George VOSKOPOULOS, PhD^

Abstract. Issues of world order are overtly or covertly related to the issue of who gets what, how, when and the overall distribution of power in a decentralized world system. This very system presents states with opportunities for expansion and provides motives for aligning. Today the international system is in a fluid transitional phase that creates and multiplies security and organizational dilemmas in a way that dramatically limits the prospects for a modus vivendi. The Eurasia and Middle East conflicts constitute crucial input into an equation that will define the character of “order” or “orders” in a highly unpredictable world. Overlapping security systems and sub-systems are in the middle of clash over domination. The approach, through overt / covert systemic analysis, will make evaluative judgments on the role of powerful intruding actors, alternative choices. Within this spectrum it will make descriptive rather than prescriptive observations and evaluations on the role and significance of the EU and the strategic value added to the Balkans as a geopolitical multi-near abroad.

Key words: world order, multipolarity, uncharted anarchy, the elite stasis, consensual international system, economic nationalism

INTRODUCTION

International politics¹ are today in a transitional phase that could be described as “the rule is that there are no rules”. Seen within an International Relations logic² it bears elements of uncharted anarchy³, the gradual collapse of the authority⁴ of international organizations⁵, the domination of centrifugal powers, the lack of both a modus vivendi and a modus operandi and the pursuit of protectionist policies⁶ that

risk setting a multi-conflictual framework⁷. It is definitely not the end of history⁸, but the beginning of a new world, navigating in uncharted waters under the impact of two major regional conflicts in the Middle East and Eurasia. Their outcomes will determine major pillars of the future world order and will answer the classical who, gets, what, how, when question⁹. Under the current framework of these structural conflicts a compromise will not produce desired outcomes for all parties involved. Moreover, these outcomes may affect the role¹⁰ of international organizations¹¹ in the emerging institutional modus operandi.

In 1996 J. Ikenberry referred to the end of Cold War¹² as, inter allia, the end of bipolarity¹³. It heralded a new distribution of power¹⁴, new potential roles in an emerging world order not seriously contested¹⁵. Current policies of world and regional powers¹⁶ cast doubt on the validity of certain assumptions in terms of international relations theory, especially when we try to scrutinize systemic changes¹⁷ and motives dictating the international behaviour of states¹⁸. K. Waltz¹⁹ commenting on the absolution of IR theories suggested that “if the conditions of a theory contemplated have changed, the theory no longer applies. But what sort of changes would alter the international political system so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be relevant? Changes of the system would do it; Changes in the system would not”.

UNCHARTED ANARCHY

“To justify their actions, they even changed the meaning of the words…This spirit has nothing to do with humanism or the quest to apply the law”²⁰

In international relations scholars have long tried to describe cooperation²¹, anarchy²², war²³ and its causes²⁴ and make forecasting²⁵ and predictions based on sensible assumptions resulting from different methodology paths. Today we are navigating in a state of “uncharted anarchy²⁶”, meaning politico-economic conditions never expe–rienced before. In “Hedley Bull and his contribution to international relations” Stanley Hoffmann²⁷ points to a time-resistant feature of Bull’s work reflecting a tenet of Political Realism²⁸ and the way it views international relations. Rejection of “utopianism” is one of the main axes to scrutinize the world of politics, especially in a time of escalating anarchy. The “time and circumstance”²⁹ parameter when making evaluative judgments is crucial, particularly when we refer to security. Security is defined, as “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger”, but also “the freedom from care, anxiety, or apprehension, a feeling of safety”³⁰. As far as security aspects are concerned it is suggested that “security inevitably means different things at different times and in different places, depending on what people have to protect, and the nature of the threat”³¹.

By coining the current situation as “Cold War II”³², we evade³³ crucial evaluative criteria that clearly distinguish the more stable bipolar world³⁴ from the political quick sand on which political and economic rivalry and conflict³⁵ are exter-nalized. What is tested today is rationality and aspects of what has been termed “rational actor assumption”³⁶. The above describe a world moving to an “out of function” order, a world where functional elements are gradually disappearing. Choices made by leaderships are tested against rationality and the ability to avoid zero-sum games. Individual personality and decision making³⁷ attributes play a role when leaders make choices that affect international relations, yet, we should look for intervening variables³⁸ that lead to decisions referring to the “war-peace” spectrum.

States are facing strategic multidimensional security dilemmas³⁹ within a frame-work of overlapping, interconnected crises in terms of geopolitics and geoeconomics⁴⁰. We are not just in a mal-functioning mode of the international system. It is more than that, or at least it appears to be more than that. Competition and contending views of world order create a very unpredictable environment. It is not any more or just about polarity, regional⁴¹ and planetary powers⁴² but about alternative if not contending world order(s)⁴³. The plural points to a direction of having groups of states advancing their perception of world order in a way that leaves limited space for compromise. After all, any cognitive and/or organizational world order(s) refer to sets of rules that mean to normalize relations among states in order to avoid zero-sum games.

In terms of rationality as described in international relations theory the current interaction setting and above all the choices made by leaderships sets onto-logical issues. In an interview with the Atlantic⁴⁴ the then U.S. vice-President Joe Biden stated that “God forbid we have a war with China or Russia”. Today escalation to a point of no return does not look an imaginary scenario. Challenges to change in the international system or pressures to sustain the established world order function at the expense of rational acting.

THE ELITE STASIS⁴⁵ AND WORLD ORDER

The concept of stasis is used here as a major deviation from institutional, constitutional, moral, normative, political commitments. It equals to an act of breaking a chain, the chain of legitimacy. It constitutes a turning point in the relation between leaderships and peoples. In modern times this deviation causes major changes in electoral behaviour. This explains aspects of the turn to extreme right wing political parties or state-centric leaderships. Such electoral behaviour changes are important during transition times. The descriptive term “transition” refers to the international and domestic levels. Today, changes in both levels are taking place simultaneously. Actually, they appear to be interconnected and feed one another, thus, making interaction among states even more complicated.

In international relations harmony of interests⁴⁶ remains a utopian⁴⁷ goal in a world built by default on inequality. Leaderships nominally represent peoples making decisions in the name of peoples. Harmony of interests represents a fictional political milieu in which leaders coincide in terms of views and courses of action to be adopted. To achieve this level, we need to eliminate heterogeneity, a time-resistant feature of the international setting.

Never before WWII has the world reached a point of total conflict. The phases of escalation and the way the two conflicts in Middle East and Eurasia⁴⁸ are developing are indicative of the qualitative criteria that make them actual, not just potential, threats to world peace. The non-political aspect of the conflict refers to a dehumanization process that dramatically undermines civilian lives. In terms of biblical semantics, the pictures of Ukrainian and Russian soldiers sitting next to icons of Jesus and Virgin Mary just before battles is more than indicative of the apocalyptic mode of the conflict. The two biggest Christian Orthodox nations in the world are at war after their leaderships made the “rational” decision to go to war. Global mainstream elites agreed in harmony that this choice served peoples’ interests.

The multi-crisis vicious circle evolves in outer and inner layers. The responses to challenges to world peace spilled over to domestic crises undermining the stability of political systems. It is more than evident that elements of domestic instability and extreme polarity stem from foreign policy choices not endorsed by electorates. This is externalized in the inner circles of domestic politics in an apocalyptic way. To many it constitutes a peculiar form of «stasis» on the part of leaderships, meaning here distancing themselves from electorates and setting elite agendas.

We should look into choices made on the basis (among many other things) of their political meaning, the way electoral choices are formulated, the stakes of those making particular choices, their aims and incentives, their impact on a wider spectrum of political, economic aims and values. Radical changes in terms of a national strategy⁴⁹ refer to a re-socialization process⁵⁰ and the adoption of new norms of international engagement that point to a state-centric view of the new world order. It remains to be seen whether this is just a temporary deviation from a widely accepted modus operandi or it will herald a new permanently less ordered world.

WORLD ORDER OR WORLD ORDERS?

“Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of nature and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknow-ledged to be a natural condition of existence”⁵¹

Under the current circumstances it is highly unlikely to establish a “consensual international system”. One of the reasons is that the input to the international system bears elements of clear dividing lines⁵², while most suggestions seem to miss the tree for the forest.

Challenging the post-Second World War order has become an issue of divide across the world. A suggested (tentative only) aim for instance of BRICS is to operate as an alternative organizational model for a new world order. The suggested aims of the group have been defined as⁵³

• “A reforming bloc with a more ambitious goal of improving the workings of the current global order”.

• “A disrupter, preparing to replace the western-dominated liberal world order”.

The emerging world order is by default different from what we have experienced in the post-Second World War era. Some predict the onset of neo-mercantilist era⁵⁴, yet, “new economic order” might just be a long, unpredictable transitional phase characterized either by absence of rules or rules applied within a tit-for-tat spectrum⁵⁵. Estimations cannot be made, since there is an intervening variable that is conditionality and the side-effects of breaking the chain of “complex interdependence”⁵⁶.

Conditions lead states and leaderships to urgently reformulate attitudes towards state behaviour⁵⁷ in a new “normality” that affects the organizational structure of the Demos as a unit of political organization⁵⁸. Currently, domestic pressures lead to electorate outcomes that constitute new input into foreign policy making equation. In a time of uncertainty⁵⁹ and a world order in the making this is of tantamount im-portance since “positive and negative feedback loops tend to produce unexpected second– and third-order effects”⁶⁰.

Moving to a next evaluation level we need to look into the perception – mis-perception framework and the way it affects the milieu within which foreign policy decisions are taken. The distinction between the psychological and the operational milieu provides useful evaluating tools. The former is based on the image of the world as a leader sees it, while the latter defines the space in which a specific policy will be carried out⁶¹. All of the above directly or indirectly relate to time-resistant organizing concepts of international politics that refer to foreign policy drawing⁶². Current trends in domestic politics across the world herald the “return of the nation-state” and enhance state-centric views of the world. Although the concept of nation-state has been criticized⁶³ under different prisms and its utility questioned on the basis of alternative to Political Realism theoretical approaches, it is still around. Above all, it is still the lenses through which more and more voters look at the world and identify themselves.

THE ABSORBING CAPACITY OF THE EMERGENT WORLD ORDER

“Do not let emotions such as fear, honor drag you into a war and if war occurs, do not let these emotions cloud your judgment. This is a hard lesson to learn, but it accounts for human agency…do not let passions lead the way”,

Thucydides

As pointed out, “…analysts are once again consumed with the current and future state of world order, which appears in crisis. Many have offered recommendations for what a future global order might look like and what should be done to build it. It is hard to imagine a more consequential question”⁶⁴. The time factor and urgency set limits to contingency plans for strategies that will balance economic statecraft and geopolitical aims⁶⁵. Crucial decisions are forced upon states under the pressure of looming protectionism threatening to set an “Iron Curtain”⁶⁶ under the impact of economic nationalism⁶⁷.

The current conflict-prone world of today stems, inter allia, from questioning the international organizational order. The traditional change – continuity framework offers limited only tools to explain and understand the current international behaviour of states. Historically international relations scholars have tried to find evidence as far as the birth of a new international system⁶⁸ was concerned. S. Hoffman⁶⁹ suggested that the emergence of a new international system is related to answering a number of qualitative questions. First, what are the system’s basic units? Second, what are the predominant foreign policy goals that these units seek with respect to each other? Third, what can the units do to each other with their military and economic capabilities?

The last question is by default crucial in attempting to make predictions when leaderships appear determined to adopt policies that question long-standing norms or practices, even those that have defined alliances in the post-Cold War era. It has been suggested that “economic statecraft in a volatile and fast-changing world is, to some extent, experimental”⁷⁰. This is particularly important during transitional phases in the presence of contending views on global order. Is there any (even circumstantial) evi-dence that we might end up in a multi-ordered setting? Issues today go beyond the polarity or/and rules-based order, but spill over into the realm of “whose order”, “who lays the rules”?

The choice of “wide multilateralism”⁷¹ under the current geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances seems limited, since this framework does not accommodate the ambitions of powerful actors. Two questions arise: Do these circumstances deterministically impose / lead to zero-sum games? Can they be avoided? Answering these questions may be crucial in determining why we have got close to a peculiar “Hobbesian world”⁷² and odd alliances⁷³.

To uphold global issues, it takes a wide consensus. Yet transitional phases cha–racterized by fluidity and the desire of states to make claims is by no means a positive international environment. This applies mostly to regional and planetary powers. Smaller states face aligning dilemmas and feel the pressure of groupthink⁷⁴ and pivotal deterrence.

The current fluid situation and the way foreign policy and economic aims are articulated sets challenges to international relations theory in terms of the ability to predict the intensity of conflicts and the means to be used by states. Rationality issues also emerge as cognitive externalizations of the psychological milieu⁷⁵ in which a leader makes a decision.

WORLD ORDER:
THE EU AS AN ACTOR AND ITS INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

It has been suggested that “the success of the EU’s policy agenda will thus depend on the union’s ability to pursue its interests while upholding global rules”⁷⁶. Yet, this goal will be heavily tested in the coming years on a. an intra-European level (bargaining and accommodating capacity of the EU institutional level) and b. the ability of Member-States to support goals that enhance the cohesion of the EU and at the same time satisfy national priorities.

European elites have not persuaded public opinion on the rationality of strategic choices. Electoral results provide ample evidence of the cognitive gap between elites and peoples. The same polarizing effects are evident in global public opinion and the way choices of the war / peace issue are approached. Societal political actors distance from leaderships. At the same there is a clear need to scrutinize the accommodating capacity of the current world and European institutional framework. This “accom-modating capacity” will be defined by many “intervening variables” and the outcome of competing visions of world order as reflected by the policies of regional⁷⁷ and global powers.

The so-called post-neoliberal world⁷⁸ is a stage of enhanced fluidity that produces conflict. It is a conflict-prone world since it produces zero-sum games. One needs to clearly define the sources of the “prone” parameter by providing causational approa-ches. In Europe shifts in politics and contested leaderships have become the main obstacles in providing a clear view of the emerging world order. The aim of a “rules-based world” should be evaluated on both a prescriptive and a descriptive level. The former bears an idealistic basis that evades the question of “whose order”. The latter is related to the many interconnected ways these rules are contested on the basis of real demands.

The EU is navigating in a vacuum of a clear vision on the role of regional and global contestants of distribution of power⁷⁹. Its long institutional tradition of economic statecraft is not adequate to secure the EU. At the same time unity is not and a priori given of a union of states that has long tried to enhance its international presence and significance status.

The issue of European unity⁸⁰ is of tantamount importance when it comes to engage in orchestrated action. This directly and indirectly relates to the EU’s institu-tional setting and the way heterogeneity affects decision making and eventually outcomes. Unity will be defined, inter allia, by the accommodating capacity of the EU and the challenges on the international level. The fluidity of a transitional phase under the impact of two major conflicts dramatically limit the tools of predicting.

During the Cold War there was a strong ideological basis on which to build an alliance. To this one can add shared interests assisted by common ideology (i.e. capi-talism, free market). The concept was further enhanced by what has been coined as “coupled systems”⁸¹. Those are systems making part of wider systems or operating as “elements in a larger system”⁸² all of which overtly or covertly refer to world order in terms of structure. As pointed out, “the coupled systems concept of M. Kaplan may be further advanced to positive or negative coupled systems. This further categorization is based on a conflict-cooperation ratio and roles within the emerging world order”⁸³.

European foreign policy is internally defined in terms of priorities and agenda setting by its ability to accommodate pluralism within the EU as well as its decision-making institutional setting. Externally it is historically defined by two crucial factors. First, its strategic relationship to the U.S. and second the challenge geography presents to the EU as far as its relationship with Russia is concerned.

The EU and the U.S. form multiple coupled systems since the EU and NATO consist to a great extent by common members that form inner links between the two institutions⁸⁴. Today the new given in domestic politics in the EU hinder common policies, thus externalizing how heterogeneous societies (electorates) respond to global issues and the way they formulate their priorities agenda.

CHALLENGES TO WORLD ORDER

“As a platform for diplomacy and a centre of operations, [the UN] continues to tackle an array of crises and conflicts”⁸⁵

Defining a new world order has long been the target of alternative and/or contending theoretical approaches to the international behaviour of states⁸⁶. The crucial issue here is a number of determinant questions: whose world order⁸⁷? Who lays down the rules of the emerging order? And finally, who gets what, how, when after a new world order⁸⁸ is clearly evident.

Failure to perceive and evaluate challenges to polarity⁸⁹ and distribution of power⁹⁰ might lead to miscalculations and false predictions. On leadership level this might lead them to decisions jeopardizing fragile peace or deteriorate a conflict. Under this spectrum it is important to attempt to define the time-resistant features of tran-sitional phases: fluidity, instability, opportunities and the logic of “seize the moment”, producing desired outcomes, making choices ranging from relative to absolute gains. These choices depend on a state’s power and its ability to produce desired outcomes.

THE SYSTEM AND GEOGRAPHY

A conventional approach to systemic analysis⁹¹ scrutinizes the international behaviour of core, peripheral and intrusive actors. During the Cold War core actors operated in a rather less complex environment. Yet, today the augmenting interve-ning power of power intrusive actors has made the exercise of foreign policy a more complicated process. Competing intrusive actors’ policies create security and choice dilemmas that dramatically limit alternative courses of action. Under this spectrum

1. States face crucial choice dilemmas and this refers mainly to core systemic actors

2. Intrusive and peripheral actors project their interests in various contending ways. This might be externalized in ways that destabilize security systems or sub-systems. Conflicting policies are negative input into a system that turns into instability or creates immature anarchy.

These choices might produce “overlay effects”⁹² for core actors, since their interests are adjusted to the priorities of powerful intrusive actors. All of the above acquire enhanced meaning when set within their space dimension, meaning geography and the danger today of engaging in a nuclear war. During the Cold War nuclear weapons⁹³ were used mainly as a threat, since common sense and MAD ensured that no rational leader would ever think of using them.

Conditions today are completely different and this multiplies the danger of a nuclear incident. This is evident not just to IR scholars but also journalists⁹⁴ who set indirect ontological questions as far as their use is concerned. The so-called “Cold War II” depicts a riskier international environment where strategic zero-sum games⁹⁵ dominate under the magnifying impact of geoeconomics.

WORLD ORDER AND INTRUDING ACTORS’ ANTAGONISM:
THE BALKANS AS A CASE STUDY

“Society had become divided into two ideologically hostile camps, and each side viewed the other with suspicion”

Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War

Geography does not only define security but also the ability to exercise foreign policy within an autonomy framework. While the term “near abroad” coined in the past described a geographical setting in (often) one dimension, today, systemic changes in overlapping security systems create a “geopolitical multi-near abroad”.

The Balkans as a geo-space have moved from the status of “liability factor” (early post-Cold War era) and via the international relations framework of continuity and change reached the “vital for European security” framework. The role of the region should be scrutinized against defining variables such as

a. The politico-historical legacy of the region

b. The Balkans’ complex role as a geo-space and near abroad in international relations

c. The way cultural approaches may / may not depict in an accurate way the systemic deficiencies of the Balkan Peninsula.

The Balkan transformation from “Europe’s backyard”⁹⁶ to its enhanced strategic value in the post-bipolar era is only indicative of the impact of systemic changes in roles and projected and conflicting national interests. These are linked to issues of world and regional order and polarity, namely moving from the bipolar to an emerging multipolar world providing opportunities for planetary and regional powers. From an early post-Cold war liability, the Balkans turned into the apple of discord for intruding actors.

The EU has focused on the region aiming at making it part of its zone. Enlarge-ment has been a conscious political choice and a choice of European foreign policy. It means to secure the EU from any perceived interference⁹⁷ and enhance its role as an international actor disposing of the ability to produce desired outcomes. This role is tested against a number of qualitative variables such as

a. The EU’s quest for strategic autonomy under the impact of its not being a state actor⁹⁸. This institutional peculiarity defines opportunities, but also sets the limitations of genuinely common strategies and actions.

b. The implications of unitary states’ rivalry (U.S., China, Russia) for influence in the region and the way they may affect the choices of the system’s core actors.

c. The need to operationally, strategically and geopolitically deal with the EU’s motivation – capability gap in a world undergoing a transitional phase, thus, producing uncertainty.

The final evaluation is based on the need to include the region in the Euro-pean integration process in a way that limits multilayer, interlinked side-effects of the Balkans being the geopolitical “near abroad” of powerful intruding actors and their quest to establish spheres of influence, project geostrategic interests and eventually affect policy outcomes that will define the blueprint of the emerging world order⁹⁹.

CONCLUSION: A RULES-ABSENT “WORLD ORDER”

“It is better to recognize that we are in darkness than to pretend that we can see the light.”

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order World Politics

In 2022 H. Kissinger defined the main geopolitical challenges the world was facing¹⁰⁰. He suggested that “the conflict in Ukraine could permanently restructure the global order”, and that the way “the USA and China navigate their relationship in this complicated world will be telling for future generations”. His evaluation today has merit for reasons that result from the twin IR process of “explaining” and “understanding”. Systemic changes in Eurasia and the Middle East will profoundly affect who gets what, how, when issue. They will also determine the new world order. At this stage there is no consensus and this turns international politics into a Hobbesian world.

International relations scholars need to pinpoint changes and scrutinize their side-effects in order to recognize the beginning and the character of a new international system¹⁰¹. Political Realism has been descriptive¹⁰² rather than prescriptive and this causes criticism on the part of alternative if not idealistic approaches¹⁰³. Rationality has been the main drive behind attempts to avoid and/or end wars¹⁰⁴. Again, the action-reaction framework points to the long-standing organizing concepts of international politics that refer to foreign policy drawing¹⁰⁵ and the way interdependence affects choices referring to war and peace issues¹⁰⁶.

It is the first time since the Second World War that the world is facing an existential threat¹⁰⁷. Informing citizens¹⁰⁸ across the world on ways to survive a nuclear war has never been experienced before, at least to this degree. Eurasia¹⁰⁹ and the Middle East security systems have become the two geo-pillars of what I described as “un-charted anarchy” territories. The “geo” factor refers to the geographical / space dimen-sion¹¹⁰ of uncharted systemic anarchy created by clashing interests of core, systemic and intruding actors that create overlapping, multi-conflictual¹¹¹ layers.

A rules-based world order almost deterministically sets the issues of whose rules and how these rules will be imposed. If war is not just the continuation of politics by other means, it could also be the conscious means to impose a selfish justice¹¹². If the world is becoming less global and more localized, as Rana Forooher¹¹³ suggested, we need to cognitively and operationally invent ways of co-existence. The impact of the restructuring process of the Middle East and Eurasia security sub-systems set challenges to cooperation and trigger emerging axes of multilateral synergies. These will critically define the overall ability of the world system to create equilibrium mechanisms on a regional and global level.