Global markets have treated Iran as a geopolitical constant, at least over the last few years. It was always seen as a significant regional power but was heavily sanctioned and constrained; however, it was ruled by a reasonably stable regime under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Commodity traders, shippers, and insurance companies have been assessing Iran, mainly by pricing proxy warfare, shadow exports, harassments, and seizures, as a constant but manageable risk. Looking at the current situation, or even since the direct involvement of Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen, but especially since the US-Israeli military actions in 2025, that assumption has become very fragile. Even though most analysts and companies are looking at a sudden Iranian revolution, which could dismantle the Khamenei regime, or a real hard power intervention by the US and/or Israel, targeting the crippling of the country’s military and nuclear infrastructure, as a local shock, reality will be different. In case of such separate or combined events, Iran’s crisis will detonate a maritime chain reaction stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, and possibly even have negative repercussions in the Suez Canal and the eastern Mediterranean, which should evoke concern and alertness among policymakers and security strategists.

Where most analysis of pundits and politicians at present is totally wrong, is the conception that regime collapse equals immediate de-escalation. When looking at the maritime sphere, the opposite is much more plausible. History should have taught us that revolutions and large-scale strikes don’t create instant stability; they create transition vacuums. Looking at shipping (and commodity trading), the real danger of an explosion or implosion of Iran is not linked only to Iran’s intent, but in the fact that there will be fragmentation of command, increased (even unwanted) autonomy of proxies, and still not fully assessed the temptation for multiple actors (including 3rd parties) to weaponize chokepoints simultaneously, which should evoke a sense of urgency and preparedness among industry professionals and analysts.

Most attention is again being focused on the Persian Gulf, with its central artery chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly a fifth of globally traded oil and a significant share of LNG flows through this particular maritime arena. Even though Iran has been very active in recent years, Iranian behavior has always been calibrated. It has only done selective seizures, used deniable harassment, and in case of escalation, the latter was controlled. This so-called discipline will be removed with a bang in the event of a revolution or a regime-crippling strike.

There are several plausible scenarios in the coming days or weeks. The first scenario is a revolutionary one, in which it is very likely that Iran’s naval and missile forces will be split among loyalists, defectors, and opportunists. At the same time, the main other change will be that control over fast-attack craft, coastal missile batteries, and naval drones will also be fragmented. For regional and even global shipping, this will be the worst-case situation, even in the event of a short-lived command breakdown. The results will be that not only the need for convoys, naval escorts, and re-routing will become reality, but also that the maritime sector will face increased war-risk premia, higher insurance costs, and potential supply chain disruptions affecting global markets.

Scenario two, which is a whole–scale US–Israel military campaign, will not only generate a different pattern but will also be equally disruptive. Markets should not misunderstand the fact that Tehran’s current doctrine still treats shipping as a pressure point. Iran doesn’t need a full-scale conventional forces capability to do this, so even when Western military action degrades its conventional forces, it will still be more than capable of mounting asymmetric retaliation, using mines, drones, and cyber interference with port systems. The primary targets would also not be Western assets, but most likely Gulf maritime infrastructure. Ports in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar will all be facing elevated threat levels, with additionally having to counter not necessarily Tehran’s direct orders, but threats coming from semi-autonomous units (Iranian or proxies), which will all be more than interested to prove themselves to be relevant in a post-strike environment.

In both scenarios, regional ports will become pressure points, no longer to be regarded as neutral infrastructure. For Persian/Arabian Gulf ports, all of which have been analyzed as passive nodes until now, they have been political instruments for years. UAE’s Ras Tanura, Fujairah, Jebel Ali, and Hamad ports have been embedded in Emirati state security strategies for years. Gulf states will be forced, if the perception prevails that Iran can no longer be deterred, to militarize port operations. For conventional operations, such as shipping and trade, this will result in tighter access controls and slower turnaround times. At the same time, all operators and shippers will need to adjust to prioritizing national (GCC) cargoes over transit trade, which should inspire strategic planning and proactive security measures among policymakers.

Maritime trade will also have to adjust, or already assess, the fact that even in a post-Khamenei Iran, seeking reintegration into the regional and global order, there will be a transition period with brutal effects on maritime trade. History has shown a significant fact of life: revolutionary regimes typically engage in a purge, reorganization, and renegotiation strategy. When looking at maritime trade and infrastructure, the latter will entail that port authorities, customs regimes, and shipping contracts will need to be frozen or rewritten. Additionally, the use of the so-called shadow fleets, currently carrying Iranian crude, should not be expected to disappear overnight. Most probably, the role will even increase, as they will be able to operate with even less oversight during this transition period or power vacuum, resulting in increased collisions, environmental, and insurance risks across the Gulf.

At the same time, so-called “out of area” spillovers are to be expected. The current geopolitical hybrid war situation will clearly indicate that distance no longer protects. One main spillover is scheduled in the Red Sea, where Iran’s leverage does not depend on its navy but on its proxies. The position and strategy of Yemen’s Houthis will need to be taken into account, without delay. An Iranian regime collapse, or a degradation of its power due to a heavy strike, would not neutralize the Houthis at all. The contrary can even be supported, as such a development will push proxies to act more aggressively, especially when a central sponsorship is disrupted. The Houthis will either feel the need to prove relevance or to secure bargaining power, possibly with new patrons.

In the above-mentioned situation, it is clear that the Bab El-Mandeb again becomes a frontline. Even though global shipping has become accustomed to rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope because of Houthi attacks, the stakes will be raised again by a wider Iranian shock. The reality could be that there will be coordinated or opportunistic attacks intensified on commercial vessels. It will also be a situation in which insurers reassess Red Sea transits altogether. The ultimate result could not be the most wanted, but lead not to a temporary detour, but to a structural reconfiguration of Asia–Europe trade routes.

One of the main casualties again could be Egypt, as its Suez Canal will be looking at a return of strategic leverage. The country’s canal revenues are highly sensitive to global risk perceptions, and analysts will be worried about the fallout. A sustained or prolonged Gulf–Red Sea crisis would not only reduce transits but also hit Egypt’s income, maybe pushing the Sisi government to a more overt security role. In any case, which is not hoped for at all, the Suez Canal will cease to play the role of a neutral artery. It will for sure re-emerge as a strategic asset whose availability is implicitly linked to regional alignments.

Europe should be paying attention to it all. European Asian trade will be affected, as reduced or non-existent Suez traffic would put a strain on European ports. A closure or disruption will immediately disrupt just-in-time supply chains and increase reliance on Atlantic routes. At the same time, the effects on the eastern Mediterranean also need to be considered. Greek, Italian, Turkish, and Israeli ports would face both opportunity and risk. While some cargoes might divert there, heightened military activity and missile threats would keep insurers cautious.

Looking further, global energy markets will be hit as volatility takes the lead over volume. Most energy traders are focusing on barrels lost in their assessments, but now the real danger is volatility, not absolute shortage. If Gulf energy exports continue, the fallout will spread, draining liquidity. It will also be rewarding actors who can move molecules more flexibly. National oil companies (NOCs), which are increasingly dominating supply markets, have, until now, been the least structurally equipped to manage such volatility. Most NOCs have to prioritize political objectives and long-term contracts over crisis arbitrage.

There are some clear winners, as IOCs, mostly more diversified, and traders, are going to be the recipients of opportunities. In a fractured Gulf, these parties are more able to source LNG from multiple basins, while also swapping cargoes mid-voyage and absorbing political risk. The latter is not going to be a market luxury but a stabilizing function. For Europe, it is better to understand that in a future in which it becomes more dependent on single-supplier NOCs, while having strategies to marginalize portfolio players (such as Shell, Total, or Exxon), a shock coming from an Iranian upheaval will be magnified.

A possible military strike by the USA (and Israel) or an Iranian revolution will also confront parties with another hard constraint: naval capacity. At present, due to global conflicts or strategies, Western navies, as well as regional navies, will be stretched to the fullest, as they are already engaged in the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific. Assisting security operations in the maritime sphere will be hard to sustain. Maritime operators, as well as traders and industry, should understand that sustained convoy operations across multiple chokepoints are resource-intensive, so shipping should not assume indefinite or complete protection.

On another level, maritime security operations can also elevate risks, as they could increase the probability of miscalculations. Looking at the Arabian/Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, or the Bab El Mandab, these risks will increase due to crowded waters and the mixing of commercial and military operations.  During a transition period or a post-regime Iran, this can happen, not only as an accidental collision but also due to a misidentified target, as authority lines in Tehran will be blurred.

Europe is not only facing its own blind spot again but also should feel uncomfortable about it. Policymakers have framed Europe’s energy security in terms of decarbonisation and supplier diversification. At the same time, most of its maritime security has been seen or treated as externality. In the coming days, an Iranian shock could expose that major fallacy, as the continent’s trade model depends on long, exposed sea lanes. Brussels and London have somehow forgotten that they don’t have control over them. It should reassess all options, especially when looking at the Gulf–Red Sea corridor, which is not peripheral but systemic.

In the long run, based on possible changes, a post-Khamenei Iran could be less hostile. Still, when looking at shipping, they don’t operate in the long run; they operate only tomorrow morning. For this sector, trade, and regional stability (depending on it), the upcoming transition period, which could be months or years of uncertainty, will be a perilous phase. A decisive military strike will most probably degrade Iran’s capabilities but also lead to a wider maritime confrontation. A new deterrent equilibrium will only emerge long after.

For markets, but also (regional) societies and stability, the real future risk is simultaneity, a combination of more than 2-3 different shocks. Looking at the option of several shocks happening at the same time, the Iran crisis could become a textbook event. Markets, financials, and insurers can deal with a blockade or disruption of two main chokepoints; it is painful but not deadly. To have this in three chokepoints, Hormuz, Bab El Mandab, and Suez, destabilization of all is there. All three chokepoints are interconnected. An Iranian implosion or regime change could activate such a combination.

Maritime sector’s worst fear could be seen very soon. It is a scenario in which not closures but persistent unpredictability will rule multiple corridors. This will lead to higher freight rates, higher insurance costs, and the existence of smaller operators. At the same time, global trade is expected to tilt further toward those with scale, capital, and political backing.

After Tehran, the sea will decide.

The fate or future of Iran’s regime is decided onshore, with the consequences for the region and the world at sea. The picture drawn shows that a shock in Iran will reverberate through ports, chokepoints, and shipping lanes. This time it will be felt far beyond the Gulf. Global trade and flows will resume; the main question, however, will be “who controls flows, what will be the costs, and under whose protection?”

The current developments are no longer linked to nukes, ideology, or sanctions. In the coming weeks and months, it will become clear whether the maritime system that underpins globalization can absorb another structural shock. It will also show if the world has prepared itself for the moment when the Gulf’s managed instability gives way to something far more chaotic.