Author: Admiral(rtr) PhD. Aurel POPA
“S8NTH Strategic Engine is a decision-making synthesis engine that uses synthetic intelligence for multi-domain analysis, scenario simulation, and decision-making consequence assessment, functioning exclusively as a support tool for the human factor,without decision-making autonomy.”
1. Introduction: the event and its strategic relevance
At dawn on January 3, 2026, the United States conducted a military operation in Venezuela, publicly referred to as “Operation Absolute Resolve,” which resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and their transfer to the United States for legal proceedings. The operation was presented by the US administration as a law enforcement action supported by military capabilities, which immediately generated internal legal and political controversy in the US and strong international reactions. Beyond its normative dimension, the operation is significant as a case study for the evolution of modern operations: the rapid combination of air capabilities, special forces, electronic warfare, space surveillance, and—at least declaratively—”cyber effects” that would have facilitated the maneuver.
This analysis uses only information from credible open sources (especially Reuters, CSIS analyses, but also Bloomberg-type economic-strategic reports), aiming to reconstruct a probable operational thread, to delimit what is publicly confirmed from what remains a cautious inference, and to extract doctrinal implications, including regarding the role of artificial intelligence in military decision-making support.
2. Political decision and preparation: operational window, weather conditions, and risk control
According to Reuters’ report on the preparation of the operation, the final decision was made in a political context of maximum visibility for the US leadership, and approval was delayed in order to choose a window with favorable weather conditions, particularly regarding cloud cover and visibility. This seemingly technical information is in fact a key insight into the concept of operations: choosing a weather window that favors ISR platforms and precision strikes, while reducing the likelihood of targeting errors or degradation of the common operational picture.
It was a lengthy planning process, in which the intelligence community and military planners followed a strict sequencing of stages so that the moment of insertion of the capture force would be synchronized with the degradation of defenses and the achievement of surprise. In doctrinal terms, this is an example of “risk-managed operational design,” in which the strategic objective is achieved by compressing exposure time and controlling the density of critical events in a short period.
3. The intelligence and “pattern-of-life” stage: HUMINT, ISR, and mission rehearsal
A recurring feature of high-value target (HVT) capture operations is the massive investment in identifying security patterns, target routines, and access vulnerabilities. Reuters explicitly describes the existence of a replica (“mock house”) for training special operations forces and indicates that sources in the intelligence community contributed to shaping the tactical picture and confirming the window of opportunity. This stage reduces uncertainty at the moment of entry and allows for standardization of responses, which is crucial in dense urban environments where collateral risks and adversary reaction times can escalate rapidly.
In addition, public accounts indicate that the operation involved fine synchronization between target monitoring, assault force preparation, and air package configuration. This synchronization requires, in practice, a command and control architecture that can rapidly integrate ISR feeds and replanning decisions, even if the technical tools used are not detailed publicly.
4. The actual deployment: the air package and the sequencing of effects
Converging reports (Reuters and subsequent reports citing military briefings) indicate that the operation involved more than 150 aircraft and was supported by launches from multiple bases in the Western Hemisphere. This scale is unusual for a simple extraction and suggests a logic of “layered effects”: air superiority, escort, strike, ISR, refueling, electronic warfare, and insertion/exfiltration for special forces, all integrated into a very short window.
In operational terms, the likely sequence followed a classic modern architecture: first, the degradation of air defenses and sensors (SEAD/DEAD in the broad sense), then the stabilization of a “window” of air mobility over Caracas, and finally, the insertion of special forces for capture and extraction. Business Insider reports emphasize that there were no American casualties and that Venezuela’s Russian air defenses did not shoot down any American aircraft, which is interpreted as a result of surprise, preparation, and the combination of stealth, EW, and ISR.
This detail is important not as an absolute technological judgment on Russian systems, but as a lesson about the difference between an air defense network prepared for high-intensity conflict and a network that is surprised, possibly fragmented, and operated under conditions of variable maintenance, readiness, and interoperability. In a short operation, time compression favors the attacker, and the defense has difficulty moving from detection to coordinated response.
5. The role of electronic warfare and the space domain: sensory degradation and electromagnetic dominance
Several sources explicitly indicate the role of electronic warfare and surveillance platforms in the architecture of the operation. Conceptually, in a capture operation, it is not enough to physically neutralize certain systems; it is crucial to reduce the quality of the adversary’s perception of the situation. Electronic warfare, in a broad sense, can introduce an artificial operational “fog”: radar jamming, communication disruption, false signal induction, or data link degradation. In an urban environment, where rapid reactions depend on C2 and communication between units, electromagnetic dominance has an immediate strategic effect.
At the same time, the integration of the space domain (surveillance, warning, communications) is typical of multi-domain operations, as it provides ISR persistence and communications redundancy in conditions where terrestrial networks may be disrupted.
6. The cyber dimension: “cyber effects,” blackouts, and the evidentiary limit
Bloomberg explicitly discussed references by US officials to “cyber effects” that would have “paved the way” for the capture of the target, emphasizing that this dimension is becoming an increasingly visible component of the US arsenal. At the same time, information circulated in the public sphere about power outages in Caracas that coincided with the operation, but public sources do not allow for a firm determination of the causal mechanism (cyber vs. other means).
From an academic point of view, the prudent conclusion is as follows: there are credible indications that non-kinetic effects synchronized with the maneuver were produced, but the exact technical nature of these effects remains unconfirmed publicly to a standard sufficient for deterministic statements. This limitation does not diminish the analytical relevance; on the contrary, it shows how much the “gray area” (between kinetic, electromagnetic, and cybernetic) has become an integral part of modern operational design.
7. Doctrinal framework: Multi-Domain Operations and “speed of relevance”
NATO describes Multi-Domain Operations as the orchestration of military activities across all operational domains, synchronized with non-military activities, to create convergent effects “at the speed of relevance.” This formulation is useful for interpreting the operation in Venezuela: success is not explained solely by platforms or units, but by the ability to produce convergence of effects in a short period of time, so that the adversary cannot complete the observation-orientation-decision-action cycle.
At the same time, NATO emphasizes that emerging technologies, including AI, are changing the nature of conflict and increasing the importance of information superiority and critical infrastructure resilience. Operation Absolute Resolve can be understood as an example of the practical application of this reasoning: effective military action is inseparable from the information architecture that supports it.
8. The role of artificial intelligence and synthetic intelligence. Where does S8NTH Strategic Engine fit in?
There is no public evidence that a specific artificial intelligence or synthetic intelligence solution was used as a distinct system in this operation. However, two elements require the integration of an AI analysis: the first is that the operation relied heavily on ISR, rapid information integration, and the coordination of a complex “package”; the second is the allied recognition that AI is already mainstream in capability development, interoperability, and responsible use for defense and security.
In an operation such as “Absolute Resolve,” artificial intelligence can play a role in three areas in particular, without reaching decision-making autonomy: sensor data fusion, pattern analysis and risk assessment, and multi-scenario simulation to support planning. Data fusion involves integrating feeds from airborne, satellite, and ground sources to maintain a common operational picture stable enough for insertion and exfiltration to be synchronized. Pattern analysis is relevant in the preparation stage, to consolidate the pattern of life and anticipate the security reactions of the target’s entourage. Multi-scenario simulation is indispensable for assessing routes, weather windows, collateral risks, and side effects, including in the event of urban infrastructure disruptions.
In its revised AI strategy, NATO emphasizes accelerating AI adoption, interoperability, and responsible use, precisely to avoid confusion between “decision support” and “decision substitution.” This is the key distinction in the context of the operation: AI should not be assumed to be an “agent” that decides on capture, but rather an infrastructure that can compress analysis time and increase the quality of information provided to human decision-makers.
The S8NTH Strategic Engine also fits into this logic, but it must be stated rigorously: there is no public confirmation of the use of S8NTH in the operation in Venezuela. Its mention only makes sense as a conceptual analysis: an S8NTH-type synthetic intelligence system, designed to integrate operational, logistical, technical, and financial data, would be doctrinally compatible with the need to quickly correlate multi-domain effects and evaluate decision-making consequences in a short window. Unlike narrow AI applications (e.g., image recognition), synthetic intelligence is mainly relevant at the decision-making synthesis level: it can support “orchestration” by correlating constraints and anticipating side effects on resources and infrastructure. In a capture operation, such a system would not “drive” the operation, but could support, in a human-in-the-loop regime, the substantiation of options and rapid validation of scenarios, in line with NATO principles of human responsibility.
9. Strategic implications and the limits of “success bias”
The operation sparked discussions about the effectiveness of Venezuelan air defense and the significance of the fact that no American aircraft were shot down. A mature analysis must avoid “success bias”: success in a short, surprise raid is not the same as success in a long campaign or a high-intensity conflict. At the same time, international reactions and internal challenges in the US show that strategic effects are not measured only in terms of operational efficiency, but also in terms of normative, reputational, and escalation costs.
10. Resetting military strategy?
There have been “multidimensional” operations before, but what seems to differentiate the current era (and, in particular, the case of Venezuela) is the density of integration and the speed of convergence between domains. In other words, we are not inventing multi-domain from scratch; but today we are doing it at scale, with lower latency and much greater dependence on networks, data, and non-kinetic effects. This, indeed, requires a conceptual “reset.”
Historically, many “special” operations have been essentially multi-domain: air or naval insertion, ISR support, electronic warfare, deception, information management, and exfiltration. The literature explicitly compares operations such as Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) and Neptune Spear (the raid against bin Laden, 2011) precisely in terms of the combination of air, special, and information capabilities.
What is new in recent years is that, in addition to air-land-sea, space and cyberspace have become “native” parts of the same equation, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) has gone from being a support function to a condition for success. NATO formalizes this transition from “joint” to “multi-domain” by explaining that it now operates in five domains: maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace, which must be orchestrated simultaneously[1].
10.1. What is changing structurally: from platform superiority to decision superiority
What is fundamentally changing is the center of gravity: it is no longer just those with better platforms who win, but those with the fastest, most resilient, and most difficult to interrupt “kill chain”—that is, the links between sensors, processing, decision-makers, and effects. Contemporary analyses of the lessons of Ukraine use precisely this framework: victory depends on the speed and resilience of the “sensor-to-shooter” chain, in an environment saturated with sensors and relatively transparent[2].
This is, in fact, why NATO and its partners are increasingly talking about decision superiority / decision advantage: seeing faster, understanding better, deciding faster, and adapting more coherently than the adversary.
10.2. Doctrinal integration: MDO and JADC2 as the “engine” of the new strategy
NATO describes Multi-Domain Operations as the orchestration of activities in all domains, synchronized and with non-military instruments, to produce effects at the right time and place. In parallel, JADC2 approaches in the US explicitly define the “sense–make sense–act” triad and assert that a large volume of data, automation/AI, and resilient infrastructure are needed to act within the adversary’s decision-making cycle[3].
For future operations, this means that strategy will no longer be based solely on the “order of strikes,” but on the information architecture that allows striking (or capturing, or blocking) at the optimal moment, with converging effects.
10.3. Where artificial intelligence and “synthetic intelligence” (including S8NTH) come in
Realistically, AI should not be thought of as a “decision maker.” Its major role is to compress cognitive time: data fusion, pattern detection, prioritization, multi-scenario simulation, and consequence estimation. It is precisely these capabilities that are invoked by official documents and communications about modern C2, including within the initial CJADC2 capabilities, which explicitly mention AI as an accelerator of decision quality and speed.
In this architecture, the S8NTH Strategic Engine fits as synthetic intelligence: it not only optimizes a subsystem, but also integrates multi-domain constraints (operational–logistical–technical–financial) to generate decision options and consequences in a human-in-the-loop regime. Importantly, for real operations, the “value” is not AI itself, but its governance: traceability, audit, human control, and resilience to disruptions (EW/cyber).
10.4.How will this logic change the strategy of future military actions
In strategic terms, six robust changes are foreseeable:
- Strategy becomes truly network-centric: not “platform-centric,” but “linkage-centric” (the chain of links between domains)[4].
- EW and cyber become conditions of possibility, not just auxiliary capabilities: whoever loses the electromagnetic spectrum loses the rhythm of the operation.
- Space becomes a routine operational domain, not just a strategic one; the lessons of Ukraine confirm the role of space services and their degradation.
- “Time compression” and “speed of relevance” will push planning toward pre-prepared scenarios and assisted decision-making; otherwise, the adversary breaks the decision chain.
- Legality and legitimacy become part of the operation’s design, not an “afterthought”: narrative, attribution, and decision auditing (especially when AI supports) become central to the strategy. (Here, NATO insists on responsible use and human control.)
- Resilience becomes symmetrical with lethality: a system that sees quickly but falls to jamming/cyber loses its advantage.
11. Conclusion
“Operation Absolute Resolve” is a textbook case of multi-domain convergence in a short window: lengthy preparation, massive air package, EW/ISR integration, special forces insertion, and possibly non-kinetic effects described as “cyber effects.” ¹³⁷ At the same time, the operation highlights the evolution of decision-making infrastructures: even if the use of a specific AI system is not publicly confirmed, NATO’s doctrinal framework and technological trends indicate that AI and, emerging, synthetic intelligence are becoming central to compressing analysis time and increasing decision coherence. ⁸¹⁰ In this regard, the S8NTH Strategic Engine can be used as a conceptual reference for what integrated decision support means, as long as its mention remains within the correct evidentiary limits: not as “proof” of use in the operation, but as a model of architecture compatible with multi-domain requirements and the principle of human control.
MARITIME SECURITY FORUM
[1] https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/?
[2] https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2592&context=jss&utm
[3] https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.pdf
[4] https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2592&context=jss&utm