Prof. Dr. Sevdalina Dimitrova ^*

Abstract: The dynamic and uncertain security environment, especially since 2020, has brought to the agenda the danger of a Third World War, which in any case would be radically different from the previous two – both in scale, in the military arsenal used, radically different from what we know, and in the degree of damage that can be inflicted on humanity. The unpredictability of risks and threats to world peace confronts humanity with new challenges. After the end of the “Iron Curtain” of the 1990s, the danger of a new one is increasingly real. The negative effects of the neoliberal regime are becoming more and more tangible. Moreover, the member states of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, with few exceptions, are showing increasingly persistent warmongering sentiments, veiled by the danger of pseudo-attacks. We are witnesses that an alliance created for purely economic reasons for the purpose of economic support and mutual assistance is today increasingly degenerating into a political-defense alliance, into a “military alliance”, generating particularly large amounts of financial resources for building alliance defense capabilities in the interests of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. Especially after the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The European Commission, prompted by the MI-7 member states, figuratively speaking, daily undertakes initiatives, summits, adopts regulations, policies, strategies, programs, instruments, etc. in support of Europe’s security. And all this while spending billions of financial resources in various forms to build the necessary European defense capabilities of the EU and NATO member states, but without an answer to what the cost is for the socio-economic and social development of these countries and what the effects are for the security of Europe. The search for answers to these questions is at the heart of the author’s scientific interests.

Keywords: security, defense, military actions Ukraine-Russia, effects, eastern wing of European security.

Introduction

At every stage of a country’s social development, the focus of public discussions is always on the question of the cost of public goods – security and defense. The manifestation of this cost is through the defense capabilities of a country, and for about ten years now there has been talk of defense capabilities of the European Union in the interests of the Common Security and Defense Policy. In this direction, a number of summits, documents, and actions have been undertaken, the justification of which is the new security environment, the new world order, the geopolitical environment, and the Union’s geostrategy.

Looking further back in time, the NATO Capability Goals 2013 were set, updated annually in accordance with the Alliance’s strategic documents and the national characteristics of the member states. This was followed by the special NATO summit in Brussels on 25 May 2017, at which the member states of the Euro-Atlantic alliance committed to developing their own national plans for increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP. As a result of this special initiative, the countries, as participants in the EU CSDP, joined on 13.11.2017 the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) initiative in defense for a gradual increase in our defense spending to 2% of GDP, as a main strategic goal in the interest of the Alliance’s Capability Goals. It is explicitly stated that this increase should contribute to the development of modernized defense capabilities of the countries in the context of the adopted goals of the PESCO, with 20% of this increase being allocated for new weapons and equipment, and 2% of them for research and development.

After the start of the special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine (February 24, 2022), the EU talked about building and developing its own allied military and defense capabilities. A key document in this direction is the Strategic Compass for Security and Defense for Protecting the EU’s External Borders (adopted on March 22, 2022). “The Strategic Compass is an action plan that establishes a common strategic vision and specific objectives to strengthen the EU’s security and defense policy until 2030. It addresses growing threats such as geopolitical competition, economic rivalry, technological development, disinformation and the climate crisis.”¹ Without going into details about the effects of the priorities in this document, not taking into account the dominant role of the United States in the outlines of the so-called “democratic community” and a neoliberal unipolar model of governance with a set “tone at the top” (researched in another publication by the author), the aspiration for allied military-defense capabilities of the EU member states is increasing. This is confirmed by the adopted European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) of March 5, 2024, the European Defense Industrial Program for the period 2025-2027 (EDIP)², according to which it is planned to provide 1.5 billion euros in the form of grants to increase Europe’s defense readiness. In this regard, a new defence plan, ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030³, was adopted in 2025, aiming to strengthen the defence capacity of EU member states, which would invest up to 1.5% of their annual GDP in defence, without being subject to sanctions for the potential budget deficit that the investment would create. Moreover, this plan envisages spending over 800 billion euros. Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishes the instrument “Security Measures for Europe (SAFE) by Strengthening the European Defence Industry” of 27 May 2025⁴. As a result of the aforementioned strategies, programs, and instruments, despite the recession in the economies of some of the leading EU countries, the debt crisis, the failures of the neoliberal regime, changes in geopolitics, and the laying of the foundations for building a multipolar governance model, the NATO summit was held in The Hague on 25.06. 2025, at which the Alliance member states, with few exceptions, adopted a decision to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. As a result of the thus made retrospective of the Euro-Atlantic security policy over the last 2-3 years, it is distinguished by the strengthening of the military-defense and the so-called. deterrent component, with the aim of building a “true European Defense Union”⁵ with an expanded financial framework, no matter what the cost to the citizens of the member states of the union. At the same time, with the strengthening of the eastern wing of the union, which is a priority for this defense union. Moreover, Eastern Europe in the face of the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania is the region that from a “security periphery” is gradually turning into a central zone of strategic deterrence and defense planning, due to their geographical location and proximity to Russia. Hence, the purpose of the author’s scientific research is provoked by the need to analyze the transformation of security in Eastern Europe and its significance for the future of European security.

Why is the security of Eastern European countries crucial for European security?

The consequences of Russia’s SmO in Ukraine go beyond the territory of Ukraine, causing an imbalance of power in Europe, accelerating the processes of militarization of security policy, leading to a reassessment of the strategic priorities of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. These processes are observed at an accelerated pace in Eastern Europe. The reasons for this are historical experience, geographical proximity, direct contact with the military infrastructure of Russia and Belarus, which determines the defense policies of the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania. Moreover, for these countries the perception of SVO is not as distant a conflict, but rather as an immediate threat to their own national security. As a result, these countries significantly increase their military budgets, expand their active and reserve forces, demonstrate an increased allied presence in NATO.

And if until recently the security of each member state of the Euro-Atlantic structures was accepted as a national responsibility, the consequences of the military actions in Ukraine have strengthened the role and significance of military force as an instrument of state policy, which undermines the premises of the liberal institutionalism that dominated European security after 1991. The very concept of the balance of power, which is the basis of neorealism, explains why the countries of Eastern Europe are reacting by accelerating rearmament and strengthening of allied ties. Seeing in the military actions in Ukraine a Russian threat for themselves, the countries of Eastern Europe believe that security for them is through the balance of power – in the internal aspect by increasing their own military capacity, and in the external aspect – through integration with NATO and collective defense, but not by maintaining neutrality in the conflict.

The concept of deterrence plays a key role in the “balance of power” process, especially in its form of “forward defense” and “tripwire deterrence”.⁶ The deployment of multinational NATO contingents in the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania is a kind of political and military mechanism that does not aim to achieve numerical superiority, but to create a political and military mechanism for allied counteraction to possible attempts at aggression. And this in itself means approaching the operational reality of collective defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty with measurable military resources, infrastructure, and constant readiness. This also explains why Eastern Europe after 2022 is becoming a major frontline for European security, where the interests of NATO, the EU, and Russia intersect in the long term. And here, in retrospect, we should clarify the reasons why the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania individually appear to be the new line of European security?

For the Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – the military actions in Ukraine are a confirmation of their strategic assessments of Russia, formed since the time when they were part of the USSR. This is evidenced by the constant increase in their defense spending above the set target of 2% of GDP, the maintenance of a comprehensive defense consisting of active and reserve components, as well as civil preparedness and active support for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. Although these countries have limited demographic and economic resources, they rely on high mobilization capacity and close integration with allied forces.

What makes Poland a regional strategic pillar? The fact that Poland is a central military and logistical hub of Eastern Europe also determines its high share of defense spending in GDP. This explains both the rapidly growing size of the Polish army, but also the significant presence of allied forces on its territory. Its main defense strategy is national rearmament combined with an active role in allied planning. This is confirmed by the words of Von der Leyen, who defines Poland as “the largest defense investor in Europe” and noted that the country will be a “main beneficiary” of the new SAFE program for European security… To match Poland’s readiness, we have proposed a fivefold increase in defense investment and a tenfold increase in funding for military mobility“.⁷

As for Romania, it occupies a special place in the regional security architecture. The reason is its strategic importance on the Black Sea. From the perspective of military operations in Ukraine, it should be noted that the Black Sea region is transforming from a peripheral zone into a key theater of strategic rivalry. The Black Sea is becoming a central area for deterrence, monitoring and logistical support for Ukraine. By expanding its allied presence, modernizing its armed forces and active diplomacy within NATO and the EU, Romania is establishing itself as a leading factor in security in Southeast Europe. Moreover, it is taking on the role of NATO’s main Black Sea center for coordination of naval forces.

Main indicators of the military capabilities of Eastern European countries ⁸,⁹,¹⁰.¹¹,¹²,¹³,¹⁴

Focusing on the countries of Eastern Europe, we should take into account the main indicators that determine the military capabilities of this region, which is transforming from peripheral to core. Among them, defense spending as a share of GDP is of paramount importance. And in order to draw the appropriate conclusions about where the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania stand in the general context of defense spending among NATO member states and in particular within the EU, we should follow the language of numbers. A brief review of the data from the research of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that global defense spending in 2024 will sharply increase compared to 2023 and the highest growth since the Cold War years is recorded by 9.4%, which amounts to over 2.7 trillion dollars.¹⁵ Undoubtedly, the reasons for this are the military actions in Ukraine and the Middle East.

It is understandable that the United States has the largest increase in defense spending – by 5.7% to $997 billion, followed by China ($314 billion) and Russia (by 38%, to $149 billion). It is noteworthy that all 32 NATO member states have increased their military spending by 17% ($693 billion). The initiative for this increase lies with the European member states, which, by virtue of the strategic goal of the special NATO summit in Brussels on May 25, 2017 and their subsequent national plans to increase their military spending to 2% of GDP. “Since 2020, EU countries have significantly increased their defense spending, with total spending amounting to €343 billion in 2024, representing 1.9% of EU GDP… In 2025, defense spending is estimated at around €381 billion, representing 2.1% of EU GDP.”.¹⁶

Against the background of the above information, a more in-depth review of the implementation of the 2% defense spending target, let’s look at what the figures show, who allocates how much of GDP for military spending and where Bulgaria stands in this regard, as seen in Figure 1. It is striking that in 2023 only 8 NATO member states will meet the defense spending target of 2% of GDP. Among them, Poland has the largest share – 3.9%, which over the last 10 years shows that they have almost doubled their defense spending as a share of GDP (increasing from 1.88% to 3.9% of GDP). They are followed by the United States with 3.49%, which is a slight decrease compared to their spending in 2014. 3.72% and Greece, whose share of spending in GDP is 3.01% in 2023, which is about 1 percentage point increase from 10 years ago. In addition to the United States, three more countries from the Alliance show a decrease in defense spending compared to the base year – the United Kingdom (from 2.14% to 2.07%), Croatia (from 1.82% to 1.79%) and Turkey (from 1.45% to 1.31%, which shows that Turkey does not reach the target of 2% of GDP). Among the countries fulfilling the target of their national plans for 2% defense spending in 2023 are also Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, the United Kingdom and Slovakia. While the remaining 11 countries during this period still do not reach the target of the special initiative of 2017 – 2% of GDP. Specifically, these countries are: Germany (1.57%), Bulgaria (1.84% against 1.31% in 2014), Turkey, Slovenia, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, France, Croatia. With the lowest share of defense spending from GDP in NATO are Luxembourg (0.72%), Belgium (1.13%) and Spain (1,26 %).¹⁷

Фиг. 1 efense spending as a share of GDP and annual real change. Share of real GDP (%). Based on 2015 prices. (source: https://www.dw.com/bg/nato-koj-dava-najmnogo-za-otbrana-i-kde-e-blgaria/a-68372428, 26.02.2024)

In 2024, there is a change in the overall picture of the implementation of the 2% defense spending target. The two percent target has already been achieved by 24 out of a total of 32 NATO countries, which can be traced in Fig. 3. The graph shows which countries cover the 2017 defense spending target and which do not. The graph shows that Croatia is the only NATO member state that maintains the level of its defense spending without any dynamics at 1.81% of GDP. What is striking is the contrast between individual NATO member states and especially European ones. Of course, the dominant role of armaments in NATO belongs to the United States, which spends “twice as much on its armed forces as all other NATO countries combined“¹⁸

Фиг. 3. Defense spending of individual NATO countries in the period 2014 – 2024 as a percentage of GDP (source: https://www.dw.com/bg/budzett-na-nato-v-grafiki-koj-kolko-harci-za-otbrana/a-71841582)

And here the question arises, what are the reasons for the contrast between countries with high and low levels of defense spending as a percentage of GDP? The answers are ambiguous, but in a systematized form, in our opinion, they are the following:

• geopolitical: for countries bordering or near conflict zones, or with a traditionally high military presence – the Baltic countries, Poland, Greece, which rely on a larger military budget;

• historical and political: for countries that maintain a policy of military neutrality, which limits their military budgets – Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, etc.;

• economic and budgetary opportunities: for countries with a larger GDP and a stronger economy, which could allocate more to defense spending, but their decisions regarding military spending are influenced by economic crises, inflation, public debts;

domestic priorities: for countries with economic or social problems, which is why defense spending is not a priority, especially if the risks and threats to their security are not immediate. Despite the fact that not all European NATO member states are meeting the target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP, the fact is that the EU has been allocating record amounts for defense over the past two years, which are growing at an accelerated pace, in order to reach the new target for defense spending set at the Hague Summit in June 2025 by 2035, gradually reaching 5% of GDP. Against the background of the overall picture of the dynamics of defense spending as a share of GDP in NATO member states and in particular the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Union, the general conclusion is that defense spending as a share of GDP in the Baltic states, Poland and Romania has a growing dynamic within the range of 4.50-2.50% of GDP, with the tendency to increase progressively and as a priority by 2030 in order to meet the target set at the Hague Summit in June 2025 to reach 5% of GDP by 2035. GDP. Poland is expected to exceed this target with a drive for intensive participation in modernization programs. As for the Baltic countries, although their economic capabilities are not great, they are striving for a progressive increase in defense spending – 3-4%, relying on their mobilization potential.

The other indicator of the military capabilities of the Eastern European countries is the numerical composition – active and reservists. The active personnel of Poland is approximately 221 thousand people, of Romania – approximately 81 thousand people, of the Baltic countries – approximately 39 thousand people in total for the three countries. Reservists number approximately between 300-350 thousand people in Poland, approximately 150-200 thousand for Romania and approximately 230 thousand for the Baltic countries. The trend is for a gradual increase in the active and reserve forces with a focus on the quality, interoperable, modernized personnel of the armies of the studied countries, integration of technologies and cyber defense. Specifically, the expectations for Poland are to increase its active army and maintain a high mobilization reserve, numbering approximately 220 thousand people by 2030. Romania is to build its maritime, air and air defense capabilities as a priority, which should number approximately 90,000 by 2030. Increasing the active and reserve personnel of the Baltic States to approximately 45,000 should be achieved by optimizing the small active contingent through highly trained reserve forces.

The third indicator of the military capabilities of the countries of Eastern Europe is the allied presence. At present, in Poland the allied presence is about 10-12 thousand people, in Romania – about 5-6 thousand people and in the Baltic countries – about 11-13 thousand people. The general conclusion from this indicator is that the trend until 2030 is towards increased deployment and presence of multinational contingents and strengthening of the command and logistics infrastructure in the region. The expectations for Poland NATO presence to number 12-14 thousand people, Romania – 6-7 thousand people, the Baltic states – a total of 14-16 thousand people. And this is in implementation of the NATO Concept for deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, thereby increasing the effectiveness of “tripwire deterrence” and strengthening the integration of national forces with those of the Alliance. In other words, the estimates support NATO’s strategic priority of creating a stable defense line on the eastern flank with sustainable integration and an effective deterrent strategy in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin by combining national and allied resources.

In summary, the three main indicators influencing the formation of the military capabilities of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Euro-Atlantic structures in general are shown in table 1.

Table 1. Key indicators of military capabilities of Eastern European countries by 2025

The conclusions that we can summarize as a result of the retrospective of the construction and development of the military capabilities of the countries studied from Eastern Europe and their role in the security of the EU and its construction as a military alliance are the following.:

• The Eastern European region is key to EU security from the standpoint of military actions in Ukraine, therefore the transformation of security in the region is through a combination of quantitative, structural and strategic actions directly related to the effective deterrence and protection of the national interests of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries. Thus, the countries of Eastern Europe are no longer seen as the periphery of European security, which transforms the region into a central zone of defense planning and strategic deterrence.

• There is an increased militarization and optimization of the mobilization forces of the countries of Eastern Europe through a systematic increase in their military budgets, the measure of which is defense spending as a share of GDP, an increase in their active and reserve forces in response to deterrent operations.

• regardless of the demographic processes in these countries, especially in the Baltic countries and the limited number of active forces, these countries maintain a high mobilization potential that can compensate for this limited number of active forces.

• in support of allied integration and operations to deter risks and threats in the region is the increased presence of allied forces (NATO contingents) in the countries of Eastern Europe, which are entrusted with the function of “tripwire deterrence”, guaranteeing the collective response to a potential threat, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of national forces.

• Romania is establishing itself as a key strategic player on NATO’s southern flank, combining national capacity, allied presence, operational integration with NATO, modernization and support for Ukraine, which necessitates a complex and multidimensional approach to assessing European security, based on a combination of quantitative and strategic indicators.

• in support of the accelerated militarization and strategic integration of Eastern Europe are the long-term programs for modernization of the armies of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries, logistics and cyber defense, as factors of the sustainability of European security. In this regard, Latvia has built a protective fence of about 280 km to permanently strengthen its eastern border with Russia, which aims to create “the most modern border defense on the eastern border of the EU“¹⁹.

Conclusion:

Without claiming to be exhaustive, on the contrary, the issues from here on are to be explored, we should bear in mind that we live in an extremely dynamically changing security environment on a global, European and regional scale. Moreover, what is relevant today is already in the past tomorrow. The security of Europe by transforming the countries of Eastern Europe into a key factor and allocating significant resources to the member states of the Euro-Atlantic structures is important. But what should not be ignored is the cost of the studied indicators of European defense capabilities in general and for national security systems. And this, the cost of European defense and the transformation of the EU into a military union, justifying itself with threats from a supposed enemy, has its dimensions. We are talking about economic and demographic problems, the growth of social inequality, armed conflicts and military actions in individual regions, the depletion of vital resources, the energy crisis, destructive natural disasters. The risk of recession in key economies on a global scale is deepening. And when we are looking for answers to the justification for the increase in defense spending, the size of the armies, the allied presence in one or another country, which in themselves are not unambiguous, we should take into account that they are determined by the economic potential, the rates of economic growth, the nominal gross domestic product as a basis for the accumulation of budget revenues and servicing state spending, including security and defense spending, and especially the sensitivity of taxpayers. Moreover, any increase in defense spending is at the expense of social security. And this neither more nor less requires a balance between “resources – capabilities – effects”, without affecting the interests of citizens and social peace. It is time to think, especially when the statistics are very worrying regarding the demographic factor, which shows that 71% of the younger generation in Brussels and not only there is of non-European origin. Against the backdrop of widespread corruption among EU leaders and in Ukraine, perhaps it is time to show some sense and return to the EU’s ancient roots and stop pouring excessive resources into transforming it into a military alliance. Let us not forget that the hundreds of billions of euros earmarked for this alliance due to a supposed threat of attack will have to be recovered by dozens of generations after us. Perhaps this is the way for the remnants of the neoliberal regime to self-preservation, but is it the right one? A common EU security and defense policy – ​​yes, modernization of national armies and strengthening of national security systems – yes, but not at the cost of the socio-economic and social development of EU member states.

Literature:

1. Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, 2020. https://www.belfercenter.org/ publication/natos-concept-deterrence-and-defence-euro-atlantic-area-dda

2. Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Instrument for the Security of Europe (SAFE) by Strengthening the European Defence Industry. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/BG/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32025R1106

3. Defense: how the European Union strengthens its security. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/bg/article/20190612STO54310/otbrana-kak-evropeyskiiat-siuz-ukrepva-sighurnostta-si, 2-12-2025.

4. European Defence Agency, European Defence Data 2025, Brussels, 2025.

5. European Defence Industry Programme 2025-2027 (EDIP). https://www.consilium. europa.eu/ bg/ policies/defence-industry-programme/

6. Estonian Defence Forces, Annual Statistical Report 2024, Tallinn, 2024.

7. Facts. Ursula von der Leyen: Vladimir Putin is a predator and will never change, 31. 08.2025.https://fakti.bg/world/997093-ursula-fon-der-laien-vladimir-putin-e-hishtnik-i-nikoga-nama-da-se-promeni Poland.

8. IISS, The Military Balance 2025, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2025

9. Latvian National Armed Forces, Annual Review 2024, Riga, 2024.

10. Latvia completes fence along border with Russia. 29.12.2025 https://news.bg/int-politics/latviya-zavarshi-ogradata-po-granitsata-s-rusiya.html

11. Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines 2025, Vilnius, 2025

12. Ministry of Defence of Poland, Annual Report 2024, Warsaw, 2024.

13. Ministry of Defence of Romania, Defense White Paper 2025, Bucharest, 2025.

14. NATO Allied Command Operations, NATO Forces and Contingent Deployment Reports, Brussels, 2025.

15. SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2025, https://www.sipri.org

16. Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/bg/ policies/ strategic-compass.

17. Walson, P., Global defense spending rises by most since the Cold War. https://www.bloombergtv.bg/a/2-novini/144173-globalnite-razhodi-za-otbrana-se-uvelichavat-nay-mnogo-ot-studenata-voyna-nasam. April 29, 2025.

18. Walter.Ya. NATO’s budget in graphs: who spends how much on defense.. https://www.dw.com/bg/budzett-na-nato-v-grafiki-koj-kolko-harci-za-otbrana/a 71841582

19. White Paper on European Defence and the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. https://bulgaria.representation.ec.europa.eu/novini-i-sbitiya/novini-0/byala-kniga-za-evropeyskata-otbrana-i-plan-rearm-europegotovnost-2030-g-2025-03-19_bg.