Russia is proving itself as an increasingly assertive political and economic regional power in EU’s Eastern periphery and neighborhood. Exerting influence in its “near abroad” is a crucial element in Russia’s geopolitical strategy, given the region’s importance as an energy producer, and its vitality as a primary corridor for the transit of oil and gas to international markets. Seeking to control energy supply routes and opening up its domestic markets to commercial opportunities for major Russian corporations are Moscow’s overarching economic objectives. In addition, mostly for geopolitical and national security reasons, Russia is highly sensitive to any efforts by the regional states (particularly those among the former-Soviet Republics) to develop concerted political ties with Western partners and remains vigilant towards harder security threats emanating from the region to the Russian North Caucasus, particularly those related to separatism and Islamic extremism.
While Moscow’s approach to regional geopolitics remains purposefully unpredictable and invariably takes its international partners by surprise, Russia will continue to allocate a larger amount of resources to ensuring that its stake on the region’s geopolitical chessboard is respected by all actors. “Indeed, it appears increasingly evident that Russia will seek to consolidate, if not expand, its geopolitical presence in the BCS [Black and Caspian Sea] in the years to come”. This mechanism appears to be the most effective tool that Russia has to deal with the West, particularly given the fact that Moscow feels that the West has been slowly encroaching on its spheres of influence in the region through the various Euro-Atlantic initiatives. This perception has caused Moscow to become increasingly bellicose toward the West and the regional regimes (i.e. Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Ukraine) that do not adhere to the Kremlin’s geopolitical worldview. Russia’s foreign policy towards its ex-Soviet neighbors will most certainly remain interventionist, a stance which is only likely to reinforce the current levels of regional instability.
The origins of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) go back to January 1995, when Russia signed a treaty on the formation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan (Kyrgyzstan also joined that treaty in 1996, followed by Tajikistan in 1997). A decision to this effect was taken at the Minsk summit of June 2006. In October 2007, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a second treaty setting up the customs union.
The three countries established a Customs Union Commission as a permanently functioning regulatory body and continued negotiating and drafting agreements necessary for the functioning of the ECU. As of 1 January 2010, a common customs tariff was launched and the Commission formally started its work.
Just before the Ukrainian crisis, it seemed that Russia was keener than the EU to establish a Common Economic Space (CES) stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, at least at the declaratory level. According to sources from the European Commission, establishing such a CES would be hardly feasible since Russian trade policy would be inconsistent with the free trade norms of the WTO.
It is for Russia to understand that its current tough stance against the West is counter-productive and is negatively impacting on its own regional integration aspirations. To avoid turning Ms. Clinton’s warning about ‘”re-Sovietizing” Eastern Europe and Central Asia into an “Obama doctrine” for neo-containment of the Russian-led Eurasian integration, Moscow should fundamentally review its foreign and security policies by adopting a cooperative attitude towards the West. Russia doesn’t have the economic, financial and even the human resources needed to impose itself as a regional power through blunt military power, as Mr. Pukhov might be dreaming. Economic integration under the threat/umbrella of tanks’, fighters’ or battleships’ fire will hardly work. The more Moscow would delay this review, the likelier is both to scare off potential future members of its Eurasian Economic Union, and to have the West developing and implementing strategies for countering the Russian-led economic integration process.
It is for the EU to understand that being challenged by Russia as “the normative power” in the Eastern Neighborhood is not necessarily bad news for Europe’s future.
It is for the US to understand that there is a direct connection between the rather poor status of the OSCE “baskets” and Washington’s gradual disengagement from European affairs prior to the Ukrainian crisis. Washington should urgently replace the failed policy of “reset” of its relations with Russia with a new strategy focused on the European Eastern neighborhood.
For Russia, since its own efforts of economic integration will be undermined by lack of appetite of local political leaders for joining new Empires in whatever outfit they would be disguised, and by possible Western “neo-containment strategies”. For the West, since isolating Europe from its Eastern Neighborhood will eventually result in lost economic and security opportunities, a strong stimulus for building bridges uniting Europe and its Eastern Neighborhood rather than (erecting) barriers should be considered. In fact, this is the spirit of the Eastern Partnership and finding constructive ways to involve Russia and other regional powers in it would provide the best guarantee against the risks of “re-Sovietizing” parts of the OSCE area.