George VOSKOPOULOS, PhD*
Abstract. Greek – Turkish relations have been characterized by ups and downs under the impact of overlapping variables related, among other things, to national priorities, foreign policy priorities, cognitive perceptions of alliance theory and the character of the two states. This very character is formulated, among other things, from the way respective political systems have defined national interests. It is also affected by they way they perceive their international role and the way this has produced conflictual – cooperative interactions on bilateral and regional levels. Their choices refer to global order challenges in a fluid period of transition that questions polarity and world order. The Ukraine crisis has constituted a challenge to both countries in terms of foreign policy choices, envisaged opportunities and the way they perceive relative and absolute gains. The approach bears elements of a comparative foreign policy framework and covert or overt alliance theory tenets.
Keywords: Ukraine crisis, Greece, Turkey, NATO, European security, foreign policy, Truman doctrine
NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
Greece and Turkey define a “geo” space in the security architecture built in the post-Second War order, one that has been characterized by fluctuations in terms of stability. In effect, they constitute a compact security environment that cannot be seen as two separate factors. Practically, in terms of geopolitics, the two states define an undivided security space of NATO’s south European flank. This despite the difficult symbiosis of the two in an alliance organizational structure that has diachronically been unable or unwilling to evaluate their policies on the basis of aggressiveness and irredentist claims. NATO membership for Greece was part of its overall strategic orientation despite the fact that the Alliance has not covered Greek security priorities stemming from Turkish militaristic bravado.
Historically the Truman Doctrine left no cognitive, strategic or operational space for parcelizing a vital for the West space. Eventually, this has dictated the policy of both the EU and the USA vis-à-vis bilateral issues and the way they perceived solutions accommodating a status quo and a revisionist state. Over time these issues have become thorny and affected the two countries’ relations with the EU and NATO. Turkey’s choices have affected its relations with the West, while Greece built its policy on constructing a reliability asset towards the EU and the USA, aiming at producing particular desired outcomes. Ankara’s choices reflected priorities set by T. Erdogan’s belief that Washington has been undermining its rule and setting hurdles to its geopolitical, Neo-ottoman ambitions. These dreams operated as a uniting force in Turkey and reflected the priorities of the whole political spectrum. By contrast in Greece the policy of PM C. Mitsotakis perceived alternative views of serving national interests that would advance the interests of a middle power state.
FROM CRIMEA TO TODAY’S CRISIS:
WORLD ORDER AND VISIONS OF ENGAGEMENT
Ukraine – Russia relations have been a challenge in terms of world order, in-ternational law and the way revisionist dreams are externalized during a transitional period under particular circumstances and challenges. These periods are by default unstable and constitute challenges for states operating under the impact of interde-pendence. Choices are formulated, inter allia, on the basis of relative and absolute gains and the way these are cognitively perceived or misperceived by leaders.
The Crimea war and its annexation by Russia became an issue of defending territorial integrity and cementing statehood vis-à-vis revisionist states. This is just one aspect of international security and reflects the conventional approaches to war and conflict approaches. By default the very fact was related to Greek and Turkish foreign policy priorities and the way they have been externalized. These reflected what has been defined as the “character” of these nominal allies in NATO and the way the USA as a leading NATO member has affected the intensity and structural phases of the conflict. Moreover, it set dilemmas in Washington as far as balanced policies towards Greece and Turkey are concerned.
Crimea’s secession opened the Pandora’s Box and cognitively reflected aspects of what has been termed “Balkanization”. The term used to describe systemic conditions of instability and immature anarchy dominated by zero-sum-games. Eventually in the past it led to major territorial changes, illustrating that a mixture of ultra nation-nalism and revisionism may become primary threats to systemic equilibrium under the impact of the lack of systemic stabilizers.
The invasion of Crimea was a blatant violation of territorial integrity of a sovereign country, yet, the past illustrated that, loopholes in international law, lack of mechanisms to apply it and its “a la carte” application, left space for “flexibility” and a precedent on which to build arguments in favour of selective application of international law. The invasion inaugurated a phase of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia and turned the area into an extended zone of instability. It was the prelude to a world order confrontation that caused spill-over effects in geopolitical crossroads and presented Greece and Turkey with dilemmas in terms of choices. Post-Crimea crisis between the West and Russia have been portrayed as a “Cold War”, although some of the basic features of this confrontation were missing. For a start there is no ideological divide present as the two “poles” do not represent alternatives to world order (economic view). It is a systemic and organizational antiparathesis of cosmotheo-ries, a conflict over world order and the way both have externalized these views.
CRIMEA AS A PRELUDE TO TURKEY AND GREECE’S POLICY DILEMMAS
In the current Ukraine crisis Greece and Turkey have found themselves in a crucial crossroads, since they make part of the overall Western strategic environment. Yet, they looked at the crisis under a differentiated spectrum. Greece supported Western policy, since revisionist behaviour on the part of Moscow referred directly to long-standing Turkish revisionism. This was a sine qua non in order to defend its territorial integrity, thus building its policy on international law, the very law that Russia broke in Crimea.
The 2014 Crimea war and its annexation by Russia constituted a blow to the territorial integrity of the Ukraine. A blatant violation of international law that should be taken at descriptive not prescriptive value and within a world order spectrum. Descriptive approaches are closer to the reality of international politics (power-based spectrum), while prescriptive approaches stem from or refer to normative thinking (international law and state behaviour).
In the case of Greece, the country formulated a policy in conformity with its post-1923 choice to defend territorial status as opposed to Turkey being a revisionist power. Proximity of both countries to flashpoints did not create a uniform set of ideas, as far as conflict resolution was concerned. Eventually crises may provide fertile ground for revisionism to flourish. Having experienced the side-effects of the Balkan crisis, Greece adopted a policy bearing wisdom stemming from the pedagogical and historical paradigm of the past. Greek policy vis-à-vis Crimea was externalizing the character of Greek foreign policy and at the same time it coincided with the policy of its European partners and NATO allies. Yet, at the same time it gradually alienated the country from Russia, a target dictated by supporting Western choices and its unconditional support of the US.
In a 2014 commentary I had suggested that a “prolonged conflict between the West and Moscow could affect Greece-Russian relations and set dilemmas as far as its relations with Russia are concerned. These pressures might stem on a tandem EU and NATO level and the commitments of the country to the EU and NATO. These are not negotiable, unless the country chooses to isolate itself. Under the circumstances the Greek government cannot preserve a balanced framework of relations with Russia. This is a realistic choice based on the need to balance security priorities and commitments to partners and allies. Having in mind that Turkey is a revisionist power challenging Greek territorial sovereignty no other choice is viable. Greece cannot endorse policies that violate international law”.
The above may epitomize Greek policy vis-à-vis the Ukraine crisis and its support for territorial integrity irrespective of the motives of the attacker. Still, groupthink logic and American pivotal deterrence did not allow the country to externalize any reaction to the problems Greek minority in Ukraine has faced under V. Zelensky’s rule. Oddly enough western policy ignored this violation of human rights and con-sidered it a “domestic” issue, a choice that set questions over the normative character of EU policies.
GREECE AND TURKEY FACING FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES
IN THE UKRAINE CRISIS
Turkish foreign policy was heavily affected by the 2016 coup against T. Erdogan. Slowly but steadily Ankara made choices that were blatantly out of tune with its allies and literally exposed the strategic and operational ambiguity of a NATO member siding with the first security priority to NATO. T. Erdogan’s positions and political choices vis-à-vis Russia created a divide not only within NATO but also exposed a stark antiparathesis of strategic views between the two NATO allies.
In the post-Crimea war period T. Erdogan’s policies have questioned the validity, balance of power logic and organizational order of the post-Second World War order. His strategic choices concerning alliances have questioned in essence the Truman Doctrine and the unity of NATO, while focusing on the vision of “great power” Turkey. The intensity of his policy of strategically approaching Moscow set dilemmas to the EU, the US, NATO as a defence alliance as well as its neighbors. Within a few years T. Erdogan managed to substantially distance the country from the basis of its geo-strategic milieu. Actually, the positions of the two countries towards the Ukraine conflict illustrated the divergent priorities of the two, as well as the way they attempted to materialize national strategies. Ankara externalized choices that questioned its validity as a NATO ally, while Greece adopted policies under the impact of American pivotal deterrence and group-thinking logic. The latter eventually forced Greece to silence objections in many policy issues to avoid isolation in the EU and NATO.
Ankara’s choices under T. Erdogan should be scrutinized under multiple over-lapping axes and fundamental elements of the logic of perceptions and misperceptions in international relations as set by Robert Jervis and his cognitive divide. This may provide the core of an “explaining” and “understanding” basis to decode Turkish President’s policy. In its seminal approach Robert Jervis focused on two major issues. The first relates to the environment a leader operates (“operational milieu”) and the second on the “psychological milieu”. Following this cognitive evaluation, Turkish President made a crucial evaluative judgement. He underestimated the “geo”-factor of his choices and more particularly geography and the way it has historically affected the overall balance of power in the region. In effect the security and balance of interest equation was overthrown, since Turkish policy threatened a pivotal balancing parameter of the post-Second World War order. Actually, a number of strategic, cognitive and operational elements of the loss of this balance has led to the inability of out of system actors (intruding actors) to stabilize the Middle East. The psychological milieu points to the cognitive elements that led T. Erdogan to the formulation of evaluative judgments or misjudgments concerning the role and future of Turkey in the emerging world order.
Support for Russia was a major deviation from long-term Turkish strategy, reflecting Western priorities. In essence, these choices have questioned in essence, the Truman Doctrine that meant to keep Greece and Turkey within the Western alliance. It was a major divergence from the established alliances of the country and its positioning as one of the two pillars in NATO’s south-eastern flank (the other being Greece). Under the IR spectrum of change and continuity Ankara and Athens chose different sides in a way that did not directly stem from their bilateral confrontation, yet, it was part of their policy to affect choices by other poles of power such as the EU and the USA.
History, politics, geography and expectations have determined Turkey’s stance as part of the Western alliance. Under this critical evaluation any attempt to derail this course set major world order challenges threatening an order that meant to accom-modate multiple overlapping security sub-systems such as south-east Europe (the Balkans), the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. Continuity meant to provide stability and setting red lines as well as rules of engagement. By contrast change was viewed as an “interference” and a challenge to the Truman Doctrine, a landmark of Turkey’s (and Greece’s) strategic positioning. The Doctrine aimed at securing vital strategic space against Communist expansion.
Gradually T. Erdogan’s policies constituted a potential threat to this fragile security environment and facilitated Russia’s intruding policies. In effect these choices rammed NATO’s most vulnerable zone, south-east European flank, one that links inter-connected security sub-systems. His support for Russia has become a threat to a long-established order that defined policies, opportunities, and limitations to expan-sion, as well as the ability to provide a working modus operandi in a region where geopolitics have historically and operationally defined what is acceptable by intruding great powers. Turkish policy has been out of tune with its allies and exposed the strategic and operational ambiguity of a NATO member making odd choices (i.e., the acquisition of Russian defense systems).
Erdogan’s revised policy towards Russia constitutes new (“revisionist”) input in a complex geographical region where systemic and sub-systemic elements overlap in a non-conforming way. For the overlapping systems to be eufunctional, a number of defining parameters need to be accepted and Turkey’s strategic positioning within the Western sphere is one of them. This explains the desire of the US and the EU not to critically isolate Turkey and fully support Greece in its quest to defend its territorial status.
If geography and vicinity defines security, then it also defines alternatives (expansion, policy limitations), based on critical choices made in the past. “Looking at the map is enough to see Turkey’s importance” suggested NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. This eventually depicts the challenges set by Erdogan’s choices and the way it upsets the balance of power and balance of interests in the region. These policy choices set challenges to Turkey’s strategic environment, while the country facilitated terrorist groups and their networks of financing.
GEOPOLITICS AND WORLD ORDER AS AN OPPORTUNITY AND A TRAP
The Ukraine – Russia conflict brought to the surface the long-standing issues of polarity and world order as well as crucial choices over balance of power / interests in the international system. Under this complex spectrum, the Ukraine crisis should be scrutinized against two parallel yet inter-connected axes. The first refers to NATO expansion, the way Russia has long viewed it and the policies of two NATO members, namely Greece and Turkey. The interplay of these security and national policy layers refer to global world order and European security. At the same time they refer to Russian foreign policy choices and the revisionist way it has been externalized. The “geo” dimension (space) stems, inter allia, from proximity issues and Ukraine’s near abroad, as well as the interplay of out of the system incompatible security interests that clash in a way that produces zero-sum games. The contending input into this security sub-system turns into destabilizing output.
Greece and Turkey adopted divergent policies in a geopolitical conflict in which players involved have adopted choices falling within a twin pillar of defensive / offensive Realism spectrum and the creation of spheres of influence. History and hindsight will illustrate the reasons of the adoption of a risky policy (NATO’s ex-pansion) with no obvious urgency factor. This led to a direct confrontation with a cognitively revisionist power and Russia’s [mis]perception of vital space. The reality of world politics illustrates the importance of power and aspects that define state behaviour.
At the same Greece and Turkey formed different visions of foreign policy objectives in areas that fall within the international security agenda and international law, reflecting contending views of world order and the means to be used to mate-rialize them. This includes the case of potential nuclear capabilities and the way it has been perceived by revisionist and status quo powers.
Greece and Turkey have adopted non-conforming policies in the post-Cold War era based on choices and their cognitive relation to the desired outcomes they wished to produce. These reflected their stance on the emergence of a multipolar international system presenting opportunities and risks. Their ability to advance national interests is related to defining parameters such as power, geography, proximity, strategic vision and the way they are able to set their value-added strategic importance within a wider strategic context during the current transition era. On its part, the USA has adopted a neutral stance in the Greek – Turkish conflict trying to balance strategic priorities (keeping Turkey in the west camp) through carefully articulated statements and communiques. Moving from the original ambiguity Washington balanced demands of the two NATO members in a way that does cause further rift within the alliance.
Greek policy choices were restrained by default by its being an EU member, a fact that differentiates it structurally from Turkey. At the same time the prospect of Ankara setting a special relationship with the EU and its role in NATO allowed ample space for “flexibility” when it came to evaluate its foreign policy choices. This at the expense of Greek security priorities and the choice made by the EU and the US to keep an equal distance policy, despite the challenges set to NATO by Turkish policy.
As pointed out “ever since 1952 when Greece joined NATO, Greek leadership has explicitly made clear where the country belongs (the West). This has never been questioned in terms of strategic orientation. Yet, allies in NATO could not carry the burden of actual Greek regional security issues, namely the Greek-Turkish issues. The Alliance is not an intra-alliance member conflict resolution mechanism. The U.S. has been a strategic ally able to interfere and operate as a facilitator and at times was able to use its persuasive credibility. Athens has always had great expectations from a strategic partnership in which the political system has invested a lot. In Athens there is a sense of not getting enough support from the U.S. vis-à-vis Turkey. Washington is trying to balance relations with two major allies and this causes choice dilemmas, never experienced in the past. Yet, the current situation was created by T. Erdogan’s choice to question the post Second World War order. In effect he questions the very essence of the Truman doctrine. His alliance with Moscow goes beyond historical precedent and rams the security edifice of the Alliance”.
The geopolitical importance of the Ukraine crisis overlooked side-effect of foreign policy choices made by Ankara and Athens. These refer, inter allia, to policy choices and an aggressive bravado on the part of Turkey articulating direct threats to the West. At the same time issues emerged with Turkish views towards nuclear capabilities, a fact that cannot be separated from its policy to support Russia. The West’s tolerance stems from Turkish geopolitical importance in the overall western security architecture.
For Greece, the Ukraine crisis has been more a challenge rather than an opportunity, since it practically eliminated his diplomatic relations with Russia. Under this spectrum, Greek persuasive credibility towards Moscow reached the lowest level ever in Greek-Russian relations. By contrast, for Turkey, it has been a “window” to a new era of materializing mega-dreams related to the past. This under the nominal aim of turning the country into a reliable mediator, a policy ontologically questioned through the pursue of contending goals. Both countries have had to face the limited accommodating capacity of a security sub-system where geopolitics and geopolitical semantics provide a battling ground for numerous systemic and out of system actors. While Greece turned into a reliable to the US and the EU ally and partner, Turkish policy has caused a confidence crisis between Ankara, Brussels and Washington.
* Associate Professor of European Studies f. Head of the Department of International and European Studies University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
 For a historical overview of the Truman Doctrine see D.J.K. “Greece, Turkey, and N.A.T.O.” The World Today, vol. 8, no. 4, 1952, pp. 162-169.
 For the post-Cold War era see George Voskopoulos, “Turkey and the Balkan Subordinate Security System: From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Era” in Muhidin Mulacic, Hasan Korkut, Elif Nuroflu (eds), Turkish – Balkans Relations, The Future Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations- Relations, Istanbul, Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, 2013.
 See Öni̇ş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz. “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 123, no. 1, 2008, pp. 123-149.
 See CSIA European Security Working Group, “Instability and Change on NATO’s Southern Flank.” International Security, vol. 3, no. 3, 1978, pp. 150-177.
 Turkish policy has changed over time. In the past “Turkey insisted that the balance between the two countries established by the Treaty of Lausanne should be maintained”. See Mango, Andrew. “Greece and Turkey: Unfriendly Allies.” The World Today, vol. 43, no. 8/9, 1987, pp. 144-147.
 See Danopoulos, Constantine P, “Regional Security Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship” Journal of Political & Military Sociology, vol. 16, no. 2, 1988, pp. 263-277.
 See Kernell, Samuel. “The Truman Doctrine Speech: A Case Study of the Dynamics of Presidential Opinion Leadership.” Social Science History, vol. 1, no. 1, 1976, pp. 20-44.
 See “Bilateral Problems in Turkish-Greek Relations and their Effects on the Relations Between Turkey and the European Union”, PhD Thesis, T.C. Marmara Ünιversιtesι.
 For the nominal aim of striking a balance between Russia and Ukraine see “Turkey Is NATO’s Pivot Point Over Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, 29/11/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/29/turkey-russia-ukraine-erdogan-putin-nato-geopolitical-wild-card/. Yet, this policy was built more on a communication need rather than the real aim of a balanced relationship with two, since T. Erdogan’s facilitating policy towards Russia outbalanced what he offered to Ukraine.
 In the last years, these focused, inter allia, on preventing Turkey from acquiring military equipment form the USA and Germany, since threats of war have been repeatedly articulated. See indicatively, “Greece slams Turkey’s ‘repeated threats of war”, Associated Press, 7/12/2022, https://apnews. com/article/europe-middle-east-greece-turkey-international-law-a4634220eae735ab8452a6cfe2 3af868/ “Greece to allies: Crack down on Turkey or risk another Ukraine”, Politico, 7/9/2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-turkey-eu-crack-down-or-risk-another-ukraine-russia-war/
 That includes threats to Greece. See “Erdoğan renews threats against Greece amid tensions over Aegean islands and migration”, Ahval News, 5/10/2022, https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-greece/
 See Gonul Tol, “Turkey’s Next Military Coup”, Foreign Affairs, May 30, 2016.
 See George Voskopoulos-Engage Interview Part 1 / Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Paris, France, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367190819_European_Security-Engage_Interview_Part_1-INSTITUT_DE_RELATIONS_INTERNATIONALES_ET_STRATEGIQUES
 See James A. Mitchell, “Middle Power Statesmanship for the New Millennium: Greece in the 21st Century” in George Voskopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy from the 20th to the 21st Century, Papazisis publishers, Athens, 2005. https://gvoskop.wordpress.com/2018/02/16/jam
 See Wadephul, Johann David. “The War against Ukraine and the World Order.” Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 21, 2022, pp. 106-115.
 See George Voskopoulos, “Geo-political, Geo-economic and Geo-cultural Elements of post-Kemalist Turkish Activism”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350580651_Geo-political_Geo-economic _and_Geo-cultural_Elements_of_post-Kemalist_Turkish_Activism
 See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in World Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976.
 For some useful comments on the strategic importance of Ukraine see “Ukraine and the battle for Eurasia”, Asia Times, 26/4/2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/ukraine-and-the-battle-for-eurasia/
 For an analysis that links the Crimea annexation and the Donbass issue see Anna Arutunyan, Hybrid Warriors: Proxies, Freelancers and Moscow’s Struggle for Ukraine, C Hurst & Co Publishers, 2022.
 For a systemic and EU institutional approach see George Voskopoulos, “The Geographical and Systemic Influences on Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans”, Perspectives, Institute of International Relations, no. 26, 2006, pp. 69-90, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616159
 See Krebs, Ronald R. “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict”, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, pp. 343-377.
 See “Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece & Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974-76”, Cold War History Journal, Volume 9, 2009, Issue 3, pp.367-387.
 For an analysis of the term as opposed to Europeanization see Naumovski, Vasko, “Europeanization of the Balkans, or Balkanization of Europe?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 20, 2019, pp. 120-125.
 For an approach outside the traditional Political Realism spectrum see Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.
 These affected choices and alternatives in Greek foreign policy. See George Voskopoulos, “The Geographical and Systemic Influences on Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans in the 1990s.”, op. cit.
 Greek and Turkish strategic choices differentiated vis-à-vis the crisis and reflected their view on regional order and the way they envisaged opportunities and risks stemming from the crisis. See George Voskopoulos, “Greece, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Union: Inter-action Within and Between a Zone of Peace & a Zone of Turmoil as an Explanatory Factor”, PhD, Exeter University, Centre for European Studies, 2001.
 For an in-depth analysis of the conditions see George Voskopoulos, “Greek-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-cold War Era: Contributing to Stability and Development in Southeastern Europe”, Mediterranean Quarterly (2008) 19 (4): 68-80, Duke University, https://doi.org/10.1215/104745 52-2008-025
 The dissolution of Yugoslavia became a challenge to the West. The eventual choice was to support self-determination at the expense of status quo. Yet, the lack of an orchestrated plan and the un-willingness of the actors involved to find a solution in a peaceful way led to warring conflict. Core actors of the Balkan subordinate system proved unable to compromise under the impact, inter allia, of the destabilizing interference of regional and out of system, intruding actors and their respective strategic priorities. For some, this was plain idealism, while others referred to the imperialism of human rights (i.e. Hobsbawm). Yet, the Kossovo issue and the process of its secession from Serbia meant to be an “asset” in the hands of Moscow that claimed violation of international law in order to evade the issue of its recognition as an independent state. This process took place outside the usual operating mode of the UN Security Council, a fact that meant to be used by Russia in the 2008 Georgian crisis and at a later stage the Crimea invasion.
 See Valur Ingimundarson, “The ‘Kosovo Precedent’: Russia’s justification of military interventions and territorial revisions in Georgia and Ukraine”, LSE Strategic Update, July 2022.
 See Elizabeth Salmon / Pablo Rozales: Russia and the Annexation of Crimea or the Crisis of the Post Cold War” (Rusia y la anexión de Crimea o la crisis de la post Guerra Fría), 73 Derecho PUCP 185 (2014).
 See George Voskopoulos, “Turkey and the Balkan Subordinate Security System: From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Era” in Mulacic, Korkut, Nuroflu (eds), Turkish-Balkans Relations, The Future Prospects of Cultural, Political & Economic Transformations- Relations, Istanbul, Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, 2013.
 For some critical questions see Nehring, Holger, “What Was the Cold War?” The English Historical Review, vol. 127, no. 527, 2012, pp. 920-949.
 See Cyprus: Statement of the Spokesperson on the observer status for Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity in Organization of Turkic States. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokes person-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity-organisation_en
 See “The Blue Homeland is uniting the Turkish youth”. In the analysis it is pinpointed that “the Blue Homeland, which is vital for our today and our future, must always be held above internal politics”, 9/1/2020, https://uwidata.com/13624-the-blue-homeland-is-uniting-the-turkish-youth/
 See Khrushcheva, Nina. “Putin v. Purse Power: Confronting International Laws, Russian Style.” Social Research, vol. 82, no. 4, 2015, pp. 967-981.
 See George Voskopoulos, “Conceptualization of Turkish Neo-Ottomanism: organizational, operational and strategic aspects of a neo-revisionist strategy”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/34 3240542_Conceptualization_of_Turkish_Neo-Ottomanism_organizational_operational_and_strategic _aspects_of_a_neo-revisionist_strategy
 See “Greece external relations briefing: Diplomatic choices of Greece under the new geopolitical situation”, Weekly Briefing, Vol. 55. No. 4 (GR) October 2022, https://china-cee.eu/2022/11/03/ greece-external-relations-briefing-diplomatic-choices-of-greece-under-the-new-geopolitical-situation/
 This policy choice became an issue of Greek public opinion and a source of criticism. See “Greece tossed aside years of caution in Ukraine – and upset Greeks”, Politico, 23/3/2022, https://www. politico.eu/article/ukraine-greece-year-caution-weapon-invasion-military/
 See (indicatively) “Ukrainian Parliament ban on the use of Greek and Russian by ethnic Greeks”, 11.12.2014, Question for written answer E-010539-14 to the Commission, Rule 130, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-010539_EN.html
 See Doug Bandow, “Why Is Turkey Still in NATO?” CATO Institute, 14-7-2022.
 As pointed out “favorable sentiment toward the U.S. ran at just 20 percent in 2019. Over the last two decades, that number has fallen as low as 9 percent. Last year, six of ten Turks named the U.S. as the greatest threat to Turkey, thrice the number who pointed to Russia”. See Doug Bandow, Why Is Turkey Still in NATO? CATO Institute, 14/7/2022.
 This at a time crucial for NATO’s unity and the challenges set to the EU and the alliance. See Voskopoulos, G. (2021), Transatlantic Relations at a Time of Uncertainty: The Formation of Transatlantic Axis. In: Voskopoulos, G. (eds) European Union Security and Defence. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48893-2_12
 This despite the many domestic issues he had to tackle. See David Heidelberger, MacDara King, Lisel Hintz, Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey: A Partner in Crisis”, Policy Watch 2930, The Washington Institute, 13/2/2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkey-partner-crisis
 A question that needs to be answered is whether Turkish policy towards Russia constitutes a case of bandwagoning for profit. On the concept see Schweller, Randall L. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 72-107.
 For the concept and a case study that refer to Greece-Turkey relations see Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, Cornell University Press, 2003.
 See Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.
 Both of them have been scrutinized in George Voskopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, from the 20th to the 21st Century, Papazisis publishers, Athens, 2005.
 See “Turkey’s Expansionist Military Policies in the Middle East”, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 24/1/2028, https://jcpa.org/article/turkeys-expansionist-military-policies-in-the-middle-east/
 For a number of issues related to world order see Chomsky, Noam. “World Order and Its Rules: Variations on Some Themes.” Journal of Law and Society, vol. 20, no. 2, 1993, pp. 145-165.
 The same applies to Turkey cooperating with radical groups in the Middle East and its relations with ISIS. See “Why is Turkey backing of a former al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria?” Ahval News, 28/10/2022
https://ahvalnews.com/hts/why-turkey-backing-former-al-qaeda-affiliate-syria-analyst Also, “An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-linked Foreigners in Türkiye”, International Crisis Group, 28/2/2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/267-enduring-challenge-isis-linked-foreigners/ Treasury Report Highlights Turkey as Islamic State’s Logistical Hub, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2/2/2021, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/ 2021/02/02/treasury-report-turkey-islamic-state-hub// The journalist Can Dündar and Turkish support for ISIS, Question for written answer E-009186-15 to the Commission, Rule 130, 4/6/2015, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-009186_EN.html / Turkey still a major hub for ISIS militants, IG report says, 5/8/2020, https://www. stripes. com/theaters/europe/turkey-still-a-major-hub-for-isis-militants-ig-report-says-1.640095. As pointed out “Turkey continues to be a regional transit hub for the Islamic State group, even though the NATO ally has recently stepped up efforts to counter attempts to smuggle ISIS fighters and weaponry into war-torn Syria, a new Inspector General’s report says”.
 See Satterthwaite, Joseph C. “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 401, 1972, pp. 74-84.
 See Merrill, Dennis. “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, 2006, pp. 27-37.
 For timely arguments on regional location and the “topography of the regions” see Spykman, Nicholas J. “Geography and Foreign Policy, II.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 32, no. 2, 1938, pp. 213-236.
 To this one should add the inability or unwillingness of the Turkish government to control operations for weapon procurement. See Justice Department Announces Charges and Sentence in Connection with Iranian Procurement Network’s Attempts to Acquire Sophisticated Military Technology, 22/3/2023, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-and-sentence-connection-iranian-procurement-network-s. As pointed out “according to the indictment, between 2012 and 2013, defendants Amanallah Paidar, of Iran, and Murat Bükey, of Turkey, conspired to procure and export U.S. technology for Iran through their companies Farazan Industrial Engineering, in Iran, and Ozon Spor Ve Hobbi Ürünleri, in Turkey. Specifically, Paidar and Bükey exported from the United States and transshipped through Turkey a device that can test the efficacy and power of fuel cells and attempted to obtain a bio-detection system that has application in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) research and use”.
 See Hamas ‘ Istanbul Headquarters Has Directed Hundreds of Terror Attacks Against Israelis and Laundered Millions of Dollars, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 30/12/2021, https://jcpa.org/ article/hamas-istanbul-headquarters-has-directed-hundreds-of-terror-attacks-against-israelis-and-laundered-millions-of-dollars/
 On multilateralism and global order (structure, roles et al), issues at the core of the current debate and a suggested taxonomy of principal components see Cox, Robert W. “Multilateralism and World Order.” Review of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp. 161-180. The analysis may give an insight of today’s features and challenges.
 Some useful arguments in Francis J. Gavin, Asking the Right Questions about the Past and Future of World Order, 20/1/2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/asking-the-right-questions-about-the-past-and-future-of-world-order/
 See “Balance of power and strategic interests in the Ukraine crisis”, Geopolitica, 8/7/2014, https:// www.geopolitica.info/balance-of-power-and-strategic-interests-in-the-ukraine-crisis/. However, in today’s crisis we need to pinpoint strategic choices on all sides that had undesired triggering effects.
 On the political, strategic, economic and historical elements of the Ukraine – Russia crisis and the way they affect Moscow’s relations to the West see Wolff, Andrew T. “The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis.” International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 5, 2015, pp. 1103-1121.
 For an analysis of the balance of threat theoretical framework (St. Walt) and Russian attitudes see Bock, Andreas M., et al. “‘If You Compress the Spring, It Will Snap Back Hard’: The Ukrainian Crisis and the Balance of Threat Theory.” International Journal, vol. 70, no. 1, 2015, pp. 101-109.
 See European Defence and Security: the case of Ukraine, MA Dissertation, UoM (in Greek), https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/handle/2159/18791
 See George Voskopoulos, “Russian foreign policy in the new millennium: Balancing between defensive and offensive realism”, The ICFAI University Journal of International Relations, 2009.
 For a projection of the challenges set see Etzioni, Amitai, “Spheres of Influence: A Reconceptualization.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2, 2015, pp. 117-132.
 For a historical approach see The CFR Symposium on NATO at 60, Session II: NATO, Russia and Eastern Europe, 26-2-2009.
 In the post-Cold War era Ukraine’s participation in the Euro-Atlantic axis has been the main divide among Russia, the EU and the USA. On a basic evaluation framework, the motives behind this strategic choice were military and security-related. See George Voskopoulos, “NATO Enlargement and Security in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Regime”, Odessa National University, Centre for International Studies, https://www.academia.edu/42357738/ NATO_Enlargement _and_Security_in_Central_and_Eastern_Europe_Towards_a_Pan_European_Security_Regime
 For a background analysis of the past that by default brings to the surface certain issues of the current crisis see Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “Revisionism in Soviet History.” History and Theory, vol. 46, no. 4, 2007, pp. 77-91.
 Opportunities for a modus vivendi were presented in the past but were missed. See George Vosko-poulos, U.S., Terrorism, International Security and Leadership: Toward a U.S.-EU-Russia Security Partnership, Demokratizatsiya, The George Washington University, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs USA, 2003.
 On the distinction between instrumental and elemental power, as well as their importance in forming and successfully advancing images of world order within a strategic partnership and their respective persuasive credibility see George Voskopoulos, “Transatlantic Relations, Alliance Theory and the Limits of Soft Power: A Realist Perspective”, The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. V, No. 3.
 The issue has been approached in many theoretical ways that form contending axes. For an approach see Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the Behavior of States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973. An overall approach was presented in depth in (in Greek) George Voskopoulos, Greek Foreign Policy, from the 20th to the 21st Century, Papazisis publishers, Athens, 2005.
 For the Turkish vision see Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions”, CFR, 24/8/2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/turkeys-growing-foreign-policy-ambitions
 See “Erdoğan warns Greece that Turkish missiles can reach Athens”, Politico, 11/12/2022, “Now we have started to make our own missiles. Of course, this production scares the Greeks. When you say ‘Tayfun,’ the Greek gets scared and say, ‘It will hit Athens.’ Well, of course it will” T. Erdogan, Samsun speech, https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-warns-greece-that-turkish-missiles-can-reach-athens%EF%BF%BC/
 For a historical approach see George Voskopoulos, “Grand Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: A Historical and Political Perspective under the Concepts of Arms Control and Disarmament”, Revista GeoPolitica, 01/2013; XI(51).
 See “Erdogan says it’s unacceptable that Turkey can’t have nuclear weapons”, Reuters, 4/9/2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-nuclear-erdogan-idUSKCN1VP2QN. Also, “Turkey Shows Nuclear Weapons Interest”, Arms Control Association, 10/2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/ act/2019-10/news/turkey-shows-nuclear-weapons-interest. T. Erdogan’s actual statement was: “Several countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us that] we can’t have them. This I cannot accept,” Erdogan said on the centennial of the Turkish independence movement. “There is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”.
 On multipolarity see George Voskopoulos, “Russia, the US and the emergence of a multipolar international system”, Proceedings, vol. 47, Book 6, Bulgaria, 2008. On the challenges it sets see (one of the original evaluations) Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory A. Raymond. “Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 36, no. 3, 1992, pp. 573-585. Also, Posen, Barry R. “Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care?” Current History, vol. 108, no. 721, 2009, pp. 347-352.
 Under a descriptive, not prescriptive or normative, Political Realism context power is to be understood “as anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man …from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another”. See Kunz, Barbara. “Hans J. Morgenthau’s Political Realism, Max Weber, and the Concept of Power.” Max Weber Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 2010, pp. 189-208.
 As plausibly suggested “in 2020, the United States has adopted a much lower profile and is operating without a clear sense of direction. This applies both to the Greek-Turkish nexus and to the broader multifaceted crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, which involves numerous local and external players”. See “Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?” Carnegie Europe, 3/9/2020, https://carnegie europe.eu/strategiceurope/82643
 See George Voskopoulos, “Defining Factors in EU-Russian Relations, Proceedings, vol. 47, Book 6, Bulgaria, 2008.
 As I have pinpointed “the original primary aim of Greece to join the (then) EEC was related to security issues. This overlaid the fact that the country was not competitive enough to join a club of industrially advanced states. As a result, Greece supported all endeavors of “federal” orientation (i.e. a European Army, CFSP, ESDP). For organizational and constitutional reasons (a Treaty-based Union) these aims were materialized in a way that did not resolve complex Greek security dilemmas and Greece is the only EU country still facing a military threat, not perceived but actual. Under this spectrum, Greek foreign policy has invested on trilateral or multilateral cooperation (i.e. Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, UAE, U.S.) to cover this need and the organizational and operational realities of CFSP, ESDP”. See George Voskopoulos interview, European Student Think Tank, “The Future of Greek Foreign Policy”, January 2021. Interview conducted by Ema Odra Raščan.
 This despite criticism concerning choices that have become major hurdles to NATO’s strategy. See “Why Is Turkey Still in NATO?” (“NATO needs to have a serious conversation about what to do when a member can no longer be trusted”), CATO Institute, 14/7/2022, https://www.cato.org/ commentary/why-turkey-still-nato#
 See “The EU’s ‘tolerance’ and ‘double standards’ with Turkey embolden Erdoğan, claims Cyprus President”, Euronews, 11/10/2022, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/11/the-eus-tolerance-and-double-standards-with-turkey-embolden-erdogan-claims-cyprus-presiden
 See “Some Urgent Questions About Turkey” Τhe ΝΥΤ, 13/10/2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/10/13/opinion/turkey-erdogan-nuclear-weapons.html?ref=oembed
 See George Voskopoulos interview, European Student Think Tank, op. cit.
 See Graham, Thomas, et al, “Ukraine Between Russia and the West: Buffer or Flashpoint?” World Policy Journal, vol. 34, no. 1, 2017, pp. 107-118.
 See Delwaide, Jacobus. “Identity and Geopolitics: Ukraine’s Grappling with Imperial Legacies.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 32/33, 2011, pp. 179-207.
 Greek PM C. Mitsotakis often made reference to long-standing Greek policy and its positive spill-over in regional and global affairs. See indicatively: This is Europe – Debate with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis (debate), European Parliament, 5/7/2022, https://www.europarl.europa. eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-07-05-ITM-004_EN.html
 Similar policies were adopted in the domestic level, particularly towards the judiciary and academia. On “methodological militarism” and insights of militarism in academic knowledge see Ayşe Gül Altınay, “Undoing Academic Cultures of Militarism Turkey and Beyond”, Current Anthropology, Volume 60, Number S19, February 2019, Cultures of Militarism.
 See “Turkey’s Erdogan warns Europeans ‘will not walk safely on the streets’ if diplomatic row continues”. T. Erdogan stated that “Europeans across the world will not be able to walk the streets safely if they keep up their current attitude towards Turkey”, The Independent, 22/3/2017, https:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-germany-netherlands-warning-europeans-not-walk-safely-a7642941.html
 See “Turkey’s nuclear onset – Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends & Defence Industrial Capabilities”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik / German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 29/10/2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C38/
 See Calis, Saban. “Turkey in the International System of Western States.” Pakistan Horizon, vol. 50, no. 3, 1997, pp. 75-100. Also, Sinan Ülgen, The Evolving EU, NATO, and Turkey Relationship, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12097.11
 Still Greece supported Ukraine with military equipment. See “Zelensky: Ukraine receives first batch of armored vehicles from Greece”, The Kyiv Independent, 4/12/2022, https://kyivindependent. com/zelensky-ukraine-receives-first-batch-of-armored-vehicles-from-greece/
 See “Ukraine War Gives Turkey’s Erdogan Opportunity to Extend His Influence” (“Turkish leader playing pivotal role in Black Sea region as the conflict progresses”), The WSJ, 5/11/2022, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-gives-turkeys-erdogan-opportunity-to-extend-his-influence-11667640601
 See Yavuz, M. Hakan, ‘Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottomanism’, “Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism”, New York, 2020.
 As stated by Alper Coskun (former head of international security at the Turkish Foreign Ministry), “it’s seemingly imperfect, but perfect in terms of advancing Turkey’s own interests in the context of the balance it’s trying to strike between Russia and Ukraine”. On his part Maj. Gen. Volodymyr Havrylov, Ukraine’s deputy defense minister stated that “we understand the situation of Turkey to be a kind of intermediary between us and Russia”.
 See Yevgeniya Gaber, “One year into the war, it’s time for Turkey to reconsider its Ukraine-Russia balancing act”, Atlantic Council, March 1, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkey source/one-year-into-the-war-its-time-for-turkey-to-reconsider-its-ukraine-russia-balancing-act/. For the side-effects of this policy see Fighter jets, NATO, Congress and Ukraine: Complex issues roil U.S.-Turkey relations. LA Times, 20/1/2023, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-01-20/fighter-jets-nato-congress-and-the-war-in-ukraine-complex-issues-roil-u-s-turkey-relations
 See plausible arguments in “Turkey: Walking the Tightrope between NATO, Russia and Ukraine”, Institut Montaigne, 8/2/2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/turkey-walking-tightrope-between-nato-russia-and-ukraine
 See Mike Pompeo’s letter to PM Mitsotakis: Athens a key ally and crucial player in the Eastern Mediterranean, 21/1/2020, https://www.amna.gr/en/balkans/article/423951/Mike-Pompeos-letter-to-PM-Mitsotakis-Athens-a-key-ally-and-crucial-player-in-the-Eastern-Mediterranean
 See State Department: Greece an essential ally for the security of NATO’s southern wing, Kathimerini, 12/5/2022, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1184202/state-department-greece-an-essential-ally-for-the-security-of-natos-southern-wing/
 A «committed ally” according to the Greek PM C. Mitsotakis.
 See “The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead, 16/1/2018, School of Public Policy, Center for International Security Studies at University of Maryland, https://cissm.umd.edu/ research-impact/publications/natous-turkey-russia-strategic-triangle-challenges-ahead