Source: https://www.linkedin.com/in/cyrilwiddershoven/?lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_series_entity%3Blga2DjJgRHaj1MwgeuuQng%3D%3D

Over the last few weeks, the main question in markets, capitals, and command rooms has been deceptively simple but still unanswered. For all analysts and politicians, it has been “why hasn’t the United States struck Iran yet?” At present, Iranian pressure is increasing across the region, as shown by vigorous proxy activity from Lebanon to Yemen, while the credibility of deterrence is clearly under strain. Most have interpreted the delay as weakness, indecision, or diplomatic paralysis. On the surface, the latter is clearly correct. US President Trump’s promise of actions to support the ongoing uprising in Iran, meant to remove the current regime, has not yet been implemented, taken as a sign of retreat by Iranians, too. It is, at the same time, comforting for Western politicians and others, but it could be wrong. What looks like hesitation may in fact be a deliberate, cold-blooded military and political strategy shaped not only by Arab opposition but also by the logic of modern warfare and US long-term strategic interests.

It is necessary to realize that at the center of all this ongoing drama sits Iran’s religious leader, Ali Khamenei, and the institutional repression machine that sustains him, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Without any question, any US military action will, by definition, be targeting that system to coerce or degrade it. However, looking at military strategy, it should also be understood that coercion is not only about firepower; it involves timing, information, and forcing an adversary to reveal itself. Taking that point of view, the current moves are not a delay as such but a weapon.

Arab red lines and narrowing of US options

Washington is currently facing several constraints, the first of which is clearly political geography. Even though the Trump Administration always wants to push the idea that it holds the unilateral power to act in a vacuum, reality is very different. Washington and its military might still operate from bases, airspace, and logistics networks embedded in the Arab Gulf. To use them as it wants, it still needs to consider the existing political geography. As shown by messages from key partners in the region, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have been unambiguous, there is at present, at least officially, no option available to be used as the launchpad for a US–Iran war.

Not surprisingly to some analysts, Qatar, even though the Trump Administration has proposed it as a significant strategic partner, has been particularly explicit and harmful in its actions. In clear statements, the Doha regime has refused to greenlight the use of Al Udeid Air Base for offensive strikes against Iran. The latter should not be treated as a footnote; it has become a significant strategic constraint. Doha’s leading position in its foreign policy has been to hedge, mediate, and maintain open channels with all sides, including Tehran. Most of this has always been presented by Western politicians, experts, and the media as a strong point of the Peninsula regime. Still, it could now become a significant security and stability threat. Doha’s rulers, with their own links to Iran and its proxies, will not allow themselves to be seen as the ignition point of a US assault, as the latter would clearly mean the collapse of that model overnight. Doha officially doesn’t want to be exposed to Iranian retaliation. Some, however, have also argued that it doesn’t want another regime in place in Iran, as that could limit its regional power projection in the future.

The current position that Saudi Arabia has taken is no less consequential. Riyadh’s reluctance to allow US strike aircraft to transit Saudi airspace has come as a surprise to some. However, the Kingdom’s current position reflects some hard-learned lessons from years of regional escalation. It is also primarily based on thawing relations between Tehran and Riyadh, instigated by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in recent years, which could threaten de-escalation strategies. A renewed use of airspace by the USA would cause a total breakdown. It is assessed that the opening of the skies will not only reverse that calculus but also invite Iranian retaliation. The Kingdom’s critical infrastructure is feared to be a significant target, especially oil, gas, and ports. Iranian missiles, cyber-attacks, and drones could hit them all. Current assessments in Riyadh point out that the costs are asymmetrical and immediate. Still, beneath the surface, there may be room for optimism, especially if the calculations in Riyadh point to positive outcomes and opportunities in the event of the removal of the Khamenei regime. Things could change within hours if the regime continues to weaken.

At present, however, the Qatari denial and Saudi refusal clearly narrow Washington’s menu. These developments, if the USA is unwilling to take contrary unilateral decisions, are complicating sortie generation, extending flight paths, and increasing operational risk. It still doesn’t prevent or block a strike; it has only become more complex. It has also become more politically charged, which is affecting the delay.

Delay as pressure, not paralysis

Washington’s pause is currently solely attributed to Arab resistance. This position, however, seems to miss the more profound logic at work, as US military doctrine has become increasingly intelligence centric. The US doctrine’s goal is not simply to destroy targets, as the media often portrays. The main goal is to map the system, focusing on what the command chains, decision thresholds, and Iranian escalation ladders are. It also wants to identify its failure points. This strategic patience aims to prevent unintended escalation, maintain regional stability, and preserve US influence, making delays a calculated component of a broader policy framework.

Due to the increased or perceived immediate and present danger of a US military strike, the Tehran regime, and even its proxies, have been forced into a state of strategic exposure. In the last days, as shown in previous days, the IRGC has already been pushed to activate its air defenses, reposition its missile units, move its naval assets, engage in drone testing, and make for intensified proxy activity. Iran’s regime and power base pushed all of it to signal deterrence. However, for US (and Israeli) intelligence, each move is also a data point.

The real outcome of all, including the US delay, is that Tehran has been compelled to show its cards. This deliberate timing serves as a form of strategic signaling, influencing Iran’s calculations and regional actors’ perceptions of US resolve and patience, which can shape future negotiations and deterrence dynamics.

For US intelligence, satellite imagery, cyber traffic, command-and-control patterns, electronic emissions, and logistics movements have been observed over the past few days. These are much more valuable than the existing static intelligence gathered in the days and weeks before.  By delaying, even at the cost of innocent Iranians fighting for their future, Washington has been opening up the opportunity to Iranian planners to self-identify priorities and vulnerabilities. All the new signatures are currently being processed and assessed to enable US forces to refine targeting and sequencing.

It should be understood that this is not conjecture, but a logical outcome of how contemporary warfare is prepared. Under increased pressure, a potential adversary reveals more of his capabilities and strategies than during a period of rest. In the Iran case, you can argue that a delay is a form of reconnaissance by provocation. Still, only under the condition that this is not a political move to retreat, but part of a preparation to act.

Endurance and strategic exhaustion

The other dimension is endurance. Exhausting an adversary is a strategic option already evident in ongoing Chinese moves in the South China Sea and Taiwan. For the US and others, it is clear that Iran’s IRGC thrives on calibrated tension. Its primary strategy is based on short, sharp escalations followed by pauses. At the same time, the Mullah regime’s leading power broker struggles with sustained uncertainty. Centralizing its current elevated readiness is putting financial pressure on its capabilities, while it is also stressful and destabilizing for its elite units. For Khamenei’s survival in the long run, IRGC loyalty is essential.

A delay, but continued military pressure, Washington is shifting the burden onto Tehran. At present, the regime is not only battling an uprising, but has to have its assets dispersed, crews on alert, its leadership bunkered, while also keeping its proxies mobilized. Keeping this posture for a long time will not only erode morale but also increase the risk of mistakes. Another potential outcome is heightened internal friction.

This potential dynamic fits especially into the US strategies. Washington is definitely not going to be engaged in a full-scale war, but only a limited, targeted, and designed operation. To be the most effective at the lowest cost, such as a strike, it will have to hit the right nodes. It seems that Washington wants only to degrade capability (armed forces, IRGC) but not trigger an uncontrollable escalation. By delaying action, the US hopes to identify these nodes correctly.

The Arab dilemma: restraint with consequences

At the same time, the current situation has identified a new risk that could have a long-term impact and push the USA to reassess its position in the region. The current Arab opposition should not be assessed as cost-free for Washington. Qatar’s denial of Al Udeid and Saudi Arabia’s caution over airspace have sent a signal to global markets and allies, not only to Iran. The statements made by Doha and Riyadh have made clear that partner politics constrain the US freedom of action in the region. This will be seen as carrying significant risks for the future.

In the coming days or weeks, Iran will assess this as a weakness of the US deterrence. It could encourage Tehran to test boundaries and probe how far it can go. For the US, it is complicating alliance management, particularly with Israel.

When looking at the Gulf states, especially Qatar or Saudi Arabia, the calculus is brutally rational. Both fear that a US strike launched from their own soil makes them targets. Arab governments, however, should also understand that by limiting US options, the latter could step up its strategic posture, broadening the scope. It could certainly make the US less sensitive to regional political fallout. Arab capitals should start to understand that by seeking insulation, they are most likely trading short-term safety for long-term unpredictability.

Markets misread the pause

Delays again should not be read as de-escalation. One sector that is always prone to this misinterpretation is financial markets. It seems they continue to use their shallow interpretation approach. While risk premia have ebbed, fundamentals didn’t change at all. Most probably, they should reassess all; a delay does not mean cancellation; it may mean preparation.

The future could show a very different and dangerous picture. It increasingly becomes an option that the longer Washington delays, the more likely it is that any eventual action will be more disruptive than what could have happened. Investors typically price in calm into their models on the assumption that “nothing happened today” could be misunderstood, not only the nature of the game, which is not based on algorithms and spreadsheets, but also on intelligence and military assessments.

The strategic paradox

Current Arab moves have constrained how the US can strike, but they have not removed the why. At present, Iran’s behavior continues to challenge US interests. Not only is America’s credibility on the line, but it is also Trump’s!

By delaying, the US buys intelligence, strains Iranian readiness, and tests the cohesion of the regime’s security apparatus. But it also risks misinterpretation if Tehran misreads that the moves made by Arab capitals have tied Washington’s hands permanently. If Khamenei or the IRGC starts to believe this, escalation is increasingly likely.

Waiting is not standing still

As history has shown, the silence before the storm is the most dangerous period. Based on current assessments and moves made by the US, it has become clear that when it acts, it will not look like the dramatic opening salvos many expect, but it will be a precise, asymmetric, and informed military operation. Maybe it would be invaluable to see the current pause as the pre-strike phase, not the post-crisis one.

Delays should not be confused with stability. The absence of action is not the absence of intent. Time is also definitely not neutral; it is used for assessments with a deliberate, methodical intent and outcome. The consequences will only be visible once the waiting ends.