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LANDSCAPES OF FEAR AND SECURITY Why spaces become the subject of geopolitical representations

by https://www.geopolitic.ro/author/

Yunes RASHIDI
Atefeh ABOLHASSANI

Abstract. Importance of geopolitical representations for space and place are crucial because of their outcomes for utilizers, audience and place/space. A considerable proportion of these occur in the framework different sorts of media and states’ propaganda. However, the place itself could act as platform for geopolitical representations and via this the function of ‘landscape’ became a ‘battleground for representation’. In the context of critical geopolitics, assessment of this issue was to extent that numerous scholars assessed various effects of that on the space like creation of spaces of fear, spaces of security, and shaping spatial emotions. Notwithstanding, there is so much remain to study. In this paper, we determined that concentrates on reasons that conducted existing powers to use landscapes for geopolitical representations. Therefore, although (in)security and fear are important, our focus is allocated to study reasons that persuade both states and existing powers to use landscapes for geopolitical representations, methods which are use, and their outcomes. In the follow we intend to answer these questions; why spaces of security are crucial? Is this because of citizens’ interest or states’ considerations and are spatial outcomes of security for civilians as same as governments? Our findings show that urgent of controlling space influenced power to use landscapes for representations and in this path not only they use fear politics, but also richly color the discriminative policies that create ‘us’ and ‘others’. In addition, it seems that results mostly are in the favor of power’s interests rather than public’s one and because of these ultimate outcomes could unethical.

Keywords: Landscape, geopolitical representation, spaces of fear, fear politics

INTRODUCTION

The issue of security could be examined and discussed in various ways. These discussions occur in a wide range of discourses and everyone tries to present their point of view base on diverse backgrounds, actual experiences, fields of study, interests, ideologies, everyday life and so on. In the context of geography, we can work on this issue from different angles, therefore, let us broach the question from a radical aspect; why spaces of security are crucial? is this because of citizens’ interest or states’ considerations? Are spatial outcomes of security for civilians as same as governments? If geopolitical aims are hidden at the behind of security’s definitions? It seems that these questions are vital to understand the dilemma of national security and civil rights. Since states are the policy-maker in the realm of security, their decisions can result in a wide range of consequences that could lead to longstanding geopolitical crises and geographical problems. As border walls which are constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestine launched a wide range of spatial limitations for Palestinian people (Boyce, Marshal and Wilson, 2015) and intensifies the Israel – Palestine tensions, United States’ withdraw from Paris Agreement by President Donald Trump disrupts global efforts against climate change (Boyce et al, 2020), collapsing civil society process in Yemen due to conflicts (Elayah and Verkoren, 2019) and impacts of United States – Iran struggles and reciprocal threats for Iranian citizens (Mather, 2018) indicate that states’ considerations and interests necessarily cannot be same for their nation or people in other countries. Nevertheless, border walls, military interventions, right wing policies, sanctions and disputable acts have their own proponents among both of politicians and individuals. Although partialities happening everywhere, potential proponents need to gain a rationale for accompanying with political leaders. These will be providing by “motivations and representations” (Cottingham, 2000), “migration regimes” (Straehle, 2017), “memory, emotion and lived experience” (Dauphinee, 2015), “populism” (Krämer, 2017), “economic interests” (Ferguson et al, 2020), “dividing space into our and their” (Rashidi et al, 2021) and even “geographical imagination” (Gregory, 1994).

Almost all of these political and geopolitical actions are tied with the “representation of others” (Fursich, 2010) for justifying spatial policies (in various scales form local to global) that discriminate “us” versus “others” and legalize and moralize actions against whom and where cannot fit in “our” circles. The consequence of this issue could be creation of sorts of “imaginative geographies” (Gregory, 1994) that assist in feeling the space in the context of “fear and hope” (Pain et al, 2010). These spatial emotions could be considered as a result of “processes of securitisation and their uneven effects” (Williams and Massaro, 2013: 752). The term of “securitisation” refers to a sort of measures that “target the space for regulations and surveillances in the name of ensuring security for a group of people” (e.g. economic, physical and cultural). Majority of these actions are the provider of interests for whom are privileged in economic and political aspects (ibid). Occasionally, as mentioned above, governments’ definitions about security could be different from what is excepted by citizens. While governments concentrate on conditions that ensure them about maintaining control over power and territory and in authoritarian regimes protecting elites’ interests, citizens desire to processes that can answer their needs. These “needs” can become a source of struggle between a government and people. Because contradictions are barriers in the path of coalescence of governments’ and privileged groups’ interests with individuals’. For overcoming this contrariety, beneficiaries (whether own states or privileged ones) frequently use the sense of place as reason for depicting dangers, maintaining risks or restoring them to life. Indeed, they can use spontaneous fears as a reason for their greater good which is perpetuate control on space. In this process, they underline disparities, discrepancies, and enmities by demonizing a group, idea, ethnicity, religion, racialized society, nation, space or state. In the other words, they recalling fears into space and society for embark policies that impossible to pursue in absence of sense of insecurity.

As Pain and her colleagues (2010:974) mentioned, fear and hopes can be different sides of the coin. For most of us, with regard to diversities in historical, social, spatial and emotional perspectives, both of fear and hope can provide motivations for a vast social, political, spatial and geopolitical actions and changes. In the dialectic of security and insecurity that causes diverse events and processes in the space, spatial emotions are changing, that mostly lead to fear. As a feeling, fear is not just an emotion, but could be a product (Rebotier, 2011:107) of “processes of securitisation” (Williams and Massaro, 2013) that functioned for geopolitical aims and can be “a driver of political maneuvering and a constraint on personal well-being” (Pain and Smith, 2008:1). By this we mean that securitisation policies in the space are launching by states and they gain supports by “geopolitical representations that persuade people dividing space into ‘our’ and ‘their’ can diminish or eliminate threats” (Rashidi et al, 2021) and secure the space. Therefore, the sense of fear and its spatial reflections become a fortifier for defining boundaries between “us” and “others”. Because “societies can exist only by defining themselves against an external standard – an Other without which the Self could not see itself as distinctive” (Agnew, 2003:23). This distinction between “us” and “others” always expand to “our and their spaces” and creating a Manichaean world. In the case of (in)security dualities, these discriminative policies are using for justifying geopolitical actions by demonizing others and their belongings (culture, geography, requests and spaces). Therefore, discussions around the security always were paired with the issue of insecurity, as related subjects such as peace, hope and order accompanied with their companions like war, fear and chaos. In the realm of geopolitics which is shadowed by real-politik and national interests, although this issue can cost for some people and spaces, states use all of in access options for moralizing and rationalizing their actions. These measures mostly are rationalized due to states’ interests. As Springer (2011:93) mentioned, this “rationality provides a justification for functioning outrageous actions” against others. Whereas these activities can influence some spaces and people’s predestination, there should be “moral borders” (El Qadim, 2020) in practicing geopolitics and as a geographer each of us has a “responsibility” (Lawson, 2007:2) to reveal thoughts and practices that can expand emotional and spatial boundaries among societies and places. “It is well known that all societies define boundaries between themselves and others. The ‘world’ beyond the horizon is threatening as well as alluring. The zone of difference and danger is both repelling and attracting” (Agnew, 2003:23). This bordering mostly is product of “raising the fear” (Hyndman, 2007:362) and develops in the social life of spaces from local to global scales. “Bordering space of social orders” somehow is “defined by separation form outer physical spaces” (Negri and Hardt, 2012: 270) and influence various subjects such as “migration and refugees” (El Qadim, 2020:2), “hunger, poverty, environmental decline, and disasters” (Lawson, 2007:7), and expand the “vulnerability in front of circulating the fear” which is occurs due to “political reasons” (Hyndman, 2007:362). Circulation of fear in the space as raises the need to security can be an encouragement for various types of violence like segregation, discrimination, and prohibition against others that are victims of creating the landscapes of fear. Since these issues mostly become to reality in the space and rely on dualities (us against others, security versus insecurity and fear and hope) assessing geographical and geopolitical aspect of them is crucial. In this paper, instead of concentration on the (in)security and fear themselves, we decided to focus on methods, reasons and causes which are using by states for richly coloring fear and sense of insecurity about space.

METHODOLOGY

Discussion about ‘landscapes of fear and security’ needs a critical approach, due to incapacities of classical geopolitics. why we underlined the term of incapacities? Because, roots of geopolitics penetrated in the ground of fears, inimical viewpoints about foreign people, and enmities about competitors that justifying production of “others” in the real-politik. As Friedrich Ratzel’s idea about Lebensraum was accompanied with act of categorizing people who live in the outer space as “others” (Halas, 2014:2), there is a wide range of representations and justifications that try to normalize geopolitical actions which are damaging individual lives. In this framework, representations through textual, visional, and religious metaphors assist political leaders to justify their actions, decisions and thoughts and help them to achieve their geopolitical goals. For instance, in 2001, after 9/11 terrorist attacks, George W Bush used a metaphor of ‘axis of evil’ for categorizing Iraq, Iran and North Korea as enemies of peace in the globe, while Pakistan that provided opportunities for North Korea to reach nuclear weapons and Saudi Arabia that obtained a wide range of assists for al-Qaeda terrorists were neglected. In fact, contributing in geopolitical and economic plans which were beneficial for United States policies was the reason of that exception. However, “The image of an axis of states challenging the United States [was] more important than empirical accuracy in whether or not they are the most important developers of weapons of mass destruction or fomenters of terrorism. The image is that of an ‘axis’ or real connection between them, even though it is not clear what each shares in common, and involves a clear analogy back to the Second World War when Germany, Italy and Japan (which really were allies) formed the so-called Axis Powers” (Agnew, 2003:4). Bush in the following months adapted another term from Bible and announced War on Terror as a virtuous war, although the concept of “virtuous war cleans up the political discourse as well as the battlefield” (Der Derian, 2009a:243). In reality, geopolitical measures like war on terror, intervention of numerous states in Syrian Civil War and Yemen conflicts were activities which were covered by transcendence concepts. In the other words, having imitated metaphors political leaders and decision-makers progress in their geopolitical plans. As James Der Derian (2009b:238) mentioned, “A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility”.

We think this preface to methodology shows why critical approach could be useful, since we will depict the grounds that obtain opportunity for states demonize ‘others’ and legalize violence actions, operations and restrictions against them. For reaching this goal, in conform of Foucault (1977) approach, rather than emphasize on argument of violence we would talk about geographical circumstance and locality of violence alongside of geographical imaginations, geopolitical representations and reasons which induce people and states to do it and provide public supports.

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Geographical areas in the four corners of the world always were grounds for geopolitical conflicts and competitions. From early thoughts about geopolitical functions of space in reaching to Lebensraum (Giaccaria and Minca, 2016:151) to classical geopolitics that considers space as a “fundamental source of national power” (Herwing, 2008:220), geography was a critical realm for providing and maintaining national interests. In Kjellén (cited in Herwing, 2008:222) opinion, for instance, “state and power were synonymous. States rose because they were powerful; they maintained their status only if they remained powerful”. Keeping power in hands depends on how a certain government seduces and forces people to show their supports (Ahmady Pour and Rashidi, 2018 and Rashidi et ak, 2021). Seduction of people for taking part in states’ plans or supporting them facilitated via various methods and instruments. In this framework, “geographical imagination and geopolitical representation” (Ahmady Pour and Rashidi, 2020), alongside of other capacities, are functional tools for states to pursue their spatial policies via providing a sort of geographical awareness among their proponents that mostly rely on underlining differences. These process in the end depicts landscapes that fulfilling with a wide range of prejudgments, imaginations and discriminations that have to be protected from what may be interred from outer spaces. In here, security is a major concern for every states.

As Williams and Massaro (2013:752) discussed, the concept of security in the mainstream geopolitics is defined by “a top-down and state-centric approach” in which studying discourses mostly considers state’ issues equal as individuals’. Whereas, in the reality there could be some differences between their actual interests. The issue of ‘national interest’ could be controversial, because, in spite of philological meaning, this term refers to “general interest of state which definition of such interests is frequently the outcome of domestic struggles and the power relations in which they are embedded” (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006:350). In authoritarian regimes, for instance, public opinions and requests usually suppressed by a sort of considerations that ensure elites who are in power about persistence of political power, economic opportunities and financial advantages. Therefore, understandings of security for governments can be interpreted as situations that cannot challenge the status quo. In democratic and semi-democratic states these gap between ultimate needs of citizens and official policies could be recognized, but under difference terms and justifications and even due to misunderstandings about security. We know that largely the national security and interests are defined by officials rather than civilians. These official definitions rooted in various backgrounds and are used for multiple reasons such as existence of eminent threats or perceived risks, political aims, economic interests, ideological issues, geopolitical considerations and so on. Nonetheless, in addition to structural capacities, successful expansion of a security policy and its acceptance among a nation or at least inside of proponents requires a set of reasons that can be credible. These requirements are answered by “geopolitical representations” (Agnew, 2003) through them states draw a line between “us and others and divide spaces into our and their” (Rashidi et al, 2021). In the other words, states, by visualizing the danger, provide cogent reasons for their policies in the area of security.

In there we will not present any conspiracy theory, but our efforts would be concentrate on functioning representations and imaginations for depicting the immediate risks and whom and where which are considering as source of dangers by states. These spatial discriminations assist the process of “dividing spaces into our and their” (Rashidi et al, 2021) and transform the fear to a part of “everyday life” (Pain et al, 2010) which persuades individuals that hard-line security policies are necessity for country’s good. Nonetheless, this approach could be one cause of ‘security dilemma’. As Rashidi and his collogues (2021:95-96) mentioned, using geographical imaginations for draw a line between ‘us’ and ‘others’ leads to “creation of spaces of fear” within them and “ both ‘us’ and ‘others’ find themselves in the shadow of threats which are imputed to them or their counterpart”. Although terrifying own citizens is not a straight policy among states and its outcomes are doubtable, historically is used by various governments. For instance, during the first years of escalating cold war, administration of Harry S. Truman reached to a solidarity that frightening people about dangers of “isolation subjectivity” can assist United States’ foreign policy in dealing with the problem of Soviet Union (Barnet, 1992:122), while George Kennan (cited in Griffiths et al, 2019:70-71), whom introduced the ‘strategy of containment’, thought that “citizens’ ideas about foreign policy which mostly are green can seduce democracies like United States to take decisions which are popular rather than right and vitreous”. For Kennan that devoted his diplomatic and scholar career for setting realism in both International Relations (IR) studies and statecraft, there was boundaries in manipulating domestic opinions about global politics, because he was worry about unanticipated results that can influence policy-making, but this does not mean that representations are futile outside the national borders and in the area of geopolitical conflicts and competitions. Instead, there are a wide range of studies in the areas of geopolitics and IR that shown both geopolitical representations and geographical imaginations were functioned for ensuring states about their intended interests (i.g. Sharp 1996; Gregory, 2004; Der Derian, 2009b; Fursich, 2010; and Springer, 2011).

As Agnew (2003) discussed, representations play an important role in the process of justifying foreign policies and obtaining geopolitical aims, but functioning the representation depends on activating ’emotions’ among its audience. Emotions, physiologically, assist individuals’ knowledge in shaping the personal world and due to this reason they have specific capacities to be used for political aims. In spite of their importance, Neta Crawford (2000:16) argued that in the realm of International Relations (IR), even realists who stressed on security (fears) and nationalism (love and hate) mostly abandoned the subject of emotions and their influences”. While prominent IR’s realism school theorists emphasized on states’ “rational behaviors” (Keohane and Nye, 1987:728) and “calculated decisions in the shadow of rationality” (Waltz, 1986:323), always there is a possibility that “irrational politics” (Morgenthau, 1985:7) or “emotional commitments” (Fearon, 1995:393) expand conflicts among nations, and even lead into war. Although, emotions were eclipsed by other confrontational issues among IR’s academics, it seems that researchers who are interested in geopolitics and political geography shown considerable commitment in assessing their influence. Davidson and Milligan (2004:524) remind us, “as we move ‘out’ from the body, emotions are no less important but they are arguably less obvious, less centrally placed in studies of, for example, the home, the community, the city and so on”, thus, maybe it is appropriate that we seek their effects in the space rather than themselves.

It has been said that “spatial emotions” is an essential part of sense of place and forming the spatial identity. Nevertheless, we have to be aware that spatial emotions in various spaces cannot be identical due to individuals’ experiences and knowledge. In the other words, personal images about places are influenced by history, relations, experiences, understandings and most importunately imaginations that are produced in societies during the time and in the framework of diverse goals. These images, overall, can shape of at least influence of people’s attitudes toward spatial issues and problems which are related to the geographical spaces. Recognizing these interactions encourages states to use representations for strengthening their hegemony and facilitating geopolitical actions. Therefore, “geopolitical representations become more explicit but also more divisive when important decisions have to be taken or a crisis occurs. Major changes in the geopolitical context generally bring the reformulation of geopolitical visions, a re-articulation of geographical representations that is necessary to acknowledge and justify foreign policy changes” (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006:357). In the context of geopolitics, representations can be utilized in various forms for gaining emotional excitation and support among people, and through this, states can intensify their efforts for reaching hegemony. From perspective of critical geopolitics governmental efforts for reaching hegemony can be recognized in both domestic and foreign area; while in the outsides of national borders states try to expand their hegemony throughout of their challengers and competitors, inside the borders elites who control the politics and economy try to stabilize domestic influence. As Gramsci (1971:245 cited in Sharp, 1996:558) mentioned, “hegemony is representative of unstable equilibrium among classes”. This means obtaining the stability should be acquired via diverse tools which one of them is ‘representation’. Representation in this arena can assist institutions of power in providing a path toward justification of geopolitical norms which are considerable in ensuring power’s interests. In this context Sharp (1996:558) believes that through the hegemony, which is a complicated and multidimensional sort of dominances, “norms that regulate reproduction of national power” are forming. These norms not only are supporter of power in expanding its hegemony, but also are fundamental tools for discriminative policies that shape individual visions of ‘us’ versus ‘others’. Nonetheless, we have to be aware that not many actors, but few of them can utilize representations for expanding their hegemony and making connection with “geopolitical visions” in global scale. In fact, a large proportion of “states use geopolitical representation as a domestic justification for certain (realistic) international routines (like colonialism, neutrality or advancing peace, bridging opposition in the world, etc.) or merely as part of a national identity strategy” (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006:356–357). This reminds us that we need to narrow down our focus occasionally on interior functions of geopolitical representations, because states use them for creation of some visions that can persuade citizens about states’ geopolitical actions. Absolutely, in this way critical geopolitics can be an appropriate company for elucidating this controversial subject. Through this, we have a chance to avoid traps which are created, unintentionally or on purpose, by state-centered geographies and even uncover them for public.

In the realm of geography, as O´ Tuathail (1996a:256) discussed, “critical geopolitics is one of many cultures of resistance to Geography as imperial truth, state-capitalized knowledge, and military weapon. It is a small part of a much larger rainbow struggle to decolonize our inherited geographical imagination so that other geo-graphings and other worlds might be possible”. States mostly tended to focus on security rather than structural problems in the space because of their unfinished desires about maintaining status-quo. This caused attention of members and thoughts of ‘school of critical geopolitics’ toward the function of security for both citizens and states and its influence on the process of representation. For instance, “feminist geopolitics asks, ‘‘security for whom and how?” (Hyndman, 2004:319). It seems that state-centered geographies and in particular geopolitics are used to define various geopolitical codes which are functioned for demonstrating images of dangers and fears that are useful in expanding security policies. Majority of these policies are out of citizens’ hands, because they are categorized under ‘national security’s labels’ that circumscribe them just to governments. This can coin the security as a governmental problem that consequently can lead into public ignorance or limitation, as people may think many national security concerns are rooted in the states own considerations and interests. For overcoming this challenge using geopolitical codes seems to be a fruitful plan for states. Geopolitical codes create a potential ground for presenting diverse forms of representations, geographical imaginations and discriminative images which are using for emphasize on differences between ‘us’ as friends and ‘others’ as enemies and advancement of security policies. In this context, “Some conditions are more favorable to the development of geopolitical codes that are consonant with popular ideas than others. Absence of political freedom is one obvious condition and the inconceivability of a supposed enemy another. The image of an enemy at the other end of the world is perhaps easier to dress up with wild fantasies than that of a nearby opponent but even struggles far away may activate parallels with one’s national history” (Dijkink, 1998:297).

These representations alongside of geopolitical actions have to result in greater scales of security in the eyes of states. But, as Williams and Massaro (2013:752) mentioned, “efforts to ‘secure’ and ‘protect’ simultaneously create a diversity of insecurity for women and otherwise marginalized population and reinforce hierarchical power relations based on gender, race, and other axes of difference”. Why this issue happens? Since geopolitical representations and geographical imaginations broadening discriminations between ‘us’ and ‘others’ and transforming some spaces into ‘our’ and ‘their'(Rashidi et al, 2021:96), always there is a high possibility that some spaces and people (from different genders, races, classes, religions, geographical origins) are picturing as ones are not qualified for intercommunicate. In other words, they gain unwanted devil faces and their spaces are depicting as zones of fear. Hereby, fears obtain their own spatial emergence. Although final outcomes of games of security can satisfy states about ensuring their political aims, there are causalities which always remain behind. These human and spatial costs are not an acceptable subject that can be justifies under terms such as ‘national interests, security, collateral damage and so on. Therefore, as geographers, we have an important moral responsibility for reveling these geopolitical actions.

Discriminative policies frequently draw lines between ‘us’ and ‘others’ or at least between ‘us’ versus everyone who cannot acquire qualifications which are needed for habiting inside the ‘our circle’. These unofficial borders can be demonstrated everywhere, inside a city, between different neighborhoods, diverse spaces, and geographical regions and shape mental maps within them virtual borders govern. Thus, physical adjacent does not matter in these discriminations. For instance, O´ Tuathail (1996b:171) in his discussion about Bosnia war mentioned that ““Bosnia is close to the West but actively produced in the foreign policy discourses of UK, France and USA as morally distant from it”. What made Bosnian citizens far away from was not their geographical location, but it was their religion and culture. There are various cases that could be additional exemplifications; Favelas in Brazil, minorities neighborhoods in North America, and deprived suburbs in developing countries like Iran.

During Bosnia war Minarets of mosques were symbols of ‘otherness’ and this intensified the danger for both landscapes and humans were besieged by Serbian and Croatian soldiers. Two decades later, during Syrian Civil war that extended into Iraq, ISIS terrorists symbolize the otherness of minorities like Christians, Shiites, and Yazidis by demolition of their churches, tombs and temples. In the other words, as Serbians, ISIS terrorists tried to symbolize their conquests in landscapes by elimination of what supposed by them as signs of ‘others’. As Cosgrove (1989, 125; Quoted in: Dittmer, 2005:633) mentioned “Symbolic landscapes” are using for reproduction of cultural norms and rehabilitation of conquering groups’ values. Therefore, all of Serbians, Croats and ISIS terrorists, wanted to erase presence of others by changing symbolic landscapes. Destructing the landscape, they shown their own spatial order. As Richard Peet (1996) discussed in his article about Daniels Shays’ memorial in Petersham, Massachusetts, landscape is a concept which is fulfilled by “cultural and ideological implications”. These implications alongside of symbolic landscapes are the source of augment for a place identity. When a conquered power, which formerly emphasized on its security by representation that depict the difference, occupy a new territory tend to unify the space by destructive policies, because it is the destruction that can indicate supposed discriminations. It was the strategy which is used by ISIS terrorists in Syria and Iraq, Serbian militias in Bosnia war and caused and intensified suffers of innocent people in these countries.

These cases indicate that landscapes will be used in either in favor or against the interests. Since we live in a humanistic world, a landscape could be considered as an understanding of a unique existence that is in the middle of evolution (Nogue and Vicente, 2004:116) and is under influence of spatial emotions. Sense of place is crucial due to its position in historic live and geographical indications (Paasi, 1991:248). Therefore, with regards to mutual relations of landscape and sense of place, representations become a critical subject. Because the act of representation plays a critical role in the ‘biopolitics’ and assists power institutions to control the space. It shows that, when we review political actions about landscapes and violence in space, in spite of absence of morality, there is rationality behind of violence. As Foucault (1996:29) noted, although violence is a bad behavior, rationality of violence is what transforms it into a dangerous action. Nonetheless, basis and persistence of violence are rooted in human rationality and because of that it could be said there is not any incompatibility between violence and rationality (Springer, 2011:93). This compatibility is one of sources of concerns. There is enough evidence to realize that ‘politics of fear’ were used in various situations and different places to maintain the control over the space (Hyndman, 2007:362). Politics of fear which mostly use ‘otherness’ as a tool for depicting sources of fears as are strategies to expand the control over the space are triggers of conflicts due to their role in creation of others that must be defeated or at least be repulsed from place. In the other words, ‘a dangerous dialectic of belonging of place’ is exist that indicates wars relate to fears (Dalby, 2010:283). It means that efforts for establishment of situations that are favorable for a certain group or nation in space which mostly are accompanied with politics of fear may lead to spatial tensions, geopolitical conflicts or at least can intensify them. It occurs because of manipulating the places of memory. As Karen Till (2005:9) discussed, places of memory are created to depict emotions about absences, fears and desires that haunt contemporary society. These spatial emotions as argued before have capacities to be used as political tools to peruse both discriminative and cautionary tales. Discriminations and cautions represent in the place by changing landscapes through monuments, symbolizations, and even spatial purgation from ‘traces of others’. In other words, although landscapes fueled by cultural and historical elements, there are possibility for creation of ‘imaginative geographies’ that are functioning for regeneration of fears and dangers. May be struggles about spatial symbols and landscapes’ visions occur between protesters and governments, like Women Protests in Iran 2022, Arab Spring, Black Lives Matter, rooted in these ‘places of memory’. It means that landscapes could be considered as “battlegrounds of representation” (Dixon et al, 2008:31). Because by representations, which are created by political-motivating desires, landscapes became to ‘imaginative places’ that have political meanings or functions. If, as Gearoid O´ Tuathail (1996b:173) proposed, an “anti-geopolitical eye” will be used, it can be discovered that places of memory frequently misused for creation of fears. Fears and their representations in the place and landscape assist defining both security and insecurity for public and facilitate geopolitical measures against ‘others’. In the other words, states use these fears to “justify political actions either inside or outside of their territories” (Pain, 2009:469). Thus, since ‘memories can act as political projects to construct and transform places and landscapes’ (Curti, 2008:107) reading of emotions, fears, desires and attachments in the place become to an important task to reveal geopolitical aims that are hidden behind landscapes. As ancient Greek goddess of Pan, that term of ‘panic; is derived from her name’ was furthering people (Negri and Hardt, 2008:309), in the modern era states’ nightmares about their security obtain motivations to “invent new forms of government” (Simon, 2008) that is reflecting in landscapes. Geographical imaginations that depict some as “others with devilish characteristics” and “us as decent semi-knights” (Palu, 2011:151) and which are using as tools of representations to explain abstract concepts of security and insecurity must be revealed. Because these metaphoric concepts widely are used to active subjective imaginations in audience of geopolitical representations and via this not only assist in power ones in expanding control over space and society, but also realign individuals, nations, and places as ‘us’ against ‘others’.

CONCLUSION

As a product of “securitization” fear is something beyond of emotion that can influence both human and space. This impact mostly demonstrates itself in the landscapes by intentional and intentional efforts of either governmental or non-governmental powers through securitisation policies in the space. These tended to guaranty both objective and subjective goals which consist in expansion of power and deterrence against threats. If we consider the geopolitics as a combination of “practice” and “representation”, then landscape is a canvas for geopolitical representation. Rivals and competitors use landscapes to represent their ideology, power, desire, and persuade people. Purifying space from insecurity and its signs and depicting “us” and “our belongings” as source of good’s genesis and “others” as the reasons of threats mainly is how they do. In the other words, since discussions around the security always were paired with the issue of insecurity, fears become the core of representations. Thus, security as a basic need acts an encouragement to various types of practical and representational violence like against others and via this “otherness” transforms into the subjective verdict.

In the mainstream geopolitics, there is a “a top-down and state-centric approach” toward security that always is feed by conception of fears. Because basis of geopolitics is rooted in the necessity of detection of potential geopolitical ricks and blocking them via defining national interests. However, the concept of national interest is controversial. Despite philological meaning, it refers to outcomes of a nation’s perception about itself and the world. Consequently, geopolitics of each state is practical and representational reflections of this. Thus, landscapes become the statement for geographical existence. To understand that, not only does we have to narrowing down our concentration on interior functions of geopolitical representations, but also its spatial reflections.

Persuasion of citizens is an obligation to persistence of territorial sovereignty, although the authority has its function for rulers. To persuade people, as discussed, ‘politics of fear’ is utilized via geopolitical representations in both public arena and space. By this, landscapes carry signs of power that are creating by both construction and deconstruction of place. The existing power always try to eliminate or redefine symbols of ‘others’ and create ‘our spatial signs’ in place. As a result, landscapes become to a ‘battleground of representations’ in which dominant power purify the space by discriminations. It indicates that although existing powers use politics of fear to accompanying people with themselves, there are under influence of this to. Because they afraid by remaining the landscapes under influence spatial existence of others, they maintain the capacity of recapturing the place. It is one of the geopolitical reasons behind the destructive policies about landscapes and also is an explanation why tensions about spatial symbols are continues.

Indeed, landscapes are crucial for places of memory because of their assistance in shaping spatial emotions. Creation of places of memory also is vital to reflect spatial feelings such as absences, fears and desires. These spatial emotions as argued before have capacities to be used as political tools to peruse both discriminative and cautionary tales. Therefore, while in the space iconography of others and otherness is inappropriate for individuals who are outside of power, in some cases, existing power controversially use these for justification of discriminative policies. Because powers need to display costs of their absence for individuals, they use politics of fear like manipulating places of memories to emphasize on ‘us’ versus ‘others’, fear and insecurity against hope and security. Nonetheless, spatial purgation from ‘traces of others’ is another policy of fears that change landscapes. Therefore, by reviewing both practice and representation about landscapes, in spite of absence of morality, we can find a sort of a rationality behind of these subjective violence in the landscape that assist states to reach their defined security. Rationale of these is urgent of maintaining and expansion power in the place and this cannot be possible without co-assistant of representation in the landscape with practice in the place. It means that we have to accept that in the geopolitical representations in the landscape a rational event is ongoing, while due to either creation or eliminating of others some of them are unethical. Since rationality can generate a justification for functioning outrageous against others, it is our responsibility to uncover the rationale behind utilizing landscapes as geopolitical representations which can create imaginative geographies and landscapes of fear.

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