Shams uz ZAMAN, MPhil
Abstract. The relationship between India and Pakistan remains tense since their inception. While several issues have prevented their relations from improving, it is primarily the Kashmir dispute which remains the principal cause of their mutual hostility. Both states had fought and clashed with each other over the dispute prior to their nuclearization. Though the nuclear weapons prevented breakout of a major war between Islamabad and New Delhi, this may change in future due to Indian endeavour of finding space below the nuclear threshold. Although, the nuclear deterrence prevented India from further escalating the conflict after Pakistan retaliated to the Indian surgical strike in the aftermaths of Pulwama crisis, this may not happen during future crises. Strategic stability can only be ensured in South Asia through the resolution of disputes, by avoiding arms race and subscribing to strategic restraint regime.
Key words: South Asia, India, Pakistan, Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Race, Kashmir, Indian Nuclear Doctrine
India and Pakistan inherited the disputes from the British Raj since their independence in 1947. Though there were several territorial disputes and boundary demarcation disagreements at Sir Creek, Run of Kutch and Ferozpur alongside the succession issue of Junagadh and Manavdar (former princely states),1 however, it was primarily the Kashmir issue which symbolizes the hostility between India and Pakistan. Immediately after the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, Kashmir issue was termed as a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia.2 India propagates that the uprising in Kashmir is sponsored by Pakistan. However, the recent wave of wide-scale protests and massive shut-downs across the entire valley clearly demonstrates that this is an indigenous uprising due to oppressive state policies, which has also been pointed out by several Indian scholars.3 It was primarily the conflict over Kashmir which resulted in the recent stand-off between Pakistan and India after Indian aerial attack over Balakot in February 2019. The stand-off between India and Pakistan exhibited the urgency of resolving the lingering disputes which could otherwise lead to a war between the South Asian nuclear neighbours.
GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT
According to the partition plan proposed by the British, several of the semi-autonomous princely states had to decide their fate of either joining Pakistan or India or of maintaining their autonomous status through plebiscite. The principal factor in deciding for the partition was the population. Hindu majority states were poised to join India while the Muslim majority states were to join Pakistan. However, Travancore, Jodhpur, Bhopal, Hyderabad, Junagadh and Bantva Manavadar were the key states which decided to maintain their independent status.4 Some of the landlocked states were motivated by Indian government to join Indian mainland. Several others, like Hyderabad, Junagadh and Manavadar, whose princely heads later opted to join Pakistan, were annexed through force by the end of 1947.5 Another conspiracy was hatched by the newly appointed Indian leader Sardar Vallabhai Patel in complicity with the Lord Mountbatten to deceitfully annex the state of Kashmir with India, against the will of majority Muslim population, without holding the plebiscite.6
Several scholars are of the opinion that Indian leaders and Mountbatten subsequently colluded with the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, for preparing a backdated ‘Instrument of Accession’ which provided the justification for deploying Indian troops in the Kashmir valley.7 This development worried Pakistani leaders who were still recovering from the loss of Junagadh and Manavadar which was forcibly occupied by India. Consequently, the tribal fighters rushed to Kashmir to pre-empt the conspiracy, which led to the first armed conflict between the newly created states of India and Pakistan in 1948. Despite that Pakistani tribal fighters were able to secure some portions of Kashmir; the larger territory remained under the Indian control. Finally the UN successfully brokered ceasefire on the assurance of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the fate of the state would be decided through a plebiscite. He had repeatedly reiterated till March 1955 that India would decide the fate of Kashmir issue ‘according to the will of the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite’.8 Even till 1957, the government of India had officially maintained the same position but subsequently refused to do so.
The Ceasefire Line (CFL), along which the forces of India and Pakistan were deployed once the fighting stopped, was later converted into the Line of Control (LOC). The LOC serves as a de facto border between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir, along which the clashes routinely take place between the militaries of the nuclear armed nations.
KASHMIR DISPUTE: THE SOURCE OF INDO-PAK HOSTILITY
In the light of Indian promises of plebiscite and UN Resolution 47 (1948), adopted on 21 April 1948, Pakistan considers Kashmir dispute as the unfinished agenda of partition awaiting resolution since 1947.9 India and Pakistan had fought two major wars, in 1948 and 1965, over Kashmir issue alongside facing numerous conflicts and crisis situations having potentials of blowing-out to full-scale wars. Since 1965, the first major military stand-off between India and Pakistan happened in April 1984 once India discreetly occupied over 985 square miles of the Siachen Glacier in the disputed region of Kashmir.10 It was months later that the Pakistani military learnt of the incursion which led to Indian and Pakistani militaries clashing at the world’s highest battlefield, called Siachen. The clash at Siachen is yet another dispute awaiting resolution between India and Pakistan since 1984.
Another major clash took place at Kargil in 1999, which was the first conflict between India and Pakistan after demonstration of their overt nuclear weapons capability. The next major military stand-off was witnessed in December 2001, once India amassed bulk of it forces along the international border against Pakistan, after accusing Pakistan of sponsoring an attack on Indian Parliament, which were actually staged by Kashmiri militants.11 Pakistan disputed Indian claims but both nuclear armed nations stood eyeball to eye ball along the LOC and international border for several months and the situation only defused once the international community diplomatically convinced both the states to de-escalate.
From 2003-2007, General Pervaiz Musharraf, the Pakistani military ruler, made several attempts to negotiate some settlement on Sir Creek and Siachen issues but the hardliners within the Indian administration prevented this from happening.12 In 2008, terrorist attacks in Indian city of Mumbai again heightened the tensions between the two nuclear rivals. India again accused Pakistan for sponsoring the attacks. On the contrary, Pakistan had been accusing India for sponsoring terrorism and militancy inside Pakistan, especially in Balochistan province and tribal area region, which have now been integrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Notably, the Pakistani allegation of India sponsoring trouble inside Pakistan was also acknowledged by the U.S. Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel in 2011.13
In later years, several attacks took place in the disputed region of Kashmir, particularly Pathankot, Uri and Pulwama etc. which resulted in increasing the tensions between India and Pakistan. All these incidents showed that the Kashmir had been at the heart of every crisis which had happened between India and Pakistan since 1971. Although there had been others irritants existing between both the countries, like Sir Creek, Runn of Kutch and Indus Water Treaty etc. but no other conflict, with the exception of Kashmir, carries higher risks of spiralling into a full blown confrontation between the nuclear armed rivals. The situation has become even more precarious once the hardliners from Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) got elected to rule India in 2014.
THE RISE OF POPULAR NATIONALISM IN INDIA
AND NUCLEAR STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA
During the 2013 election campaign, the BJP promised in the election manifesto to review the existing Indian nuclear doctrine.14 However, there was no consensus within Indian and foreign scholars as to what the review actually meant. Many scholars speculated that BJP may review the conditional “No First Use” (NFU) clause in the Indian nuclear doctrine. It is pertinent to mention that Indian nuclear doctrine, revealed in 1999 and 2003, renders the NFU conditional, which would not be valid under following three circumstances:
The first condition says, “Any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat.” This condition implies that if India feels threatened by possible use of nuclear weapons, it shall take ‘all the necessary measures’, without ruling out the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, against that perceived threat.15
The second condition clarifies that the NFU is not relevant against Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and even against those which are not aligned with NWS. The clause states, “India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers”.16 However, the meaning of word aligned has not been elucidated in the doctrine.
The third condition qualifies the first use of nuclear weapons, “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons”.17 The doctrine further states that, “India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons” in event of a chemical or biological attack on its forces anywhere in the world.18
But despite these caveats, many analysts still believed in the definiteness of the Indian NFU which actually is not the case. However, BJP still considered that the doctrine needed a change. This was primarily because the BJP comprises of hardliner religious components of Indian society, seeking guidance from Kutaliya’s Arthashastra and other ancient texts, believing in exclusiveness of Hindutva ideology. Through the prism of Hindutva, they envision projecting India as dominant global hegemon by creating a Post-Nehruvian Hindu World Order.19
Exactly opposite is the case in Pakistan, which effectively fought and defeated terrorism through a long and concerted campaign, spread almost over 15 years. In Pakistan the menace of terrorism and extremism are dying phenomena, which on the contrary is on the rise in India. The Indian society has rapidly drifted towards the right wing politics, drastically squeezing space for minority communities and neighbouring states. According to the report released by Human Rights Watch in February 2019, lynching incidents, mob attacks and gang rape incidents against minority communities, especially Muslims, Christians and low caste Hindus (Dalits) – at the hands of Hindu extremists – have enormously increased since the BJP came to power in 2014.20 Regrettably, these attacks are instigated with the backing of the state officials and police in a systemic chain of organized violence. The impact of BJP hardliner politics is also visible externally because the neighbouring states of India, like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, are all facing pressure and unease from Indian hegemonic policies.21
These trends show that the tolerance threshold of BJP hardliners – for ‘others’ – is very low which heightens the risk of war in event of a crisis. Several scholars have argued recently that there is a growing inclination amongst Indian policy makers to acquire capabilities for fighting a nuclear war.22 Even the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had frequently issued nuclear threats during his election campaign in 2019.23 This trend shows that the psychology of Indian decision makers is gradually changing and they now see more utility in the employment and use of nuclear weapons rather than considering these as a mechanism of deterrence. Such a shift in BJP mind-set risks creating an unstable and dangerous environment in South Asia.
CHANGING FORCE POSTURES AND DOCTRINES:
CHALLENGES TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
In BJP’s perception, the Indian nuclear doctrine needs critical review due to changing environments and new geo-political realities. This was obvious amid the new types of weapons technologies being developed and acquired by India from technologically advanced nations. These weapon systems and technologies include procurement of hi-tech fighter aircrafts (Rafael) from France, Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems (like S-400 from Russia and NASAMS-II from the US), armed drones and UAVs from the US and purchase of nuclear fuel from developed states, through a discriminatory Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, while sparing its domestic uranium reserves for nuclear weapons development. The US has also been pressing India to buy Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) as an alternative to Russian S-400 but India has not yet decided on this offer.
India is also domestically developing numerous weapon systems which risks disturbing the regional balance of power and could prompt an arms competition with Pakistan. These destabilizing technologies include jointly manufactured hypersonic cruise like BrahMos with the help of Russia (and enhancement of range in violation to the MTCR), development of BMD systems, manufacturing nuclear armed submarines (like Arihant with Russian help) and testing of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missiles and weapon systems. Furthermore, there are reports that India is also working to develop thermonuclear weapons (or Hydrogen bombs),24 which the Indian Prime Minister also mentioned in his election speech of April 2019.25 In response to Indian BMD systems, Pakistan has developed Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) capable missiles. Such trends would only increase the arms competition in South Asia.
All these capabilities are bringing a psychological change in Indian strategic thinking as well which is dangerous and destabilizing for the stability in South Asia. Several Indian government and military officials, aligned with the BJP’s hard-line ideology, have proposed that India needs to abandon NFU in favour of pre-emptive nuclear first strike against Pakistan.26 This policy is likely to be supplemented through host of other capabilities like canisterization of ballistic missiles, mating nuclear warheads with the delivery systems – which has presumably been done already,27 and pre-delegation of authority to nuclear missiles deployed at sea – which was demon-strated in November 2018 through first deterrent patrol of nuclear armed submarine Arihant.28 Consequently, this shows that Indian nuclear posture is shifting towards ready to launch or Launch on Warning (LOW) posture, with pre-delegation authority at sea and land. More so, the principle of minimalism in Indian nuclear doctrine is also drifting away towards maximization.
These military and nuclear capabilities would further accentuate the nuclear and conventional asymmetries in South Asia thus emboldening the Indian leadership to maintain more belligerent policy towards its neighbours, especially Pakistan. This was witnessed in past as well, during the BJPs’ tenure, in which the Indian government hardened its stance towards Pakistan thus further increasing the risks of war in South Asia. This was practically demonstrated on 26 February 2019, once the Indian Air Force (IAF) violated Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity near Balakot. The strike was launched after a Kashmiri freedom fighter blew his vehicle in a suicide attack near the convoy of Indian armed forces. Indian government, without any evidence, accused Jaish-e-Muhammad of sponsoring the attack and subsequently conducted a strike near a training facility allegedly belonging to the group which was banned by the Pakistani government back in 2002.
POST-PULWAMA SURGICAL STRIKE AND NEW NORMAL DEBATE
Since 2002, India had been seeking for a space of limited war below the Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. But due to high risk of escalation and crossing over the nuclear thresholds inadvertently, India probably resorted to the aerial strike only. Several Indian scholars have claimed that the Indian aerial strike established a new normal in South Asia in which India is now at liberty to strike whatever target it chooses, without any fear or threat of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.29 However, there are other scholars who argued that if Indian aerial strike is the new normal then Pakistani retaliation also qualifies to be termed as a new normal because Pakistan could not be deterred from retaliating back to shoot down at least one Indian fighter aircraft. Moreover, it was naïve to consider that Pakistan would press the nuclear button in response to a single incursion by the IAF. On the contrary, a greater risk is posed by the action reaction syndrome in which retaliation and counter retaliation could gradually spiral out of control, leading to a nuclear exchange. Indian violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty/territorial integrity and Pakistani counter strike in retaliation, also generated a debate that whether the nuclear deterrence was undermined in South Asia as a consequence of Indian surgical strike? And did India actually call out Pakistani nuclear bluff?
But these questions are premised on an entirely wrong assumption. The purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is to deter conventional wars and nuclear attacks. These do not cater for the sub-conventional or non-conventional forms of warfare. Like for example, nuclear weapons can’t deter intelligence operations, insur-gencies, terrorist incidents and non-kinetic actions. Both India and Pakistan have been accusing each other of sponsoring trouble and interfering in internal matters since last several decades despite possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore, believing that nuclear weapons could prevent even non-kinetic and sub-conventional forms of warfare between two States, with lingering disputes, is erroneous. Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, which was meant to deter India from initiating a war, did actually serve its purpose in this particular case.
A conventional war can be distinguished from a sub-conventional act of warfare on three accounts. First, the level and strength of forces would differ in a conventional war and a sub-conventional act. A conventional war would involve a large body of force (comprising of brigades or divisions), while a sub-conventional act would involve very limited strength of force. Second, a sub-conventional act must involve a short, brisk and precise action with a clean break while a conventional war should involve a systematic and persistent use of force, spread over a prolonged period of time. Third, a sub-conventional act is limited in objective and scope while a conventional war should have a broader purpose. Thus Pakistan nuclear deterrent did prevent India from further escalating the conflict or initiating a war which clearly demonstrated that Pakistani nuclear deterrence prevailed and served its purpose of preventing a war between India and Pakistan.
Nevertheless, nuclear weapons alone cannot guarantee perpetual peace between India and Pakistan and hence, there is a dire need to address the underlying reasons of conflict in South Asia, else these may trigger a war due to either miscalculation or misperception. The following steps needs to be undertaken between India and Pakistan:
Peaceful Resolution of Disputes. Both India and Pakistan need to resolve the unsettled disputes, through dialogue, which have always served as stumbling blocks in improving bilateral relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. Most notable are the Kashmir, Siachen and Indus Water Treaty disputes which need to be resolved on priority. The UN report has also highlighted gross human rights violations in Indian Held Kashmir at the hands of Indian forces, but the international community’s response is not very encouraging in taking note of such violations. Pakistan has repeatedly offered India an olive branch, but India has so far been unwilling to respond positively to Pakistan’s offer. Therefore, the responsibility of taking initiative now rests with the newly elected Indian Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Strategic Restraint Regime. In order to avoid an arms race or a competition in South Asia, India and Pakistan need to negotiate a Strategic Restraint Regime. This regime should be aimed at preventing the deployment of destabilizing technologies and defence systems like BMD and MIRVs, deploying nuclear weapons at sea and avoiding adoption of counter-force strike and ready to launch nuclear postures. In the past, Pakistani proposal of Strategic Restraint Regime comprised of three principal components. First, preserving a stable deterrence without risking an arms race; second, maintaining a proportionate level of conventional forces critically needed for national security rather than military dominance; and third, resolution of lingering disputes through dialogue.
Non-testing of Nuclear Weapons Agreement. Both India and Pakistan need to sign a bilateral agreement of no further testing of nuclear weapons. There exists a possibility of India testing a thermonuclear device in future. This would tilt the strategic balance of power in India’s favour while undermining Pakistan’s national security. Hence, it would not be acceptable to Pakistan for the stability of the region. Thus any new nuclear test could resume a nuclear arms race in South Asia, which needs to be avoided.
No war pact. Signing of a “No War Pact” between India and Pakistan could become a corner stone of peace and stability in the region. If both states sign a bilateral no-war pact, it would become easier to negotiate settlement of the lingering disputes like Kashmir, Siachen, water and Sir Creek etc.
The situation in South Asia is fraught with dangers after the landslide victory of hardliners in India. Any shift in nuclear posture or an attempt to create a new normal of surgical strikes could result in gross miscalculation or misperception which could lead to unintended consequences. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons capable States which maintain a tense bilateral equation in which the risk of war remains high due to prevailing disputes. More so, India also seeks to create space for a limited war below the nuclear over-hang which is a very dangerous proposition. The lasting peace in the region can only become possible if both states sit on negotiation table to settle the disputes, while subscribing to a Strategic Restraint Regime. The mediation from European states and UN would help in reaching such a settlement.
MPhil, (Strategic and Nuclear Studies), National Defence University, Islamabad; Ex-Visiting Faculty Member, Roots International University College, Islamabad (Affiliated with The University of London)
1 Martin W. Lewis, “Does Pakistan Claim Junagadh in the Indian State of Gujarat?”, GeoCurrents, April 22, 2014, http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/border-disputes/pakistan-claim-junagadh-indian-state-gujarat.
2 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Kashmir is South Asian Flash Point”, The Washington Post, June 3, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/03/kashmir-is-south-asian-flash-point/e6e896b7-5f57-433d-bd38-fc03b2030e82/?utm_term=.75066a2c8f7f.
3 Shashank Joshi, “Kashmir uprising threatens the ‘idea of India’”, Lowy Institute, The interpreter, August 15, 2016, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kashmir-uprising-threatens-idea-india. See also: Economic Times, “India has lost Kashmir valley emotionally, says Yashwant Sinha”, October 1, 2017, https://economic times.indiatimes.com/ news/politics-and-nation/india-has-lost-kashmir-valley-emotionally-says-yashwant-sinha/articleshow/60902616.cms.
4 Adrija Roychowdhury, “Five states that refused to join India after Independence”, The Indian Express, August 17, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/research/five-states-that-refused-to-join-india-after-independence/.
5 Rakesh Ankit, “The accession of Junagadh, 1947-48: Colonial sovereignty, state violence and post-independence India”, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, August 2016, 53(3), pp. 371-404. See also: The Economist, “India erects the biggest statue in the world – and it’s not Gandhi”, November 3, 2018, https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/03/india-erects-the-biggest-statue-in-the-world-and-its-not-gandhi.
6 Alastair Lamb, Myth of Indian Claim to Jammu and Kashmir: A Reappraisal (Canada: Abe Books, 1994). Excerpts can be read at: http://www.mofa.gov.pk/documents/related/Myth.pdf.
7 Victoria Schofield, “Kashmir: The origins of the dispute”, BBC News, January 16, 2002, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm.
8 Arundhati Roy, “They can file a charge posthumously against Jawaharlal Nehru too: Arundhati Roy”, The Hindu, November 28, 2010, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/They-can-file-a-charge-posthumously-against-Jawaharlal-Nehru-too-Arundhati-Roy/article15718475.ece.
9 United Nations, “47 (1948). Resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726]”, https://undocs.org/S/RES/47(1948).
10 Tim McGirk with Aravind Adiga, “War at the Top of the World”, Time, July 4, 2005, http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,1079528-1,00.html.
11 Matthias Williams, “Protests erupt as India executes man for 2001 parliament attack”, Reuters, February 9, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-execution/protests-erupt-as-india-executes-man-for-2001-parliament-attack-idUSBRE91801J20130209.
12 Suhasini Haidar, “India, Pakistan nearly agreed on Siachen three times: Shyam Saran”, The Hindu, September 7, 2017, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-nearly-agreed-on-siachen-three-times-shyam-saran/article19631457.ece.
13 Adam Kredo, “Chuck Hagel’s Indian Problem: Said allied nation is funding attacks on Pakistan in Afghanistan in previously unreleased 2011 speech”, The Washington Free Beacon, February 25, 2013, https://freebeacon. com/politics/chuck-hagels-indian-problem/.
14 Elizabeth Roche, “BJP manifesto says will revise India’s nuclear doctrine”, Livemint.com, April 8, 2014, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/xno41g9Q3UYykzPhv3guXP/BJP-election-manifesto-says-will-revise-Indias-nuclear-doct.html.
15 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, August 17, 1999, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+ National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine.
17 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operatio-nalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, January 04, 2003, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/2013 1/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine.
19 Thorsten Alexander Wojczewski, “India and the Quest for World Order: Hegemony and Identity in India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Discourse”, Ph.D Dissertation (unpublished manuscript), University of Kiel, March 14, 2016, pp. 203-240, https://d-nb.info/1114735116/34.
20 Human Rights Watch, “Violent Cow Protection in India: Vigilante Group Attack Minorities”, February 18, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/02/18/violent-cow-protection-india/vigilante-groups-attack-minorities.
21 Aakar Patel, “Why neighbours dislike or suspect India”, The Express Tribune, May 29, 2017, p. 5. See also: Happymon Jacob, “Losing the neighbourhood”, The Hindu, October 18, 2016, https://www.thehindu. com/opinion/lead/Losing-the-neighbourhood/article14324718.ece.
22 Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2016), pp. 19-26. See also: Ali Ahmed, “Taking Nuclear War-Fighting Seriously”, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 2012, http://www.indiandefence review.com/spotlights/taking-nuclear-war-fighting-seriously/.
23 Ciaran Mcgrath, “Modi Warns Pakistan Against ‘Threats’: India Has ‘Mother of Nuclear Bombs’”, Express, April 18, 2019, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1116158/india-pakistan-war-mother-of-nuclear-bombs-kashmir-world-war-3.
24 Adrian Levy, “India is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Expert Say”, Foreign Policy, December 16, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_ secret_china_pakistan_barc/.
25 Mcgrath, “Modi Warns Pakistan: India Has ‘Mother of Nuclear Bombs’”, Express, op. cit.
26 Vipin Narang, “Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use”, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference Washington, March 20, 2017, https://fbfy83yid9j1dqsev3zq0w8n-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Vipin-Narang-Remarks-Carnegie-Nukefest-2017.pdf.
27 Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3, Summer 2013, pp. 148-150.
28 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Indian Navy Boomer Completes ‘First Deterrent Patrol’”, The Diplomat, November 6, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/indian-navy-boomer-completes-first-deterrent-patrol/.
29 Happymon Jacob, “After Balakot: India-Pakistan Relations Heading Nowhere”, The India Forum, May 7, 2019, https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/after-balakot-india-pakistan-relations-heading-nowhere.