Syed Nadeem FARHAT
”I am sure, democracy is in our blood. Indeed, it is in the marrow of our bones. Only centuries of adverse circumstances have made the circulation of this blood cold. It has become frozen, and our arteries have not been functioning. But thank God, the blood is circulating again.”
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
Presidential address at the session of the All India Muslim League on April 24, 19431
Democracy is among the phenomena that are better understood than defined. From Aristotle’s detested perception of democracy as mob rule to the time when Fukuyama considered it as the climax of mankind2 to the present time when exclusionist pluralism has caused serious blows to an inclusive and equal world, democracy has remained a process and an ideal. With its varying interpretations, democracy is generally seen as a set of institutional arrangements but its essence lies in the shared values of collective concern and participation in public life and affairs of the state. In fact, definitions and interpretations of democracy can be boiled down to being the ‘institutionalisation of the collective conscience of a people’.
If taken as a definition, it essentially means that democracy would have an inherent variation in different cultures and times. It also means that the character of democracy in a particular society is shaped by the preferences and practices of its members. It further means that mere constitutional and subordinate laws are not sufficient to guarantee that the will and consent of people will actually prevail; rather the people have to remain informed, involved and engaged to ensure their true representation.3 With the changing dynamics of society, concepts like liberty, inclusiveness, sovereignty and representation keep changing. This explains why democracy remains an ideal even where achieved to a certain degree. No society can therefore claim having achieved democracy to its fullest and no society has the reason to abandon the pursuit for the ideal in democracy.
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
The birth of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in August 1947 was a political miracle in many respects. It is the only country in the world the struggle for which was aimed at institutionalising an ideology and that was achieved solely through non-violent political process.4 The President of All India Muslim League (AIML), Muhammad Ali Jinnah, led the political campaign for Pakistan and achieved it without any violence, chaos or disruption. Jinnah, whom Pakistanis call Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), was a democrat and champion of civic rights.5
Despite the democratic spirit that the Muslims of the Subcontinent had demonstrated during their struggle for freedom, the country’s formative years defined the future trajectory of statehood in a different fashion. These formative years formally started in March 1940 when a public convention of the AIML passed a resolution (Lahore Declaration) for a separate homeland for Muslims. This resolution was a turning point that came only months after the 1939 elections for the federal and provincial legislative assemblies in which Muslim League suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indian National Congress, led by Nehru. In fact, Muslim League had only completed formation of its organisation in all provinces by 1938, and that too with varying strengths.6
Immediately after passage of the Lahore Declaration,7 the slogan for Pakistan became so popular that through the wave of this public sentiment Muslim League emerged as the key representative political party of Muslims throughout the Sub-continent. The masses rallied behind the party for a cause but this does not mean that they were organised on political lines as well and Muslim League remained a uniting platform, rather than an organisation. Further to damage the objectives of the League, several prominent Muslims who had stayed away till now, joined it to surf the tide. AIML succeeded on most Muslim majority seats in the 1946 elections. It was hardly the AIML shaping the movement; rather it was the movement that shaped the Muslim League. The 1946 electoral results carried an unmistakable message for the ruling British, Hindu-majority Indian National Congress and the masses of all religions and castes; and the message for a separate homeland was well communicated.
THE TRANSITION PHASE
On June 3, 1947, the British Government proclaimed establishment of two dominions on religious grounds in August. Chaos and arbitrariness are obvious when there were merely 10 weeks available to carve Pakistan out of the Subcontinent and put the partition and independence in place.8 Pakistan’s territory was not even fully demarcated at the time of its birth. Pakistan was almost an ‘overnight’ state and an ‘overnight’ nation.9 The confirmation that the Subcontinent was to be divided had been a shock to Hindu nationalists whose religious ethos would consider the land of India as sacred and indivisible.10 Though riots had already taken place in Bengal and Bihar in 1946, widespread riots broke out through most parts of the Subcontinent after declaration of Indian Independence Act. In these conditions, Muslims who opted to migrate to Pakistan as well as those who preferred to stay in their ancestral lands were targeted. One of the largest human migrations took place during the second and third quarters of 1947 and Pakistan received around 10 million muhajireen11 who were wounded, sick, looted and broken.12
The areas that became part of Pakistan had very poor infrastructure and hardly any industry.13
The partition plan included a formula for division of assets but Pakistan hardly got anything from India that was actually useful.14 The Muslim League was undergoing a major crisis and transition from being an anti colonial movement to adapting itself to the different function of governing a country.15 Meanwhile, the death of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah merely 13 months after creation of Pakistan in September 1948 proved a serious blow to the nation. The economic condition as well as future prospects were fragile and deliberate attempts to cripple the economy could be sensed.16 The country’s military was in a bad shape while battle had broken out on the Jammu and Kashmir front. Besides, the country’s two wings were separated by around 1,000 miles.17
In the midst of its unique challenges characterised by riots, large-scale migration, economic disparity, nation-building and security threats, the country started off by laying the foundation on the principles of “democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam” through the Objectives Resolution of 1949. This resolution is of primary significance in any debate that aims to understand the nature of the State of Pakistan. It is in fact the articulation of the ideals of the founding fathers, articulation of the public conscience and the essence of the freedom movement. In political sense, it spelled out the objectives on the basis of which the constitution was to be framed. The document is remarkable also in the sense that it defines democracy in indigenous context and aims at developing a hybrid model in which Islamic ideals meet the modern concept of a nation state. Above everything else, this was a manifestation that the political leadership had the vision and capability to read public sentiments and to translate them into policy documents.
This should have been a take-off point; Pakistan’s constitution should have been made on the basis of this much-celebrated resolution, and democracy should have prevailed ever since. The reality has, however, been much different.
From 1951 to 1958, Pakistan had seven prime ministers and the political scene remained like a game of musical chairs. Then the military took over and the country was under military rule from 1958 to 1971. Following two years of civilian martial law a parliamentary system under a political setting was put in place in 1973. The military took over again in 1977 and General Zia-ul-Haq remained at the helm of affairs till his death in 1988. Parliamentary democracy was revived in 1988, and during the next 11 years Pakistan had four governments (apart from caretaker governments). In 1999, the country witnessed another military coupled by General Pervez Musharraf. He left office of the president in 2008. Since then there have been two governments, from 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2018, each of which completed its five-year term.18
Thus, during 72 years of its existence, the country experienced 33 years of military rule. Only three governments could complete their full terms (including one under a military ruler from 2003 to 2008), and no prime minister could serve a full term in office. The country had its first constitution after nine years of its creation, which lasted only a couple of years (1956-1958). The second constitution was given by General Ayub Khan and remained in force up till he held office. The third and currently in force constitution was formulated by the Parliament in 1973. This constitution is a key milestone in Pakistan’s history. It is another manifestation of the vision and wisdom of the political leadership for stewarding the nation to its objectives by putting aside their internal differences. The two military rules (from 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2008) did some tinkering with the constitution but could not abrogate it. The Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment Act of 2010 has sought to do away with most such deviations.19
THE THREE LEGACIES OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD
AND NATIONAL POLITICS
Looking at this game of political see-saw one wonders how the national leadership of a country that had very clear ideals before it could be so reckless with its destiny. The answer again lies in the origins.
The colonial rule that lasted for almost a century thrived on the basis of three groups of the locals.20
The first such group is civil bureaucracy that was on one hand given a sense of superiority over the masses and kept at physical and intellectual distance from them in all respects, and on the other hand was trained to essentially serve their bosses.21 Though the bureaucracy of every level played an important role in a state of administrative chaos after the creation of Pakistan, but simultaneously found a vacuum of leadership and stepped forward when the country’s third governor general came from its ranks. The third governor general removed the leader of Muslim League Khwaja Nazimuddin from premiership and appointed Pakistan’s envoy to the US (another member of civil bureaucracy) as prime minister. Eyebrows were naturally raised and the suspicions of foreign intervention in the country’s politics were rightfully suspected.
The second group was of the feudal lords who were raised by granting huge lands, statuses and titles by the British and were used as their pawns to control the locals and for the benefit of the rulers. As such, these landlords not only held huge resources but also significant authority over their lands. Most of them had got this prominence for having betrayed their fellow countrymen and having served the objectives of the colonial rulers. When the tide turned in favour of Pakistan, they were quick to shift their allegiances and were able to hold the same prominence in the new setting where a leadership gap was obvious. With the sole intent of clinching more power, the feudal lords served as the political leadership of the new country and were a major reason for political instability and intrigue during the initial years. They would easily bargain their positions and would covertly revolt against a sitting prime minister in favour of an aspiring one.
In fact, they had raised a political class and set a political tradition that was deeply entrenched in feudalism. During later years, when feudalism lost its shape and power to some extent, the feudal mind-set survived and impacted national politics to a great deal.22
The third group was the military. It was undergoing a transition from a former colonial army into a national army.23 Like every other army, it had all three political advantages that Finer had counted: “a marked superiority of organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms”24. Though the military was in a bad shape itself but it was trained, disciplined and highly motivated to guard the country and the people against all odds. During very initial days the military received widespread respect due to its services to the immigrants and affectees of floods, as well as fighting a war with its meagre resources on the Kashmir front25 immediately after independence.26
These were the times when there was unrest in East Pakistan on linguistic27 and in Punjab on religious grounds.28 On the foreign front, Pakistan was looking for allies in an environment when India had brought its military to the borders, had forcibly annexed the states of Junagadh, Manavadar and Hyderabad29 and had fought a war on Kashmir with Pakistan.30 On the Western side, Afghanistan was contemplating establishment of Pakhtoonistan (land of the Pakhtoons) by annexing areas of the North Western Frontier Province. The military was therefore formally given a role in the affairs of the state with full consensus and support by the political leaders.31 Major General Iskandar Mirza was appointed as defence secretary in 1947 and as interior minister in 1955. He then took over the reins of the country as governor general. He was the first to bring martial law to the land in 1958 through his appointed Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Ayub dismissed Mirza within a few days and took full charge of the country.
With these beginnings, the three groups remained significantly relevant in national politics and the democratic journey in varying degrees. The civilian bureaucracy soon confined itself to its business and kept itself engaged in administering the affairs of the state as per their roles. The military had its phases. There were times when it took charge of things while at other times it preferred politicians to manage the affairs of the country.32 In political camps too, regard for democratic principles gradually increased and politicians without a feudal background played their role in promoting mature political culture.
To sum up, the roots of instability in Pakistan lie in loss of consensus leadership during its early years, feudalistic political culture and the military’s inherent conviction that based on its organisational discipline it is better suited to steer the country to progress.33 With these domestic problems, international power politics, hostility with India and continuous regional instability have provided an enabling environment against democratic development.
SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY
One would wonder how the people had responded to these episodes of political see-saw and whether they had been silent spectators to the happenings in the country. The rough road treaded by democracy in Pakistan might convince someone to conclude that democracy has failed in or is not meant for Pakistan.
In fact, the answer to such suspicions has always been given by the people themselves as they are the biggest stakeholders and the most fervent supporters of democracy in Pakistan. The spirit of Pakistan Movement and the ideal of Quaid-e-Azam are so strongly embedded that they have their appeal and inspiration even after seven decades. Apart from what has been summarised above, these people have gone through the hardest times. They have seen two full-scale wars in 1965 and 1971, and two limited wars in 1948 and 1999 with India, have lost the eastern wing, and have faced natural calamities like earthquakes, and severe floods.34 The country faced, survived and prevailed against secessionist movements, terrorism, internal displacements and a huge influx of refugees. The constants have been a hostile bigger neighbour (India) on the eastern side and a volatile neighbour (Afghanistan) on the west that has kept Pakistan in the eye of the storm for decades. Through the cold war followed by global power politics, foreign backing has unfortunately been available more to military rules than the democratic dispensations.35
The people of Pakistan have reacted with maturity and have realised that democracy is a process for which they have to remain consistent despite all odds. They are mindful that any response to a situation has to be in a proportion and should not undermine the security and solidarity of the state itself. While political gambling and intrigue has been on the forefront of national political scene, the opposition has always been very vibrant as well. There have been large scale political movements and no government could take a visible drift from the national ideals enunciated in the Objectives Resolution.
Alongside the restriction and strictness of the martial law governments, the security situation of the country, the immature political culture and confidence in the armed forces served in favour of military rule. Still the people did not stop acting in favour of democracy. Finer had pointed out two “crippling weaknesses” of the military in political field, namely the ‘technical inability to administer any but the most primitive community’ and ‘their lack of legitimacy’ for which they have to seek civilian collaboration.36 Rulers coming from the military, Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf held referendums to give legitimacy to their regimes but the people generally stayed indifferent to the process (though official figures showed immense approval for their preposition). Public response was entirely different when the same rulers allowed some political process and held elections to allow selection of public representatives.37 Despite the fact that these elections were held in shady conditions and with several restrictions, people realised that revival of political activity, in whatever form, is the only way to reviving democracy. This public sentiment was so obvious that every military ruler had to give a political cloak to his regime. This was done by putting restrictions on independent political voices and creating a king’s party on each occasion.38 In such instances, the politicians who served the feudal mindset mostly served the purpose.
Despite all odds, hope is not lost as long as the people of Pakistan subscribe to democratic principles. In fact, the country has progressed significantly on many fronts. The first and the foremost sign of optimism is the near consensus among the people with respect to confidence in democracy. Several surveys conducted recently have exhibited such widespread confidence. In a survey conducted in October 2017 by Gallup Pakistan, 81% of Pakistanis showed confidence in democracy as a system of governance as against 19% who preferred military democracy. A January 2018 survey by the same organisation indicates that people are keen to be taken onboard on key national issues. As much as 68% of Pakistanis39 would like to vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law.40 At the same time, 62% support representative democracy as well.41
In practical terms, the people have used their votes to express their preferences and have voted out political governments that have disappointed them. The power is not confined to a single political party and every election has brought change. Increasing literacy and spread of information through the media is producing general awareness and choices are becoming saner. The most encouraging fact is that the youth are the most significant group that has to play a role. Pakistan being the youngest country in the world,42 youth (18 to 35 years) constituted 44% of the total registered voters in the 2018 elections. Youth being the most optimistic, the most passionate and forward looking segment are a good omen for democracy in Pakistan.
A socio-political change is taking place in the country. Three governments have successively completed their five-year tenures (2002-2007, 2008-2013, 2013-2018) while the fourth successive government has come in through elections. Different political parties have been and are ruling in the centre and the provinces have successfully established a working relationship despite political differences. Similarly, system has continued to run smoothly in spite of the governments having difficulties in legislation for not enjoying majority in the upper house of the Parliament, the Senate. All national institutions are also part of the process. The judiciary and media too are going through phases.43 There definitely are occasional vibes against optimism for democracy but the reasons for optimism are much stronger and more frequent. Like in many countries of the world, the tussle between political parties, blame game, issues of civil-Military relations continue, though with varying degrees, but it appears much more clear now that the democratic process is here to stay.
CONCLUSION
The people have put their confidence in political parties in the hope for mature policy making and inclusive national development. The promotion of democracy would require political process in all segments and levels of society. This has to start from promoting democracy within the political parties and side-lining the feudalistic approaches within their ranks. Political governments have also been shying away from sharing their power with grassroots political leadership and have been avoiding local government elections. If elections for local bodies were held, their powers were curtailed.44 The student unions and trade unions too are nurseries for political leadership and guarantees for peaceful political settlement of issues. Discontinuing them is always a bad omen for democratic principles. Literacy is a national emergency, increase of which would surely help in numerous ways including maturity of political voices and choices. The ‘failure of democracy’45 has very grim implications like the one that Pakistan saw when it lost East Pakistan.
Democratic institutions and traditions take a long time to develop strong roots. Political institutions have historically been products of interaction and disagreement among social forces46 and the people of Pakistan understand that the road to ideal is long and tough, but it is a process through which they will be able to institutionalise their collective conscience and practice the principles of “democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam” in letter and spirit.
Senior Research Officer, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad
1 Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad Khan. “Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam.” Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal 2 (1996): 70.
2 Francis, Fukuyama. “The end of history and the last man.” Op. cit (1992): 49-50.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty Speech, http://www.learnedhand.org/?p=4
4 Jabbar, Javed, Pakistan: Unique Origins, Unique Destiny? Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2012, p. 73.
5 In his broadcast talk on Pakistan to the people of the USA in February 1948, Quaid-e-Azam had said, “The Constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago. Islam and its idealism has taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fairplay to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state, to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims – Hindus, Christians and Parsis – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.” Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad Khan, Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam, Vol. IV, Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996, p. 2694.
6 Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry, Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore: Longmans, (1961), p. 190.
7 This resolution was ironically named Pakistan Resolution by Hindu press, but the same name became popular and is still referred to as such.
8 Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh. Partition and region: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent. Oxford University Press, 1999.
9 Jabbar, p. 73.
10 This is despite the fact that Indian Subcontinent has never been a single empire prior to becoming a colony of the British.
11 Muhajir (pl. muhajireen) is generally translated in English as refugee. This Arabic term, however, refers to a Muslim who permanently abandons a place and migrates to another in search of a better environment for his/her faith. Abou-El-Wafa, Ahmed, Professor, The Right to Asylum between Islamic Shari’ah and International Refugee Law: A Comparative Study, Riyadh: UNHCR, 2009.
12 Jabbar, p. 79.
13 Aziz, Sartaj, Between Dreams and Realities, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 347.
14 A glimpse of this has been recorded by Brian Cloughley in these words, “170,000 tons of equipment and stores for Pakistan were intended to be dispatched in 300 trainloads from India; only three railway wagons arrived, and these contained either obsolete items or rubbish.” Cloughley, Brian, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 4.
15 Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, Virginia: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 17.
16 On December 30, 1947, Prime Minister of Pakistan had written to the Indian Prime Minister, “The systematic sabotage against the implementation of partition, the stoppage of such essential requirements as coal and rail transport, the deliberate with-holding of Pakistan’s share of funds and arms and equipment, the wholesale massacre of Muslim population, are all designed towards one aim, namely, the destruction of Pakistan” … “India’s forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar and other states of Kathiawar, which had acceded to Pakistan as well as the fraudulent procurement of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State are acts of hostility against Pakistan whose destruction is India’s immediate objective” Rizvi, Hasan Askari, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986, p. 38; Also see: Jabbar, Javed, Pakistan – Unique Origins; Unique Destiny, Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2012, p. 77, 78; and Ali, Chaudhary Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1975, 175.
17 Eastern wing of Pakistan, commonly referred to as East Pakistan, was later severed from Pakistan and was established as Bangladesh in 1971.
18 The reader should be cautious from drawing a comparison between Pakistan and India merely on the basis of shared history and dates of independence. Pakistan not only lacked formal continuity in terms of political centre, it also had to evolve a new federal structure, craft a new constitution, make institutions for providing financial sovereignty, adjust anew in international arena, adjust the demographic imbalance caused by largescale migration, and all that when the country lost its consensus leadership within months after its creation. India had the utility of Nehru’s leadership who had not only led the independence movement but also had the opportunity to serve as its prime minister for 17 years after independence. The Indian National Congress had been spearheading the freedom movement for a much longer period than the All India Muslim League and had a strong reservoir of leadership, as opposed to AIML that took off only after 1940. See Husain, Ishrat, Governing the Ungovernable: Institutional Reforms for Democratic Governance, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 57.
19 Nuri, Maqsudul Hasan, Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Nawaz Khan (eds.), Eighteenth Amendment Revisited, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2012, p. ii.
20 Waseem, Muhammad, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994, pp. 21-59.
21 Waseem, pp. 135-141.
22 Jaffrelot, Christophe, Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, Haryana: Penguin Books, 2017, p. 12.
23 Jaffrelot, p. 29.
24 Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall Press Ltd. 1962, p. 6.
25 Pakistan Army, Kashmir War 1947-49, Pakistan Army Web Portal, https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AW PReview/TextContent9900.html?pId=195&rnd=444
26 Waseem, p. 141.
27 Matinuddin, Kamal, Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968-1971, Lahore. WajidAlis Pvt Limited, 1994, pp. 47-52.
28 Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953, Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing, Punjab, 1954.
29 Ali, Mir Laik, Tragedy of Hyderabad, Karachi: Pakistan Co-operative Book Society, 1962.
30 Hodson, H.V., The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 427-493.
31 Rizvi, p. 42.
32 Akhund, Iqbal, Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benzir Bhutto, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 118-125.
33 Khan, M. Asghar, Pakistan: Politics and Military Power, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 6-9.
34 The massive earthquake of October 2005 killed over 85,000 individuals, while floods in July-August 2010 affected approximately 20 million people, killing nearly 2,000 and displacing over 12 million.
35 Ali, Murad. “US aid to Pakistan and democracy.” Policy Perspectives (2009): 119-132.
36 Finer, 14.
37 Chaudhry, M.A.K. Martial Law Ka Siyasi Andaz. (1988), p. 81.
38 Asghar Khan, pp. 198-200; 213.
39 The figure is comparable with USA (68%), Europe (70%) and Africa (64%).
40 Gallup Pakistan, Views about Democracy in Pakistan as compared to the World, http://gallup.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Report-on-Global-Democracy.pdf
41 ibid.
42 UNDP, Pakistan National Human Development Report. UNDP (2017). https://www.undp.org/content/dam /pakistan/docs/HDR/PK-NHDR.pdf
43 Newbe, Paula R., Judging the State, Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1995); Munir, Kishwar, and Iram Khalid. ‘Judicial Activism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Supreme Court Judgments 2008-13’. South Asian Studies (1026-678X) 33, No. 2 (2018), pp. 321-334.
44 Khan, Abdul Qayum, ‘Local Government and Judiciary in Pakistan after 2010’, Pakistan Perspectives, vol. 22, No. 1, January-June, (2017), 27-41.
45 Aziz, Sartaj, Between Dreams and Realities, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 26.
46 Huntington, p. 11.
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