Since 1979, Western policy towards Iran has fluctuated between deterrence and diplomacy. Western governments and alliances have been stuck between sanctions and negotiations, covert pressure and rhetorical restraint, but results have been minimal. The West, not learning from Iraq-Kuwait (1991), Iraq 2003, Libya-Syria (Arab Spring), or Afghanistan, again doesn’t have a serious plan for a situation in which success results in the most destabilising result: the implosion and removal of the Islamic Republic itself. At present, such a scenario, until now always dismissed as fantasy, seems to be discussed and discussed more openly in Washington, and hinted at by Israeli strategic circles. At the same time, whispers are heard across Gulf capitals. The hardening tone by the Trump Administration, while linking all to Israel’s increasingly explicit linkage between Iran’s regional network and its own existential security, seems to push forward a realization that the survival of the Mullah regime in Tehran is no longer treated as a given.

In the case of such an implosion, whether due to internal collapse, elite fragmentation, or an external shock, the situation would not at all resemble the neat “regime change” narratives of policy papers. The end of the Islamic Republic of Iran would for sure trigger a systemic crisis across the Middle East. The consequences of all of this could rival or exceed those of a regional war. In stark contrast to what some media are pushing, or politicians are hoping for, the removal of the Iranian regime will not result in immediate stability, nor would it open up Iran’s oil and gas sector and push a flood of hydrocarbons into the market. Commodity traders, investors, and politicians should assess that it will be the opposite: it could not only unleash a prolonged period of fragmentation but also lead to proxy violence and geopolitical realignment. All of these internal and external factors will have profound implications for energy security and global power balances.

The possibility of an implosion of Iran’s system and power brokers has become increasingly visible, as the internal preconditions for such an implosion are in plain sight. After years of internal strength of the overall ruling system, its current political system now mainly rests on a brittle compact between clerical authority, the security apparatus, and economic patronage networks. The results of sanctions, mismanagement, demographic pressure, and social repression are now coming together, eroding the compact.  The cross-class waves of protests are showing a depth of alienation that no amount of repression has been able to resolve. Until now, the regime has been able to survive due to its control of coercion, which is very important. Any system that is primarily sustained by force will fracture suddenly, not gradually.

At the same time, external pressure is increasing, with a focus on the mullah regime, which is compounding internal stress. After a long period of ambiguity, the Trump Administration is showing a more confrontational posture, especially by framing Iran as the central source of regional instability. The latter combined with frames such as Iran’s nuclear ambitions, ongoing proxy warfare, and sanctions evasion, the country’s elite has become a single threat narrative. While Washington is increasing its pressure and threats, Israel has also changed its approach and strategy. While Iran was once seen as a distant strategic problem, it is now viewed as an immediate operational one. Policymakers should evaluate how regional actors like Israel and Gulf states might exploit or respond to regime collapse, affecting stability and security dynamics.

It should be understood that an implosion of the current Iranian regime will not mean an end to the country’s regional influence overnight. At present, the most durable legacy of the extremist Islamic Republic is not its formal state power; the real impact and legacy is its network of proxies and militias. The latter has been cultivated and expanded over decades precisely to ensure strategic depth and deniability. While most attention is being put, of course, by international media and observers on the well-known groups, especially Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, policymakers should also focus on the Iraqi Shia militias, which pose a significant threat to regional stability. Understanding the resilience and potential radicalization of these proxies is crucial for developing effective policy responses to a possible regime collapse.

If the Iranian regime collapses, these proxies will not automatically dissolve. It can be expected that some, and maybe even most, of them will radicalise further. Western politicians and advisors should assess the situation and act independently to demonstrate their relevance or secure resources. Some will for sure go the other way, fragment along factional or tribal lines. While most attention is being put on Iran, its neighbor is facing a very acute risk. Iraq will have to deal with Iranian-backed Shia militias, most of whom are deeply entrenched within the state. A long list of these militias controls territory, has vast economic assets, and has set up armed units, only nominally under central (Baghdad) control. An implosion or a developing power vacuum in Tehran could push these militias to compete violently with one another. In such a situation, Iraq could be destabilized, especially if it is still the central linchpin or confrontational theatre between the Gulf, Iran, and the Levant.

Lebanon, already facing instability and power struggles, could be facing a similar dilemma, as Hezbollah remains a leading power broker. The latter’s power rests partly on Iranian support and on its own domestic entrenchment and military capability. For Hezbollah, in the event of an Iranian implosion, there are two options, both with internal and external repercussions. It could either be pushed towards escalation externally (Israel) to rally its base, and indirectly justifying its military arsenal. The other option, maybe even more dangerous, is that it will turn inward, tightening its grip on Lebanon’s fragile state. Either path increases the risk of domestic or regional conflict.

Gulf Arabs will, for sure, at present look at Yemen, and especially the Houthis’ position. Even though they are currently portrayed as mere Iranian proxies, it should be expected that the group will recalibrate, as their grip on territory and missile capabilities already gives them leverage independent of Tehran. In the coming period, if Iran collapses, it is to be expected that the Houthis will act more unpredictably, either seeking new patrons or escalating pressure on its neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia. For sure, more actions should be expected regarding maritime routes, as this will help strengthen their bargaining position.

While examining proxies, it is more interesting to assess Iran’s own options in the face of an existential threat. As history has shown, regimes under siege do not go quietly, so Iran’s Mullahs also do not. If the Khamenei regime feels that it will collapse or be removed soon, there are powerful incentives to externalise the crisis. As already indicated in the last hours, as stated by Khamenei, Iran will attack U.S. bases in Iraq, Syria, or the Gulf if Washington (and/or Israel) acts. By saying these obvious threats, Tehran is trying to use blunt language, indicating a willingness to raise the cost of pressure and force Washington into crisis management. Iran’s regime has already repeated threats that Gulf Cooperation Council states, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, are potential targets. These threats can be real, as Iran still holds a vast arsenal of missiles and drones, or can use its extensive cyber operations capabilities. All actions that make it difficult for others to respond can be carried out through covert operations, supported by the sabotage of energy infrastructure.

The grim reality of this is that the logic behind it is rational, not emotional or religious. If the Khamenei regime cannot guarantee its own survival, it can still ensure that its fall will be costly. For Iran’s regime, however, the risk is also extremely high, as it is clear that such actions would invite retaliation. This will accelerate escalation precisely when internal cohesion in Iran is weakest. While most military strategies and planning are built on rational fundamentals, it should be understood that a collapsing state with a vast missile arsenal and multiple proxy channels is still far more dangerous, especially if there are some extremist religious parties involved, than a stable adversary. A no-survival scenario doesn’t hold anybody back from using an Armageddon strategy.

For Western parties, such as the USA and Israel, this situation creates a strategic dilemma. Let’s hope the lessons learned from Libya (Gaddafi), Syria (Assad), Egypt (Mubarak), and Iraq (Saddam Hussein) have been taken into account this time, as it is clear that pressuring Iran towards collapse may remove a long-standing adversary, but could result in an unwanted situation. These unleashing forces are more complex to control than the regime itself. While Washington is very frustrated with the costs of containment, there are no signs that the Trump Administration has a comprehensive plan for the “day after. The results of the actions taken in Venezuela don’t bode well for an Iranian operation.  For Israel, the overall calculus is narrow, but it should not underestimate the outcome. While the result sought is to weaken Iran’s command over its proxies, reducing or removing long-term threats, the immediate outcome could, however, be the opposite: a multi-front chaos it doesn’t want to face.

At the same time, the Arab Gulf states are watching from the sidelines, with no real options. The ambivalence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE is evident, as the removal of the Islamic Republic would eliminate the primary source of ideological and military pressure. At the same time, a fragmented or destabilized Iran, possibly also facing civil war, could be a new and chronic source of instability, smuggling, radicalisation, and cross-border insecurity. For most Gulf leaders, a predictable adversary is easier to manage than a vacuum. In this, they have read Israeli strategies, it seems, as the latter was always cautious in removing heads of Arab states.

Whatever happens in the coming hours, days, or weeks, the main “casualty,” as always, is the oil and gas market. At the same time, it will be tempting to follow the route that the fall of the Iranian regime will lead to the unleashing of suppressed supply, resulting in a flood of Iranian crude and gas into global markets. Again, markets should have learned, or read the news about Venezuela, that this is a dangerous illusion. Regime collapse would almost certainly disrupt production rather than expand it. At present, Iran’s energy sector is deeply intertwined with state institutions and is mainly linked to IRGC organizations or leadership. The latter is fully supported by sanctions-evasion networks and a still vast and compelling security structure. If the regime implodes, these structures will also be fractured, leaving a significant power vacuum, with the option of infighting or outright violence. Such a situation, which will be a reality, will not only deter foreign investment but also increase operational risks.

Looking to the short – and medium term, the more likely a specific outcome is, the higher the volatility and risk premia. Whatever the scenarios, any escalation will be immediately reflected in oil prices. It should be understood that even in the absence of direct damage, the existence of current and future uncertainty alone will result in high prices. Markets will not wait for confirmation; they will move on fear alone.

The long-term repercussions of this are much more impactful. A weakened Iran will be changing global energy geopolitics in ways that disadvantage its current partners, especially China and Russia. Both are currently benefiting not only from their links to the Mullah regime, but also from discounted Iranian crude and barter-style arrangements. Beijing and Moscow will be the main losers. China’s access, as does Putin’s, depends entirely on the current regime, which can enforce contracts, control territory, and is willing and capable of evading sanctions. It is clear, even if Moscow is still in denial, that a  fragmented Iran is no longer a reliable supplier. At the same time, India will also be hit. The latter’s position will be undermined, as it will lose both supply options and geopolitical flexibility in balancing relations across the region.

For most Gulf Arab oil and gas producers, the situation is diffuse. Based on higher prices, they will benefit in the short term, but the cost will be very high, as they will face heightened insecurity. Not only will instability hit investment decisions or raise insurance costs, but their total oil and gas strategies will be put under extreme pressure, as markets will be asking them to act as de facto stabilisers of global energy markets. Given the current spare production capacity, this assumption that Gulf Arabs can absorb a potential Iranian disruption is at least very optimistic. Reality could be hitting markets in the face very soon.

The overall message is that regime removal is not an endpoint but a beginning. By pushing for an implosion of the regime in Tehran, parties are not closing the chapter of Iran’s regional role! They are ripping the whole book apart, without knowing the final chapter yet. Strategies should admit that Iran’s proxies will not vanish, while energy flows are not going to normalize overnight. Vast volumes have already been written indicating that power vacuums only invite competition, not consensus. Policy makers should understand that the idea that eliminating the Islamic Republic is going resolve the Middle East’s chronic instability is a fallacy. The honest but very uncomfortable truth is that such a situation will redistribute instability in a more chaotic form.

Strategists and pundits should realize that history offers few examples of revolutionary regimes collapsing without regional aftershocks. Iran will not be one, as its strategic depth, ideological reach, and centrality to energy markets have made it clear that its fate will be felt far beyond its borders. The world can survive the fall of the Iranian regime, no doubt about it. However, are the parties pushing for it, preparing for the disorder that will follow? At present, there is little evidence that they are.

Source: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lion-roars-again-tehran-falls-why-regime-collapse-war-widdershoven-mbmre/?trackingId=jpU1vSvavKKdnTCmCuLUrw%3D%3D