Jeff SCHUBERT^*

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Russia and China is now being examined by much media and many analysts in terms of the personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and in terms of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While these things are important, there are other influences and Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia for three days during March provided an opportunity to reflect on some of these.

Both Xi and Vladimir Putin wrote articles for publication in the mass media of the other country, and a joint statement was subsequently issued on 21 March[1] along with a statement of negotiation issues[2].

Putin’s article was strongly worded, taking the US to task for the “simulta-neously deterring (containing) Russia and China” and directly criticised NATO for amongst other things trying to “give its activities a global reach, aiming at penetration into the Asia-Pacific region” [3]. Xi’s article[4] was more restrained and focused on Russia – China relations and a few visionary-type statements about some world issues. Both articles mentioned Ukraine. Putin said the “crisis” was provoked and diligently fuelled by the West, while Xi promoted the previously published China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis[5].

Unsurprisingly, the Joint Statement included some of both what Putin and Xi said in their published articles, but there was no mention of military cooperation between the two countries.

The Joint Statement did say that “the parties insist that NATO strictly comply with the obligations relating to the regional and defensive nature of the said Organization.

 

They call on NATO to respect the sovereignty of other states, their security and interests, civilizational, historical and cultural diversity, and treat the peaceful development of other states objectively and without prejudice. The parties express great concern over the ongoing strengthening of NATO’s ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region on military and security issues, as well as undermining by the Organization of regional peace and stability.”

The “partner without limits”[6] terminology of the 4 February 2022 Joint State-ment – just prior to the invasion of Ukraine – was not repeated in the March 2023 Joint Statement although Putin did include the words “without limitations” to describe “Russia – China relations” in his newspaper article.

More recently, in April, the Chinese ambassador to the EU, Fu Cong, said that China was not on Russia’s side in the war in Ukraine. “‘No limit’ is nothing but rhetoric,”[7] he said. In my view there are a host of “limits” to the relationship besides the events in Ukraine and I aim to analyse some of these in this article.

The China 12-point “Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis” released a month before the Summit led its first point with “respecting the sovereignty of all countries” but that phrase was not in the Joint Statement. This was something that Russia has clearly not done with respect to Ukraine. In accordance with its emphasis on “respecting sovereignty” – with Taiwan in mind – China has not recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

The Joint Statement said that “the Russian side reaffirms its adherence to the “one China” principle, recognizes that Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC, opposes the independence of Taiwan in any form, and firmly supports the actions of the Chinese side to protect its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

The Russian released official list of agreements on joint Russian-Chinese projects[8] was mainly unexciting, including: “joint production of television programs”; “exhibition and fair activities”; “use of forest resources”; “the soybean industry”; “development of the Far East and the Arctic”; “fundamental scientific research”; “fast neutron reactors and closing the nuclear fuel cycle”.

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline, running across Mongolia to supply Russian gas to China was not mentioned in any officially released docu-mentation, although Putin and some of his officials spoke as though it was almost a done deal. China seems in no hurry on this, particularly as Russia’s hydrocarbon exports to Europe are not going to return to the pre-war levels any time soon – if ever – and there are no other major export markets within easy reach. There are clear limits to the energy partnership.

Xi’s article included an invocation “to continue joint work to interface the (BRI) Belt and Road Initiative and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) for institutional support of bilateral cooperation and regional integration”. Putin’s article also spoke of “work aimed at coordinating the development of the EAEU with the One Belt, One Road Initiative” (ie the alternate name for the BRI).

This issue also made it into the Joint Statement: “The Chinese Side supports the promotion of integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian Side supports the One Belt, One Road initiative. The Parties are making active joint efforts to link the development plans of the Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road initiative in order to strengthen interconnectedness in the space of the Eurasian region.”

The March Joint Statement said that “the parties will continue to develop practical cooperation in the field of civil aviation, automotive, shipbuilding, metallurgy, as well as in other areas of mutual interest”. Like the mooted EAEU-BRI connection, this statement was largely an exercise in wishful thinking as I will explain latter.

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also met with Xi and according to Mishustin they agreed on 79 projects worth over $165 billion involving the Intergo-vernmental Russian-Chinese Commission on Investment cooperation, which focuses on energy, high-tech, transport and logistics.[9]

I will now unpack some of the main issues mentioned in these documents: the Ukraine; the EAEU-BRI connection within the context of Eurasia region; high-tech (including fundamental scientific research, industrial sovereignty, civil aviation, machine-tools); space research; and the Arctic.

IMPORTANCE OF UKRAINE

From the very beginning of the “special military operation” (SMO), China expressed understanding of Russia’s position on Ukraine but has been very careful to limit any action in support – particularly not wanting to get caught-up in US secondary sanctions! Russia had clearly expected more from China and tried to use the 2022 SCO summit meeting in Uzbekistan to push SCO members (including China and Kazakhstan) to jointly take a anti-West stance.

However, there was great push-back against this with Putin having to publicly acknowledged Chinese “concerns”. While he praised Beijing’s “balanced position”, Putin said he would explain himself on the sidelines of the meeting. By contrast, Xi did not mention Ukraine at all in his remarks, stating instead that China was “willing to work with Russia to demonstrate the responsibility of big powers” and to “instil stability and positive energy in a world of chaos”.[10]

When departing Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping commented to Putin: “Now there are changes that haven’t happened in 100 years. When we are together, we drive these changes.”.[11] “I agree,” Putin replied, to which Xi said, “Take care of yourself, dear friend, please.”

While Xi is right about significant changes, both he and Putin have a dim view of the future of Western countries. It is this, rather than any real view of “we together” that are behind these remarks.

A September 2022 Valdai Club paper, “Russia – China Strategic Partnership in the Context of the Crisis in Europe”[12] said that “when future historians will look for the starting point of the collapse of the old international order and the rise of a new world order where a small group of powers can no longer claim undivided leadership, they can begin with February 24, 2022”. While acknowledging some sanctions caused difficulties between Russia and China, the Valdai paper concludes that “in their decision to openly confront Russia over Ukraine, the Western countries underesti-mated the scale and depth of the Russia – China strategic partnership in the new era”.

This Valdai paper is typical of many of its previous reports in attempting to promote a – in my view – unrealistic or even romantic vision of the Russia – China relationship.

GENERAL RUSSIA – CHINA RELATIONSHIP

Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian Valdai Club associated commentator who favours closer relations with China, noted in an early 2018 interview with an Indian newspaper that “there are some members of the Russian elite who are fearful of China”.[13]

Despite this, moves by the European Union and NATO to expand in an easterly direction and events in Crimea prompted a significant change in the Russian view of its possible relationship with the “West”. This led the Russian leadership to conclude that Russia needed to build a closer relationship with China, while reducing its reliance on energy exports to Europe and imports of Western capital and technology.[14]

According to Alexander Gabuev, Russia decided that it needed to remove “three key informal barriers”.[15] In the future, sales of advanced weapons to China would have fewer restrictions, China would be allowed greater participation in large Russian infrastructure and natural-resource projects, and greater efforts would be made to cooperate with China in Central Asia.

An advantage for China was that Russia’s actions sapped the focus and energy from the US “pivot to the East” by the US Obama administration. China wants to have as much control as possible over the sea approaches to its coastlines and the “pivot” was seen as a threat to China in much the same way as NATO expansion was seen as a threat to Russia.

Andrei Denisov, Russian Ambassador to China has noted that “it is not a romantic union of one heart but a calculated marriage”.[16] Dmitri Trenin, of the Carnegie Moscow Center, seemed satisfied with the situation when he succinctly summed up the relationship saying it is “founded on the premise that the two will never turn against each other, but neither will they automatically follow each other: a fine combination of reassurance and flexibility”.[17] In my view, we are seeing this is present day relations.

A 2016 Valdai Discussion Club report heavily influenced by Sergei Karaganov, “Toward the Great Ocean 4” report, said “fears and uncertainties persist. Russia fears that China will turn toward the US. In China many are afraid that Russia will cave in under the weight of its geostrategic commitments and revert to quasi-colonial status in relations with the West.”[18]

Most Russian advocates of closer Russian-Chinese relations do not nece-ssarily want a “formal” military alliance. In the view of Karaganov and others, a “Greater Eurasia” macro-bloc is only viable if “China does not claim hegemonic status in the region”.[19]

EAEU, BRI, SCO AND EURASIAN REGION

Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU)

“At the core”, according to Irina Kobrinskaya writing in 2016, “Moscow views Chinese regional policy through the prism of Russia’s own efforts to strengthen economic (ieEAEU) integration within the post-Soviet space.”[20] As the March 2002 statements suggest, this remains the case.

The EAEU consists of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Efforts to attract Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have failed for various reasons. According to its internet site, the EAEU is an international organization for regional economic integration. It “provides for free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, pursues coordinated, harmonized and single policy in the sectors determined by the Treaty and international agreements within the Union.”[21]

There is no provision for common foreign policy and security arrangements, which has given Kazakhstan room to manoeuvre as it expressed views on Russian actions in Ukraine.

Li Ziguo of the China Institute of International Studies noted that Russian stitched together the EAEU by offering costly “benefit lures” such direct payments, subsidies, and preferential tariff and import rule exceptions. He summarized the issue in the following way: “While the European Union puts forward various requests to applicant countries if they want to join the union, the situation in the EAEU is totally opposite: applicant countries put forward various requests before they agree to join the union.”[22]

In recent years the best source of information on the state of Russia – China relations has been the annual Russian International Affairs (RIAC) report on “Russia – China Dialogue”[23] produced jointly with China’s Fudan University and the annual conferences held in Moscow prior to COVID19 (where some of the informal com-mentary was highly informative). The “Russia – China Dialogue: the 2022 Model”[24] was released in August 2022.

The RIAC 2022 report says “Chinese commentators note that while the EAEU’s adoption of hundreds of decisions and recommendations during the year is testament to the willingness of the member states to work together towards a common vision for the further development of the association, none of this led to a breakthrough in practice”.

The RIAC 2022 report acknowledges some differences in views. “According to Chinese experts, the ‘bottlenecks’ in integration within the EAEU have still not been eliminated. First, Russia’s capacity for providing economic benefits to its EAEU partners is limited due to the dynamics of its development. Second, the Chinese side believes that the governance structure of the EAEU is centred on Russia, and the other member states have concerns about transferring some of their sovereignty to the supranational level. Third, the similarity of economic structures and export models among the EAEU member states can lead to competition in the markets.”

EAEU members may fear Russia, with the example of Ukraine clear to all, but neither do they want to be left alone in the face of rising Chinese power and assertiveness. While the future of the EAEU is not bright, it is not about to collapse any time soon.[25] In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan is showing a quite strong streak of independence – it has never recognized Crimea as part of Russia – and its President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has openly refused to support Russia in 2022. But, there is no suggestion that Kazakhstan might leave the EAEU.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The RIAC 2022 says that “China’s interests in Central Asia are connected with a number of factors, including:

“First, it is important to have a favourable situation in the region in order to maintain security, stability and a high level of development in China’s western pro-vinces. Overall, the countries of Central Asia pursue a multi-vector and balanced foreign policy, not focussing on any one power, and supporting peaceful coexistence and cooperation within the region, which is in Beijing’s interests.”

“Second, Central Asia is important for China in terms of energy diversifi-cation. China maintains entire oil and gas supply network that includes Central Asia, and this makes it possible to guarantee the country’s energy security.”

“Third, Central Asia is an important region for the BRI.”

The initial BRI idea expressed by Xi Jinping in a speech in Kazakhstan in 2013 was for a new Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) running from China across the Asian landmass toward Europe. It expanded into One Belt, One Road (OBOR) when a sea route through the Indian Ocean was added. As countries in other parts of the world sought to be included the Chinese started using the term Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

After its initial launch in 2013 as the SREB, the BRI enjoyed several years of good publicity and many countries and regions vied to receive money. But, whether as SREB, OBOR or BRI, it was more an umbrella term for a number of existing and future Chinese projects and investments. There was never any sense that it was a well thought out and coherent project with a unified structure and leadership.

Many politically hyped BRI projects eventually turned out to be much less attractive when subjected to economic scrutiny. According to a March 2023 report by AIDDATA, “following a more than decade-long boom in overseas lending and invest-ment, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has come under pressure, as many recipient (debtor) countries in the developing world experience financial distress”.[26]

EAEU – BRI Connection

At the 2017 Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, Putin said: “I believe that by adding together the potential of all the integration formats like the EAEU, the OBOR (or BRI), the SCO and the ASEAN, we can build the foundation for a larger Eurasian partnership”.

While Putin spoke of the “extensive Eurasian partnership” evolving in a “vast Eurasian integration area”, some Russian analysts referred to “a partnership or com-munity of Greater Eurasia”.[27] A succession of Valdai Discussion Club reports – under the influence of Sergei Karaganov – with the general motto “Towards the Great Ocean” calling for “the transformation of Central Eurasia into a zone of joint development” by combining the SREB with the Russian EAEU[28][29] were released over the next few years.

References to “security” eventually were included in these reports, with a “rejuvenated SCO with China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, other regional powers, and eventually Iran.”[30] That is, a “Community of Greater Eurasia” geopolitical bloc which will include “China, Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Iran, and many other states”.

However, whereas Kazakhstan continually gets a separate mention in the Valdai reports, Putin never separately mentioned Kazakhstan in his speeches or Russian official documents – but rather always envisages it participating in Eurasian integration as part of the EAEU and not as an individual country.

When Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan just prior to the 2022 SCO summit in Uzbekistan, Chinese media reported that he specifically said that “China will always support Kazakhstan in maintaining national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”[31].

On their side, the Chinese have few ideas of their own about Greater Eurasia. When I have asked Chinese visiting Russia about it they have been are likely to refer to the writings of Karaganov and express scepticism. According to Ka-Ho Wong, writing in a RIAC ‘blog’, “A Comparative Study of the Greater Eurasian Partnership: The Chinese and Russian Perspectives”, “Chinese scholars understand the Greater Eurasian Partnership by reading Sergei Karaganov’s articles and the relevant Valdai club reports”.[32]

Ka-Ho Wong said that Russian scholars perceive the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” initiative as “grand strategy”, while Chinese scholars consider it an “opportunistic move” by Russia to cope with its “international isolation”. The Chinese consider the idea to have a “bleak future” because of its “vagueness” and “strong political sense”. They consider Russia a “Eurocentric country” which will abandon the partnership “following rapprochement with the West”.

“Meanwhile”, Ka-Ho Wong adds, “the EAEU has suffered from institutional deficiency and consequently most cooperation between China and the EAEU member states is on the bilateral level”.

In my own experience, the ideas of Karaganov and Eurasia (or Greater Eurasia) are often derided by more European orientated Russians working in the foreign policy area. This is particularly the case when he tells foreign visitors to Russia that “we are now Eurasians”. A published critique by myself is available here.[33]

The RIAC 2022 report said that “Chinese experts believe that the prospects for creating a political alliance in the region, including on the basis of the EAEU, are slim at best. Some countries in the region are concerned that such an alliance would harm their status as independent sovereign states. What is more, one of the motivating factors for the less economically developed countries in Central Asia when joining the EAEU was the possibility of creating new partnership opportunities with Russia. To maximize their gains, Central Asian states are pursuing a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy, manoeuvring between the major powers. If the EAEU’s economic momentum slows down, then they are likely to start strengthening relations with China or the United States.”

Yet at the same time the RIAC 2022 report says that “Chinese commentators believe that the natural choice for the EAEU in the long term is thus to strengthen ties with the BRI.” On the face of it, this comment is a surprise given the individual difficulties faced by both the structured EAEU and the amorphous BRI and the clear lack of a way of joining the two – though it may just be another example of lack of realism such as included in the March 2023 Joint Statement of Putin and Xi.

In my view, despite the emphasis of many on EAEU in Russian relations with China, the reality is that in Chinese thinking the EAEU will necessarily rank a far second to any direct bilateral ties with any country.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO was initially formed in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five”, which in addition to China included four countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) which had a border with it. The main purpose was settling border disputes following the collapse of the USSR. Uzbekistan joined in 2001 and the group became officially known as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO). The “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” was signed which defined the main goals of the SCO as the fight against the “three evil forces”, being terrorism, separatism and extremism.

At a meeting of SCO security council secretaries held in Tashkent prior to the September 2022 annual Council of Heads of State summit in Samarkand, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev promoted Russia’s aspiration to make the SCO the center of resistance to the West. It was reported that he “repeatedly mentioned the global confrontation, in which, in his opinion, Moscow and its SCO partners are on the same side.”[34]

And speaking about Regional Cooperation 2022 drills under US command that took place in Tajikistan in August, with the participation of military personnel from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Pakistan, Nikolai Patrushev emphasized: “I would like to reiterate to our partners that, above all, the Americans need such events in order to study the potential theater of military operations, specify the positions of potential targets and adjust digital maps for high-precision weapons. I really hope that all the SCO member states by now realize the extremely high risks that these American initiatives present for our security.”[35]

Despite Patrushev’s efforts, Putin was publicly chided by Indian prime minister Modi at the September SCO Council of Heads of State summit. Modi said that “I know today’s era is not an era of war and we have talked to you many times over the phone on the subject”[36]. In reply to Modi, Putin said “we will do our best to stop this as soon as possible’, citing “concerns that you constantly express”.

In his speech before the meeting with Modi, Putin had to recognise Chinese disquiet with developments. Putin said he acknowledged Chinese “concerns” about the Russia’s activities in Ukraine. While he praised Beijing’s “balanced position”, Putin said he would explain himself on the sidelines of the meeting. By contrast, Xi did not mention Ukraine at all in his remarks, stating instead that China was “willing to work with Russia to demonstrate the responsibility of big powers” and to “instil stability and positive energy in a world of chaos”.[37]

The comments of Modi and Xi in Samarkand show that India and China are clearly not signing up to the Patrushev vision of the SCO. This should not have been a surprise, as the SCO has a very diverse membership including. Indeed, in my view, it is amazing that Russia expected anything otherwise, and the Patrushev’s comments may tell us something about the standard of thinking in some parts of the Russian leadership!

HIGH-TECH AND TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY

Following his March 2023 meeting with Xi in Moscow, Prime Minister Mishustin said:

“I would like to highlight co-operation in high-tech areas. We are discussing aircraft construction, mechanical engineering, machine tool construction, space research, and end-to-end technologies aimed at creating innovative products and providing services. I am convinced that expanding innovative co-operation will strengthen Russia’s and China’s technological sovereignty”[38].

In my view, most of these words are not grounded in reality.

To start with, there are significant culture and language differences. Former Russian diplomat Georgy Toloraya is certainly correct when he says that “Russia still remains an integral part of the European Judeo-Christian civilization” and “the Russian political class still does not know the East, and all its knowledge of it is often reduced to trite clichés”.[39] The Russia – China relationship also suffers from a significant language barrier, as both languages are difficult to learn and most discourse occurs via English – a fact which, in itself makes the users more inclined to look for contact in other countries where English is more common.

In general, Russian experts I have spoken to in Russia think that it is still ahead of China in theoretical and “fundamental scientific research” – which was in-cluded in the March official list of agreements – but Chinese institutions with greater financial resources are able to develop applied science faster. They say that China is only interested in Russian military technology with no interest in no-military technology (although there are few exceptions), but it does not explicitly say this. Russia, however, would like full scale cooperation in all relevant fields of technolo-gical innovation such as IT, AI, new materials, biotech etc. These Russian experts also say that Russia aims to retain technological independence while attracting Chinese investment in technological areas; learn new technology from the Chinese; and diversify its trade by increasing tech-product exports.

There is a significant lack of mutual respect and trust in the Russia – China technological relationship.

The book “Russia – China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?”[40] has a chapter by Elina Sinkkonen and Jussi Lassi that notes there is a Russian “fear – common in Western countries – that China has the ability to steal foreign innovations and integrate them into its own production”. I would add here that even Russians who have worked for prolonged periods in China for Chinese technology companies are often regarded with suspicion when they return to Russia.

The Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix chapter on “Russia – China Naval Partnership and Its Significance” in the same book relates that “in December 2018, Yevgeny Livadny, head of the intellectual property protection service of the Rostec state defense con-glomerate, accused China of illegally copying a wide range of Russian weapons and other military materials: ‘There have been 500 cases in the past 17 years … China alone has copied aircraft engines, Sukhoi fighter jets including fighters on aircraft carriers, air defense systems including an analogue of the medium range Pantsir system’.”

A late-2017 Chinese article on CR929 said that Russia is generally “arrogant in civil and military-technical cooperation”, that China’s need for Russia is decreasing, and “China’s superiority will inevitably accelerate”.[41]

CR929 is a 2014 politically supported project for China’s COMAC and Russia’s United Aircraft Building Corporation (UAC) to jointly develop a wide-body long-range aircraft scheduled to enter service in 2026. It involved equally shared development costs, but mid-2019 reports in the Russian financial press suggested China wanted to separately sell the aircraft inside China, leaving the Russian side locked out of the expected Chinese market of nearly 800 planes which compares with that in Russia and other countries of probably less than 100.[42] About this time I attended a meeting in Moscow on this issue involving Russian and Chinese analysts. The Russians were clearly frustrated about how things were developing, but could get no sensible answers from the Chinese.

In June 2022, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov, told a forum that Russia was “decreasing” its participation in the CR929 project, saying it was “not going in the direction that suits us”. Borisov added that “China, as it becomes an industrial giant, is less and less interested in our services”[43].

The Eurasia Daily Monitor reported that in mid-2022 that Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov told the Russian Duma about the need to take a turn “from absolutist market-type industrial policy toward a policy aimed at securing industrial sovereignty”[44]. He particularly mentioned that industries such as electronics, machine tools and chemistry “should be paid special attention”.

According to Viktor Slavyantsev, head of projects of the highest category of innovative development of the state corporation Rostec, the dependence of Russian companies of the radio-electronic complex on imported materials is very high. At a conference in August 2022, he reportedly said: “We really should be proud of some technological areas, such as nuclear technology, air defense and missile defense technology, hypersonics, but we have many problems, primarily from the point of view of the radio-electronic industry, where import dependence on functional and critical materials for companies in the radio-electronic complex is still at over 90%.”[45]

Only about 30% of machine tools are Russian-made and local industry doesn’t have the capacity to cover rising demand. Indeed, according to a FOI (the Swedish Defense Research Agency) 2019 report, Russian machine tool builders “have so far overlooked the on-going paradigm shift, where especially high-end machine tool companies are transforming from being merely manufacturers to becoming ‘process solution partners’ that are more or less integrated into their customer’s entire business and manufacturing processes”.[46] The FOI report says that the Chinese versions tend to be cheaper and of lower quality than those of the West.[47]

Elina Sinkkonen and Jussi Lassi Rivals[48] note that “Russia’s own technology programs and knowledge base are aimed at developing credible national solutions, whereas China is export-oriented in striving to acquire know-how, conquer the market and set standards for Russia as well.” That is, “compared with China’s expansive commercial strategies in tech, Russia relies on an explicitly more inward-looking and confrontational approach” and they give the example of the National Technology Initiative (NTI), launched by Putin in 2014, which “draws on the idea of global competing blocs in trade, technology and politics”.

I agree with this assessment. I examined the NTI in great detail in 2016 in my report, entitled, “NTI – Waiting for the High-tech Tooth Fairy”[49]. I also wrote about “Russia and China’s Digital Silk Road”, in Baku Dialogues: Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region, Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021[50].

The RIAC 2022 report on Russia – China relations[51] says that “despite the long list of areas in which the two sides cooperate, real and productive research interaction can only be seen on a small range of issues”:

“Several hundred agreements on scientific, technical and educational interaction have been concluded between the countries’ research institutions and universities over the past decade. However, many of these agreements remain on paper as the sides do not really know how to carry out this interaction, and because the documents themselves are full of abstract plans and declarative statements. Many initiatives are limited to science exchanges and research conferences, with no joint research projects being carried out at all. However, more active forms of interaction have appeared in recent years, mainly in hi-tech fields.”

The RIAC 2022 report concludes by saying:

“On the whole, long-held plans for scientific and technical cooperation between Russia and China are now being put into practice, and work is moving towards the creation of joint projects and laboratories. At the same time, experience shows that many research teams in Russia and China do not fully understand the formal and administrative intricacies of their interaction and in many cases have not been involved in such cooperative work before. Interaction is often limited to organizing joint roundtables and symposiums that produce no tangible results and do not lead to joint R&D”.

SPACE RESEARCH

On 27 September 2022 Interfax reported that Russia and China have signed contracts for the deployment of Russian Glonass satellite navigation system stations in China and China’s Beidou system stations in Russia. Three Russian measurement stations should be built in the Chinese cities of Changchun, Urumqi, and Shanghai, and three Chinese stations in Russia’s Obninsk, Irkutsk, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, it said. “The simultaneous use of the Russian and Chinese systems, Glonass and Beidou, provides more accurate and reliable navigation”.[52]

The RIAC 2022 report says that “an important area of Russia – China interaction over the past few years has been space. In September 2019, Russian State Space Cor-poration ROSCOSMOS and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) signed an agreement on cooperation to coordinate the Russian Luna 27 orbital spacecraft mission and the Chinese Chang’e 7 mission to explore the polar region of the Moon, as well as the Agreement on the Creation of a United Data Center for Exploration of the Moon and Outer Space. Russia and China also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Construction of an International Lunar Research Station. The sides are set to develop a roadmap for the project moving forward. The plan is to give all interested countries and international partners access to the station. Moscow and Beijing have made progress in such areas as remote Earth sensing, exploration of the Moon and outer space, electronic components for space flight applications, and the monitoring of space debris. Additionally, Russian and Chinese scientists are planning to carry out joint observations using China’s 500-metre aperture spherical telescope (FAST), as part of the Years of Scientific, Technological and Innovative Cooperation.”

FAR EAST AND THE ARCTIC

I have travelled extensively in the Russian Far East and am at a loss to explain what cooperation the parties have in mind, other than this reflects the usual Valdai Club type dreaming about Chinese money coming to rescue a rather undeveloped region.

While there are suggestions regarding Russia – China differences on Arctic issues, I do find this odd given that China has no territory or territorial aspirations in this region and is thus not an “Arctic state”.

The 2022 RIAC report on Russia – China relations says – somewhat cryptically -that “it appears particularly important to foster a climate of mutual trust between Russia and China in Arctic affairs. When launching cooperation projects in the Russian Arctic, the advantages of all the parties need to be carefully assessed and their interests should be taken into account, with due consideration of the special status of Arctic states.”

The issue of Russia – China trust was more directly tackled in a February 2022 article in the Eurasian Daily Monitor[53] which states “Russia has promoted the Northern Sea Route with the expectation that China will be a major user. And it is assertively advocating for the development of natural resources, such as natural gas in the Arctic, with the hope that China will be a major customer. Both of these calculations, combined with the economic pressure from the Western sanctions regime, have pushed Moscow to cooperate ever more closely with Beijing in the Arctic and Russian High North. However, concerns are growing in Moscow that the ambitious Russian goals for the region may not work out in the ways it hopes. Some Russian observers’ worry that China will graduate from a junior partner in both spheres to a dominant player. One fear is that Beijing will ultimately transform Russia’s Northern Sea Route – an east-west maritime corridor that follows the Russian Arctic coast – into just a constituent segment of a Chinese-dominated Polar Silk Road. Another anxiety is that Beijing could exploit cooperation in the development of Russian Arctic gas fields as a basis for further expanding China’s political-economic interests at Russia’s expense. As a result, worried voices in the Russian capital are now suggesting that China is helping Russia today but may push it aside later.”

Whatever the real situation about such Russian concerns, The Diplomat magazine says that “whereas the 2015 version of the Naval Doctrine stated that the ‘development of friendly ties with China is a key component of national maritime policy in the Pacific direction’, China is completely absent from the new 2022 Naval Doctrine”.[54]

FUTURE PROSPECTS

So far the events of 2022 have led to Russia becoming much weaker county in a variety of ways: militarily, economically, and international reputation. There are no upsides! The Russian economy is very self-sufficient in many basic ways such as energy, food and even some technologies. However, most “Western” sanctions will not be lifted while Putin is in power; and even if he goes, change will come very slowly.

China only needs Russia as a source of energy and raw materials and as a secure “backyard” in its increasing competition / confrontation with the West (and particularly the US). In 2017, a Chinese academic gave his opinion on the superficiality of this new partnership: “Concerning Russia, our first consideration is purely bilateral, we need a good relationship; it may not bring much benefit to China, but if the relationship is bad, it could be the biggest threat to our security. It’s all about negative interests, avoiding trouble. But there are also economic interests. They are our primary supplier of oil and we need their natural gas. On a human level, we don’t love each other. We don’t trust each other and the partnership is unreliable. It’s just that we don’t have a choice, because we are great neighbors. Russia’s strategic position is isolation. The Russians only like Europe and the United States, but it is not reciprocal because nobody likes them.”[55]

Alexander Gabuev says that “Russia is reorienting itself to China. But their relationship now is deeply asymmetric. China is clearly the stronger partner”. “That said, the Chinese are skillfully massaging Russia’s ego with their rhetoric. And their broader attitudes toward each other helps. China doesn’t care about Alexei Navalny [the Putin critic who has been poisoned and thrown in prison by the Kremlin], and Russia doesn’t care about Xinjiang. That provides a type of glue for their relationship that makes it more comfortable for them to talk.”

* International Business & Economic Consultant, and International Affairs, Visiting Professor at the Higher School of Economics He is author of “New Eurasian Age: China’s Silk Road and the EAEU in SCO space” (“Noodles and Meatballs in a Breaking Bowl”)

[1] “Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики об углублении отношений всеобъемлющего партнёрства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающих в новую эпоху”, 21 марта 2023 года http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5920

[2] Российско-китайские переговоры. В Кремле прошли переговоры Владимира Путина с Председателем Китайской Народной Республики Си Цзиньпином. 21 марта 2023 года http:// kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70748

[3] Vladimir Putin’s Article for People’s Daily Newspaper, “Russia and China: A Future-Bound Partnership”, 19 March 2023. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70743

[4] Председатель КНР Си Цзиньпин (авторская статья для российских СМИ), “Упорно двигаться вперед, к новым перспективам дружбы, сотрудничества и совместного развития Китая и России”, https://rg.ru/2023/03/20/uporno-dvigatsia-vpered-k-novym-perspektivam-druzhby-sotrudnichestva-i-sovmestnogo-razvitiia-kitaia-i-rossii.html

[5] China’s Position on Political Settlement of Ukraine Crisis”, Chinese Foreign Ministry, 24 February 2023 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html

[6] http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770

[7] Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Steven Erlanger, “China’s Ambassador to the E.U. Tries to Distance Beijing From Moscow”, New York Times, 5 April 2023 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/05/ world /europe/eu-china-embassador-russia-fu-cong.html

[8] Перечень документов, подписанных в рамках государственного визита в Российскую ФедерациюПредседателяКитайскойНароднойРеспубликиСиЦзиньпина, 21 марта 2023 года, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5918

[9] Ben Aris, BNE Intellinews, “Russia and China sign off $165bn of energy and transport deals in Xis second day in Moscow”, 21 March 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-and-china-sign-off-165bn-of-energy-and-transport-deals-in-xi-s-second-day-in-moscow-273546/?source=russia

[10] Getting a handle on what was said and what was not said at various meetings can be very difficult. For example, following a meeting between Li Zhanshu (chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress) and leaders of the Russian Duma, the Russians released a document suggesting that Li Zhanshu had specifically given Chinese “support” for the invasion of Ukraine. Yet multiple Chinese reporting on the same meeting did not mention Ukraine. See: http://duma.gov.ru /en /news/55208/

[11] Isabel Keane, New York Post, 22 March 2023, https://nypost.com/2023/03/22/xi-makes-cryptic-comment-to-putin-as-ukraine-gets-hit-with-missiles/

[12] Timofei Bordachev, Vasily Kashin, Nikita Potashev, Egor Prokhin, Veronika Smirnova, Alexandra Yankova, “Russia-China Strategic Partnership in the Context of the Crisis in Europe”, Valdai Discussion Club, 9 June 2022 https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/russia-china-strategic-partnership/

[13] Indrani Bagchi, “China and Russia are quasiallies”, The Times of India, February 28, 2018, https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Globespotting/china-and-russia-are-quasi-allies-on-strategic-affairs-russia-and-india-have-serious-conversations-only-at-top-level/

[14] Alexander Gabuev, “Friends With Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis”, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29, 2016, http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953

[15] Alexander Gabuev, “Friends With Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis”, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29, 2016, http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953

[16] “Country Report: Russia”, The Asan Forum, November 24, 2016 http://www.theasanforum.org /country-report-russia-november-2016/

[17] Dmitri Trenin, “National Interest, the Same Language of Beijing, Washington and Moscow”, Global Times, December 29, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1026358.shtml

[18] “Toward the Great Ocean 4: Turn to the East – preliminary results and new objectives”, Valdai Discussion Club, 2016, http://valdaiclub.com/files/11431/

[19] Sergei A. Karaganov, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”, Russian Embassy to UK, April 24, 2017, https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/50

[20] Irina Kobrinskaya, “Is Russia Coming to Terms with China’s‘ Silk Road’?”, Russia in Global Affairs, December 30, 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/PONARS-Eurasia/Is-Russia-Coming-to-Terms-with-Chinas-Silk-Road-18526

[21] http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about

[22] Li Ziguo, “Eurasian Economic Union: Achievements, Problems and Prospects”, China Institute of International Studies, August 19, 2016, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2016-08/19/content_897 5486.htm

[23] https://russiancouncil.ru/en/

[24] https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russian-chinese-dialogue-the-2022-model/

[25] For a more detailed consideration of the EAEU, see Jeff Schubert, “New Eurasian Age: China’s Silk Road and the EAEU in SCO Space”, April 5, 2017, http://russianeconomicreform.ru/2017/04/ chinas-silk-road-and-the-eaeu-in-sco-space/

[26] Sebastian Horn, Bradley C. Parkes, Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch, “China as an International Lender of Last Resort”, Working Paper 124, AIDDATA, William & Mary, March 2023, https://www. aiddata.org/publications/china-as-an-international-lender-of-last-resort

[27] Sergei A. Karaganov, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”, Russian Embassy to UK, April 24, 2017, https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/50

[28] “Toward the Great Ocean – 3: Creating Central Eurasia” Valdai Discussion Club, April 2015, http:// valdaiclub.com/files/17658/

[29] Toward the Great Ocean 4: Turn to the East – preliminary results and new objectives”, Valdai Discussion Club, 2016, http://valdaiclub.com/files/11431/

[30] Sergei A. Karaganov, Kristina I. Cherniavskaia, Dmitry P. Novikov, “Russian Foreign Policy Risky Successes”, Perspectives, Spring 2016, https://we.hse.ru/data/2016/08/15/1117920075/Harvard _Interlational_Review.pdf

[31] Putin concedes China has ‘questions and concerns’ over Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. By Nectar Gan, CNN. September 15, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/15/asia/xi-putin-meeting-main-bar-intl-hnk/index.html

[32] Ka-Ho Wang, “A Comparative Study of the Greater Eurasian Partnership: The Chinese and Russian Perspectives”, RIAC 31 May, 2018 http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/frankywongk/a-comparative-study-of-the-greater-eurasian-partnership-the-chinese-an/

[33] Jeff Schubert, “Reflecting on Greater Eurasia and its Role in the World”, RIAC, April 20, 2018, http:// russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/asian-kaleidoscope/reflecting-on-greater-eurasia-and-its-role-in-the-world/

[34] Alexander Vorontsov, “What to Expect From the SCO Summit in Samarkand”, 9 Sept. 2022 https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/what-to-expect-from-the-sco-summit-in-samarkand/

[35] Ibidem.

[36] Narendra Modi chides Vladimir Putin over Ukraine war, https://www.ft.com/content/d0ac036 1-c101-4605-ba22-ee20f9f92233

[37] Szu Ping Chan, “Isolated Putin left at Beijing’s mercy as his disastrous war backfires”, https:// www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/isolated-putin-left-at-beijing-s-mercy-as-his-disastrous-war-backfires/ar-AA11XnvS?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=59bdb848d8f943f189bc87897f67fcc7

[38] Ben Aris, BNE Intellinews, “Russia and China sign off $165bn of energy and transport deals in Xis second day in Moscow”, 21 March 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-and-china-sign-off-165bn-of-energy-and-transport-deals-in-xi-s-second-day-in-moscow-273546/?source=russia

[39] Georgy Toloraya, “Two Heads of the Russian Eagle”, Russia in Global Affairs, February 13, 2017, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Two-Heads-of-the-Russian-Eagle-18592

[40] Editors: Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, Nils Wörmer, “Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?”, 2022, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3 Curiously, the book pays little attention to Central Asia, while it has significant emphasis on implications for the West.

[41] http://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1585833891323490384&wfr=spider&for=pc

[42] https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/04/18/799607-rossiisko–kitaiskogo–samoleta

[43] https://tass.ru/ekonomika/15073925?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign =t.co&utm_referrer=t.co

[44] Sergey Sukhankin, “Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume”, September 7, 2022 https://jamestown. org/ program/gosplan-2-0-is-russia-taking-another-step-toward-a-planned-economy/

[45] Ростех: зависимость российских компаний в сфере радиоэлектроники от импорта выше 90% https://tass.ru/ekonomika/15547653?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign =t.co&utm_referrer=t.co

[46] Tomas Malmlöf, “The Russian machine tool industry: Prospects for a turnaround?”, FOI-R–4635–SE, February 2019, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R–4635–SE

[47] Tomas Malmlöf, “The Russian machine tool industry: Prospects for a turnaround?”, FOI-R–4635–SE, February 2019, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R–4635–SE

[48] Editors: Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, Nils Wörmer, “Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?”, 2022, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3 Curiously, the book pays little attention to Central Asia, while it has significant emphasis on implications for the West.

[49] Jeff Schubert, “National Technology Initiative – Waiting for the High-Tech Tooth Fairy”, Russia Economic Reform, 2016, https://russianeconomicreform.ru/2016/06/russian-national-technology-initiative-failure-or-success/

[50] https://bakudialogues.ada.edu.az/media/2020/12/12/bd-2-schubert.pdf

[51] https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/russian-chinese-dialogue-the-2022-model/

[52] “Russia, China sign deal on mutual deployment of Glonass, Beidou satellite navigation systems in their territories – Roscosmos”, Interfax, 27 Sept, 2022, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/ 83370/

[53] Paul Goble, “Moscow Needs Beijing in the Arctic but Worries About China’s Expanding Role”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 February 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-needs-beijing-in-the-arctic-but-worries-about-chinas-expanding-role/

[54] Daniel Rakov, “Russia’s New Naval Doctrine: A ‘Pivot to Asia’?”, The Diplomat, 19 August 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/russias-new-naval-doctrine-a-pivot-to-asia/

[55] Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix, “Russia-China Naval Partnership and Its Significance”, Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3.pdf