By Robin Ashby

“Si vis pacem, para bellum” – if you want peace prepare for war. Roman military writer

Publius Vegetius Renatus, 4^th century

We are not at peace. We are not yet in a kinetic war. But we are already in a hybrid war – theme at Berline Security Conference, November 2025

Europe and its friends face challenges of existential importance.

The mid 17^th century proverb “We must all hang together or we will all hang separately” has never been truer.

The current and emerging threats to our European values and way of life call for our collective wisdom, our courage, and our shared determination to meet a timeline that demands significant action within the next two years.

The EU’s Defence Commissioner Kubilius, in his pivotal speech on June 2025, made clear that the window for meaningful reform and capability delivery is narrow. By 2027, the immediate threat to Europe will be reconstituted Russian forces supported by a war-footing economy already in existence and growing rapidly.

So the Allied nations must have adapted their defence industrial base, acquisition models, and cooperation frameworks to meet this. He spelled out his views on necessary steps. And this is not a distant goal; it is an immediate imperative.

The response of Allied defence industries to numerous challenges will determine whether we succeed in preserving strategic advantage—or surrender it to those who operate with fewer constraints and more audacity. ( “Allied” here means NATO members, EU members and others from anywhere in the world who are willing to join the collective endeavour. )

“Give us the tools and we’ll finish the job” said Sir Winston Churchill in 1941. Governments can provide the money (or underwrite it) but it is to industry that nations must turn for the tools. But the whole procurement environment is beset with issues that require ultra rapid resolution. This article explores some of the most fundamental.

Leadership requires politicians to say clearly what they want, to find the necessary funds even at the expense of existing priorities. It is also the duty of politicians to inform and convince their publics of the new realities – creating “social acceptance” as its been called.

The nature of warfare and the domains in which it is fought have transformed. It now encompasses cyber, space, electromagnetic, and cognitive theatres, alongside increasingly blurred distinctions between peace and conflict, civilian and military infrastructure, and state and non-state actors. Deniability, even of the most flimsy sort, is a key feature of that last group.

A former UK Foreign Secretary has written of the Middle East and Ukraine conflicts: “the science of war is progressing so rapidly, integrating data, AI and signals intelligence with drones and missiles to such devastating effect, that any major country needs to keep up.

“Countries such as the UK, planning a slow build up of defence, must act with more speed and innovation if they are to defend themselves against any future attack.”

Although this article cites UK examples of good practice and learning points, these are the exception not the rule. The UK generally is just as bad as most other European countries who have forgotten the lessons of the past – although honourable mentions must be made of Poland, the Baltic states and Finland. Baltic states, especially Sweden, are embracing the concept of Total War and are preparing their citizens for their part in it.

But there are fundamental structural weaknesses in the defence industrial domain.

*The widening gap between the pace of innovation and bureaucratic restraint in our systems

• Fragmentation within the Allied defence ecosystem

• The intensifying global competition for talent and technological expertise

• Fragility in supply chains and industrial base resilience

Each issue is multifaceted. Each demands not merely solutions, but integrated strategic action – now – across government, industry, academia, and allied partners.

The pace of innovation, speed of productionising, and volume of production

We are in an era of exponential technology development—AI, machine learning, quantum computing, hypersonics, autonomy, and directed energy. Our adversaries increasingly embrace these technologies, often through calculated military-commercial alliances. They move swiftly, leveraging off-the-shelf innovation and exploiting emergent capabilities in conflict theatres.

History teaches us valuable lessons about innovation under pressure. During the Second World War, the rapid development and deployment of iconic aircraft like Spitfires—where 24 marks were introduced over six years—and Hurricanes were not just feats of engineering but triumphs of urgent adaptation to win battles in the sky.

Likewise, production volumes. In 1938, only about 30 Spitfires were available. By the Battle of

Britain, 2,000 had been built. Over 20,000 were produced during the war—not just by Supermarine but also by subcontractors like Castle Bromwich Aircraft Factory and “shadow” sites where engineering firms pivoted to wartime work.

The Air Transport Auxiliaries ferried these planes to operational bases. I love the story of the ATA girls. They’d taught themselves to fly, but weren’t allowed to join the RAF. They’d collect aircraft with only a few typed instructions—covering single, twin, and even four-engine types— and take off. Often with no return arrangements, they relied on their charm to persuade young pilots to give them lifts on motorbikes or in sports cars to the nearest train station. I met several of these formidable women in later years and could well imagine the impact they had. These ladies embodied the agility and spirit required in crisis.

More recently in Afghanistan, the UK’s Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) showed how frontline needs can drive rapid acquisition, bypassing traditional slow procurement cycles. These real-world examples show why speed and flexibility are essential to maintain superiority.

But things then—and now—were far from perfect. Take the 1940s De Havilland Mosquito. The Air Ministry initially banned development of this ultra-fast, flexible bomber/reconnaissance/night fighter aircraft. Only after De Havilland built one in secret and demonstrated it in November 1940 did the Air Ministry draft a specification and place an order. It was exactly what the country needed—made largely of wood, partly because skilled furniture makers were available but not metal workers! It entered production mid-1941. In total, 7,781 Mosquitos were built in Britain, Canada, and Australia. It served until 1963.

While I’ve used UK examples, overall our defence procurement is poor. Past lessons are often ignored, and overruns in time and budget are the norm. The persistent “black hole” in defence spending means extra funds risk being absorbed by legacy programmes instead of new capabilities.

Innovation is only half the battle. Rapidly producing those innovations at scale is just as critical. Capabilities must be not only advanced but available in sufficient quantities to meet demand— once it’s identified, as with the Mosquito.

Whether it’s munitions, sensors, platforms, or software, surge capacity must be planned. This requires flexible manufacturing lines, dual-use technologies, and scalable supply chains.

Yet our traditional acquisition systems, while transparent, are risk-averse and slow. Governments wade through technical reviews, compliance rules, and legacy systems, taking years to move from prototype to production. Adversaries are not waiting, nor are the Ukranians. They prototype and manufacture flexibly, adapting in months or weeks. Currently by the time we deploy, the battlefield may have already changed.

There’s a stark asymmetry: adversaries prioritize speed and scale; we lean on thoroughness and delays. Some argue “reform talk” and continent-wide policies are political tactics to avoid taking hard defence decisions.

There is good news. Budgets are rising in key Allied nations, creating both the means and mandate to act. Germany is boosting defence investment. France is accelerating modernisation. The UK will raise defence spending to 2.6% of GDP within two years—recognising the urgency, despite earlier caveats. The European Union is hugely increasing grants and loan guarantees. With agile acquisition reform, this funding can unlock real capability gains by 2027.

Consider what’s possible with the right approach. DragonFire is a Royal Navy-directed energy weapon designed for drone defence. The marginal cost of a laser shot is 10 – 15 euros. Originally due in 2032, it’s now expected by 2027—and hopefully sooner.

• In April 2024, the UK Ministry of Defence launched an Integrated Procurement Model focusing on rapid delivery of a minimum deployable capability, followed by in-service development—akin to spiral development.

• In November 2022: high-power firing trials at Porton Down validated 50 kW laser accuracy

• In late 2023 and Jan 2024: end-to-end tests on a test range in the Hebrides successfully engaged aerial targets

• In Jan 2024: the first aerial target was neutralised—reported to Parliament as a major milestone. The shift from demonstration to operational capability was confirmed, with minimal redesign to speed up deployment

• Initial single warship fit has grown to plans for four destroyers equipped by 2027—with more likely

• £100 million has been invested since 2017, shared by MoD and industry

• £350 million has been allocated through 2027 for deployable capability

• Industry led by MBDA with Leonardo and QinetiQ, is collaborating under the new procurement model

In short, DragonFire has been fast-tracked via:

• Bold procurement reform

• Close industry collaboration

• Successful live testing

• Funding bridging demo and deployment

• Clear path to frontline integration

This showcases speed, scale, political will—and urgency.

So how do we maintain tech dominance if we can’t keep up in innovation, production, and volume?

The answer lies in change, with six interlinked steps:

• 1. Rapid experimentation and iterative prototyping

• 2. Relaxed risk thresholds in non-critical environments

• 3. 4. Dual-track acquisition: parallel development and scale-up

• 5. Agile methods from sectors like Formula 1

• 6. Mandating surge-readiness and scalability

• 7. Milestones aligned to 2027 goals

If we fail to adapt swiftly, we risk a widening strategic gap—not just in capability, but credibility. Allies may hesitate, adversaries may be emboldened. Our survival depends on adopting a speedand-volume-first ethos, without compromising safety or stewardship.

Fragmentation Across Allies: Standards, Interoperability, Stocks, Spares, and Maintenance

The Allied advantage should stem from our capacity to cooperate: to pool resources, standardise systems, streamline logistics, and operate jointly. But fragmentation is our silent adversary. Disparate standards, mismatched procurement cycles, differing export controls, and isolated R&D create inefficiencies that slow us down, inflate costs, and limit collective capability.

Consider a hypothetical operation to interdict a new threat in contested airspace. The U.S. operates with LINK 16, the UK with TTNT, France with SATURN, others with national waveforms. True data sharing becomes a choreography of translations, gateways, and trust agreements—each introducing latency, risk, or friction. Likewise, partner nations may be restricted by export laws, requiring cumbersome exemptions before sharing even vital command and control software.

Addressing this fragmentation is not a luxury but an urgent requirement to meet 2027 timelines. Allies must:

• Build an Allied interoperability architecture aligned to operational needs by 2027

• Establish mutual defence export assurance agreements with clear time-bound milestones

• Launch joint R&D consortia for disruptive technologies to accelerate development

• Coordinate procurement timelines and avoid duplication of effort

• Share multinational digital twins and test environments to reduce time-to-field

• Harmonise standards for spare parts, maintenance procedures, and lifecycle support

• Ensure strategic stockpiles of critical spares and maintenance supplies are maintained and regularly tested

When Allies truly trust and rely on one another, the collective becomes more than the sum of its parts. Fragmentation is no longer a choice – before 2027, choice must become unity.

Workforce and Talent

Our most advanced systems will not succeed without minds and skills driving them. And yet, the global race for talent is relentless. We are contending with a workforce that gravitates towards other parts of the private sector tech which offers rapid advancement, agile culture, and high reward. Meanwhile, defence lags behind.

Defence work must become synonymous with innovation, agility, and mission-driven purpose—or we risk losing another generation of strategic thinkers, developers, production engineers, and the like. Already there has been skills fade in critical area like nuclear submarines as craftsmen retire and a generation has been virtually ignored.

So actions for the longer term – starting now – must include

• Targeting scholarships and apprenticeships to underserved groups to expand the talent pool

• Embracing flexible employment arrangements recognising changing workforce expectations

• Fostering intellectual ownership and transparent ethical frameworks

• Retaining talent in times of fiscal downturn through creative employment models and upskilling.

Supply Chain Resilience

Supply chains, once largely invisible, are now front-page news. COVID-19, geopolitical shifts, and regional conflict have revealed that resilience is not a procurement luxury—it’s an existential imperative. Gain, this was frequently stressed at the Berlin Security Conference.

Key vulnerabilities include:

• Dependence on overseas semiconductor manufacturing

• Concentration of rare-earth elements sourcing

• Sub-tier supplier fragility

• Single-source spares and black-box components

To meet the 2027 readiness goals, we must:

• Build strategic stockpiles of critical components and spares with clear replenishment plans

• Establish trusted supplier networks with real-time risk monitoring

• Incentivise onshoring and nearshoring, particularly in sensitive technologies  Implement digital supply chain mapping for complete transparency

• Design for divergent sourcing specifications to avoid single points of failure

• Supply chain resilience is no longer a back-office function. It is a frontline priority in strategic readiness and must be demonstrable by 2027.

And this is where Governments must accept their responsibilities as the monopoly customer, as well as the regulator. Politicians must forgo trite nonsense such as “the market will decide.”

Government’s Role as Monopoly Customer: Driving Innovation, Production, and Readiness

Governments are uniquely positioned—and obligated—to shape the defence industrial base by:

• Setting clear strategic requirements with unambiguous timelines and performance criteria

• Providing predictable, sustained funding to support both innovation and scale-up

• Streamlining and modernising acquisition regulations to balance oversight with agility

• Taking calculated risks in early-stage funding and experimentation to de-risk industry development

• Coordinating multinational procurement to maximise economies of scale and interoperability

• Holding industry accountable for delivery milestones, while enabling flexibility in execution

• Leading efforts to maintain stocks, spares, and lifecycle support as an integral part of capability assurance

The monopoly customer role is not passive. It is an active partnership demanding leadership, vision, and decisiveness—especially in a contested and dynamic battlespace. Failure to discharge this responsibility effectively risks capability gaps, delays, and strategic vulnerability.

Intellectual Property, Sovereignty, and Innovation Collaboration

In parallel with the government’s role as monopoly customer, we must also grapple with the delicate balance between protecting national intellectual property (IP) and enabling the crossborder collaboration essential to Allied readiness.

Sovereignty over key industrial capabilities is a legitimate concern. Defence primes and small innovators alike invest immense time, capital, and risk in developing proprietary subsystems, software, and manufacturing techniques. Robust IP protection is not just a legal formality—it is essential to maintain industrial competitiveness and to incentivise the long-term innovation our national defence depends on.

Yet there is a danger here. Overly rigid IP regimes, siloed development, and nationalistic procurement models can become self-defeating. They slow multinational programmes, duplicate effort, and restrict interoperability at precisely the moment when speed and cohesion are at a premium.

We need a new model development and acquisition frameworks that safeguard core sovereign technologies while enabling trusted industrial collaboration across borders.

This requires four concrete actions:

• Mutual recognition of classified R&D and IP protections across Allied nations, allowing trusted partners to engage in co-development without compromising national security.

• Escrowed IP and controlled-access licensing models, giving coalition partners the ability to integrate systems without requiring full ownership or compromising sensitive technologies.

• Agreed frameworks for joint IP ownership and benefit sharing, particularly for technologies developed through publicly funded multinational R&D programmes.

• A harmonised Allied IP enforcement regime, backed by political commitment, that rewards transparency and penalises exploitation or misuse.

We already see both the risks and opportunities here. The Eurodrone programme—despite its promise—has been delayed in part by disagreements over national IP claims and industrial workshare. Conversely, AUKUS Pillar II on undersea autonomous systems has demonstrated that with pre-agreed IP handling protocols and common security standards, real progress can be achieved quickly—even in highly sensitive domains. Although of course in recent days a question mark has appeared over this project because of Make America Great Again vigilantes.

This is the model we must emulate: one where we protect what must be protected, but share what can and must be shared to accelerate capability delivery. Sovereignty and collaboration are not mutually exclusive—they are complementary pillars of strategic resilience.

Governments must lead in this space: as policy-setters, as conveners, and as stewards of both national interest and Allied success. Failure to address this now could mean that our most promising innovations remain locked behind national boundaries—just as the operational need for integration becomes most acute.

Conclusion

Our adversaries exploit speed, leverage asymmetric tactics, and press our seams. But we possess a defining advantage: collaborative resolve among the world’s wealthiest, most innovative defence nations.

Commissioner Kubilius’s call for action by 2027 is a clear signal that the status quo is no longer an option. We have the resources—exemplified by increased defence budgets from Germany, France, and the UK. More will be required. It will need to be spent wisely but at pace.

The mandate to act is clear. To fulfil, the defence and security domain must:

• Reform acquisition systems to be rapid, modular, and performance-driven with 2027 milestones

• Embrace production scale-up and surge capacity as core capability enablers

• Eliminate fragmentation and align policy, standards, and trust across Allies

• Revitalise education, recruitment, and career pathways to claim top-tier talent  Fortify our supply chains to ensure sustained resilience, even amid crisis  Fully exercise government’s monopoly customer role to lead and enable this transformation and all this at a speed and scale not seen for generations.

The stakes are clear: strategic advantage, deterrence credibility, and ultimately, the preservation of peace. Carpe diem. Leaders must seize this moment—boldly, decisively, and collectively—and deliver within two years.

The author is Secretary-General of Eurodefense UK and founder of the UK Defence Forum.

This article is an updated and expanded version of a speech delivered in June 2025 at The Hague to a NATO Fringe Meeting organised by the Atlantic Treaty Association – Turkey.