s team participated in the congresses, and Ilya Ponomarev’s personal involvement was also not welcomed either.
In September 2024, the Anti-Corruption Foundation published an investigation alleging that Leonid Nevzlin, a former Yukos executive and close associate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, ordered the assassination attempt on Leonid Volkov, Ivan Zhdanov, and Maxim Mironov’s wife, Alexandra Petrachkova. It should be emphasized that this investigation indirectly implicates Mikhail Khodorkovsky.[17]
In October 2024, blogger Maxim Katz published an investigation alleging that Alexander Zheleznyak, the former owner of the Russian bank Probusinessbank, and Sergey Leontyev stole significant funds from the bank’s owners and fled abroad in 2015. There, they sought to rehabilitate their reputations by cooperating with the Anti-Corruption Foundation and framing their persecution as politically motivated. Later, the Anti-Corruption Foundation acknowledged that in 2021, they had received free assistance from Zheleznyak in registering the ACF as a legal entity in the United States. However, they maintain that they did not act in Zheleznyak’s interests or assist in his reputation laundering. Zheleznyak has since announced his resignation as treasurer of the ACF.
Later, the Anti-War Committee called on all participants in opposition activities to disclose the sources of their funding.
Yulia Navalnaya admitted that her cooperation with Zheleznyak was a mistake, emphasizing the moral aspect of the situation, but she is unsure whether Zheleznyak stole money from the bank’s depositors[18].
It is worth noting that in April 2024, Maria Pevchikh and Navalny’s team released the documentary series The Traitors, which chronicles the rise of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to power. The film served as a prologue to a broader discussion among political émigrés about the moral responsibility of figures like Mikhail Khodorkovsky for the current events.
In November 2024, the Yulia Navalnaya Forum was held in Vilnius, marking the formal beginning of her independent political career. The forum’s existence and its goals were only made public after the event. According to some reports, the main topics discussed at the forum included potential constitutional and economic reforms in Russia, as well as the establishment of social justice. Participants worked in groups, discussing various aspects of constitutional changes aimed at transforming Russia into a genuine federation and a democratic parliamentary republic. They envisioned a mixed proportional system of parliamentary elections that would respect the rights of regions and municipalities. Given the rapid pace of current events, the participants acknowledged that predicting the future remains challenging.
Lev Kadik, an independent Russian political observer, argues that in the current situation, the greatest political capital is being generated by informal and grassroots social groups and activists. Notably, former city councilors Maria Solenova and Natalia Shavshukova have gained recognition for organizing fundraising efforts to purchase gasoline generators, stoves, and portable gas stoves, which were then delivered to Ukraine.
Most members of the Free Russia Forum and the Russian Action Committee have been in exile for a considerable period of time and have lost any significant political connection with Russia. None of the representatives possesses formal or informal organizational structures within the Russian Federation. It seems unlikely that these political figures will achieve success in the event of a change of power in Russia, as stated in the goals declared by the participants of the congresses in Vilnius in 2022. For the time being, and for a long period before, their efforts have been primarily directed towards Western politicians and focused on forms of opposition to Russia.
Armed Struggle from Declarations to Actions
In August 2022, Ilya Ponomarev, representing the National Republican Army, signed the “Declaration of the Russian Armed Opposition” and declared the inclusion of the Freedom of Russia Legion – a Russian unit fighting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (the Irpin Declaration). However, in the context of war, verifying the authenticity of such declarations remains challenging, and an analysis of available open-source information suggests that these entities function primarily as propaganda tools. However, on July 31, 2024, the Freedom of Russia Legion announced its withdrawal from the Irpin Declaration and the termination of any political cooperation with the Congress of People’s Deputies, emphasizing its sole focus on armed struggle. The Freedom of Russia Legion avoids formally declaring an ideological affiliation, instead advocating for political pluralism.[19]
In November 2022, Ilya Ponomarev organized the “Congress of People’s Deputies”,[20] ), which adopted several groundbreaking declarations. These included affirming the right of Russians to revolt and emphasizing that Resistance participants should adhere to the criteria set forth in the Hague Convention (1907) and the Geneva Convention (1949) to avoid endangering civilians. The Congress also recognized the principle of self-determination for peoples in line with the UN Charter and the Declaration on the Principles of International Law. A particularly significant document, titled “Priority Decrees of the New Government,” proposed a “Revolutionary Act.” This act would aim to dissolve the Russian Federation, nullify the existing Russian Constitution, remove the President of the Russian Federation, and establish a new Russian Republic. The Revolutionary Act was envisioned as a transitional framework to precede the formation of a Constituent Assembly, tasked with drafting a new constitutional foundation for the nation.
The “Congress of People’s Deputies” announced the Constituent Declaration of the International Anti-Authoritarian Union, signed by Ilya Ponomarev and representatives of the Republic of Ichkeria. However, Ponomarev’s activities provoked strong reactions and condemnation from several Russian opposition organizations and individuals, underscoring the divisive nature of his proposals. It is worth emphasizing that the declarations of the congress organized by Ponomarev were the most radical and most closely correspond to the interests of the current Ukrainian government (collapse of the Russian Federation, the payment of reparations to Ukraine, and the recognition/call for the Russian people to fight against the Putin regime). The “Congress of People’s Deputies” continues to hold regular sessions in Poland, engaging in legislative discussions. Having resided in Ukraine as a Ukrainian citizen[21], Ponomarev is widely regarded as the most overtly pro-Ukrainian figure among the exiled Russian opposition. Many political commentators suggest that Ponomarev’s actions are coordinated with Ukraine’s military and political leadership of Ukraine.
Instead, in November 2024, two congresses of people’s deputies took place. The First Renewed or 7th Congress removed Ilya Ponomarev from the post of chairman. The participants of the meeting, led by Olga Kurnosova and Andriy Illarionov, called for closer contacts with other Russian politicians and the Ukrainian authorities, up to the creation of the Russian Federal Republic on the territory of Russia controlled by the Ukrainian army (Rostislav Murzagulov’s project[22]). Caesar, a representative of the Free Russia Legion, spoke at the forum. At the second congress of people’s deputies, chaired by Ilya Ponomarev, Olga Kurnosova was dismissed, and a report was heard from the Congress of People’s Deputies chairman. Ponomarev continued to work on legislation for a future Russia without Putin. It is worth emphasizing that Ukrainian MPs Oleksandr Merezhko and Oleh Dunda spoke at Ponomarev’s congress.
In August 2022, a military unit of the Russian Volunteer Corps, consisting of ethnic Russians, was formed within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Its leaders were associated with right-wing radical and ultra-conservative groups[23]. The Russian Volunteer Corps recognizes the right of the peoples living within the territory of the Russian Federation to self-determination. In November 2022, the Civic Council was established in Warsaw as the political wing of the Russian Volunteer Corps. The Civic Council announced fundraising efforts to train and equip Russian volunteers to fight in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and conduct guerrilla operations within the Russian Federation. However, on June 6, 2023, the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Civic Council ended their political cooperation, citing differences in political views. Notably, the Russian Volunteer Corps did not initially join the Irpin Declaration
The Civic Council concentrated on organizing and supporting the Sibir Battalion, a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine composed of representatives from the indigenous peoples of Russia. To date, the public activities of the Civic Council are not significant and influential.
Accordingly, there are currently three Russian military formations that are part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (International Legion for the Defence of Ukraine, and are subordinated to the Defence Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine). As of 2024, none of the military formations has its own separate political representation or structure.
In March 2023, a raid was conducted in the Bryansk Oblast of the Russian Federation with the participation of the Russian Volunteer Corps. In May 2023, another raid took place in the Belgorod Oblast, involving the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Freedom of Russia Legion, and the Sibir Battalion. In March 2024, a raid was carried out in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts, with the participation of the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Freedom of Russia Legion, and the Sibir Battalion.
In June 2023, the media reported on the activities of the underground military organization “Order of the Republic”, which includes former and current military personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, who call themselves intelligence in exile. The Order stands for the republican form of government, the 1991 borders and categorically does not support any actions that could lead to a civil war on the territory of the Russian Federation. The Order rejects any form of cooperation with the Ukrainian military leadership[24].
In August 2022, Darya Dugina was killed, and in April 2023, Vladlen Tatarsky was killed. In both cases, representatives of the National Republican Army claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks against these individuals[25]. Reports of attempted assassinations of these individuals appeared on the Rospartizan website, which positions itself as a resistance movement and an informational platform for the guerrilla movement. Based on various media publications, it can be assumed that different groups of so-called autonomous partisans exist within the Russian Federation, actively opposing the Putin regime. These groups likely consist of Russian citizens or individuals permanently residing in the country. Their political declarations and beliefs may span a range of ideological perspectives, and their operational structures are often leaderless, networked, and autonomous.
The Rospartizan media resource published an article stating that resistance to the Putin regime will persist even if peace treaties are signed, as the totalitarian nature of the Russian state will remain unchanged. The media claim that Rospartizan was founded by journalist Roman Popkov, who has publicly advocated for supporting the armed struggle against the Putin regime. Popkov emphasizes the importance of uniting various resistance groups, adhering to security and diversity protocols, and refining strategies for armed resistance.
In August 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted a military operation in the Kursk Oblast. The Free Russia Forum Council issued a statement regarding the events, characterizing the war as defensive and just. The Council congratulated the Armed Forces on their breakthrough into the Kursk Oblast, emphasizing Ukraine’s right to conduct such operations as part of liberating Russian territories from Putinism. Similarly, the Executive Committee of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Republic described the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as the liberation of territories from Putinism, dictatorship, and the power of murderers. The Executive Committee also called on volunteers and partisans to join efforts to overthrow the regime.
It is important to highlight the separate opinions of Vladimir Pastukhov, Doctor of Political Science, and philosopher Denis Grekov. Pastukhov argues that Russians who emigrated due to the establishment of a totalitarian regime in Russia, which initiated the war, will need to accept Russophobia as an inevitable consequence. They must also recognize the political reality that Russia is now an enemy to Ukraine and the countries of East-Central Europe, which have direct historical experience of coexistence with Russia in its various political and historical forms. Grekov, in contrast, takes a more radical stance. He claims that there is a low-intensity civil war within Russia, with the enforcers ready to fight their own people because they are the caste that enjoys the most privileges, as long as the ruling regime remains in power. He asserts that the Russian opposition must accept that the days of “vegetarian” protests are over and that it is time for more aggressive action. The significance of these statements by the publicists is notable, as they were made a year before Prigozhin’s mutiny.
The radicalism of publicists is always the first stage before the start of a real revolutionary struggle.
Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023 showed that the Russian opposition was not ready for any military action on the territory of the Russian Federation.[26] At the 5th anti-war conference of the Free Russia Forum (October 2023), a declaration was issued recognizing any form of violent resistance to Putinism, provided it does not threaten civilians.
The duration and intensity of the military actions led to an evolution of views within the Russian opposition. While at the beginning of the invasion, the vast majority of Russians and Russian politicians called solely for peaceful opposition to the Kremlin’s war machine, by 2024, a significant portion of the Russian opposition recognized that the military or force factor of confrontation would be an essential element in the future transition of power and internal Russian reality. Two political groups – the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Republic and the Forum of Free Russia – directly and publicly supported the armed struggle against the current government in Russia. The National Republican Army is the only military organization that claims responsibility for terrorist attacks within Russia.
In March and May 2024, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine held forums in Kyiv and Lviv. The events were attended by representatives of the Free Russia Forum (Ivan Tyutrin, Garry Kasparov) and the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Republic (Ilya Ponomarev and Alexander Osovtsov), as well as Mark Feygin, Yevgeniya Chirikova, Roman Popkov, Rostislav Murzagulov, Andrey Volna, and representatives from the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Sibir Battalion.
The National Liberation Struggle and the Russian Federation
Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine has exposed the problem of Russian national identity and brought to the forefront the issues of the self-determination of peoples and the real federalization of Russia. After the collapse of the USSR, most national conflicts in the Soviet republics and in Russia itself were initiated by the union leadership in Moscow. In the early 1990s, the subjects of the Russian Federation attempted to seize the opportunity to expand their sovereignty or proclaim it[27]. Accordingly, we propose that separatist or national liberation movements be methodologically classified as part of the Russian opposition, viewed through the prism of the confrontation and interaction between the metropolis and the colony.
In May 2022, the first Free Nations of Russia Forum was held in Warsaw. Over next few years, regular congresses of the Forum took place in various parts of the world, including the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
The Free Nations of Russia Forum (August 2023, known as the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum) is a communication platform for leaders of regional movements and representatives of indigenous peoples of Russia. Its goal is the controlled and non-violent reconstruction of the Russian Federation, with key components including deimperialization, decolonization, denazification, demilitarization, and denuclearization. The ultimate aim is the disintegration of the Russian Federation. The Forum’s declaration is the most radical in terms of Russia’s future, but it is unlikely that its leaders possess the necessary structures and resources to achieve these goals.
The activities of the Chechen diaspora should be highlighted separately. In October 2022, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a statement by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine recognizing the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation and condemning the genocide of the Chechen people. This statement intensified Chechen political emigration, particularly:
Akhmed Zakayev is the leader of the Committee for the De-occupation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the Cabinet of Ministers in exile. He announced the revival of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Jambulat Suleymanov is the leader of the Tolam (Victory) movement, which was founded at the First International Congress of the United Diaspora of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Paris in November 2022. Anzor Maskhadov serves as the movement’s deputy. Both politicians held political meetings in Ukraine.
Several separate Chechen battalions operate within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under the political patronage of Akhmed Zakayev. It is important to emphasize that Chechen politicians do not call for armed struggle on the territory of the Chechen Republic. During a congress in Brussels in October 2022, Zakayev’s supporters declared the necessity of a peaceful deoccupation of the Chechen Republic, stating that the Chechen people are being held hostage and will not survive a third war.
Cultural, Artistic and Religious Opposition
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered a deep crisis within Russian society, forcing cultural and artistic circles to clearly and unequivocally declare their anti-war position[28]. The radically anti-war position of some Russian artists and their disagreement with the military actions of the Russian authorities reflects the moral and ethical responsibility of a segment of the Russian cultural and artistic elite. However, at present, we cannot identify a single leader or group of leaders in the cultural and artistic spheres who embody opposition sentiments or are capable of sparking protests, rather than merely holding concerts for political émigrés[29]. YouTube bloggers and opinion leaders with a large and steady audience who publicly oppose the war,[30] though they may be regarded as opinion leaders, experts, or public intellectuals, cannot be classified as political or opposition figures from a methodological perspective. This is because they do not aim to come to power, even if they publicly call for a change in government or consider the current government to be criminal. However, any statement made by Russians who have left the country due to the war is, to some degree, perceived through a political lens.
Given these factors, we believe it is necessary to emphasize that Ukrainian society and the state are in a constant process of self-determination regarding their attitude toward Russians and Russia.[31]
In March 2022, an appeal by the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, calling for reconciliation and an end to the war, was published and signed by 263 clerics, including 20 members of the Belarusian Exarchate. However, no organized groups were formed, and any public protest by clergy members was met with a harsh response from the Russian Orthodox Church authorities[32].
The Chief Rabbi of Moscow, Pinchas Goldschmidt, was forced to leave Russia after refusing to support the war against Ukraine. In an interview, he called on Russian Jews to leave the country.
It is worth emphasizing that the only religious institution that openly prays for peace, formally remains outside the state-military rhetoric of official Moscow, and legally operates within Russia is the Catholic Church.
Some representatives of Protestant churches have expressed opposition to the hostilities [33].
In the fall of 2022, the spiritual leader of the Kalmyk Buddhists and the Dalai Lama’s honorary representative in Russia, Mongolia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Telo Tulku Rinpoche, left Russia for Mongolia due to his disagreement with the war in Ukraine. In January 2023, he announced his resignation as the Supreme Lama of Kalmykia.
Among Muslim communities, the leadership of Abu Umar Sasitlinsky, founder of the ‘Free Muslims’ movement, stands out. While abroad, he calls on Muslims in Russia to refrain from participating in the war against Ukraine. Researchers note that the most pronounced ‘anti-war’ stance – interpreted as abstention from involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, which they view as irrelevant to true Muslims – is held by preachers associated with Salafism[34].
Instead of Conclusions
From a formal perspective, we can claim that the entire Russian opposition currently operates outside the territory of Russia, with highly limited ability to communicate with its citizens[35]. For the Russian opposition, its self-identity remains ultimately uncertain, dynamic, and continuously shaped by the prism of Russia’s military actions against Ukraine.
It should be emphasized that not all representatives of the Russian opposition recognize the correlation between their opposition to the current government in Russia and their stance toward Ukraine. The dichotomy of Russia’s future identity will inevitably be tied to Ukraine. Unfortunately, at this stage in history, many Russian opposition figures fail to grasp that Ukraine, both as a society and a state acting independently and occasionally in conflict[36], will influence Russia and its political system to some extent. Today, it can be stated that any end to the war without Russia’s capitulation would represent a compromise between Ukraine’s perception of what Russia is and the reality of Russia with its current political leadership.
The Russian opposition/emigration, in the broadest sense, faces a fundamental question of self-determination and the need to rethink its identity beyond imperialist patterns (both in terms of how it views itself and how others view it). Politicians, such as Yulia Navalnaya in her speech at the forum in Slovenia, and experts/scholars like Vasily Zharkov, Evgeny Roshchin, Artemy Magun, and others, are attempting to navigate this process. The lack of a clear strategy for dealing with Russia is seen in the West as a key issue for the Russian opposition, which believes that Western countries should support the democratization of Russia.[37]
By analogy, we can argue that the Russian opposition and emigration will have to choose between two strategies. The first is to become the new Valeriya Novodvorskaya, fighting uncompromisingly for a truly democratic Russia to the very end. The second is to follow in the footsteps of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, emigrating from the “evil empire” and eventually returning to a new Russia, where a new empire can be built.
Unfortunately, there is always a third option that Russian artists in exile or opposition can choose: to write a poem in the style of the late Joseph Brodsky[38].
However, there is always a chance of a grotesque repetition of the story of “perestroika” or the twentieth party congress, where Vladimir Putin’s criminal regime will be exposed, forcing the authorities to start the process of “thaw-perestroika 2.0” with the first free elections in which the above-mentioned political actors can participate.
Center of Political Narratives of Democracy (Ukraine)
Groups Akademia Wschód (Poland)
Edited by dr Eugeniusz Bilonozhko
[1] Introduction of criminal liability for “fake news about the army” and increased liability for desertion, voluntary surrender, etc.
Russian law on fake news (officially: Federal Law as of March 4, 2022, No. 32-FZ on Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Articles 31 and 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation
It is worth noting that Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin received their sentences for slandering the Russian army.
[2] All of them were formally engaged in political activity, whether by running for or holding elected office or by actively participating in a political party. One figure deserving special mention is Alexander Skobov, a 67-year-old historian from St. Petersburg and a defendant in the final case in the USSR’s history under the charge of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.” A committed Marxist and veteran of the dissident movement, Skobov’s activism spans decades.
In the 1970s and 1980s, he was twice forcibly confined to a psychiatric hospital: first for his role as an editor of samizdat (self-published materials) and later for painting slogans in support of political prisoners on the walls of Leningrad buildings. Today, Skobov has been arrested on charges of justifying terrorism and is currently detained in Syktyvkar.
In May 2023, the court handed down a fine of 260 thousand rubles in Yevhen Rozman’s case, and the politician is currently inactive.
[3] The expulsion of Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrei Pivovarov, and Ilya Yashin has revitalized the Russian opposition. However, in both the short and long term, their political activities will be shaped entirely by external political actors rather than by their own agency.
[4] A number of Russian public figures stated that they had not been invited to the protest.
[5] It should be noted that the march was attended not only by supporters of these politicians but also by various marginal political groups, ranging from anarchists advocating for the arming of Ukraine to anti-NATO activists and performance artists, such as Semyon Skrepetsky. The event once again brought to the forefront the issue of Russian self-identity abroad and the symbolism of the official Russian Federation flag (see Luka Andreev’s incident). White-blue-white flags were prominently displayed, with some even featuring a hammer and sickle. On the eve of the march, there were calls for the event to serve as a catalyst for uniting the Russian opposition.
[6] In March 2024, Olena Zelenska declined an invitation from the White House to attend US President Biden’s address to Congress, as the organizers intended to seat her next to the widow of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
[7] The legislative initiative classifies the distribution of a map of the Russian Federation that challenges its territorial integrity as equivalent to disseminating extremist materials.
[8] According to various estimates, emigration in 2022 ranged between 500,000 and 1 million people, accounting for just 0.7% of Russia’s 140 million population. However, when assessed in terms of quality rather than quantity, this wave of emigration represents a significant loss for Russia, as it primarily involves its most educated and wealthy citizen, the so-called creative class.
[9] Garry Kasparov’s 2015 book Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must Be Stopped accurately predicted many subsequent developments and exposed the West’s critical political miscalculations regarding Putin and Russia, though it ultimately failed to prevent the full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Bukovsky, Vladimir. The heirs of Lavrenty Beria: Putin and his team. Moscow: Algorithms, 2013, 240 p.]
[10] In late 2012, Russia’s State Duma introduced bill No. 186614-6, commonly referred to as the “response to the Magnitsky Act.” One of its amendments prohibited U.S. citizens from adopting Russian children. The United Russia party proposed naming the law in memory of Dima Yakovlev. Despite heated debates about the appropriateness of these changes and the disproportionality of the adoption ban, the State Duma voted overwhelmingly in favor, with only seven votes against and one abstention. Subsequently, the Russian parliament effectively ceased to function as a place for debate, with voting reduced to a ritualistic exercise.
[11] The manifesto was released following the murder of Darya Dugina, an act for which the National Republican Army also claimed responsibility. In their declaration, the congress participants characterized Ponomarev’s statements as acts of terrorism and incitement to kill civilians. See the text of the declaration by Russian Volunteer Corps “…At the same time, we cannot support calls for terror against civilians uninvolved in the armed conflict or the demonstrative refusal to show basic human empathy toward the relatives of the victims.”
[12] Feminist Anti-War Resistance, the Vesna movement, the Ark project, the True Russia Foundation, the UA-RU-EU initiative, HelpHub volunteers, the Without Prejudice community, and others.
[13] We consider any quantitative sociological research conducted in Russia to be unreliable.
[14] Where it recognizes Russia exclusively within its internationally recognized borders, condemns military aggression, calls for the trial of war criminals and compensation payments to war victims.
[15]In November 2024, Evgeny Chichvarkin announced in a sarcastic video that he was leaving the Russian opposition.
[16] The Berlin Declaration is one of the few formal documents supported by Russian public and political figures from different political backgrounds, as well as journalists. The most important postulates of the declaration are the recognition of the criminal nature of Russia’s war against Ukraine, a call for the withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied territories, and the recognition of Russia within its internationally recognized borders. The declaration also calls for war criminals to be brought to justice and for compensation to be provided to the victims of aggression. It recognizes the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin as ‘illegitimate and criminal,’ and therefore must be eliminated. The signatories share democratic values, recognize human rights and freedoms, and uphold the principles of diversity and equality, while opposing discrimination. They also ‘refrain from public conflicts within the democratic and anti-war movements’ (a point that was violated on the same day)
[17] Poland and Lithuania are conducting investigations into the events mentioned above. These politicians claim that they have appealed to law enforcement agencies. This event is purely symbolic in nature, as it is a clear indication of the division and disputes in the Russian opposition. These events provoked a wave of publications and discussions about the financing of some Russian opposition resources.
[18] The described facts, numerous publications, and the cascading nature of the scandal – referred to by the media as “Nevzlingate,” encompassing Katz’s investigation, Zheleznyak’s response, and the Anti-Corruption Foundation’s involvement – indicate the orchestrated nature of the events. This suggests potential involvement by Russian special services aiming to discredit the Russian opposition, thereby exacerbating divisions and fostering mutual distrust among its members.
[19] It should be noted that the deputy commander and spokesman is Maximilian Andronnikov, known by the pseudonym “Caesar,” who until 2014 was a member of the ultranationalist Russian Imperial Movement, an organization that publicly opposes Vladimir Putin but also has interaction with pro-Russian militants in the conflict in Donbas.
[20] The congress described itself as a gathering of “representatives of society and the state who have democratic legitimacy derived from Russian citizens.” It was attended by between 30 and 80 people who had been elected to parliament or local government at various times. A number of Russian experts have questioned the legitimacy of such meetings.
[21] In August 2024, Ilya Ponomarev claimed that a Russian drone attacked the house where he lived and he miraculously escaped, after which he left the territory of Ukraine. Olga Kurnosova and the delegates of the Congress of People’s Deputies (renewed) accused Ponomarev of financial fraud.
[22] The media, referring to the “Nevzlin archive,” claim that Leonid Nevzlin is behind the split in the NDP.
[23] The ideological component has become a significant obstacle to unifying Russian volunteers into a single combat structure within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Fighters of the Russian Volunteer Corps identify with right-wing conservative political views and traditionalist beliefs. In contrast, Ilya Ponomarev declares his association with left-wing ideas, while the National Republican Army positions itself as a non-ideological armed formation.
[24] The only public action of the Order of the Republicans was to facilitate the escape of Russian Aerospace Forces lieutenant Dmitry Mishov to one of the Baltic states in May 2023.
[25] According to The Washington Post in October 2023, the murder of Darya Dugina was carried out by Ukrainian special services. It is also likely that the murder of Vladlen Tatarsky was coordinated with Ukrainian special services.
[26] Mikhail Khodorkovsky called for support for the rebels led by Yevgeny Prigozhin.
[27] In 1993, the Ural Republic was declared and subsequently liquidated, while the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is still in force today, was amended. In the same year, a public opinion poll was held to raise the status of St. Petersburg to that of a republic within the Russian Federation. Additionally, in 1992, the formation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed.
[28] Artists with oppositional or skeptical views left Russia, such as Maxim Galkin, Andrey Makarevich, Zemfira, and Max Pokrovsky. Meanwhile, others, like Vladimir Pozner and Dmitry Muratov, have withdrawn from the media spotlight but remain within the country.
In March 2023, during an online meeting organized by Ubiquity University (USA), Vladimir Pozner attempted to rationalize and justify Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. In September 2024, in his first interview with Russian media since the invasion, Pozner declined to answer any military or political questions. He remarked that, based on his experience living in the USSR, he did not believe the current Russian Federation resembled any realities of the Soviet Union. From the context of Pozner’s interview, it can be inferred that contemporary Russia is postulating or developing the idea of symmetrism in its relations with the United States and a multipolar world as a framework for understanding its invasion of Ukraine.
[29] A similar situation occurred during the emigration from the Russian Empire, when the work of certain artists focused exclusively on reflecting and interpreting the revolutionary events of 1917 and the Civil War. A notable example is works by Alexander Vertinsky and his return to the USSR.
[30] Maxim Katz, Ilya Varlamov, Alexander Nevzorov, Yuriy Dud, Ekaterina Schulmann, and others.
[31] The discussions between Vitaliy Portnikov and Yulia Latynina, as well as the conversations between Oleksii Arestovych and Mark Feygin, are vivid examples of the dialogic interactions between the so-called Russian opposition and Ukrainians. These examples demonstrate that, at this stage, Ukrainian society is not yet prepared for a full-fledged dialogue with Russians in a philosophical and political sense. Nevertheless, there is political expediency in cooperating with the Russian political opposition and Ukraine’s military and political leadership. The very existence of these dialogues, however, indicates that the ongoing war is driving both sides toward a deeper self-reflection on their perceptions of each other.
[32] Some parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Europe have changed their jurisdiction from the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia or the Russian Orthodox Church to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
[33] In 2017, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled that the activities of the religious organization Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, along with its 395 regional branches, were recognized as extremist and subsequently banned in Russia. In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights deemed the ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia a violation of human rights. Jehovah’s Witnesses are considered the most anti-military Christian organization.
[34] The events in Dagestan in 2023-2024 and the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall demonstrate that the most radical Islamic movements are attempting to exploit Russia’s war against Ukraine for their own agenda. As a result, the opposition of Russian Muslims in the war against Ukraine is largely situational, with many believing that Muslims should not support either side.
[35] It should be emphasized that, to some extent, the Russian authorities consider it necessary to control and monitor Russian opposition figures and public personalities. This is evidenced by the activities of journalist and spy Pablo González (Pavel Rubtsov), spy professor Vyacheslav Morozov, and Nomma Zarubina’s actions in the United States.
[36] Unfortunately, there is a naïve expectation among some Ukrainian political experts that all Russians should join a movement against Russia similar to the left-wing radical Antideutsche movement.
[37] The Russian opposition in exile is currently attempting to emulate the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
[38] This is a poem by Joseph Brodsky on the Independence of Ukraine from 1992.