Dănuț MAFTEI, PhD

National Cyber Security Directorate, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract

The Chinese concept ”Three Warfares” and the Russian model of the ”Hybrid Warfare” represent strategic approaches to new generation conflicts that blend conventional and/or unconventional means to achieve the national intended objectives. These strategies have negative implications for domestic and international stability and security, cybersecurity, foreign policy, economy, diplomacy, democracy, and democratic institutions.

This scientific research analyses the two concepts to uncover details about their scope, purpose, objectives, and tools used, similarities and differences, as well as the implications for conflicts. Security experts will be better informed, having the opportunity to assess, prepare and appropriately address asymmetric challenges.

The study could lead to additional results in areas such as: information collection, analysis and exchange; a better understanding of the modern warfare; conflict prevention and mitigation; development of new policies, strategies, security norms and standards to combat new types of threats; strategic decision-making; resource allocation and military training; ensuring the unaltered functioning of democratic processes and institutions; international cooperation; ensuring national/international/collective security.

Keywords: Three Warfares; Hybrid Warfare; new generation warfare; asymmetric threats; national/international security; cybersecurity; non-kinetic tactics; foreign interference; state actors.

Introduction

The 21^st century highlights the adoption of new concepts and strategies in modern conflicts. These are constantly evolving, characterized by dimensions and manifestations that exceed the traditional approach to war, giving a new appearance to confrontations and military operations against adversaries. All these new concepts are specific to state and non-state actors who explore alternative courses of action to achieve their strategic objectives in security, politics, military, economy, espionage, or foreign interference, intending to engage as few resources as possible, unlike in classic military conflicts.

Two of the state actors studied in this paper are the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, as major regional and global powers that have initiated innovative strategies in this regard.

According to some researchers , the new generation warfare integrates, case by case, military forces, irregular tactics and human resources, as well as non-kinetic methods based on advanced cyber capabilities and information operations (cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, fake news, foreign interference), economic pressure, psychological, legal, diplomatic, or political actions, and other malicious techniques—summed up as “Dirty Tricks”—all increasingly seen as legitimate instruments of state policy.

Such activities negatively impact domestic and international stability and security, aiming to erode social cohesion, public trust in governments and institutions, weaken their capacity to function efficiently, undermine democracy, foster political and cultural polarization, incite violence, paralyze legislative processes, fuel discrimination and marginalization, increase social tensions and violence, and foster criminal and terrorist activities, with profound and complex effects on states and societies .

Modern conflicts, especially those involving the Russian Federation, have been called “Non-linear Warfare,” “5^th Generation Warfare,” “New Generation Warfare” , “Asymmetric Warfare,” but the most common term is “Hybrid Warfare,” as adopted by NATO .

In recent decades, China has developed its own strategic concept of unconventional/asymmetric warfare, known as “Three Warfares.” This thinking is part of China’s extended military strategy, emphasizes the importance of information warfare and non-military means, and focuses on three types of warfare – Psychological, Legal, and Media – used as needed to achieve strategic objectives, often without significant resource investment and without exceeding the limits of conventional conflicts.

The “Three Warfares” concept is integral to China’s efforts to protect its sovereignty, expand its influence, and deter adversaries, especially in its relations with the United States, Taiwan, India, and other regional or global actors. Methods based on this concept are used to shape target opinions on various issues (for example, in the South China Sea, Beijing presents itself as a peaceful power while accusing other nations of aggression).

As for the Russian hybrid warfare model, it also features the combination of conventional and unconventional tactics and asymmetric strategies, used to achieve national objectives with limited resource investment and reduced risk of direct military confrontation. Strategic flexibility, adaptability, and deception are emphasized, as well as exploiting vulnerabilities in an adversary’s political, economic, and social systems. The boundaries between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are blurred. Paradoxically, Russia uses democratic instruments to undermine democracy in adversary states.

Hybrid warfare is also highlighted as a persistent new reality in recent Russian military thinking, with the “information sphere” and “information warfare” being critical battle spaces . Russia has become particularly noted for its hybrid warfare tactics, especially in its intervention in Georgia (2008) and subsequent military actions in Crimea (2014), Syria (2014), and Ukraine (2022).

The Chinese “Three Warfares” concept and the Russian “Hybrid Warfare” model have become essential to modern geopolitical competition, especially as they continue to evolve. Both concepts represent innovative, sophisticated, and multidimensional approaches to conflict, non-traditional forms of warfare that use non-kinetic means, have a different dimension, and blend conventional and unconventional means to project power and influence.

“Three Warfares” and “Hybrid Warfare” share many information warfare similarities, with various common elements (multidimensional conflict approach, non-military means, non-kinetic strategies, techniques, and procedures).

Of course, cyber warfare and cyberspace, as the 5^th domain of operations , are common domains used for implementing these concepts. Both “Three Warfares” and “Hybrid Warfare” include common cyber elements, especially in how information and cyber tools are used in modern conflicts. These concepts involve using non-traditional warfare methods, where advanced cyber capabilities are strategic tools central to achieving political, economic, and military objectives, used to influence the information environment, disrupt infrastructure, conduct espionage, or undermine democracy and the stability of targeted states.

Common elements are also found during Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a domain where both China and the Russian Federation are particularly active .

However, there are also some differences between the two concepts, related to their strategic domain of application, objectives, methods of implementation, etc.

This paper will explore and compare these two concepts, analysing their roots, examining, and highlighting their components, objectives, impact on foreign policy, broader implications for national and global stability and security, how they shape the geopolitical landscape, their conflict potential, and patterns of implementation.

A deeper understanding of these doctrines, their similarities and differences, offers a range of benefits to security experts and is essential for nations, governments, the international community, and security institutions to adapt to the ever-changing global security landscape, develop a stronger defense, counter-strategies, and more effective responses to these evolving forms of conflict and unconventional threats.

Methodology and Research Hypotheses

The study adopts an analytical and exploratory methodology, based on the following components:

(1) Documentary analysis by examining available specialized bibliographic materials addressing the research topic, as well as participation in national and international conferences where these aspects were debated;

(2) Comparative study: comparing the two concepts to discover similarities and differences, and how cyber warfare and cyberspace are common domains for their implementation;

(3) Study of the scope, objectives, and tools used in both concepts, as well as their implications for conflicts;

(4) Presentation of relevant conclusions for experts in governments, the international community, and security institutions to quickly adapt to the changing global security landscape, develop a stronger defense, counterstrategies, and effective responses to these evolving forms of conflict and asymmetric threats.

The methodology facilitates a clear perspective on internal and international security challenges that may arise from applying these two concepts.

The study is based on the following research hypotheses:

1. It is anticipated that a pronounced conceptual similarity between “Three Warfares” and “Hybrid Warfare,” once identified and analysed, will lead to the development of an extended cognitive framework, capable of increasing the effectiveness of security experts in assessing, estimating, and countering contemporary asymmetric challenges, including cyber, hybrid, and external interference threats;

2. It is estimated that empirical validation of this study’s conclusions will provide the theoretical-methodological basis needed to review and improve national security strategies, potentially resulting in optimized allocation and use of national resources in the context of new generation conflicts;

3. The existence of cyber warfare and cyberspace as common operational areas for the “Three Warfares” and “Hybrid Warfare” paradigms suggests substantial theoretical similarity between these two concepts;

4. Given the increasing complexity of the contemporary security environment, it is estimated that activities under the “Three Warfares” and “Hybrid Warfare” concepts have significant destabilizing consequences for national and international security and stability.

1 The Chinese Concept of “Three Warfares”

The People’s Republic of China has a very long history regarding war and military approaches, with several ancient scholars highlighting theories and strategies that go beyond the mere use of brute force. The famous phrase from “The Art of War” – “all warfare is based on deception” – highlights a fundamental element of the three domains of warfare. The basic condition is that the one exploiting the science of illusion and deception holds the advantage of knowing and understanding the adversary’s vulnerabilities .

In an era of globalization and information technology evolution, the “Three Warfares” (TW) concept is particularly important in the context of China’s geopolitical ambitions and is deeply rooted in Chinese military and political thinking, being essential for achieving political, military, and economic strategic objectives without engaging in direct military confrontation.

This concept was studied more closely in the work “Unrestricted Warfare” by two researchers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army – PLA . By 2002, the “Three Warfares” concept had been expanded to cover conflicts in the legal, psychological, and media domains, reflecting China’s understanding of the changing nature of modern warfare and geopolitical strategy, where battles are fought not only with conventional weapons but also through manipulation of information, legal structures, and public opinion.

As interest in asymmetric warfare forms grew, especially in areas considered “core interests,” under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China published in December 2003 a set of codes implementing TW for regulating political warfare. These rules, approved by the Central Military Commission – commonly called “work regulations” for the PLA – were later integrated into the PLA’s education and training programs and updated in 2010 to specifically address the “Three Warfares”.

TW continued to be integrated and consolidated as a pillar of modern Chinese military strategy, especially for protecting sovereignty, expanding influence, and deterring adversaries, particularly in relations with the US, Taiwan, India, and other regional or global actors.

The TW concept uses a multidimensional approach to modern warfare, especially in the asymmetric context, to complement traditional military power with unconventional and non-kinetic means to achieve national objectives, using legal constraints on adversaries, manipulating the psychological environment and narrative control, influencing decision-making, and shaping public perception in both military and non-military contexts, domestically and internationally. As China has become a global power, these methods have increasingly influenced its interactions with other nations, corporate strategies, and internal governance.

Implementing the “Three Warfares” concept has significant implications both domestically in China and externally in its relations with other countries, promoting its interests while avoiding the risks and costs associated with traditional warfare. For China, the ability to wage psychological, media, and legal warfare—merging together into a coherent strategy—allows it to project power on the world stage without direct military confrontation. This gives it a significant advantage in its strategic rivalry with various adversaries.

Among other things, the benefits of using the TW concept include: flexibility (non-kinetic strategies allow a more adaptable framework for engaging in conflict; state actors, especially those with less military power, can effectively challenge more powerful adversaries); cost-effectiveness (engaging in psychological, media, and legal warfare can often be less expensive than maintaining large standing armies or engaging in prolonged military campaigns); psychological and media warfare offer opportunities for preventive actions that can shape narratives before they take root, allowing a more favourable environment for diplomacy.

China also pays attention to the concept of asymmetric warfare, based on Mao Zedong’s strategy of using regular and irregular forces together, which later inspired Russian strategists.

In all the three warfares, cyber operations serve as a strategic tool for influence and undermining adversaries’ stability, while simultaneously shaping outcomes in China’s favour, without overt military confrontation.

On the international stage, China’s use of TW poses a challenge for other states, especially democratic nations with a free press and open political systems. Manipulating information, using disinformation campaigns, and exploiting legal systems create a complex environment for global diplomacy and international relations.

For countries targeted by China’s media or legal warfare, there is a growing need to understand these tactics and develop countermeasures. Democracies must protect their media landscapes from foreign manipulation, safeguard the integrity of their legal systems, and ensure resilience to psychological operations.

2. Components of the „Three Warfares” Concept

2.1 Psychological Warfare

“Psychological warfare,” as a component of the “Three Warfares” concept, involves using specific strategies to manipulate the perceptions, beliefs, emotions, morale, and decision-making of the enemy, to induce fear, confusion, and insecurity among adversaries, making them question their own decisions or actions. It also aims to influence domestic and international political and public opinion. All these seek to achieve strategic objectives in ways that use to favour China, without engaging in direct military confrontations.

Psychological warfare has evolved with technological and media advances, allowing increasingly sophisticated methods. Some main elements of Chinese psychological warfare are threats of military action (using intimidation, military demonstrations, or public statements to stress and destabilize the adversary), influence operations, propaganda, persuasion, deception, and disinformation campaigns (creating and spreading false narratives to deceive an adversary or the public), undermining trust (to create doubt, fear, and indecision regarding a military force or a state’s political leadership), strategic information leaks via social media, etc. This type of aggression also includes conducting cyber operations.

Studies show that psychological tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have been used to: present China as a peaceful power and a responsible member of the international community, especially on sensitive issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, while accusing other nations of aggression; shape global opinions on issues like territorial claims in the South China Sea and its responses to human rights criticisms; undermine perceptions of the US globally and promote trade narratives advantageous to Beijing; erode Taiwan’s sense of identity, undermine public trust in the Taiwanese government, and promote divisions within Taiwanese society; pressure Taiwan’s international allies by creating fear of Chinese reprisals; threaten military action .

Cognitive Domain Operations

As information becomes increasingly important for Chinese warfare, the PLA has begun developing a new concept specific to psychological warfare in the information era, called “cognitive domain operations.” This new generation evolution of psychological warfare seeks to use information to influence an adversary’s cognitive functions, from public opinion in peacetime to decision-making in wartime.

Cognitive domain operations represent the next frontier of warfare domains, moving from domains such as land, sea, air, electromagnetic, information, space, and cyber to the human mind. Their objective is “mental superiority” – the next phase in the PLA’s traditional concept of ensuring superiority in these domains, using psychological warfare to shape or even control the enemy’s thinking and decision-making .

2.2 Media Warfare

“Media warfare” involves using both traditional mass media (state-controlled television, publications, national journals) and digital platforms, including social media and other communication channels, to shape public opinion, promote positive images of China’s international role, and influence the perceptions of domestic and foreign audiences. This type of conflict has helped strengthen China’s position both domestically and internationally.

To better understand the situation, it is worth quoting Xi Jinping, who, in February 2016, stated: “Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles” .

Modern social media platforms facilitate the use of battle strategies in which information is distorted, contested, and used for influence. This also involves manipulating news coverage and promoting favourable images of China, while targeting foreign media to undermine their credibility.

Media warfare encompasses a variety of tactics aimed at controlling the flow of information, such as: censorship and control of domestic media narratives to ensure alignment with strategic interests; promoting a positive image of its domestic and foreign policies (to create a favourable image at home and abroad); interference and manipulation of social media (to influence the public); dissemination of fake news; disinformation operations, etc.

Chinese state media plays a significant role in media warfare , acting to globally project government-approved narratives and promote strategic objectives without resorting to traditional military means .

According to studies, media warfare TTPs, which include elements specific to cyber operations, are used by China to: counter Western narratives about China’s rise and actions; censor sensitive topics such as the Tiananmen Square massacre, issues related to Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, as well as international criticism of China’s policies; justify territorial claims and assert that its military presence in various areas is purely peaceful, despite international criticism and competing claims from other Southeast Asian countries; highlight China’s economic growth and important position in global geopolitics; showcase China’s contributions to regional development, presenting itself as a benevolent power; control the narrative regarding its response to and management of the COVID-19 pandemic, presenting itself as a responsible global leader through humanitarian and diplomatic actions; manipulate public opinion by portraying dissidents as radicals, etc.

China’s use of social media platforms for public influence includes the increasingly active use of “troll farms” and “bots.” Thus, social networks are flooded with fake pages and automated accounts managed by trolls and maintained by bots, resulting in the posting of manipulative and false content according to preset algorithms.

A “troll” is a person using a false identity, seemingly posting original content on social networks to transmit propaganda messages, conflictual information, to accuse or praise a party involved in the online conversation. In other cases, professional trolls take over and abusively manage online user accounts. “Bots” are not people, but programs that generate pre-designed content against a party, candidate, person, state, or in favour of entities financing the bot farm administrators. Bots react automatically and quite simplistically, sometimes using easily detectable artificial language. .

2.3 Legal Warfare

“Legal warfare” involves using national and international legal instruments and frameworks to achieve strategic objectives, support China’s claims and actions, and constrain adversaries by manipulating or exploiting ambiguities in national legal frameworks, treaties, and international agreements . China also uses legal warfare to promote its interests, especially in areas where it does not have the conventional military, strategic, or economic power to engage in direct conflict.

Legal warfare is an important tool for China in international relations and diplomacy, allowing: challenging adversaries’ positions on certain topics in international forums, undermining their legal and political legitimacy; using international law/treaties to legitimize its own actions or provoke adversaries; exploiting legal ambiguity to take advantage of legal grey areas; active involvement in international legal forums or courts to modify the international legal framework to reflect China’s interests.

Key strategies within legal warfare also include influencing domestic legal systems (to suppress dissent, silence critics, and control political discourse) or strategic processes (as a form of pressure on foreign companies, governments, or individuals).

China’s approach to legal warfare has become increasingly prominent in recent years, presenting various legal arguments to justify reprisals, infringements on freedom of expression or press, citing national security laws. It has also invoked historical rights to legally consolidate territorial claims and strengthen its position against international court rulings, while simultaneously launching psychological campaigns to discredit rival claims by nations like Vietnam and the Philippines. At the same time, China has rejected/ignored international arbitration rulings, confirmed by various types of threats and challenges to the rule of law, such as: presenting excessive maritime claims, illegal construction and militarization of artificial islands, violating other states’ sovereignty through high-altitude balloons or illegal and undeclared fishing .

Chinese companies have also repeatedly sued foreign companies or governments to challenge their policies or decisions. For example, a large-scale litigation campaign has been observed since 2018, leading to legal challenges following the exclusion of Chinese telecom suppliers Huawei and ZTE (accused of ties to the CCP) from 5G¹ equipment tenders. Several states’ concerns about 5G network security stem from allegations that Chinese 5G technologies may contain malicious software enabling espionage and surveillance (as part of China’s international intelligence activities), under a legal framework obliging companies and individuals to assist in information gathering. Accordingly, China has initiated lawsuits against the following states: Australia, Canada, Poland (2018–2020); France, New Zealand, USA (2019); Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Ukraine, UK, USA (2020); India, Kenya, Malaysia, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka (2020–2021); Sweden (2020–present); Chile, Russia, South Korea, Thailand (2021). Also, Bahrain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Costa Rica, Netherlands, Slovakia, Taiwan, Vietnam have banned Huawei and were at least criticized by the Chinese government for these measures . Given the Chinese government’s ambition to become a global leader in new technologies, manifested in state-led industrial policies such as Made in China 2025 , it can be concluded that as other states (especially those about to join the EU) exclude Chinese suppliers from future 5G or 6G tenders, China will continue to use national and international legal instruments and frameworks against them to challenge their decisions.

When China cannot successfully apply legal warfare tools in certain domains, it will use them in others: in outer space and cyberspace. In these cases, the effects can be even more dangerous, as the specific legislation for these two domains is not well developed, both by custom and by treaties, unlike other cases, such as the Law of the Sea. In these conditions, China’s potential influence—positive or negative – on the formation and crystallization of international law in outer space and cyberspace can be even greater .

By using legal instruments, China seeks to justify its cyber operations, influence international legal norms specific to the cyber domain, expand sovereignty rights, and gain an advantage regarding future actions in the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains . At the same time, China’s use of legal warfare TTPs in cyberspace aims to limit the effects and ways in which international law can be applied or interpreted to China’s detriment.

2. The Russian Hybrid Warfare Model

3.1 Introduction

Modern conflicts, especially those involving the Russian Federation, have been called “Non-linear Warfare,” “5^th Generation Warfare,” “New Generation Warfare,” “Asymmetric Warfare” , but the most common term is “Hybrid Warfare,” as adopted by NATO .

Hybrid warfare TTPs have become central elements of Russian military doctrine and integrate military forces, irregular tactics and human resources, kinetic and non-kinetic methods based on advanced cyber capabilities and information operations (cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, influence, fake news, foreign interference), economic pressure, psychological and political warfare, diplomatic instruments, and other malign techniques, increasingly considered by Russia as legitimate state instruments.

The new generation of Russian military art targets asymmetry (as a strategy for a weaker adversary to fight a stronger one), strategic flexibility, adaptability, surprise, and deception. As Putin stated in 2006, “We should not pursue quantity… Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetric and, although not as costly, will undoubtedly make our nuclear triad more reliable and effective” .

The new generation of conflicts allows Russia to achieve strategic objectives such as: destabilizing rival states; increasing insecurity and complexity through diverse tactics (“multimodal confrontations”), making it difficult for adversaries to develop counter-strategies; blurring the lines between military and civilian targets, increasing the risk of collateral damage and unintended consequences; projecting Russian power and using hybrid warfare components globally in various regions and contexts; promoting strategic and security interests; influencing political and social dynamics in adversary states; undermining foreign governments and promoting pro-Russian sentiments; plausible denial of direct involvement in various conflicts through the use of irregular forces and covert operations; escalation control, with strategies allowing flexibility to escalate or de-escalate a situation as needed.

Here, interstate conflict and war are equated with political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and non-military activities. However, hybrid TTPs allow the avoidance of officially triggering a large-scale military response. This new generation of warfare has significant implications for global security and stability, international relations, and democracy, creating uncertainty, blurring the lines between military and civilian targets, and challenging existing norms of international relations.

The USSR’s experiences during the Cold War and in Afghanistan (1979–1989) led to a greater emphasis on unconventional warfare, including the use of proxies, subversive activities, and political confrontations. After the Cold War, the term “hybrid warfare” appeared in the West as a response to the limitations of classic conflict and became synonymous with Russian operations, especially regarding its actions in Georgia, Chechnya, Ukraine, Syria, and the post-Soviet space.

The modern iteration of the Russian hybrid warfare model draws on the strategic thinking of Soviet-era theorists (Leonid Brezhnev and Nikolai Ogarkov), who advocated combining conventional, irregular tactics and asymmetric warfare capabilities as tools to counter superior Western military forces .

Later, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov developed this concept through the “Primakov Doctrine” (1996), which holds that a unipolar world dominated by the United States is unacceptable to Russia. Since 2014, hybrid warfare has been at the center of Western security analysts’ attention, especially as a new Russian military strategy has been developed and applied, particularly under President Vladimir Putin. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a turning point for the Russian hybrid warfare model, as it demonstrated the successful integration of military, cyber, irregular, and information warfare capabilities. This strategic approach was further refined during the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the 2022 invasion, with hybrid warfare being deployed more aggressively to destabilize Ukraine and challenge Western influence in the region.

Modern hybrid warfare is associated with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, author of the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” – a concept articulated in a 2013 speech, combining Soft power with Hard power across multiple domains and transcending the boundaries between peacetime and wartime. The Gerasimov Doctrine represents an effort to elaborate and develop an operational concept for Russia’s confrontation with the West, supporting earlier doctrines that guided Russian policy .

Gerasimov emphasized the need for Russia to use a combination of military, political, and informational strategies to achieve its objectives. He also stated that warfare must involve a wide spectrum of unconventional methods – cyber-attacks, propaganda, economic measures, and irregular forces – alongside traditional military force.

Russia’s hybrid strategy has continued to evolve, incorporating lessons from various conflicts and adapting to the changing global security landscape. Russian leaders are aware that they are not strong enough to win a potential conflict with NATO, which is why they focus on asymmetric combat strategies and exploiting adversaries’ weaknesses.

The evolution of hybrid warfare does not mean the end of traditional or conventional military conflicts, but it complicates defense planning in the 21^st century. As the implications could be significant, they must be carefully analysed to identify current and innovative approaches .

3.2 Components of Modern “Hybrid Warfare”

Conventional military force remains a central element of the Russian hybrid strategy. Russian forces may be engaged in limited or large-scale military operations, combined with hybrid tactics. For example, in the 2008 Georgia conflict, Russia deployed conventional military forces to support separatist groups in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, while simultaneously conducting cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. In Crimea, Russian military forces organized a rapid and largely bloodless occupation in 2014, using a combination of special actions, local militias, and support from the ethnic Russian population to take control of the region. Conventional Russian forces played a decisive role in these operations, but their effectiveness was enhanced by the use of other hybrid tactics. In eastern Ukraine, conventional Russian forces were deployed covertly and without direct attribution, allowing Moscow to maintain plausible deniability while supporting separatist forces in the Donbas region. This approach allowed Russia to avoid direct confrontation with the West, which could have had more serious international consequences. The conflict initiated by the Russian Federation in Ukraine in 2022 also demonstrates the use of conventional military troops alongside non-kinetic operations.

Asymmetric warfare and irregular/proxy forces. One of the characteristics of Russian hybrid warfare is the use of irregular forces (local militias, mercenaries, separatist groups, etc.) as a means of destabilizing adversary states, while avoiding the risk of direct military confrontation. This allows Russia to maintain a degree of denial while pursuing its strategic objectives. Proxy forces are usually secretly supported by the Russian government and often used in regions where Russia seeks to exert influence without directly engaging its own military troops. Russia supports separatist movements with weapons, training, and political support, while also using them for paramilitary operations. These proxy groups are essential for destabilization and prolonging conflicts, while Russia itself avoids direct military confrontation with Western powers.

Cyber warfare and information confrontation. Cyber operations play an important role as a component of hybrid warfare. Russia has prioritized developing advanced military and civilian cyber capabilities, which has made it a prominent actor in cyber warfare, using it as a tool for both offensive and defensive actions. Cyber operations are used both in peacetime and conflict (where they support kinetic attacks) to disrupt the functioning of adversaries’ critical information infrastructures, attack government networks, destabilize targeted states and affect the functioning of their political and economic systems, extract sensitive information, and conduct disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion, create confusion, and erode democracy and trust in government institutions. Russia has been accused of using cyber capabilities for espionage, sabotage, and disruptions. The 2016 cyber-attack, where Russia allegedly intervened in the US presidential elections by hacking the Democratic National Committee’s emails and subsequently disseminating them via WikiLeaks, is one of the most publicized examples of Russian cyber warfare tactics . The 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia are often cited as one of the first cases of state-sponsored cyber warfare . Subsequently, cyber-attacks against a wide range of targets, including government institutions, civil entities, and private sector companies, have been attributed to Russian state and non-state actors .

Information warfare: Russia’s concept of “information confrontation” and the role of cyberspace within it is presented in several strategic policy documents: Military Doctrine (2014), National Security Strategy (2015), Foreign Policy Concept (2016), Information Security Doctrine (2016), Conceptual Perspectives on the Activities of the Armed Forces in the Information Space (2016), as well as in works and publications by Russian military thinkers . Russia aggressively uses information warfare tactics – key elements of hybrid warfare, often involving state-controlled media, social media “bots,” and online “trolls”—to influence public opinion, alter political outcomes, disrupt social cohesion, erode public trust, destabilize political systems, undermine democratic norms, weaken the resilience of democratic states, and create confusion among adversaries to gain strategic advantages both domestically and internationally.

Russian “trolls” and “bots” play an important role in spreading fake news, propaganda, disinformation, combining human-generated content with computerized posting and/or manipulating/promoting online narratives through media platforms. Also, creating and using large networks of fake accounts plays a significant role in achieving specific information warfare objectives .

Diplomatic and economic warfare. Russia has used complex diplomatic and economic measures as key elements of its hybrid warfare strategy, including sanctions, energy influence/diplomacy, and trade restrictions to pressure adversaries and achieve strategic objectives. Using economic instruments allows Russia to influence the political and economic behaviour of other states without resorting to military force. In response to Western sanctions imposed against it, Russia has implemented countersanctions, including banning certain products from the European Union and the US. Russia has also used its control over energy resources, especially natural gas, to influence European countries dependent on Russian energy exports. By threatening to cut off energy supplies, Russia has managed to exert political influence over several states. Additionally, Russia has focused on building economic alliances with countries resistant to Western influence, such as China, Iran, and Venezuela. These relationships allow Russia to bypass Western sanctions and continue to pursue its geopolitical objectives.

Psychological and political warfare play a significant role in Russia’s hybrid strategy, using these tools to manipulate adversaries’ morale, will, and decision-making. Russia uses combinations of propaganda, fear tactics, and perception manipulation to undermine its enemies’ decision-making power and create political instability. An example is the use of “active measures” (a concept used by Russia since the 1950s), a covert form of political warfare intended to influence/destabilize adversaries’ political landscapes. These measures include spreading false or misleading information, bribery, extortion, initiating revolutions, and encouraging internal divisions within targeted societies .

2. ”Three Warfares” Versus “Hybrid Warfare” – Comparative Analysis

The two concepts present several similarities and differences, as follows:

2. 1. Similarities:

– both Russian and Chinese strategies focus on using classical and unconventional methods of warfare to achieve strategic objectives. The unconventional ones emphasize psychological, media, and legal warfare, as well as diplomatic, economic, and cyber tactics to influence adversaries and shape the international landscape, allowing both states to avoid direct military confrontation while pursuing strategic objectives;

– both doctrines allow plausible deniability and use strategies that create uncertainty and complexity, making it difficult for adversaries to develop effective counterstrategies;

– the integration of traditional and non-traditional military capabilities blurs the lines between military and civilian targets, between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, increasing the risk of collateral damage and unintended consequences;

– both concepts have a global scope, being usable in different regions and contexts;

– studies demonstrate the effectiveness and adaptability of both concepts;

– both Russia and China have been accused of interfering in electoral processes in other states, demonstrating the use of non-military means to influence final outcomes;

– both states have developed their own asymmetric warfare strategies, using both regular and irregular forces;

– the ideological dimension of warfare has long been fundamental to victory for China, a valuable lesson later learned by the Russians. Both states believe that societal support is fundamental to achieving strategic war objectives, ensuring its legitimacy, and achieving victory. The success of military campaigns may depend more on the relationship between military and civilian factors, such as political, psychological, ideological, and informational elements of the conflict, than on military power itself;

– both Russia and China focus on influencing domestic and international public opinion. Media warfare, disinformation campaigns, and psychological tactics are successfully used to influence the perceptions of key audiences, including political elites, the general public, and international organizations;

– both cyber warfare and cyberspace are common domains used to implement these concepts. Advanced cyber capabilities are strategic tools in both, playing a central role in conducting large-scale cyber operations to achieve the political, economic, and military objectives of the attackers. Cyber operations also allow plausible deniability, helping avoid direct confrontation.

2. 2. Differences

– while the Russian hybrid warfare focuses more on using irregular forces, information warfare, and cyber operations, the TW concept relies more on media, psychological, and legal warfare;

– the methods used in the above context are specific to each concept;

– ”Hybrid warfare” also involves the use of conventional military forces. In contrast, the Chinese “Three Warfares” strategy focuses mainly on non-kinetic actions using the media, legal system, and psychological warfare to avoid using brute force;

-the Russian hybrid warfare model is mainly focused on achieving strategic objectives through the use of force. TW focuses more on shaping public opinion and creating strategic advantages through non-military means;

– unlike the Russian Federation, China extensively uses legal warfare to constrain adversaries by manipulating or exploiting ambiguities in national legal frameworks, treaties, and international agreements, including suing foreign companies or governments to challenge their policies or decisions (see the Huawei case);

– for Russia, the hybrid warfare is a means of gaining geopolitical influence and destabilizing adversaries without triggering a conventional war, while for China, the TW concept is primarily a tool for shaping global perceptions and achieving strategic objectives, especially in territorial disputes and international diplomacy.

Conclusions

This scientific research analysed the Chinese “Three Warfares” concept and the Russian “Hybrid Warfare” model to uncover details about their scope, objectives, and tools used, similarities and differences, as well as their implications for conflicts.

The study’s results validate the research hypotheses, facilitating the development of an extended cognitive framework. The two concepts represent strategic approaches to new generation conflicts, involving the use of conventional and/or unconventional means to achieve the intended objectives of state actors. These strategies have negative implications for domestic and international stability and security, cybersecurity, foreign policy, economy, diplomacy, democracy, and democratic institutions.

“Three Warfares” represents a modern approach to the dynamics of contemporary conflicts, incorporating psychological, media, and legal strategies into a unified framework. As China asserts itself on the world stage, their implementation has introduced new dimensions to international relations, intensifying tensions and reshaping the world order. Understanding the implications and applications of TW makes it clear that both state and non-state actors must navigate an increasingly complex landscape, where war transcends traditional military engagements. In light of future geopolitical developments, attention must be paid to how the three directions of action continue to influence conflicts, internal and international security, diplomacy, and international cooperation.

By leveraging non-kinetic means of influence, China manages to promote its strategic objectives in a way that complements traditional military power. The TW concept reflects how China understands and approaches modern warfare, where shaping perceptions, controlling narratives, and manipulating legal frameworks are key components in achieving geopolitical objectives. As global competition intensifies, TW plays a crucial role in China’s strategy regarding territorial ambitions, influence, and other national strategic objectives.

On the other hand, the Russian “Hybrid Warfare” model represents a paradigm shift in how wars are waged, and national interests are achieved. By combining conventional military power with unconventional means, Russia can pursue strategic objectives without triggering a large-scale military conflict. This approach allows Russia to project power, influence international affairs, and challenge Western hegemony without resorting to traditional methods of war. The implications of Russian hybrid warfare are significant for global security. Hybrid tactics allow Russia to destabilize regions, undermine democracies, and assert its geopolitical interests. The use of hybrid means has made it more difficult for Western powers to effectively counter Russian aggression, often staying below the threshold of armed conflict.

As hybrid warfare evolves, it is likely that other state threat vectors will adopt similar strategies to achieve their own strategic objectives. The challenge for the international community will be to develop effective countermeasures to combat this new form of warfare and protect the integrity of political systems, economic stability, and international peace.

The scientific study found that warfare and cyberspace are common domains of the two concepts. Both of them pay attention to cyber operations and use advanced cyber capabilities as strategic tools and critical components of modern warfare, vital for achieving the political, economic, and military objectives of state threat vectors. In this context, cybersecurity becomes an important priority for states.

Security experts will be better informed, able to assess and appropriately address asymmetric threats (cyber, hybrid, foreign interference). Thus, this research could facilitate better results in areas such as: information collection, analysis, and exchange; faster detection of hybrid attacks; clearer understanding of the characteristics of modern warfare; prevention and mitigation of conflicts; coordination of multi-dimensional security responses; combating disinformation, cyber-attacks, foreign interference; development of modern security policies, strategies, norms, and standards to combat new types of threats; decision-making; achieving consensus on international and humanitarian norms; preparation for conflicts and efficient resource allocation; ensuring the unaltered functioning of democratic processes and institutions; international cooperation; strengthening global governance; adapting to technological advances; ensuring national/international/collective stability and security; protecting national sovereignty; election security; adapting to the future of warfare; changing defense posture.

As the global security landscape continues to evolve and the two targeted actors continue to perfect their strategies for new generation conflicts, the international community will need to adopt appropriate measures to counter these evolving forms of warfare, which ignore traditional notions of conflict and security. It is also essential for states to develop effective counterstrategies to address the challenges presented by these concepts.

Understanding the nuances of Russian and Chinese hybrid warfare strategies is essential for decision-makers and military and political leaders, as these doctrines will likely continue to shape the future of international relations and global stability and security.

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