PhD. Eng. PETRU VALENTIN GLOD,

Government Counsellor

General Secretariat of the Government

From World War II to today, the global security architecture is in a permanent transformation, dangerously changing, dangerously fast, dangerously surprising. Starting with 2014 after the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, to 2022 with the attack on Ukraine, with China’s aggression regarding the Taiwan Strait, the security of Europe and the security of the Indo-Pacific region are areas with major security impact that fundamentally change the global security architecture, redefine the present and future of planetary security. Is the global security order changing?

Today, the United States, Japan and Europe are faced with the explosion of Chinese authoritarianism, the economic and military rise of China profoundly changing the center of gravity of global security in all its forms. The interpretation of the phenomenon of economic encouragement and military deterrence is changing. Security challenges are in a rapid and unknown evolution so that, with certainty, traditional measures of demonstrating power through military force and regional or national territorial defense capabilities are no longer convincing.

A security analysis published by CEPA – the Center for European Policy Analysis, states:

“The US, Europe and Japan must adapt their security strategies to take into account a world in which technology, energy, trade and competition play a greater role in shaping the geopolitical environment. The future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security will depend on the ability of allies to protect and project power along these non-traditional vectors.”¹

Regional crises such as Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack in Israel, the Israel-Islamic Republic of Iran war in 2023, China’s tensions and threats in the Indo-Pacific region in 2024 – 2025, define a new global security landscape, where the results of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Beijing’s in Taiwan, and North Korea’s military support for Russia show a new model of autocratic connectivity.

Hese frames that define the new global security landscape and in fact, the new global security architecture, must be analyzed in depth, in an analysis of strategic points such as: the political situation, the economic situation and the economic-military situation of these autocratic countries where absolute power is concentrated in a single leader and a small group, without accountability to the citizens, including regimes such as those in China, North Korea, Russia, but also Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, countries where individual rights are limited and freedom of expression is restricted, in contrast to the world’s democracies, in order to responds to the immediate and medium-term needs of national and collective defense, such as NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the most profound way and with speed so that democratic countries redefine their security strategies, strengthening the phenomenon of deterrence, rearming at a major level of military capabilities, continental defense capabilities, securing supply chains, real implementation of national resilience growth plans with appropriate financial support, industrial adaptability to dual-use production of military and civilian equipment and technologies, national productivity of armaments and ammunition, in-depth scientific research in the area of ​​unconventional technologies and nanotechnology with rapid budget increases and encouraging research and production of prototypes funded to capacity, without budgetary limitations.

Perhaps we should pay closer attention to what Japan is doing. Japan’s approach to China’s economic and military rise involves three main lines of action: the first line is to develop economic pragmatism, recognizing China’s indispensable role in trade while protecting its industry from excessive dependence; the second line is to increase economic security by strengthening customs controls on exports and truly stimulating the autonomy of industrial resources through new investment plans; and the third line is to modernize and strengthen defenses on the southwestern islands by increasing high-precision long-range attack capabilities and strengthening deterrence through military actions, exercises, and maneuvers with allies.

Securing raw materials and securing supply chains in all sectors of activity are essential and are also the most vulnerable. Several examples are the aeronautics industry which has dual-use industrial production, military and civilian, the automotive industry but also the nuclear-electric industry. They are directly hit by critical competition from China and threats from Russia regarding the supply chains of raw materials such as titanium, nickel and uranium.²

Two areas are essential for maintaining economic power and developing industrial capacities in crisis situations, the area of ​​national resilience and the area of ​​resilience of critical entities. In internal analyses within some responsible ministries, these requirements are intertwined, are common but not yet finalized, complementary but non-existent and, moreover, continuously analyzed but not materialized. The technological and industrial security of the European Union is based on a strategy with three real pillars of development: stockpiling, dual supply (civilian and military) and innovation.

It is remarkable that these pillars are strongly supported financially, thus protecting European industry, promoting innovation and cross-border partnership.

A new area of ​​great importance, both civilian and especially military, is artificial intelligence, which has become the defining factor of strategic competence in both investment and especially in defense. For example, China is making unlimited, state-led investments in its national artificial intelligence industry, starting from raw materials such as rare earth metals and critical minerals, to hardware with chip manufacturing and software with open-source artificial intelligence models. In these conditions, there is a need to develop adaptable applications that strengthen resilience and support artificial intelligence-based innovations in logistics support, defense and cybersecurity, and public services.

Sustainable security under these conditions, in this era of partially transparent and crushing competition of effects, is supported by military force and the support of leading industries that are in fact the vectors of industrial competition of the great planetary powers.

Another approach to the image of the global security architecture is the strengthening of China’s nuclear triad (the three levels of the nuclear triad – land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long-range strategic bombers) which, through continuous efforts, is capable of challenging the nuclear supremacy of the United States of America sooner or later. This effort is recognized for the modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal in preparation for a potential conflict with Taiwan, thus beyond the development for deterrence.

The DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile is the centerpiece of this modernization, with a range of over 12,000 km and the ability to carry up to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

By developing a robust nuclear triad, China ensures both the survival of its communist, autocratic regime and the ability to project its own power beyond Asia, placing its nuclear doctrine in line with its broader geopolitical strategy of challenging US dominance in the Indo-Pacific and securing its place as a competitor on the global stage.

Let’s look at the southeastern area of ​​the European Union, where the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), the powerful political platform of the EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, has an express purpose of the “Initiative”, namely stimulating cooperation in the region, accelerating the processes of infrastructure modernization and strengthening energy independence, and we look for the results in Romania. These are not identifiable.

Initiatives are good for ideas, ideas are translated into projects and projects develop regional and national security in their entirety in the most direct way possible. Military mobility is a problem that is still unresolved, poorly addressed and not or not very well supported politically. An incisive approach to needs is recommended, military mobility is easily developed through dual-use projects, which is much easier to support both from own funds but especially from the European Union’s joint investment plans such as the PNRR, the National Recovery and Resilience Plan but especially through SAFE, the “Action for the Security of Europe”. SAFE which is a new financial instrument of the European Union that will support member states that want to invest in defense industry production through joint public procurement focused on priority capabilities.

SAFE will finance urgent and large-scale investments in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The aim is to boost production capacity to make defence equipment available when needed and to address current capability gaps – ultimately strengthening the overall defence preparedness of the European Union.⁴

Considerations

The military development actions of autocratic countries to the detriment of social development are only actions to satisfy the leaders’ illusory conception that they are the most powerful people on the planet, thus they do not have the curiosity nor will they have the courage to bear the consequences of the defeat of their own nation, they the leaders being the main actors and the country their immoral support of credibility.

Definition

We can define global security as an important act of social progress, economic and industrial progress, a real cultural and intellectual progress which, through its dynamic architecture of continuous interchangeability, complementarity and political pragmatism, gives nations social harmony, predictability in inter-institutional development but also unilateral conviction in protecting the fundamental values ​​of democratic policies.