Ross BABBAGE*
A new book has been published that analyses the potential for a major war between China and the US – its pro-bable causes, its main features, its scale, its probable phases, its duration and the main drivers of the outcome.
This book does address the military dimensions of such a conflict but it goes much further to also discuss the stra-tegic, political, economic, industrial and business implications.[1]
In order to give a general sense for the book, this article briefly addresses four key questions.
- Why is major war in the Indo-Pacific a very serious risk?
- If war erupts, how does China plan to fight?
- What would a major US-China war look like? What would be its key features?
- What do the US and its allies need to do?
First, why is major war in the Indo-Pacific a very serious risk?
A primary generator of the risk is Xi Jinping’s repeatedly expressed deter-mination to seize democratic Taiwan. He has made this a core promise to the Chinese people and he often states:
“We will never allow anyone …at any time… to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!” And another favourite form of words is: “…complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled and definitely will be fulfilled”.
Backing up these statements has been a very rapid military build-up. China now has the largest navy and army in the world and the largest military aviation force in the Western Pacific.
Defence spending is also growing rapidly. While China’s economy is currently growing at about 3.5% per year, the publicly-released defence budget is surging at more than double that rate. This year it is rising by 7.2%.
In recent months China’s military mobilization laws have been updated, mo-bilization staffs have been activated throughout the country, mobilization exercises are being conducted and there are reports that many state-owned and private companies have been ordered to prepare for the emergency production of military-related goods.
Xi has also recently elevated the junior general who has led China’s planning for military operations against Taiwan to be one of his two most senior military advisors. In addition, Xi Jinping has substantially modified China’s development programs by stating that defence and security needs must have equal, and often higher, priority to the goals of economic growth and infrastructure modernisation. He calls this “integrating national strategies and strategic capabilities”.
Self-reliance is at the heart of Xi’s powerful drive in the “Made in China 2025” campaign, the Dual Circulation Concept, the Civil-military Fusion policy, the so-called “New Development Phase” and also the vast government spending to develop cutting-edge technologies and modernize civil infrastructure.
The economic cost of these policies has been huge – probably reducing China’s economic growth by some 1-2 percent of GDP each year. But Xi has been determined to insulate his Party-State from external coercion and prepare the country for the contingency of major war. Yet another indicator of Beijing’s preparations for war are the frequent penetrations of Taiwanese air and sea space by Chinese air and naval units. Some of these operations have been assessed by security analysts to be rehearsals for particular phases of a military assault on Taiwan.
Then we should note China’s construction of full-scale replicas of key Taiwanese government buildings and other installations and the frequent training of Chinese regiments in assaulting these locations.
China’s Rocket Force also practises strikes against American and allied bases in Japan and Guam by firing missiles into full-sized replicas that have been constructed in China’s deserts. And there are reports that China is building more bomb shelters, particularly in the provinces adjacent to Taiwan.
Yet another indicator is China’s intense cyber, information warfare and sub-version campaigns against Taiwan. These penetrating, disrupting, dividing, under-mining and corrupting operations are also being conducted in modified forms against the US, Australia, Japan and most other Western allies.
Senior US intelligence officials have stated to Congressional committees that Xi Jinping has ordered the Chinese military to be fully ready to conduct an assault on Taiwan by 2027.
In the face of these very active preparations, President Biden has been asked four times since his election whether, in the event of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan, America would commit military forces to fight. And four times he has replied without hesitation that US forces would fight to defend the island. Indeed, he occa-sionally refers to America’s legal obligation to do so under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
The book concludes that war over Taiwan is not inevitable. But it is certainly a very serious risk that none of the Western allies can ignore. We need to prepare.
A great deal is at stake. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy of 24 million people in a strategically vital part of the Western Pacific. A successful Chinese invasion would punch a huge hole in the allies’ island chain defences in the Western Pacific and seriously undermine the defence of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and America’s own territories in the theatre.
And if China took control of Taiwan, some analysts doubt whether Beijing would stop there. It might move on to seize other territories in the Western Pacific.
The allies also have a strong interest in ensuring that Taiwan’s world-leading semi-conductor companies, that supply critical components for many allied military systems, don’t fall into China’s hands.
Washington is also well aware that if it gives way to Beijing’s pressure and abandons Taiwan, huge damage would be done to US credibility and the entire Ame-rican alliance system. All American allies would be forced to reassess the value of Washington’s security commitments. Some would probably start looking for alternative means of security.
Let me now turn very briefly to address my second key question. How is China planning to fight?
The short answer is that China is planning to fight very differently to the largely conventional military approach of the United States.
While Xi Jinping would love to win a quick military victory and force the US out of the Western Pacific within weeks, Beijing’s planners consider this to be an unlikely prospect. So China is preparing to fight a long, draining and exhausting war that would probably progress through several phases and eventually force the collapse of American and allied political will. And the Chinese are planning to fight in many more domains than those to which the US and its allies currently give priority.
Of course, Xi Jinping and his colleagues know that the military domain will be important. But they expect to suffer heavy military losses and they consider other domains to be equally important. Let me explain.
While Americans and most allied citizens currently believe that they are in a state of ‘peace’, the Chinese believe that they are already engaged in an intense struggle with the US and its allies that they consider to be a form of non-kinetic warfare, that they usually call political warfare. That is why the Chinese have nearly a million people in four central agencies of government already inserting fake news stories, manipulating Western media to exacerbate divisions and tensions, working to influence political views and elections and conducting subversion, disruption and spying operations. When supplemented by widespread cyber intrusions to penetrate strategically important electronic systems, the scene is set for much more severe levels of disruption to Western decision-making and societies in future crises.
Beijing is also working to weaponize supply chains and many other elements of economic leverage. The regime has many ways of exploiting the West’s dependence on Chinese supplies of everything from rare earths and fertilizers to building materials and consumer electronics.
Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese are planning to exploit their newly-won dominance of global manufacturing. In 2004, American manufacturing output was more than double that of China. But by 2021, China’s manufacturing output had grown to be more than double that of the United States. This is a result of policies that have driven the effective export of America’s industrial supremacy offshore – mostly to China.
Most other Western democracies have followed a similar path.
China now manufactures more ships, steel and smartphones than any other country and it is a world leader in the production of chemicals, metals, heavy industrial equipment and electronics – the basic building blocks of any military-industrial economy.
Critically, the United States is no longer able to outproduce China in advanced weapons and other supplies needed in a war. The conflict in Ukraine has made this clear. So the American industrial dominance that was so central to the allied victories in the two world wars is no more. And Beijing is planning to exploit this new industrial dominance in telling ways in a future war.
Beijing is also preparing a range of disruption capabilities in space, in terrestrial communications and in other strategic networks.
The Chinese assessment is that America’s greatest weakness is not its military but its highly polarized and deeply fractured society. Xi Jinping believes that even if the US wins some military battles, China will not be defeated. He judges that when faced with the prospect of a long, drawn-out, draining struggle with no end in sight, America’s society would fracture, there would be massive anti-war demonstrations in the streets of the US and its allies and Washington would be forced to negotiate a peace deal largely on Beijing’s terms.
This brings me to my third key question. What would such a war actually look like and what would be the primary impacts on allied societies?
There are several ways that Beijing might try to seize Taiwan. But the most likely is a massive surprise assault that would aim to paralyse Taiwan’s command and control systems, capture key people and occupy vital installations within hours. Some prominent Chinese call this the “fourteen hour” option.
In this initial phase of a major war, many of China’s 1,400 theatre ballistic and cruise missiles would likely strike strategic targets not only in Taiwan but also in allied countries across the Indo-Pacific. Beijing would aim to win the battle for Taiwan before the US and its allies could intervene with substantial force.
The fighting would likely be intense for the first 3-4 weeks with both sides suffering significant losses. However, before long Chinese and allied forces would start to run short of the most relevant munitions and they may also start to run out of worthwhile targets in the immediate theatre.
What would follow would likely be a long and draining struggle that would extend for many months and possibly for several years. The human costs would be huge but so would the economic and social costs. All of the allies would need to mobilize their economies and societies for what would be a ‘total war’ the likes of which has not been seen since the Second World War.
This would be a huge shock for all of the allies. Our societies have grown used to sending military forces away to the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other theatres to fight limited conflicts with our home communities left largely undisturbed. But a major war between China and the US would be completely different. This would not be a conflict that could be out-sourced to the military to fight and win.
This war would affect almost everyone. Many products could soon run low, paralyzing a vast range of businesses. Emergency rationing of some items would be needed. Inflation and unemployment would surge, especially in the period in which allied economies are repurposed for the war effort. Many people would be recruited into the armed forces and even larger numbers would need to move into different types of work, often in distant locations. The stresses on allied societies would likely be intense.
And so to my fourth and final question. What needs to be done?
First, on the military front, the U.S. and its allies need to strengthen, disperse and protect their military forces and their supporting bases and infrastructures in the Western Pacific and in many other parts of the world.
Second, we need to find better ways of protecting our media, key agencies, businesses and our publics from Chinese political warfare operations. Some technical fixes are possible but major public education programs are also needed.
Third, the international supply chains of critical goods and services need to be reconfigured to shift production to the allies and other trusted partners. European industry has a particularly important role to play in this. We cannot rely on supplies coming from potentially hostile states in an emergency.
Fourth, the allies must drive hard to restore their dominance of world-leading manufacturing. This is possible, but it will require serious industrial reforms, a dramatic rise in productivity and international competitiveness and new levels of business and industrial sector cooperation between the allies and other trusted partners. These reforms should be an urgent priority.
In sum then, stronger multi-domain deterrence and defensive capabilities will be the best means of averting a slide to major conflict and, if the allies are forced to fight, of winning the war.
A core conclusion of this book is that the US and all its allies have a lot of work to do, and we may not have much time.
Interested readers are encouraged to read the summary reviews of the book by the independent experts that are below.
WHAT DO INDEPENDENT EXPERTS SAY?
“A timely, sobering, and essential read for anyone who wants to understand in detail how a major war in the Indo-Pacific would unfold, the strengths and weaknesses of the United States and China along with their partners, the likely economic and business impacts, and the measures that need to be taken now for the United States and its allies to deter China-and if necessary, to prevail. As concern grows that China will invade Taiwan before mid-century, the issues examined in this book are crucial for policymakers, militaries, academics, and business leaders to consider.”
Bonnie Glaser, Director,
Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the US
“In this prize jewel of a book, Babbage provides an eagle-eyed look ahead at the worst political, economic, and military crises in the near future-and, very importantly, a critical blueprint for averting these. Politicians, business leaders, journalists, and everyday citizens should read Babbage’s urgent roadmap for deterring-or, as may be necessary, winning-the war Beijing is cooking up.”
Matt Pottinger,
former US Deputy National Security Adviser
“U.S. officials now warn of a growing risk of war with China. But how might such a conflict begin? How long would it last? And what factors would be most important in determining its outcome? The Next Major War is an outstanding book that offers the deepest and most wide-ranging analysis to date of these questions, going far beyond the usual comparisons of weapons systems and operational concepts to explore the economic, political, and societal dimensions of a possible future clash between the Pacific superpowers.”
Aaron L. Friedberg,
Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University
“In The Next Major War, Ross Babbage, one of Australia’s foremost strategic thinkers, provides a timely, insightful, and much-needed net assessment of the threat posed by China to the Indo-Pacific liberal international order-and how to meet it. The insights derived from Babbage’s study of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical chessboard and military balance exemplifies Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil – the ability to see the interrelationships among all the major factors shaping the intensifying rivalry between China, and the United States and its allies. The Next Major War is a serious, important, and timely gem that is mandatory reading for all senior officials charged with deterring Chinese aggression and, should deterrence fail, defeating it.”
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.,
President and CEO, Solarium LLC; and Founder, former President, and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
“Ross Babbage has produced a timely and clear-eyed study of the multitude of challenges posed by a resurgent China across the Indo-Pacific. His examination of alliance weaknesses-and the opportunities available to the US, Japan, Australia, and others in this dynamic environment-is highly relevant to government, military, national security, and scholarly communities across the globe.”
Mick Ryan,
Major General, Australian Army (ret.)
“The Next Major War represents an appropriately sober appeal and is a sobering forewarning to the United States and its allies to take seriously the prospect of a major war with China. More than that, it is an urgent call to action to prepare for such an increasingly likely contingency. Babbage’s book will be of intense interest to soldiers and statesmen alike.”
Thomas G. Mahnken,
President and CEO, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments;
and Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS
“The Next Major War is an absolute wake-up call for the national security / foreign policy / political ‘ruling classes.’ There’s a lot more to taking on China than building a 500-ship US Navy and getting the military part right. Changed mindsets in all parts of society are required-this includes leadership in the business world. This book lays out the dangers and what’s required to counter them. It offers perspectives that aren’t readily found in existing literature on the China threat issue. The book synthesizes a wide range of existing information on the topic in a way not done before, including the author’s original earlier research on Chinese and Russian political warfare, which is impressive on its own. This presents a new approach to analyzing and understanding the China threat, which is heavily covered by analysts and pundits, so producing a new or novel approach that stands out is no small feat. A strength of the book is its clarity; some of the topics-financial and economic, for example-can be hard to understand, yet these parts are clearly presented, which is also not easy to accomplish. The various conflict scenarios are easily laid out and flow well-another task that is not easy. As such, this book is a helpful tool for recognizing and understanding the range of issues and influences involved in national security matters-as well as the need for a broad perspective when assessing such topics.”
Grant Newsham,
Colonel, US Marines (ret.) and former executive director, Morgan Stanley Japan
* Dr. Ross Babbage is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington and Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum in Australia. He served as an Australian government official for 16 years, he led the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and he was a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London for a maximum six year term.
[1] Further details about the book and purchasing options can be found at:
The Next Major War: Can the US and its Allies Win Against China? By Ross Babbage (cambriapress.com)