Delfina Ertanowska¹

“The goal of active measures is to direct public opinion in capitalist countries in the desired direction, to intensify contradictions, and to undermine trust in the enemy’s government.” „Цель активных мероприятий — направлять общественное мнение капиталистических стран в нужную сторону, усиливать противоречия и подрывать доверие к правительству противника.”

From KGB instructions on active operations (so-called “активные мероприятия“, 1980s). Contents revealed after 1991 by former officers Oleg Kalugin, Vasily Mitrokhin. KGB doctrine, implemented in the Soviet Union, from the Cold War era? The same tactics, new tools: tactics relatable and adapted to the contemporary possibilities of war against the “evil West.” This is the best example of how nothing changes in Russia, and Homo sovieticus continues to think imperialistically, now with a smartphone in hand. Let us take a closer look at how they implement this doctrine in present time, during their criminal attack on Ukraine and their hybrid activities in the former Eastern Bloc countries — which has become the target and embodiment of the contemporary “rotten West”.

PSYOP — psychological operations, influence and management of emotions, feelings, and social moods. Depending on the context or intent of the task/action, they can be aimed at improving the morale of one’s own military (and this was their original role), as options for psychological and information warfare against the target (enemy). Or to manage and direct public moods according to one’s own intentions. Here, two examples of non-violent resistance emerge — the building of resistance movements by democratic forces in occupied areas, regimes, or dictatorships. I would also call this “underground guerrilla,” but in a negative sense, the building of a so-called fifth column, movements that weaken the unity of a given society, state, or ethnic group in order to infiltrate, polarize, and slowly seize control of the message and communication, ultimately seizing power. And this element is indirectly characterized by violence: verbal on the Internet, but also physical in real life, as many provoked people transfer their frustrations from the virtual to the real world. It is this last element of “underground guerrilla” that Russia utilizes as a strategy in the hybrid war it has been waging for many years against the EU and NATO, particularly against former Eastern Bloc countries, where it seeks to regain influence and power.

Tools and strategies used in Russian psychological and information operations against the Baltic countries:

• Traditional sabotage and diversion — creating chaos, destabilization, a sense of insecurity, and a real physical threat to the life and health of residents.

• Hacking and cybercrimes — data theft, blocking and disrupting operating systems (e.g., websites of ministries, banks, etc.), espionage, and data theft for later use against the country.

• Recruitment of saboteurs and spies through social media — particularly job postings on Telegram and Viber, but also on X.

• Spreading propaganda and disinformation on social media and online outlets — fake news, deepfakes, and content based on falsified information. And here we distinguish:

• Digital diplomacy — using official cybernetic channels of its ministries, diplomats, as well as TV stars and so-called experts

• Troll Farms — the cheapest and most effective form of building antagonism in Eastern Bloc countries, thousands of fake accounts on online portals, flooding all comments under articles, videos, and reels posted there. Mainly hate speech, which is also part of this puzzle, but also forgery contemporary stories, as well as falsifying the history and relations of various countries.

• AI, Deepfake — the use of AI to create content, fabricate photographs and videos (especially by substituting a fabricated voice over real videos), create realistic graphics (e.g., supposedly from the front, etc.).

• Use of visual communication — here we refer to the point above and the use of AI in creating and editing photos, graphics, but also memes (including special companies and troll farms that produce meme campaigns for commission) or cartoons (in this case, specific creators can do this for appropriate remuneration).

Poland

Poland is one of the countries most vulnerable to Russian hybrid activities. Sabotage and psychological and informational operations in this country have been most effective. To what extent can we speak of a responsible attitude of railway services and employees during the recent attempts to blow up tracks and passenger trains². While the current government reacted appropriately, experts’ opinions are divided on the response of the services. While Poland has armed itself very well, many people point out that there is no system for protecting critical infrastructure. The most worrying is the subsequent disinformation campaign against Ukraine (insinuations that Ukraine was behind the sabotages to drag Poland into the war)³. Poland, as a country and as a society, has failed the test of cyber and social media resilience. It is the only country in the EU to have been so deceived by Russian propaganda, and its society has become extremely polarized. And I’m not talking about the country’s media branding, but rather about the commentary, Polish-language blogs (understanding the context is easier only for those fluent in the language and active in that society), and the wave of hatred sweeping the country. It seems to be nothing special, as Poles are known for their envy, but in the last two years, after the wave of popular uprising to help the attacked Ukraine, we have seen in the media — especially social media, far-right channels and portals — anti-Ukrainian, anti-Lithuanian (appearing more and more often as the topic of Ukraine is exhausted), anti-Semitic and at the same time anti-Muslim rhetoric, of course supported by slogans about POLEXIT and blaming the European Union for everything (surprisingly, such accusations never target Russia). Hate speech is one of the main tools in the psychological operation in Poland — in the form of hateful comments under articles, videos, content — ​​at the beginning it was based on aversion and antagonism towards Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens and war refugees, but today it is expanding its circles to include anti-Lithuanianness⁴ and even anti-Estonianness⁵, and of course anti-EU attitudes and aversion to democratic values, women’s freedoms, etc. The situation is fueled by tweets and posts from far-right and pseudo-nationalist politicians, such as the aforementioned post about Lithuania. Anti-feminist views are also being expressed, according to which the greatest threat is posed to free, independent, and educated women (it’s worth noting that the left in Poland has a female face — nearly 80% of young Polish women hold leftist or liberal views). All of these traits, like those of freedom, are perceived as a threat to “traditional values” — typical narratives from the campaigns of Orban, Vuicic, and Rosiya 24. Holiday decorations and their colors also don’t get a discount. The recent scandal involving the Teddy Bear in a Blue Scarf from Przemyśl, and the hate on social media (mainly caused by bots but picked up by fringe citizens who have become “useful idiots” of Russian propaganda, and who are not necessarily residents of Przemyśl), forced the city authorities to change the mascot’s scarf from blue (ironically, the city’s coat of arms is yellow and blue) to red⁶. Unfortunately, this reflects poorly on society’s resistance to psychological campaigns, how the colors of the mascot can trigger waves of hatred towards Ukraine (ironically, historically and ethnically, almost half of the inhabitants of Przemyśl have Ukrainian or Jewish roots, but their voice is suppressed). In this case, the Russian propaganda machine played brilliantly, but it is sad that even the city authorities were unable to counter the social media paranoia.

Lithuania

Is the situation in Lithuania similar to that in Poland? How are Russian psychological and information operations affecting Lithuanian society and the media space, how does Lithuania intend to defend itself against this, and what are the resilience measures like? And for a few words about the sabotages of recent weeks, I asked a well-known Lithuanian journalist — Vytautas Bruveris:

“If we speak about special psychological operations conducted by Russia and Belarus, we must first clarify what we mean. If we imply certain deliberate information dumps and provocations that ignite major information waves in the mainstream public sphere, then it is difficult to talk about such “operations” — meaning information processes initiated from the outside. In fact, one could say that these simply do not exist. Russian and Belarusian propaganda has virtually no influence or presence in Lithuania’s main media and public space. In this respect, both dictatorships have operated and continue to operate only in “standby mode,” at low intensity. Their primary environment is social media. This is, above all, Facebook, which remains the main national platform, and TikTok, which has surged in recent years and where all of “alternative” Lithuania and the radical underground flourish.

There are also Russian state TV channels which, despite being blocked, are still widely watched in the eastern and southern regions. These regions have the highest concentration of Polish and Russian national minorities, and both groups are pro-Russian, anti-Western, anti-Lithuanian, and aligned with the “Russian world.” This is the essence and main algorithm of this propaganda: to keep these minorities within its orbit and to influence “alternative Lithuania.” Russian and Belarusian propaganda always attaches itself to major polarizing events and processes, trying to catalyze them and encourage conflict. This, incidentally, is the essence of such propaganda everywhere — it always falls upon moods, polarization, and conflicts that already exist within societies, growing out of these societies themselves. That is why the traditional concept of “combating enemy propaganda and disinformation” is superficial and ineffective.

And in Lithuania, in this respect, the Russians and Belarusians hardly have to try at all. This part of Lithuanian society is now experiencing a genuine upsurge and has already burst into the epicenter of Lithuania’s public sphere and politics. This is not difficult to explain: historically, about one-third of the active Lithuanian electorate has always gravitated toward a radical “protest” worldview, and the pandemic, followed by the war in Ukraine, consolidated and shaped it anew. This is why in the recent presidential elections we saw candidates who broke what seemed an unbreakable Lithuanian political taboo — openly pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, and even antisemitic narratives. And now, within the governing coalition of a “center-left” bent, there are political forces that are increasingly forcefully and effectively attacking the main directions and pillars of Lithuania’s defense and foreign policy, which have always been pro-Western, pro-Ukrainian, and anti-Kremlin. It is symptomatic that these forces are aligning with anti-liberal, “anti-leftist” nationalist trends, jointly attacking some of the country’s key democratic institutions — for example, the media. At the moment, the authorities are carrying out an assault on the public broadcaster — Lithuanian Radio and Television.

As for kinetic aggression from the Russian and Belarusian regimes — with the latter acting as the main workforce and operational agent of the former — this aggression has been ongoing for quite some time and is increasingly moving from what could be called “hybrid” toward something simply terrorist. In essence, it is the same as in Poland, though there it is much larger in scale (for example, in terms of the number of drones that cross the border) and in ambition. In Lithuania, there have not yet been attempts to blow up railways to cause mass civilian casualties. Why Poland is the main target in the region is clear: the Russian regime, moving along an inevitable path of escalation against other countries in the region — NATO members — sees Poland as the principal enemy and object of “revenge.”

In Lithuania, we are witnessing, for example, the mass launching of balloons from Belarus, which have disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport (and, of course, pose risks to civilians). These balloons have always been used to transport tobacco contraband, but now the regime, which has always been involved in this business, has turned it into terrorist aggression — very similar to the orchestrated influx of illegal migrants a few years ago. And unfortunately, the Lithuanian authorities are currently losing badly. First, without proper preparation and without sounding out Warsaw, Riga, Brussels, and especially Washington, they closed the border, threatening also to halt Russian transit to Kaliningrad. Minsk then simply took hostage all Lithuanian freight carriers who happened to be in Belarus at that time and locked them in paid parking lots. Eventually, Lithuania — agreeing to “technical consultations” — reopened the border earlier than planned, but the balloons keep coming, and Minsk is not releasing the people or the property, demanding negotiations at the level of foreign ministers. In official Vilnius, there is bewilderment; no one really knows what to do.

There are several reasons for this. One is the internal situation within the government, with a crisis of political leadership and the aforementioned destructive actions of those ruling forces that oppose any new decisive steps against the regimes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the top state leaders are so far only promising that such actions will be taken and that they are “consulting” with Brussels, Washington, and Warsaw about a new border closure and new EU-level sanctions against Minsk. But neither Brussels nor, of course, Washington appears to be moving in that direction.

On the technical level, law-enforcement agencies are now catching tobacco smugglers, and the army assures that it can shoot down these balloons as well as drones if they cross the border again. But they are reluctant to do so for civilian-safety reasons.

All this leads to what the Anglo-Saxons call the bottom line: neither in Lithuania nor between Lithuania and other regional countries, nor at the levels of NATO, the EU, and the major Western European states, is there what is most essential — a political, conceptual, and, of course, military consensus, nor a general plan for how to respond to the regimes’ escalating level of aggression, how to climb these rungs of escalation, or whether to climb them at all. So, I repeat: for now, the enemy dictates the pace of escalation and retains the initiative, while we still mistakenly and naively hope that “it will not go further.” Of course it will.

…that there are “consultations” underway with Poland, Brussels, and Washington regarding a new and “real” closure of the border, and new sanctions at the European level against Minsk. But obviously, neither in Brussels nor, even more so, in Washington is anyone really moving to meet this.

On the technical level, now the law-enforcement agencies are catching smugglers, and the army assures that it can shoot down these balloons and drones if they fly in again — it only hesitates to do this because of considerations of civilian safety. All this leads us to what, as the Anglo-Saxons say, is the bottom line: neither in Lithuania, nor between it and the countries of the region, nor between the region and the upper echelons of NATO and the EU, nor among the main Western European states, is there a common political and conceptual consensus on the algorithm for responding to the escalation raised by the regimes. In other words — how to climb the steps of escalation, and whether to climb them at all. So, for now everyone continues to drift along, hoping that perhaps “it will not go further.” Therefore, the enemy still dictates the pace and level of escalation.”

An interesting fact is that the Polish national minority in Lithuania is probably the only anti-EU and pro-Russian minority originating from the countries of the United Europe. or centuries, persecuted by Russians, this minority supports them solely to spite Lithuanians. Ironically, the positions of the current and even former Polish governments have unequivocally recognized Russia as an aggressor and a terrorist state.

Latvia

While the situation in Latvian-language media is similar to Lithuanian, in Russian-language media, some TV programs are still available online, but not exclusively, and propaganda websites are accessed via VPN. It’s like two worlds in one country. Latvia’s problem is significant because it is home to the largest Russian national minority. While Latvia manages this situation admirably: mandatory Latvian language exams, deportations to the Russian Federation, etc., the fifth column only targets those of Russian descent. Recently, a well-known operation by Europol and Eurojuts (and partners form Austria, Finland and Estonia), codenamed SIM KARTEL⁷, broke up a SIM card farm ring that sold fake phone numbers to validate millions of fake accounts on social media portals, banks, and cyber offices. SimBoxes and FTC gateways were sold. It is estimated that approximately 4.9 billion fake accounts were registered in the EU with these numbers — a more powerful troll army than the one operating in St. Petersburg. A similar situation occurred in Poland in 2022⁸/2024, when cyber forces disrupted a group selling counterfeit SIM cards from around the world, including 25,000 Ukrainian ones.

These cases are interesting because their saboteurs (citizens of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, who cannot enter Ukraine anyway, or those convicted in Ukraine for espionage and staying in Belarus used Ukrainian telephone numbers during sabotage in Poland)

Estonia

A similar case is that Lithuania and Latvia are handling propaganda very well in their national language media. Estonia, the most digitally-oriented country (Europe’s second Japan), has built a strong social resilience. The same problem, the same scenario, the target audience: Russian-speaking residents of eastern Estonia. Especially in the eastern part of the country, Narva, but not only there. During my stay in Yohvi, it was easy to find Russian-language TV programs ( and it is not a Russian-language public channel Настоящее Время / Nastoyashcheye Vremya prepared as a European alternative for Russian speakers ), but generally this community continues to watch Russian propaganda programs using VPNs and travels to the country (unfortunately without major problems), which creates ideal conditions for another special operation (rapid recruitment of potential provocateurs, etc.).

In summary, the Baltic countries are generally coping well with Russian propaganda attacks in their media sphere. They are losing ground only in the Russian-speaking minority and the Polish minority in Lithuania. Poland, on the other hand, is coping well in the mainstream media, but the main current of hatred emerges in social media, “pseudo-alternative portals, blogs, far-right and pseudo-patriotic” where Russian propaganda reigns supreme. Unfortunately, the phenomenon is so widespread in Poland that it spills over into the entire country, thanks to “extreme bloggers” and far-right politics.

References:

1. Bakun, W.Prezydnet Miasta Przemyśl.(2025). Zmiana garderoby iluminacji. Facebook. URL: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1421098102705195&set=a.343937323754617

2. Jóźwiak, T. (2025). Operacja SIMCARTEL – 7 osób zatrzymanych, przejęte 40 tys. kart SIM z 80 krajów. Sekurak. URL: https://sekurak.pl/operacja-simcartel-7-osob-zatrzymanych-przejete-40-tys-kart-sim-z-80-krajow/

3. Narracje dezinformacyjne na temat sabotażu polskich linii kolejowych/ (2025). Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji. URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/narracje-dezinformacyjne-na-temat-sabotazu-polskich-linii-kolejowych

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6. Piskorski, M. (2025). Płk Jacques Baud: Estonizacja jako krok do III wojny światowej. Myśl Polska. URL: https://myslpolska.info/2025/09/30/plk-jacques-baud-estonizacja-jako-krok-do-iii-wojny-swiatowej/

7. Przestępcza infrastruktura tzw. „SIMBOX-ów” przejęta przez CBZC. (2023). Sekurak. URL: https://cbzc.policja.gov.pl/bzc/aktualnosci/232,Przestepcza-infrastruktura-tzw-SIMBOX-ow-przejeta-przez-CBZC.html