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You are here: Home / TOPICS / CASE STUDIES / CHINA, PLAYING ITS GUARDIAN ROLE FOR NORTH KOREA

CHINA, PLAYING ITS GUARDIAN ROLE FOR NORTH KOREA

by https://www.geopolitic.ro/author/

Junsoo KIM, PhD

Although North Korea reached an all time high in its missile provocations last year, China abandoned its responsibility as a member of the Security Council and openly supported North Korea, voluntarily playing its guardian role.

Moreover, China, along with Russia, has aided and abetted North Korea’s provocations by rejecting the adoption of a new resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea and continued to neglect the loopholes in sanctions, escalating the security instability on the Korean Peninsula.

China is also ignoring the international community’s call for the use of its influence to persuade North Korea to return to the negotiation table for denucleari-zation, even though it is more than capable of implementing various means to deter the North.

Given its strategic competition with the United States, China’s irresponsible behavior stems from an outdated Cold War mentality and a misguided belief that a nuclear-armed North Korea is better than a collapsed North Korea.

North Korea, on the other hand, is relying on its inter-dependency with China to advance its nuclear weapons and missiles, and use China as a “security insurance” to shield itself against global sanctions.

NORTH KOREA’S LATEST MISSILE PROVOCATIONS

In 2022, North Korea launched more than forty SRBMㆍIRBMㆍSLMB and more, all time high number of provocations, and showing off its ability to strike South Korea and the mainland of the United States.

In particular, the level of provocations rose by firing the ICBM eight times, thoroughly destroying the moratorium declaration for the first time in four years.

It continued to fire missiles before and after major events such as South Korea’s mourning period for the Itaewon accident (Oct 30-Nov 5,2022), Beijing Winter Olympics (Feb 4-20, 2022), and China’s 20th Party Congress (Oct 16-22, 2022), showing inconsiderate attitude, like a rogue state, toward neighboring countries.

This year, it resumed provocations by launching a short range ballistic missile toward East Sea on the New Year’s day and fired ICBMs on February 18th and March 16th. It is expanding pressure on South Korea and the U.S. by announcing that it will ‘use the Pacific as a shooting range in the future’ (Kim Yo-jong, February 20, 2023).

CHINA’S ADVOCACY OF NORTH KOREA

  • Diplomacy: Unchanging traditional friendship and showing off socialist solidarity.

China re-recognizes North Korea’s value as a buffer zone amid intensifying competition with the U.S. It highlighted its special relationship with North Korea by sending diplomatic letters to Kim Jong Un. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un exchanged congratulatory messages and letters on special occasions such as the Day of the Foundation of DPRK in September, 2022.[1]

In particular, amid the prolonged COVID 19 crisis, the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party maintained strategic communication by leading high-level face-to-face[2] contact between the two countries using the North Korean embassy channel.

  • North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles: China voluntarily plays guardian role by blatantly covering up for North Korea’s provocations.

Last year, North Korea conducted the most missile provocations ever (about 40 times), but China strengthened its advocate role at the UN Security Council. Following China’s veto[3] on a new resolution to respond to North Korea’s ICBM launches (May, 2022), it also opposed the Chairman’s statement which carried less intensity against North Korea’s ICBM launches in November 2022 and February 2023.

Moreover, China mentioned the need for a change in South Korea and the U.S. attitude toward North Korea. It insisted on ‘suspending South Korea – U.S. military drills and relaxing sanctions against North Korea’, highlighting the possibility of stimulating North Korea to conduct additional nuclear tests.

  • Economy and Health: China, playing the role of ‘respirator’ under sanctions against North Korea and COVID 19 lockdown.

China maintains its status as North Korea’s largest trading partner and strategic donor by re-running cargo trains (January 2022). It condones a significant portion of the ‘loophole in sanctions against North Korea.’

China was the only country to provide quarantine supplies (May 2022) to North Korea right after the COVID 19 breakout. It provided 100,000 tons of rice to help it overcome the food shortage.

HOW CHINA AND RUSSIA REJECTED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS RESOLUTION ON NORTH KOREA (MAY, 2022)

Following North Korea’s successive ICBM launches, the UN Security Council pushed for a new sanctions resolution, as a response to the request of the United States, in May 2022, which calls for reducing the ceiling on crude oil and refined oil imports and banning the launch of nuclear-mounted vehicles such as cruise missiles.

However, the UN delegation to China and Russia, vetoed with the reasoning that “the new sanctions do not help solve the problem, but only cause negative effects and create tensions.”

This is the first case of a permanent member of the Security Council to veto a resolution to sanction against North Korea. China and Russia explained the reason for the veto at the UN General Assembly in June.[4]

Rather, China and Russia submitted a resolution to the Security Council on easing sanctions on North Korea in October, 2021. At every opportunity, they argued for easing sanctions on the area of the people’s livelihoods, using the pretext of enhancing mutual trust and creating an atmosphere for resuming dialogue.

THE LOOPHOLE OF CHINA’S SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

  • Export of refined oil to North Korea: China’s annual export of refined oil to North Korea is estimated to be well above the allowed level of 500,000 barrels.

The UN Security Council’s panel of experts on North Korea Sanctions said in an interim report released in October, 2022, that North Korea has already brought in about 458,898 barrels using 16 ships, which reaches up to 90% of the annual allowance, from January to April 2022.

China reported that it supplied 105,321 barrels between January and November, 2022, to the North Korean sanctions committee, but this is consistent with the total exports of non-fuel products such as lubricating oil and petroleum bitumen released by the Customs Service, so it is assumed that China did not include fuel oil in the report.

  • North Korean coal imports: China has consistently condoned North Korea’s smuggling of banned coal to its country through maritime transshipment and other methods to avoid international surveillance.

In November of 2022, South Korea’s Daily NK reported that “North Korea is accelerating coal production at coal mines in Suncheon and Bukchang district for emergency coal exports to China through Nampo Port.”

In June of 2022, Nikkei Shimbun of Japan revealed that “over the past year and a half, more than 50 North Korean ships have entered Chinese ports to transport coal including Longkou Port in Shandong Province.”

  • North Korean overseas workers: China stopped issuing work visas for North Koreans and partially expelled them when the residence period expired. However, since the COVID 19 lockdown, China has been ignoring their overtime stay as it became difficult for North Korean to go back to their home country.

In relations to this, the Daily NK reported that some Chinese factories and North Korean workers’ management agencies have already signed contracts to dispatch new workers in preparation for re-opening the border between China and North Korea in 2023, and that wage negotiations have also been completed.

If China continues to defend North Korea, it would be facing serious cones-quences such as the loss of its status as a responsible member of the G2 and P5 and the spread of “China threat theory” following the “Wolf-warrior diplomacy”.

China can no longer use North Korea’s provocations as a “leverage” against the US. Rather, the provocations would only deepen security dilemmas and further isolate China, as they would strengthen the ROK-US-Japan military cooperation and fuel the possibility of deploying additional US strategic weapons.

Therefore, China needs to stop its efforts to achieve hegemony that would only fulfill its national interests, and play a constructive role in North Korea-related issues to better position itself as a “respected global power”.

China should no longer tolerate North Korea’s nuclear advancement activities. At the same time, it should lead the international community to punish the North Korea in such cases. It is time for China to teach North Korea a lesson for its strategic use of China, which undermines China’s national interests.

Another available option is encouraging China to reverse its thinking to adopt a cooperative attitude regarding North Korea issues and open up a room for negotiation with the US on its key interests such as the conflict over the Taiwan Strait.

The international community should also take action and form an alliance, pressuring China to use its influence over North Korea and firmly abide by the global sanctions against the North, and urging it to revise its pro-North Korea policies.

[1] China→NK: 4 times / NK→China: 8 times

[2] Liu Jian Chao from the International Liaison Department of CCP and Ri Yong Nam Ambassador of North Korea had meetings in July and December, 2022.

[3] The resolution on sanctions against North Korea was rejected for the first time in 16 years since 2006.

[4] The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution in April, 2022, calling for the issue to be discussed at the General Assembly when a permanent member vetoes at the Security Council.

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Pe geopolitic.ro sunt publicate abstracte ale articolelor publicate în Revista GEOPOLITICA, care poate fi comandată pe www.geopoliticamagazine.com, în format tipărit sau electronic.

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REFERENŢI ŞTIINŢIFICI

Constantin ANECHITOAE – Universitatea „Ovidius”, Constanţa
Maricel ANTIPA – Universitatea Naţională de Apărare „Carol I”, Bucureşti
Cristian BARNA – Universitatea Bucureşti
Adrian FILIP – Universitatea „Andrei Şaguna”, Constanţa
Constantin HLIHOR – Universitatea Bucureşti
Aliodor MANOLEA – Universitatea Hyperion, Bucureşti
Ioana RIEBER – Societatea de Ştiinţe Istorice din România
Radu SĂGEATĂ – Institutul de Geografie al Academiei Române

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Referenti stiintifici

Constantin ANECHITOAE – Universitatea „Ovidius”, Constanţa Maricel ANTIPA – Universitatea Naţională de Apărare „Carol I”, Bucureşti Cristian BARNA – Universitatea Bucureşti Adrian FILIP – Universitatea „Andrei Şaguna”, Constanţa Constantin HLIHOR – Universitatea Bucureşti Aliodor MANOLEA – Universitatea Hyperion, Bucureşti Ioana RIEBER – Societatea de Ştiinţe Istorice din România Radu SĂGEATĂ – Institutul de Geografie al Academiei Române

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Constantin ANECHITOAE – Universitatea „Ovidius”, Constanţa Maricel ANTIPA – Universitatea Naţională de Apărare „Carol I”, Bucureşti Cristian BARNA – Universitatea Bucureşti Adrian FILIP – Universitatea „Andrei Şaguna”, Constanţa Constantin HLIHOR – Universitatea Bucureşti Aliodor MANOLEA – Universitatea Hyperion, Bucureşti Ioana RIEBER – Societatea de Ştiinţe Istorice din România Radu SĂGEATĂ – Institutul de Geografie al Academiei Romane

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