Sureyya Yigit

Professor of Politics and International Relations

New Vision University, Tbilisi, Georgia

The ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine which began on 24 February 2022 with the Russian invasion represents a significant turning point, marking the first instance of military aggression on European soil since the conclusion of World War II. This situation not only poses tremendous challenges but also threatens to disrupt the established European security order, which has remained relatively stable since 1945 (Yigit, 2023). It places the spotlight squarely on the urgent decisions that EU Member States must make regarding their defence policies, especially bearing in mind the decreased lack of commitment expressed by the United States in maintaining its traditional support for steadfast defence of the European continent. The current crisis is reminiscent of pivotal moments in recent history, such as the launch of the euro and the implementation of the recovery plan. During these times, the costs associated with “non-Europe” became alarmingly high, prompting nations to reconsider their longstanding boundaries and invest in cooperative European solutions.

The war in Ukraine, coupled with the threat posed by Russia towards other European states, has underscored the pressing need to bolster European defence capabilities (Yigit, 2022). However, the path forward to achieving this goal remains unresolved. Each EU Member State lacks sufficient defence resources to confront security threats alone, and the existing levels of cooperation among them fall far short of what is necessary. A truly genuinely European solution would involve the creation of a unified defence framework, allowing for the coordinated exercise of defence powers in line with the EU’s overall method of integration, even though such a venture would still exclude major defence actors such as the UK, Norway and Turkey (Yigit, 2021). Yet, such a proposal faces resistance from certain nations that are reluctant to relinquish control over their defence policies, viewing this as a violation of their sovereignty. Consequently, a fundamental tension emerges: the desire for national sovereignty clashes with the potential for greater coherence and efficiency that a more integrated defence approach could yield.

The ongoing tension between two contrasting methods of defence cooperation within the Union is a longstanding issue that has shaped its entire evolution – most notably, one is reminded of the debacle of the European Defence Community which was stillborn in 1954 (Ruane, 2000). This friction has not only sparked extensive speculation and criticism but has also manifested as a persistent dilemma. On the one hand, proponents of greater integration argue that the current approach is overly intergovernmental, hindering collective progress toward a unified defence strategy. On the other side, critics contend that the integration efforts are too ambitious, arguing that states should retain their sovereign control over defence matters.

Furthermore, the issue is perceived differently depending on one’s viewpoint: some consider this cooperative framework essential for addressing the myriad security challenges facing Europe today, while others deem it redundant given the existing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Given the ambivalence of US support for defending Europe and maintaining its traditional level of commitment to NATO, the former view is steadily gaining credibility and strength (Yigit, 2025a).

This was very much underlined when the White House released the 2025 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) in November 2025, a foundational but non-binding document that outlined the administration’s foreign policy principles, priorities, and regional focus where it marked a significant reorientation of the US approach to global affairs, reflecting a realignment of the US role in the world order (Trump, 2025). It was notably shaped by President Trump’s ideological agenda, especially regarding Europe.

The NSS underscores the urgent need for a clear and coherent American strategy, contending that only a focused and realistic grand strategy can safeguard the nation’s strength, prosperity, and leadership. It contends that previous post-Cold War approaches faltered due to undisciplined policymaking and the pursuit of broad global ambitions at the expense of core national interests. The central thesis is that American strategy must be disciplined and narrowly focused on defending national interests rather than attempting to solve all global challenges or maintain perpetual dominance. Past failures are linked to overextension, unclear priorities, and an overreliance on international institutions that sometimes compromise U.S. sovereignty.

The Trump administration is cast as a corrective force, introducing a new approach that recentres strategy on core interests. The key questions raised are what goals the U.S. should pursue, by what means, and how these aims can be unified into a practical National Security Strategy. The highest priority is the unwavering survival and security of the United States as a sovereign republic, steadfastly protecting the rights and welfare of its citizens. Achieving these demands strong defences against military threats, foreign interference, espionage, unfair trade, trafficking, propaganda, and other evolving risks. Another central objective is the rigorous management of borders, immigration, and transportation systems. The strategy emphasises halting destabilising migration and constructing resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding disasters and hostile actions.

The strategy calls for recruiting, rigorous training, and state-of-the-art equipping a military that is not only the world’s most powerful but also agile, technologically advanced, and ready to address a broad spectrum of threats. This includes investments in next-generation weaponry, cyber capabilities, intelligence, and rapid deployment forces to ensure superiority across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. The strategy places a premium on unwavering deterrence and the ability to win both conventional and unconventional conflicts decisively. A robust nuclear deterrent is deemed essential, with ongoing modernisation of the nuclear triad and the development of advanced missile defence systems to shield the homeland and allies from evolving threats, including hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

Equally, economic and industrial strength is elevated as a pillar of national security. The strategy prioritises revitalising the domestic industrial base to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains and ensure the capability to rapidly scale production of critical materials, defence equipment, and medical supplies in times of crisis. A robust energy sector is emphasised, advocating for energy independence through expanded domestic production, infrastructure resilience, and the adoption of emerging technologies. Innovation is encouraged through increased investment in research and development, particularly in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing. Intellectual property protection is strengthened as a safeguard for America’s competitive advantage and future prosperity. Sustaining strong soft power and restoring American spiritual and cultural health are key priorities. The strategy prioritises a proud, optimistic citizenry and strong, traditional families to ensure long-term security.

America’s vital foreign policy interests are:

a) Enforce Western Hemisphere stability to block migration and hostile incursions.

b) Block foreign economic coercion, guarantee Indo-Pacific navigation, and secure supply chains.

c) Support European allies to preserve freedom, security, and Western identity.

d) Prevent adversary dominance in the Middle East and avoid costly wars.

e) Assert U.S. leadership in AI, biotech, and quantum computing.

America retains key advantages: a flexible political system, a large innovative economy, advanced technology, military power, alliances, strong geography, soft power, and patriotic citizens. The Trump administration is credited with revitalising competence, energy production, reindustrialisation, economic freedom, and innovation.

The strategy insists on integrating these formidable assets to relentlessly strengthen American power and guarantee sustained pre-eminence.

The document outlines several guiding principles:

i. Focused National Interest: Strategy must prioritise core interests, not attempt to address every global issue.

ii. Peace Through Strength: Deterrence is best achieved through economic, technological, and military strength.

iii. Non-Interventionism: While rigid non-interventionism is impractical, interventions must meet a high bar of justification.

iv. Flexible Realism: U.S. policy should be realistic, seeking peaceful relations without imposing American values.

v. Primacy of Nations: The nation-state remains the fundamental political unit; America will put its interests first and encourage others to do the same.

vi. Sovereignty and Respect: The U.S. will protect its sovereignty from erosion by international organisations and foreign influence.

vii. Balance of Power: America will work with allies to prevent the emergence of dominant adversaries.

viii. Pro-American Worker: Policy will prioritise American workers and broad-based prosperity.

ix. Fairness: The U.S. will insist on fair treatment in alliances and trade, ending free-riding and predatory practices.

x. Competence and Merit: Prosperity and security depend on competence and merit, not group status or global talent pools.

Barely a month after its publication the Trump Administration’s capture of Venezuelan President Maduro to face charges in the United States has caused tremendous scepticism regarding the third and eight principles, namely non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. In terms of strategic priorities, one can highlight four:

a. End of Mass Migration: Border security is fundamental to national security; uncontrolled migration must be stopped.

b. Protection of Rights and Liberties: Government powers must not be abused; core rights must be protected.

c. Burden-Sharing: Allies must assume greater responsibility for regional security and defence spending.

d. Realignment Through Peace: Presidential diplomacy is used to resolve conflicts and realign regions toward American interests.

The strategy’s top economic priorities are defined by a comprehensive approach to national prosperity and resilience. Balanced trade is pursued through the negotiation of fair agreements, the reduction of trade deficits, and the enforcement of reciprocal market access. Supply chain security is elevated by encouraging domestic manufacturing of critical goods, diversifying sources for essential materials, and establishing strategic reserves to prevent shortages in times of crisis. Reindustrialisation efforts focus on revitalising key sectors such as advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and rare earth elements, reducing dependency on foreign producers. Revitalising the defence industrial base entails investments in modern production facilities, workforce development, and technological innovation to ensure rapid and sustained military readiness. Energy dominance is promoted by expanding domestic energy production, modernising infrastructure, and supporting research into next-generation energy technologies, with an emphasis on both fossil fuels and renewables to secure American energy independence. Leadership in the financial sector is supported by strengthening the regulatory framework, safeguarding the dollar’s global role, and encouraging innovation in fintech and digital currencies.

The strategy reasserts the Monroe Doctrine with renewed force, determined to restore undisputed American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and categorically deny non-Hemispheric competitors any strategic foothold. Objectives include building and commanding robust regional partnerships to control migration flows, dismantle transnational criminal networks, and enforce economic and political stability. To this end, the U.S. will recalibrate its military presence to act as both a deterrent and a rapid-response force, employ targeted commercial diplomacy to secure favourable trade and investment arrangements, and fortify supply chains to protect against disruptions. The expansion of mutually beneficial partnerships is prioritized, with an emphasis on capacity-building, information sharing, and joint security initiatives. The strategy mandates unyielding resistance to foreign influence operations, positioning America as the indispensable and trusted partner of choice throughout the hemisphere.

President Trump’s China policy represents a significant strategic realignment, emphasizing relentless economic competition, reciprocity in trade practices, and the enforcement of fairness in all bilateral engagements. The Indo-Pacific is identified as the primary theatre for both economic and geopolitical rivalry, with particular attention on China’s expanding influence and assertive behaviour. The strategy pursues comprehensive trade rebalancing through the negotiation of stricter trade agreements, the imposition of targeted tariffs, and aggressive enforcement of intellectual property rights to counter unfair Chinese practices. Supply chain security is strengthened by incentivizing domestic production of critical technologies, pharmaceuticals, and rare earth minerals, as well as encouraging the diversification of global supply lines away from China to mitigate vulnerabilities. In the military-technological domain, the U.S. prioritizes the development and deployment of advanced systems including hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, and next-generation missile defences to maintain a decisive edge.

Deterrence is reinforced by increasing the U.S. naval and air presence in the region, conducting joint military exercises with allies, and clearly signalling unwavering support for Taiwan, freedom of navigation operations, and the defence of the South China Sea. Allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India are strongly encouraged to expand their defence capabilities, increase military spending, and participate in coordinated security frameworks like the Quad. U.S. economic engagement is aimed not only at strengthening domestic growth but also at fostering a network of resilient, market-based economies throughout the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative and promote regional stability (Yigit 2024).

The strategy addresses Europe’s ongoing economic decline and waning public confidence, identifying key contributing factors, including burdensome transnational regulatory regimes, mass migration pressures that strain social cohesion, and increasing restrictions on free speech and political dissent. To counter these trends, the U.S. aims to support Europe in restoring economic growth by promoting market-friendly reforms, deregulation, and policies that incentivize innovation and entrepreneurship. The U.S. will encourage European partners to adopt energy diversification strategies, reduce dependency on hostile suppliers, and invest in critical infrastructure.

Countering adversarial influence – particularly from Russia and China – remains a top priority, with the U.S. committed to strengthening NATO’s core mission of collective defence, enhancing intelligence sharing, and coordinating cyber defence initiatives. The ongoing war in Ukraine amplifies instability and underscores the urgency of diplomatic efforts for a negotiated settlement that preserves Ukrainian sovereignty and deters further aggression. While the U.S. remains a steadfast supporter of democratic allies, it advocates for a measured approach to NATO expansion, prioritizing alliance cohesion and operational effectiveness over open-ended enlargement.

In the Middle East, the strategy marks a deliberate shift away from large-scale military interventions and prolonged nation-building. Recognizing America’s increased energy independence and the evolving geopolitical landscape, the U.S. now emphasizes building resilient partnerships based on mutual interests, economic investment, and conflict de-escalation. Central to this approach is the expansion and deepening of the Abraham Accords, which serve as a framework for regional normalization, economic cooperation, and collective security.

The U.S. will play a leading role in safeguarding the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, ensuring the security of strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, and supporting technological and defence collaborations with key partners, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. At the same time, the U.S. will avoid entanglement in protracted conflicts and resist efforts at forced regime change, focusing instead on diplomatic engagement and targeted counterterrorism measures.

American policy in Africa reflects a transition from traditional aid-driven models and ideological conditionality toward pragmatic partnerships that emphasize mutual benefit and local capacity-building. The strategy prioritizes conflict resolution through mediation and support for African-led peace initiatives, while leveraging American diplomatic influence to address the root causes of instability. Economic engagement centres on expanding trade with reliable, reform-oriented states, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, critical minerals, agriculture, and telecommunications. The U.S. will promote private-sector investment, infrastructure development, and technology transfer to foster sustainable growth and reduce the continent’s vulnerability to malign influence from competitors such as China and Russia. Initiatives such as Power Africa and Prosper Africa will be expanded to support these objectives, positioning the U.S. as a preferred partner for modernization and development.

In conclusion, the NSS unequivocally asserts that only a bold, pragmatic strategy rooted in uncompromising national interests will guarantee America’s future. It declares that the Trump administration has enacted a historic course correction: unapologetically reclaiming U.S. sovereignty, aggressively advancing economic and military supremacy, and fusing strategic realism with unwavering American principles to ensure enduring prosperity and unchallenged global leadership.

Facing such a prospect, the continent of Europe faces a dilemma. The traditional post-war and post-Cold War American foreign policy is no more. It has been replaced by one that is very much focused on the short term, with a much narrower short-sighted approach. Henceforth, Europe cannot rely on the American nuclear shield nor on its massive conventional armed forces. If there were no pressing threats to the continent, this would not be a critical issue. Given the fact that the continent is witnessing Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, ex-Soviet bloc and ex-Soviet states such as Poland and the Baltic countries consider their territorial integrity under threat.

The defence of Europe is the responsibility of Europe. During the Cold War, NATO underpinned the security of Europe as ideological bipolarity ensured the defence of European democratic liberal states by the Western superpower, namely the United States. This continued after the end of the Cold War, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, as the undisputed hegemon – and indeed hyperpower for a time – ensured continental security. With President Trump’s second term, this continuity has been halted, and the path pursued has changed. Hence, the choice that Europe faces. It is obvious that individual countries cannot resist or respond to a military attack, similar to the one witnessed in Ukraine. A collective response is required to offer a credible defence. If NATO is not the venue for such an endeavour, then the EU must be considered a candidate.

It is clear that there is no American leader in the ilk of Roosevelt or Truman in the White House. Given that is so, then where is the contemporary European Churchill, Adenauer or Spaak? What will happen to the Atlantic Alliance? How will it develop? What role will the EU play? Looking at the anticipated developments, the expansion and evolution of defence cooperation within the EU will undoubtably fundamentally rely on various unfolding dynamics. Moreover, the partnership between the EU and NATO could be structured to capitalise on the EU’s unique attributes, thereby facilitating the EU’s engagement within NATO. This approach may reconcile the diverse forms of cooperation both organisations are working to develop, leading to a more cohesive security strategy on both sides.

The development of Union initiatives in defence presents a valuable opportunity for Member States to assess their cost-benefit ratios at both the national and NATO levels. By informally ensuring complementarity between the two organisations, Member States can enhance their collaborative efforts. Moving forward, it would be beneficial to formalise this complementarity by establishing a clear hierarchy or task division. Given the unique characteristics of each organisation and the potential evolution of NATO, one can envision two constructive approaches to division: the first, focused on the distinct functions undertaken by each organisation, and the second, on the geographical scope of their respective activities. This structured framework could lead to more effective cooperation and resource allocation.

To ensure greater cooperation and eliminate any competitive dynamics between the European Union and NATO, it is essential to establish a clear division of tasks between the two organisations. In this context, the advancement of defence cooperation within the European Union must be driven by the political will of NATO member states. The notion of establishing a distinct division of responsibilities between the Union and NATO is frequently discussed in the relevant literature (Whitman, 2024). While the proposals regarding this division may vary, they are all grounded in the specific characteristics of the two organisations and are intended to foster a balanced partnership.

Given the current state of cooperation between the two entities, it is suggested that NATO assume responsibility for large-scale military operations. In contrast, the Union should manage operations that require fewer resources or rely predominantly on civilian assets. Furthermore, a similar allocation of duties could be considered based on the nature of the operations: armed combat missions would be conducted by NATO. At the same time, humanitarian initiatives would fall under the Union’s purview. Nevertheless, this framework faces challenges in precisely defining a crisis, particularly given the dynamic nature of such situations. For example, operations initially categorised as peacekeeping may escalate into a mission of mutual defence for the involved forces, potentially resulting in engagements of a significantly higher intensity.

Another proposal centres around the foundational principles of the two cooperatives. In this proposed framework, NATO would operate exclusively in the realm of territorial defence, adhering strictly to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which emphasises mutual defence among member states in the event of an attack. Meanwhile, the European Union would assume responsibility for addressing security issues beyond purely military concerns, adopting a more holistic approach to safety and stability.

This multifaceted approach would also include the Union’s commitment to conducting operations outside European territory and to responding to international crises as they arise. However, this division of responsibilities is not without its complexities. The increasing prevalence of hybrid threats—such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, and disinformation campaigns—complicates this separation of tasks. These modern security challenges are deeply intertwined with issues of collective defence and cannot easily be isolated.

In response to these evolving threats, NATO undertook significant reforms to its internal organisation in 2007, aiming to enhance its adaptability, particularly concerning the functionality of its headquarters (Berdal & Ucko, 2009). This restructuring reflects the alliance’s recognition of the need to address a broader spectrum of security challenges in an interconnected world.

A rigid separation of responsibilities between NATO and the EU may create more issues than it resolves. Therefore, it is more advantageous to approach each situation on a case-by-case basis, considering the specific characteristics of each crisis and operation. Although the inherent differences between the two organisations suggest a natural division of tasks, this division should remain adaptable. In summary, the EU continues to refine its comprehensive strategy for crisis management, security, and defence, while NATO has tended to focus on preserving its military capabilities and addressing unconventional threats. A fixed framework should not determine task allocation; rather, strengthened cooperation should be used to avoid overlapping operations that could lead to competition.

In this context, establishing agreements is crucial to strengthening the connection between defence planning in the two organisations and to streamlining the sharing of sensitive information. Currently, operational cooperation faces significant challenges, but one can pursue two effective solutions. The first approach is to create a legally binding agreement that activates during a crisis. In such situations, one organisation can direct the other to execute an operation, effectively mobilising their respective resources. This upfront agreement will clearly outline the consequences concerning organisation, processes, timeframes, resource allocation, and cost distribution. This strategy combines two key elements into a single agreement: updating the ‘Berlin Plus’ framework, which permitted the EU to draw on some of NATO’s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations, and introducing a concept akin to a reversal of the ‘Berlin Plus’ allowing the EU to contribute its civilian capabilities to NATO (Reichard, 2004). Additionally, this initiative will require agreements that address the interests of member states from only one of the two organisations, particularly regarding their political representation, participation in activities, and the exchange of classified information.

The second solution involves creating a comprehensive legal framework to coordinate cooperation among concurrent operations systematically. This framework would mirror the agreements established with third countries, which outline their involvement in CSDP operations. Although the legal organisation of such cooperation is certainly feasible, its successful implementation is heavily influenced by the shifting positions and stances of the participating states.

The issue of task division remains highly uncertain, both in its implementation and in its potential evolution. The conclusion of agreements is hindered not only by the complexity of their drafting but primarily by political tensions among specific member states of the two organisations. Disagreements involving Turks, on one side, and Greeks and Greek Cypriots on the other, have obstructed the utilisation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements and impeded the establishment of essential arrangements for the exchange of classified information (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012). As a result, there is a pressing need for broader-scale agreements.

The subsequent evolution of the division of tasks will depend on the modifications enacted by NATO member states. These modifications are expected to be limited, as the Atlantic Alliance fundamentally operates as a military and security alliance characterised by intergovernmental cooperation. Nonetheless, the strategic directions adopted by NATO may influence the role designated to the European Union, serving in a complementary capacity. Three discernible trends may emerge.

The first trend is the potential for the European Union to become increasingly engaged in crisis management beyond its member states’ borders. This development would require NATO to continue enhancing its civilian capabilities to ensure effective operations. There will remain circumstances in which recourse to the CSDP is pertinent, particularly when not all NATO member states are inclined to participate or when specific competencies of the European Union are essential. For example, in addressing maritime piracy, the European Commission’s unique expertise facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the threat. It enabled the effective organisation of the transfer of individuals detained during operations. However, the functional complementarity between NATO and the European Union may become less evident, resulting in a more intricate division of tasks. Certain scenarios that could fall under the CSDP purview might instead be addressed at the NATO level, thereby constraining the European Union’s involvement and diminishing the appeal of intra-European cooperation.

The second scenario envisions NATO rekindling its commitment to the fundamentals of collective defence, a principle that gained renewed significance during the Warsaw Summit in 2016 (Devanny, 2017). This pivotal meeting was a direct response to Russia’s unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the escalating conflict in the Donbas region (Yigit, 2021a). NATO’s mission encompasses three core tasks:

I. Collective defence

II. Crisis management

III. Cooperative security

However, in light of recent geopolitical tensions, there has been a pronounced emphasis on enhancing its deterrence and defence posture.

In practical terms, this means NATO has adapted its institutional framework and bolstered its military presence along Russia’s borders, a move designed to demonstrate solidarity and readiness. Following Russia’s aggressive military actions against Ukrainian territory in 2022, this trend of strengthening defences has only accelerated (Yigit, 2023a). The Declaration from the Madrid Summit in June 2022, underscores the importance of collective defence as NATO’s raison d’être and primary responsibility, reaffirming the alliance’s core mission amid evolving threats (Gjoreski & Nacev, 2024). In this context, NATO’s foundational principles for deterrence and defence are being redefined, with robust measures being put in place to enhance its operational capabilities. This includes a strategic re-engagement of armed forces across European territory.

The significance of the Madrid Summit cannot be overstated; it marks a transformative moment for the Atlantic Alliance; a change deemed the most consequential since the fall of the USSR in the early 1990s. This evolution reflects NATO’s adaptability in a rapidly shifting security landscape and its commitment to standing firm against aggression which was underlined by the NATO Hague Summit in 2025 (Pchaladze, 2025). Firstly, there was a strong reaffirmation of the commitment by the Heads of State and Government to NATO, emphasizing the enduring strength of the Alliance, the importance of the transatlantic bond, and the principle of collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Secondly, the Alliance identified profound security threats, particularly the long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the persistent threat of terrorism. In response, the Allies committed to investing 5% of GDP annually on core defence and security-related spending by 2035, ensuring the Alliance’s readiness and resilience. The commitment to invest 5% of GDP annually on defence was described as a historic decision, with a clear breakdown of spending priorities and a renewed focus on innovation and industrial cooperation.

The 5% GDP commitment was split into two categories:

a. At least 3.5% for core defence requirements and meeting NATO Capability Targets.

b. Up to 1.5% for protecting critical infrastructure, defending networks, civil preparedness, resilience, innovation, and strengthening the defence industrial base.

Allies would submit annual plans to show progress, and the balance of spending will be reviewed in 2029. Support for Ukraine’s defence was explicitly included in these calculations.

Thirdly, the Allies reaffirmed their enduring commitment to support Ukraine, noting that since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, NATO Allies had provided 99% of all military aid to Ukraine and committed over EUR 35 billion in additional security assistance in 2025. The Summit stressed that this support was aimed at enabling Ukraine to defend itself and deter future aggression, not to prolong the war.

Fourthly, there was a strong emphasis on expanding transatlantic defence industrial cooperation, eliminating trade barriers among Allies, and leveraging partnerships and emerging technologies to advance collective security.

Fifthly, the Summit acknowledged ongoing instability and hybrid threats (such as cyber-attacks and sabotage of critical infrastructure) targeting NATO countries. It highlighted NATO’s recent efforts to reinforce collective defence across all domains—land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space—and the need for increased investment to maintain and improve deterrence and defence posture.

The Hague Summit underscored NATO’s unity and resolve in the face of evolving security threats, setting a new benchmark for defence spending, prioritizing support for Ukraine, and commitments to strengthening both industrial cooperation and technological innovation to ensure the Alliance’s long-term security and resilience.

NATO’s return to its foundational role is viewed favourably by proponents, who argue that expanding its responsibilities could undermine the alliance’s effectiveness by diluting financial resources and exposing a lack of political will. As a result, this focused approach provides the European Union with greater flexibility to assert its influence beyond collective defence, including in crisis management and the mitigation of hybrid threats.

The third scenario posits a gradual reduction in NATO’s activities, limiting its function to that of a military alliance whose primary goal is to offer mutual assistance in response to armed attacks on the territories of member states, while concurrently promoting peaceful relations. This scenario appears unlikely in the short term, particularly in light of the recent revitalisation of the Atlantic Alliance since 2022, which includes the accession of two new European members and NATO’s evolving role in relation to Russia. Significant uncertainties remain regarding the situation following the end of the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the United States’ stance. The U.S. has long encouraged European nations to assume greater responsibility for their defence; however, there are concerns that this may lead to competitive dynamics with the United States. This phenomenon referred to by some as ‘schizophrenia’, does not preclude the possibility of rapid developments occurring. The European geolocation program Galileo exemplifies this dynamic; although initially met with criticism from the United States for potentially fostering competition, it ultimately received acknowledgement as an ‘asset of shared resilience’. In any event, the hypothesis above would necessitate enhanced collaboration within the European Union to compensate for roles currently fulfilled by NATO, encompassing responsibilities in crisis management, countering hybrid threats, and other collaborative efforts between the two organisations.

Consequently, it is conceivable to establish a division of functions between NATO and the EU, characterised by flexibility in its design and temporal scope. Additionally, an alternative approach could involve a geographical division of tasks, serving either as a substitute or a complement to the existing frameworks.

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