Ioannis P. SOTIROPOULOS, PhD

This good world

This good world
patched many times
sew unravel, sew unravel
you won’

This good world
others had it first
laugh my friend, laugh my friend
it’s not, it’s not, it’s not for pity

This good world
they handed it down to us
run my friend, run my friend
and don’t, and don’t, and don’t take it seriously

This good world
others await it
think my friend, think my friend
the time, the time, the time that you will leave

Greek popular song, 197230

INSTEAD OF INTRODUCTION

It is an undisputed admittance that the Russo-Ukrainian war stands as a catalytic global milestone in the historical diachrony of international relations between sovereign states.
The beginning of the turbulence for the international, western-routed, socio-economic model of liberal bourgeois democracy came in the early 21st century,31
however, the full-scale seismic conclusion and the changeover to a new historical era for international relations is sealed with the crisis and subsequent war between Russia and Ukraine. As far as one can predict, Pax Americana, and idealism, while it lasted and where it prevailed after the end of the Cold War, since 1991, gives way to the anarchical society32 of Structural Realism and a multipolar world, where interna-tional rules between sovereign states will be challenged, not only in practice, but also theoretically, for their morality and political expediency. Pax Americana succumbed, inter alia, to the inherent weaknesses of the implementation of the capitalist model internationally and to the excessive “cost of strategic overextension”33 of the representatives of liberal ideology, falling victim to the oligarchic cultural tradition of the authoritarian revisionist powers of China and Russia.34
On a strategic level, the war may have brought together the Western Community, with the European Union and the United States predominantly, in an unprecedented manner and extremely quickly and effectively, but this did not come without a cost. It is enough to think that the economically strongest European state and the leading steam engine of the European Union, Germany, lost the import of cheap Russian energy mixture that is essential for its energy-intensive industry and the privileged relationship of thousands of German business investments in Russia and China, and ‘was forced’ to immediately draw up a national armaments program worth 1 trillion for the next 10 years.35 On the other hand, NATO was strengthened with the entry of Finland and Sweden into the alliance, while the defense budgets of its member states tend to increase continuously. Certainly, the immediate, fierce, absolute and constant confrontation of the Western Community and the US with Russia, catalytically accelerated the expected turn of the latter, pushing Russian for good into the arms of the China, something that he had warned about by Professor John Mearsheimer from 2015, describing it as a strategic mistake: “pushing the Russians into the arms of the Chinese … is strategic folly of the first order”.36
In the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian war, new geopolitical dynamics are emerging within the framework of the international system. These dynamics are highly reflected in the geopolitical shifts and geostrategic plans of the most powerful ethnocratic and supranational actors in the international system. Core geopolitical trend of the new historic era is going to be the systemic geostrategic confrontation between the forces of the existing status quo, represented by the liberal Western Community, and the revisionist Russian-Chinese geopolitical alignment.

UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN COMMUNITY

Since they prevailed in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States (US) used to function as the only global superpower. Besides there is a number of states that traditionally embrace and grow through liberal ideas, with which Washington has created strong political, defense, economic, and cultural ties, forming the Western Community. Especially with Europe, there has always been a special relationship of strategic interdependency between the US and Europe, both in the narrow defense context of NATO, and in that of the bilateral relations of the US with all the states of the Western community.37 Although, this relationship was far from being a symmetrical one, because both sides were never equally dependent on each other, history has proven that, grosso modo, at least and at the end of the day both Americans and Europeans people were benefited by this kind of relationship, in terms of security issues.
European spending on NATO
The recently elected US President, Donald Trump has repeatedly declared his firm intention to end the war in Ukraine immediately, and a tendency towards isolationism has been pervasive since his election in November 2024. However, these do not negate the core of some basic trends in US foreign policy and its specific goals, which have been established in the international field for the medium term. Thus, the US is certain to continue to cultivate the current strategic principle of strategic interdependency38 with European Union, the European NATO members’ states, having close relations with the rest of the Western Community states. Hence, at its best, on the one hand it will function as an authentic and strong inter-state western strategic link and on the other; it will substantially lighten the strategic burden that the US carries alone in Eurasia. The latter coincides with Trump’s announcements for an equal distribution of military spending and implementation of agreements for NATO countries.39 It is a common truth that the national governments of NATO members had a low record of spending budget for it. (See Map no 1)
Map no 1: Defence spending by NATO members (2024)
Source: North Atlantic treaty Organisation (2024)
However, “from 2006 onwards, NATO member states agreed to reverse this trend, [of low spending for NATO] by collectively setting themselves the goal of increasing their military budgets to at least 2% of their GDP. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the member states clarified this objective: The aim was then to “move towards the 2% guideline” by 2024, although this rule was not made binding, while by the end of 2023, only 11 of the 31 NATO members had made good on this commitment…. [with] France and Germany behind 1.9%, and 1.6%, [respectively].”40 It is true that Europe, especially the West, has enjoyed almost 75 years of security relying heavily on the USA. Particularly after 1991, Europe had no reason to worry about security, so it postponed its defensive emancipation indefinitely. Moscow’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, but much more so in Eastern Ukraine in 2022, came to remind Europe of its responsibilities for self-security and a corresponding military might.

The AUKUS

As far as the strategic future of the Western Community, it is remarkable how well the model of the enhanced trilateral security partnership of AUKUS41 suits as practical proof of potential military cooperation within the context of a common strategic perception. The AUKUS strategic initiative is governed by an analogy from the recent past. During the Cold War, the Western strategists, based on Sir John Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman, had proposed the encirclement of the Soviet Union by a chain of states at least friendly to the Western Community, aiming the prevention of Moscow from descending into warm waters and becoming a naval power without losing its continental power.42 According to the same Anglo-Saxon geopolitical theorists and by analogy, AUKUS creates a maritime zone of enhanced military and economic control by the Western Community and especially its Anglo-Saxon part, in the Pacific Ocean, in southeast of China, section of which coincides with the outer or insular crescent of the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical theories. (See Maps no 2 and no 3)
Map no 2: Mackinder’s geopolitical view of the world in 1904
Source: Mackinder, Halford John, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), vol. 23, no 4, April 1904, London, pp. 421-437
Map no 3: Spykman’s geopolitical view of the world in 1943
Source: euro-synergies.hautetfort.com
The geostrategic purpose, inter alia, is the tightening and control of China at the military and commercial / trade level to the extent that this is geographically intertwined with Beijing’s maritime and air activity. If one adds Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and of course Taiwan, all part of the Western Community and systemic antagonists of China, an impenetrable maritime zone is born, which with the appropriate support of the naval forces of the USA, UK, and Australia, forms an impenetrable wall that separates China from the rest of the maritime world. (See Maps no 4, 5, and 6)
Map no 4: AUKUS geostrategic planning
Source: Council of Geostrategy. Council on Geostrategy – New geostrategic thinking for a more competitive age – Homepage

Map no 5: US Globe Military Areas
Source: US Army Map Resources Standard and Sharable Geospatial Foundation (SSGF) Resources SSGF content, by COCOM Area of Responsibility (AoR). US Army Map Resources

Map no 6: The Geopolitical Competition in the Indo-Pacific
Sources: Die Studienförderung der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, created by FES Asia Editorial
In other words, a coordinated naval blockade of China by the Western Community or the United States alone would put Beijing in an extremely difficult position. China is not self-sufficient in either raw materials or the energy mixture, products that it imports mainly through commercial shipping.43 For this reason, Beijing is trying and will eagerly try in the future to integrate Taiwan with any form of valid, legitimate agreement, and offering unimaginable rewards to Washington, if necessary, securing, this way, the only outlet to the high seas and breaking the outer or insular crescent of the Western Community’s naval liberal forces.44 Consequently, it becomes imperative for Washington to further deepen US relations with Taiwan.

The Quad(s)

Another element of the US’s strategy that geographically routed from the Mackinderian outer or insular crescent, is the re-established in 2017, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue forum [Quad(s)] comprising of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan.45 “The Quad leaders exchange views on contemporary global issues such as critical and emerging technologies, connectivity and infrastructure, cyber security, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, climate change, pandemic and education.”46 While originally of diplomatic and cooperation nature in low politics issues, in time, especially after the aggravation of China’s relations with Taiwan, the aims of the 4 focused “to keep the strategic sea routes in the Indo-Pacific free of any military or political influence… The core objective of the Quad is to secure a rules-based global order, freedom of navigation and a liberal trading system.”47 Besides, according to Council of Foreign Relations, “Still, the group has intensified its security and economic ties as tensions with China rise.”48 While the Quads “offer alternative debt financing for nations in the Indo-Pacific region”49, China has been particularly annoyed, and run anti-campaign, so as to prevent other countries in the region from joining the 4 founders, with the most typical case of Bangladesh.50 On the other hand, New Zealand is ready to enter as the 5th member of the coalition.51
The foreign policy objectives of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, which dominates the geographical center of Mackinder’s outer or insular crescent, as well as the well-established beliefs of the future President Trump, who considers China as the primary competitor of the US, align perfectly. Therefore, it is more than certain that the increased interest of the US, of its regional allies Japan, Australia, and of the systemic competitor of China, India, will serve as great leverage, on the one hand, for further deepening and enlarging the strategic alliance in the Indo-Pacific region (Quads), and on the other hand, for further tightening (qualitatively and quantitatively) China’s maritime underbelly, mainly the geopolitical subsystem of the South China Sea, by the regional powers of the Western Community, led by the US (AUKUS), aiming to control any further Chinese geopolitical ambition in the South East China Sea.

The Ukrainian issue

With regard to Ukraine, the US must carefully weigh the benefits of a reconciliation with Russia via a multilateral agreement that would bring peace, and the results this would have in the broader geopolitical picture, as well as what impression would give towards other would-be revisionists in various parts of the world. Already, official and powerful centers are openly expressing their skepticism of a quick decision on peace. The Head of MI6, Sir Richard Moore stated on 29 November 2024: “Our security – British, French, European and transatlantic – will be jeopardised. The cost of supporting Ukraine is well known, but the cost of not doing so would be infinitely higher.” … If Putin succeeds, China would weigh the implications, North Korea would be emboldened, and Iran would become still more dangerous.”52 On the other hand, it is undeniable that the end of the war will drastically reduce the resources consumed by the US and its allies at all levels, while economic sanctions on Moscow will gradually be lifted. However, the differences between the belligerents are so great both on the territorial and mutual guarantees issues, that an agreement that would satisfy all parties involved, even minimally, seems completely untenable for the time being. According to Professor John Mearsheimer: “The Russians and the Ukrainians don’t have a common set of objectives that would allow them to reach an agreement. They’re never going to agree on how to divide the territory in Ukraine, and they’re never going to agree on whether Ukraine is a neutral state or a member of the West. …So, I think the best you can hope for, just focusing on Ukraine and Russia, is a cold peace. That you’ll get some ceasefire at some point, and you’ll get a cold peace; it’ll look like the 38th parallel in Korea, but you’re not going to get a meaningful peace agreement.”53 Ultimately, everything has to do with the nature of the agreement and its content, and not with the end of the war itself.

The US – China trade war

For some analysts it is almost certain that the US attempt to withdraw from the economic status quo of open and regulated trade created after World War II, coupled with the sweeping tariffs54 that Trump promises, an era of trade wars and economic nationalism reminiscent of the 1930s, will begin.55 Moreover, the continuation of this model in the medium term may gradually lead to the degeneration of the mandated role of the United Nations, as happened with the League of Nations in the 1930s,56 resulting in increasing insecurity in international level at the maximum level and in the readjustment of the spheres of influence of the great powers and powerful states and coalitions, in a strategically fluid world where everything is potentially up for grabs.
Based on Mearsheimer’s logic that “Russia is the weakest of the three great powers” and “China is a pure competitor”, while “Russia is not”57, the US trade war with China has begun since the previous term of President Trump (2017-2021), and is not an exclusive initiative of the Republican Party, but a common action of both political parties of the US. More thoroughly, the Sino – US trade war started in 2018, with Washington imposing 25% tariffs on imports from China, including industrial machinery, cars, auto parts and television cameras.58 That measure resulted to a solid over 10% decrease of US spending on Chinese products imports for 2018, ($50 billion cut of $540 billions), with Beijing responding of an equivalent 25% tariffs over US goods of same nature.59 During the Democratic Party’s administration, President Biden surpassed its predecessor, and significantly increased the tariffs against China, “including a 100% tax on imports of electric cars from China, a 50% tax on solar panels and a 25% tax on lithium-ion batteries and steel and aluminum products.”60 Moreover, he “has also continued the first Trump administration’s use of export bans to curb China’s access to US technology.”61 Also, it is an extremely serious development that in early December 2024, when “…the US expanded restrictions on sales of semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment to China and added 140 Chinese entities to a blacklist that limits trade with US businesses on national security concerns”,62 and China responded by banning the exports to US of gallium, germanium, antimony, minerals, which are used in both civil and military constructions.63 It is obvious that no matter which party is in power in the US, the trade war against China will only intensify if the economic situation demands it. Recently, the new elected President Trump has, also, threatened to ignore US World Trade Organization pledges, by increasing “… tariffs to 60 percent on imports from China and 10 percent to 20 percent on imports from other trading partners, including the European Union.”,64 while he warned BRICS “… for [increasing in] tariffs 100% if they undermine the dollar.”65
On the other hand, China is preparing for more intense trade war. As a rather new stance vis-à-vis ideological issues and Marxist and Maoist hierarchy, it is promoting consumption in an attempt to boost economic growth creating new depth in Chinese economy. Indeed, according to the Deputy Director of China’s Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, and Senior Member Official of the Communist Party of China, Han Wenxiu, “…there was a need to boost consumption and view domestic demand expansion as a long-term strategic move that would become the main driving force for economic growth.”66 Furthermore, he stated that “China’s economy is expected to grow by about 5% this year… The world’s second-largest economy is expected to contribute close to 30% of global growth.”67 In the same vein, the Chief China economist at Macquarie Larry Hu, emphatically stated that “They [the Chinese] are willing to do ‘whatever it takes’ to achieve the GDP target, … But they [the Chinese] will do so in a reactive way…How much they [the Chinese] will do in 2025 will depend on two things: our GDP target and the new US tariffs.”68 Likewise, Ting Lu, Chief China economist at Nomura stated that “Beijing may want to use the ‘around 5.0%’ growth target to show that it won’t cave to Trump’s threatened 60% tariff and other restrictive measures imposed on China”.69
It is clear that China makes an extraordinary step for its repositioning, in order to cope with the intensification of the trade war with the US, within 2025. As Shuang Ding, Chief economist for Greater China and North Asia at Standard Chartered commented, “From prudent to moderately loose is a big change. … It leaves a lot of room for imagination.”70
But it is not just the declared economic rival and geopolitical enemy of Beijing, which is preparing for the escalation of the trade war in 2025. It is also the European Union who endeavors to create conditions for a favorable economic climate focusing on the necessity of diversification during an estimated trade war escalation in 2025, both for their domestic market and for their exports. On 6 December 2024, the European Union concluded a milestone agreement with four South American states. “The deal, between the European Union and members of Mercosur-a bloc that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay-would establish one of the largest trade zones in the world and would be the European Union’s biggest trade agreement ever.”71 Although the ratification date has not yet been announced, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that “the political agreement was a milestone for Europe and South America”.72 It is an oxymoron that despite the deep alliance relationship between the US and the EU, due to the global interconnection of the economies, the EU as a large and powerful economy is affected by international economic developments and often becomes direct target of the actions of allied countries such as the US.
The economic war between the US and China has been alive for at least 6 years now and is expected to intensify even further, while the imposition of tariffs in EU will certainly result in the emergence of some centrifugal tendencies in the US – Europe strategic interdependency model, which will to some extent affect their coherence in the new global geopolitical architecture that is under creation.
The quasi-economic isolationism of the US is ante portas, however, on a political, military and cultural level, Washington is not going to move in the same way. Once the new administration of the US regards China as number one geopolitical antagonist, if not number one geopolitical enemy, it is practically impossible to leave it free space to maneuver in global affairs, so that it can become even more powerful without some strong harassment, especially on issues of fundamental importance for the global geopolitical architecture. Washington is most likely to embed an additional layer of specific requirements in the decision-making process regarding its foreign policy decisions, which will impact the selectivity norm in US involvement globally. For example, on 7 December 2024, while the ongoing conflict in Syria, Trump sent a clear message about the direct future US policy to the region: “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, and the United States should have nothing to do with it… This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved!”73 Nevertheless, some days earlier he posted the following on the occasion of the hostage situation in Israel: “Everybody is talking about the hostages who are being held so violently, inhumanely, and against the will of the entire world, in the Middle East – but it’s all talk, and no action! If the hostages are not released prior to January 20, 2025, the date that I proudly assume office as President of the United States, there will be all hell to pay in the Middle East, and for those in charge who perpetrated these atrocities against humanity.”74 This, two weights and two measures, policy is it not something new, and is perfectly legitimate in the foreign policy of sovereign states in Realpolitik. It is clear that the two issues have different geopolitical weight for the American national interest, as, for example, any geopolitical crisis within the geographical triangle of China, India and Indonesia would have for the US.
The strategic goal of the Western Community is to contain the revisionist powers, China and Russia. Based on the current geopolitical situation, the interdependency between them, and the dynamics of every major actor in the international system, the only beneficial way for it is to foster “good relations with the Russians and pivoting full force to East Asia because China is a pure competitor and Russia is not.”75 In other words, the Western Community must include in its foreign policy not only different aggressive means (war-tariffs) addressed to different actors (Russia – China) respectively, but by expanding this concept, introducing different approaches (friendship – confrontation) i.e. to restore its relations with Moscow and to concentrate on confronting the expansion of China’s influence in Southeast Asia, as well as globally. (See Map no 9)

CHINA AND RUSSIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF SINO-RUSSIAN ALIGNMENT

Sino-Russian relations have had many challenges throughout history, but they have mainly been of a competitive nature due to geographical, demographic, and ideological reasons. In the recent geopolitical shift, Russia and China are considered to be the most significant powers following the US, and they have been both characterized as revisionist contrasting the current status quo. Furthermore, with the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent war, Moscow and Beijing have come closer and cooperate in many areas where they enjoy mutual benefits aiming to promote their national interest. Their relationship is highly reciprocal in matters vis-à-vis the Western Community. According to Mearsheimer, “… there’s no question that American policy toward China and American policy toward Russia have pushed them closely together. I think that there’s no question that the Chinese have a deep-seated interest in making sure that Russia does not lose in Ukraine.”76 Indeed, the two states demonstrate a relationship approaching strategic interdependence with each other, having crucial mutual interests.

Revisionism in common?

The first thorough sign of common revisionism and Sino-Russian convergence was the joint statement of Presidents’ Putin and Xi Jinping during the visit of former to Beijing on February 4, 2022, a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the 24th Olympic Winter Games. The Joint statement which is a monument of revisionism titled, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”,77 states among other things: “Today, the world is going through momentous changes, and humanity is entering a new era of rapid development and profound transformation. It sees the development of such processes and phenomena as multipolarity, economic globalization, the advent of information society, cultural diversity, transformation of the global governance architecture and world order; there is increasing interrelation and interdependence between the States; a trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world; and the international community is showing a growing demand for the leadership aiming at peaceful and gradual development.”78 Moreover on democracy: “The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a common responsibility of the entire world community.”79 On BRI, EEC, Arctic: “The sides believe that peace, development and cooperation lie at the core of the modern international system. Development is a key driver in ensuring the prosperity of the nations. …The sides are seeking to advance their work to link the development plans for the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative with a view to intensifying practical cooperation between the EAEU and China in various areas and promoting greater interconnectedness between the Asia Pacific and Eurasian regions. The sides reaffirm their focus on building the Greater Eurasian Partnership in parallel and in coordination with the Belt and Road construction to foster the development of regional associations as well as bilateral and multilateral integration processes for the benefit of the peoples on the Eurasian continent. … The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.”80 On international security, Taiwan, colour revolutions and Ukraine (the word Ukraine is not mentioned anywhere in the statement): “The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security. The sides reaffirm their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose interference by external forces in their internal affairs. The Russian side reaffirms its support for the One-China principle, confirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan. Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions, intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, oppose colour revolutions, and will increase cooperation in the aforementioned areas.”81 This is the Sino-Russian official start of the struggle for the systemic geopolitical transition to a ‘New Era’. It codifies the Sino-Russian views on international affairs and communicates, urbi et orbi, their geostrategic plans for the redistribution of power globally. The Russo-Ukrainian war officially marked the beginning of the ‘New Era’, accelerating the transition to it as a historical milestone.

China

As the most competent, with deep-rooted potential, the revisionist power of China asserts its claims both in the broader region of Southeast Asia and on the Eurasian continent, including the Middle East as well. It can be characterized as the “cunning neutral” during the Russo-Ukrainian war. Without being pressured at all, it improved all the geopolitical terms in respect to its major competitors, since they got involved in a war of attrition of all kinds of their resources. Moreover, “… one could argue the Chinese have a vested interest in this war going on and on and on because, as long as the war continues and the United States is pinned down in Europe, the United States is limited in its ability to focus on East Asia.”82
Diagram no 1: China Exports to Russia was US $110.94 billion during 2023
Source: United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. China Exports to Russia-data, historical chart and statistics-was last updated on December of 2024
Despite last year’s (2023) reduction in the growth rate to 3%,83 Beijing, which recently announced a new economic support package worth 2 trillion,84 will continue its efforts to stabilize the Chinese economy, both in the management sector and domestic consumption, and most importantly in the export sector,85 as well as imports of energy mixture for its energy intensive industry. Regarding the current export cooperation, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, China’s exports to Russia were 110.94 billion US dollar during 2023,86 and was further increased in 2024. (See Diagram no 1)
For example, in June 2024 China’s exports to Russia increased by 4,76% compared to June 2023, while the value of bilateral trade continues also to increase, reaching 143.9 billion Yuan (19.81 billion US dollar) in June 2024, an increase of 2,3% from 140.7 billion Yuan in May 2024.87 (See Diagram no 2)
Diagram no 2: Chinese vs European Union’s Exports to Russia since the Invasion of Ukraine
Source: UN Comtrade
Graphic no 1: European Union’s imports from main partners, years 2019, 2021
Sources: Eurostat
With China being the world’s biggest trader in goods since 201388 and the largest trade partner of the European Union since 2020, overtaking the United States,89 (See Graphic no 1) Beijing has planned to consolidate this status with the launch of the monumental Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast and multifaceted project that connects China with Western and Northern Europe across the Eurasian continent. It also includes a maritime component, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea. (See Maps no 7 and no 8)
The Chinese plan constitutes the Chinese version of ‘strategic extension’ via soft power, by using the systemic commercial and trade liberal system. Apart from the export of classic commercial consumer goods, it includes, most importantly, the export of cultural goods and Chinese culture internationally. The development of the famous BRI geographically crosses, among others, all the countries of Central Asia, a geographical zone under Russian geopolitical influence and potential military control,90 a fact that makes Russia an absolutely necessary partner for the safe and rapid completion and smooth operation of the project, vital for the Chinese high strategy. It is worth noting that most of Central Asia states as participating in numerous regional and supranational organizations such as, SCO and EEU, have already opted to adopt trade and cultural relations (a demonstration of Chinese soft power) also with Beijing. This is something that is envisaged and sought in the Joint Statement of the 4th of February 2024 by the two States: “Russia and China proceed from the ever-increasing importance of cultural and humanitarian cooperation for the progressive development of the SCO. In order to strengthen mutual understanding between the people of the SCO member States, they will continue to effectively foster interaction in such areas as cultural ties, education, science and technology, healthcare, environmental protection, tourism, people-to-people contacts, sports.” However, the current situation has not resulted in any friction between Moscow and Beijing, despite internal conflicts within these organizations.
Map no 7: The Belt Road Initiative, the Maritime Silk Road, Pipelines from Russia and Central Asia states that heading to China
Source: The Wall Street Journal
Map no 8: The BRI and MSR with Railways Connections, Pipelines, Ports and Economic Corridors
Source: Mapping China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2015). Mapping China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Source: Mercator Institute… | Download Scientific Diagram

Cooperation in the energy sector

The Russia – China partnership in energy follows the ancient rule of necessity. Both countries have a great need in the energy sector. China has a dynamically developing economy, which has climbed to the 2nd position after the US economy, and consumes more and more energy mixture every year. For this reason, Beijing is closely monitoring developments and trying to take advantage of every possible opportunity for new energy mix imports, entering into special energy agreements with countries in Africa and Latin America.91 On the other hand, Russia, whose economy heavily relies on the energy sector, holds the first position in total reserves of natural gas with 44.2 tcm. It is the second largest natural gas producer with 586.4 bcm, third in natural gas exports (first in 2022), while second in oil production and oil exports for 2023. Besides, Russia comes third in total energy production for 2023.92
As it becomes evident, the Russo-Ukrainian War and the continuous imposition of sanctions measures93 on Moscow indicated the common path of Beijing and Moscow, among others, in the energy sector. The West’s boycott of the Russian energy mix, the export of which constitutes the sole (along with the export of weapon systems) economic engine of Russia, led to a massive increase in the export of Russian oil, oil products and natural gas to neighboring China. Thus, on the one hand, the smooth operation of the entire turnover of Russian energy companies and the Russian economy is maintained, and on the other hand, the ever-increasing demand for energy from China’s energy-intensive industries is satisfied.
The same pattern, which aligns with the growing needs of the Chinese industry, is very likely to continue with Russia as the exporter and China as the importer of the energy mix at a preferential price, forging the informal alliance of the two countries, based on interdependence in the energy sector, for as long as their national interests align. Moreover, there is a possibility for Russia to become an economic ‘hostage’ of China, which consumes the lion’s share of the Russian energy mix. Already, according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, on December 27, 2023, “Russia has redirected its oil exports from Europe to China and India. … We previously supplied a total of 40-45% of oil and oil products to Europe… This year, we expect the figure not to exceed 4-5% of total exports…China – whose share (of oil exports) has grown to 45-50% – and India have become our main partners in the current situation… In two years the total share of supplies to India has increased to about 40%.”94 For this reason, Moscow must re-diversify its customer base in the energy sector, to a pre-Russian-Ukrainian war level, as soon as possible, something that is expected to happen gradually with its end.
It is worth noting that the Sino-Russian cooperation in the energy sector also has more aspects of mutual benefit. There have been many instances where Europe bought Russian LNG, which China had initially imported from Russia, benefiting both countries. For example, “… according to the Chinese South China Morning Post (SCMP), which processes data from Chinese customs, in the first half of 2022, China bought 28.7% more Russian LNG (liquefied natural gas) on an annual basis compared to 2021, with the cost increased by 182%. This is in addition to Chinese purchases of Russian natural gas delivered through pipelines. According to a Gazprom announcement, there was a 63.37% increase in the same period.”95
Following the successful example of cooperation in the energy sector, Russia and China attempt to further improve and deepen their relations in other fields. Besides, the tools used by Moscow and Beijing have a common origin and/or common destination. The BRICS, BRI, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,96 the Eurasian Economic Union and CSTO constitute, inter alia, the most useful and influential tools in security, economy and culture. Also, the members of these regional organisations and supra-national multi-mechanisms structures in many cases coincide, creating to some extent a strong norm of strategic convergence on the Eurasian continent. (See Map no 9)
Map no 9: Shanghai Economic Cooperation
Source: Britannica Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) | Definition, Members, History, Map, & Facts | Britannica
This article will continue in GeoPolitica Magazine no. 106 (1/2025)
Bibliography
Primary Sources
1. Australian Prime Minister in Joint Leaders Statement On AUKUS, 14 March 2023,
in: Joint Leaders Statement On AUKUS | Prime Minister of Australia
2. Biden, Joseph R., “America needs the world just as the world needs America”, Participation Speech, 45th Munich Security Conference, 7 February, 2009,
in: http://germany.usembassy/events2009/ feb-biden-security
3. Counter Terrorism Guide, US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), US Department of State.
in: National Counterterrorism Center | Terrorist Groups
4. Credento, Knowledge Hub, Brussels. China – Africa relations: China pledges an increase in financial commitments to Africa at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit | Credendo
5. “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, 4 February, 2024, Beijing.
in: Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development • President of Russia
6. European Council, International Summits, G7 summit, Hiroshima, Japan, 19-21 May 2023.
in: G7 summit, Hiroshima, Japan – Consilium.
7. European Council, “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts 15th package of restrictive measures”, European Council, 16 December, 2024.
in: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts 15th package of restrictive measures – Consilium
8. Eurostat, “China overtook the US as EU’s largest trade partner”, Economic and Social, Council of Greece, 8 September, 2021, Athens.
in: https://www.oke-esc.eu/en/china-overtook-us-eus-largest-trade-partner.
9. European Commission, “Key elements of the EU – China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment”, European Commission, 30 December, 2020, Brussels.
10. ‘Near Abroad’, Part V. Regional tracks of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 229, March 31, 2023.
11. President Vladimir Putin’s speech, 43rd Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007.
12. Prime Minister of Australia, Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS), 05 April 2022.
13. Prime Minister of Australia, on Joint statement on AUKUS, Media Statement, 16 September 2021,
in: Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS | Prime Minister of Australia
14. Trading Economics, “China Exports to Russia-2024”, Trading Economics, 2024.
in: China Exports to Russia – 2024 Data 2025 Forecast 1992-2023 Historical
Secondary Sources
Books
1. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan, How To Conduct The US Soviet Contest, Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1986.
2. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, New York, 1997.
3. Challiand, J., and Rageaou, J., P., Strategic Atlas, World Geopolitics, Penguin, London, 1985.
4. Dugin, Alexander, The Fourth Political Theory, Translated by Mark Sleboda and Michael Millerman, Arktos Media Ltd, London, 2012.
5. Grivas Konstantinos, The military rise of China and the geopolitics of war in the Middle East, Livanis, Athens, 2013.
6. Schneider, Florian, Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity, Amsterdam University Press, 2021.
7. Lygeros, Stavros, Why the war in Ukraine is changing the world. The complicated relations between Ukrainians and Russians throughout history, Pataki, 2nd edition Athens, 2022.
8. Mackinder, Halford John, Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, Henry Holt and Company Inc, New York, 1919.
9. Mazis, I, Th., Geopolitics: Theory and Praxis, Papazisis / ELIAMEP, Athens 2002.
10. Mazis, I, Th., Metatheoretical Critical approach of International Relations and Geopolitics. The Neoposistivist Frame, Papazisis Publications, Athens, 2012.
11. Filis, Konstantinos, The Future of History. How the War in Ukraine Changed the International Landscape, Editing Filis, Konstantinos, Papadopoulos Press, Athens, 2022.
12. Spykman, Nicholas, J., The Geography of Peace, Papazisis, Greek translation, Athens, 2004.
Monographs and Research Studies
1. Boulègue, Mathieu, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment”, Royal Institute for International Relations (Chatham House), Russia and Eurasia Programme, June 2019, London.
Articles
1. Adachi, Aya, “China and its Free Trade Agreements with Latin America”, Dialogo Politico, February 2023, Madrid,
in: China and its Free Trade Agreements with Latin America – Diálogo Político
2. AFP, “Russia Says Redirected Most Oil Exports to China, India”, The Moscow Times, 27 December, 2023.
in: Russia Says Redirected Most Oil Exports to China, India – The Moscow Times.
3. Anderlini Jamil and Hornby Lucy, “China overtakes US as world’s largest goods trader”, Financial Times, January, 2014, Beijing.
in: China overtakes US as world’s largest goods trader
4. Arvatitopoulos, Konstantinos, “Amerika”, Part I “Cosmos and Polemos”, The Future of History. How the War in Ukraine Changed the International Landscape, Editing Filis, Konstantinos, Papadopoulos Press, 2022, Athens.
5. Bao, Anniek, “China’s monetary shift signals economic worries, but ‘bazooka-style’ stimulus is unlikely, experts say”, CNBC, Money Report, 11 December, 2024, New York.
in: China’s monetary shift signals economic worries, but ‘bazooka-style’ stimulus is unlikely, experts say – NBC New York
6. Baskaran Gracelin and Schwartz Meredith, “China imposes its most stringer critical minerals export restrictions yet amidst escalating US – China tech war”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 04 December, 2024, Washington.
in: China Imposes Its Most Stringent Critical Minerals Export Restrictions Yet Amidst Escalating US – China Tech War
7. BBC, “China overtakes US as world’s largest goods trader”, BBC, 10 January, 2014. London. in: China ‘overtakes’ US as world’s largest goods trader – BBC News
8. Bercero Ignacio Garcia, Mavroidis, C. Petros, Sapir Andre, “How the European Union respond to Trump’s tariffs”, Bruegel, 9 December, 2024, Brussels.
How the European Union should respond to Trump’s tariffs
9. Business Standard, “Quad: About Quad”, Business Standard, New Delhi.
in: What is Quad? – Objectives, Principles, Significance and Summit
10. Capital.gr, “China: Exports to Russia up 4.76% in June”, Capital.gr, 12 July, 2024.
in: Κίνα: Αύξηση 4,76% των εξαγωγών στη Ρωσία τον Ιούνιο | Capital
11. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Are We in a New Era for China – Africa Relations?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 September, 2024, Washington.
in: Are We in a New Era for China-Africa Relations? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
12. Crotiner, Isaac, “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the US for the Crisis in Ukraine”, The New Yorker, 1 March, 2022, New York.
in: Why John Mearsheimer Blames the US for the Crisis in Ukraine | The New Yorker.
13. Etzioni, Amitai, “Mearsheimer’s War with China. The provocative political scientist foresees tense relations between the US and China”, The Diplomat, 29 March, 2015, Arlington.
in: https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/mearsheimers-war-with-china/
14. Fitzgerald, James, “Trump appears to threaten Hamas with ‘all hell to pay’ over hostages”, BBC News, 04 December, 2024, London.
in: Trump appears to threaten Hamas with ‘all hell to pay’ over hostages
15. Gross Jenny, Alderman Liz, Cohen Patricia, “As Trump Threatens Tariffs, Europe and South America Strengthen Ties”, The New York Times, 06 December, 2024, New York.
in: As Trump Threatens Tariffs, Europe and South America Strengthen Ties – The New York Times
16. Haynes, Deborah, “Head of MI6 says ‘I’ve never seen the world in a more dangerous state’ as he warns Russia would not stop if it wins in Ukraine”, Sky News, 29 November, 2024, London.
in: Head of MI6 says ‘I’ve never seen the world in a more dangerous state’ as he warns Russia would not stop if it wins in Ukraine | World News | Sky News
17. Hijar-Chiapa, Miguel A., “A Quad plus? The Prospects for Australia and New Zealand”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Special Issue, 2020.
18. Hussein, Fatima, “US plans to impose major new tariffs on EVs, other Chinese green energy imports”, Los Angeles Times, 11 May, 2024, Los Angeles.
in: US plans major new tariffs on EVs, other Chinese green energy imports – Los Angeles Times.
19. Imbach, Romain, “Why did Donald Trump accuse NATO members of not paying?”, Le Monde, 14 February, 2024.
in: Why did Donald Trump accuse NATO members of not paying?
20. Käpylä, Juha and Mikkola, Harri, The Global Arctic, The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union, FIIA, Briefing Paper 133, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, August 2013.
21. Kathimerini, Money review, “China Will Never Become No.1-Why It Will Not Be Able to Overtake the US”, Kathimerini, Money review, 05 September, 2023, Athens.
in: Η Κίνα δεν θα γίνει ποτέ Νο1 – Γιατί δεν θα μπορέσει να ξεπεράσει τις ΗΠΑ | Moneyreview.gr
22. Kelsey, Jane, “New Zealand has just joined an overtly anti-China alliance – are the economic risks worth it?”, The Conversation, 24 May, 2022,
in: New Zealand has just joined an overtly anti-China alliance – are the economic risks worth it?
23. Konstantopoulos, Ioannis, N., “The Two Geopolitical Theories of Air Power: Presentation and Critical Appraisal”, Civitas Gentium, 2nd New Annual Edition, Vol. 10, 2023.
24. Konstantopoulos, Ioannis, N., “The Cyberpolitics of the Main Actors of the International System (Supra-system): General Theory and Recent Practice”, Civitas Gentium, 2nd New Annual Edition, Vol. 10, 2023.
25. Kluth Andrew, “Trump’s ‘new order’ will be global anarchy”, Deccan Herald, Bloomberg Opinion, 12 November, 2024,
in: Trump’s ‘new order’ will be global anarchy
26. Kulp, S.A., Strauss, B.H. “New elevation data triple estimates of global vulnerability to sea-level rise and coastal flooding”, Nature Communication, 10, 4844 (2019),
doi:10.1038/s41467-019-12808-zhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-12808-z
27. Kurtenbach, Elaine, “China bans exports to US of gallium, germanium, antimony in response to chip sanctions”, Associated Press, 03 December, 2024, Bangkok.
in: China bans gallium, antimony exports to US in response to chip sanctions | AP News
28. Mackinder, Halford John, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), vol. 23, no 4, April 1904, London, pp. 421-437.
29. Martin, Nick, “China and Trump’s tariffs: Beijing tries to unleash economy”, Deutsche Welle, 29, November, 2024, Bonn,
in: China and Trump’s tariffs: Beijing tries to unleash economy – DW – 11/29/2024
30. Overland, J., Bhatt, U., Key, K, Liu, Y., Walsh, J., and Wang, M., “Temperature and Clouds”, Arctic Report Card, NOAA, November 2011.
31. Reduction Africanews and AP, “BRICS: ‘34 countries have expressed desire to join’-Putin”, Africanews, 13 September, 2024, Lyon.
in: BRICS: “34 countries have expressed desire to join” – Putin | Africanews
32. Reuters, “China’s GDP growth expected around 5% this year, senior official says”, Reuters, 14 December, 2024, Toronto.
in: China’s GDP growth expected around 5% this year, senior official says | Reuters
33. Reuters, “Half of Russia’s 2023 Oil and Petroleum Exports Went to China – Russia’s Novak”, Reuters, 27 December, 2023, Toronto.
in: Half of Russia’s 2023 Oil and Petroleum Exports Went to China – Russia’s Novak.
34. Reuters, “NATO’s Rutte congratulates Trump, says allies spending more on defence”, Reuters, 06 November, 2024, Toronto.
in: NATO’s Rutte congratulates Trump, says allies spending more on defence | Reuters
35. Reuters, “Trump’s US election win may bring NATO members’ defense spending back into focus”, Reuters, 16 November, 2024, Toronto.
in: Trump’s US election win may bring NATO members’ defense spending back into focus | Reuters
36. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “Afghanistan: The Geopolitics of the Russian Déjà vu”, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note (EMPN), Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA), The University of Nicosia, No 67, October 2021.
37. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “Climatic Change and Geopolitical Principles. From the Strategy of ‘Containment’ to the Strategy of ‘Containment Antagonism’. The Transformation of the Anglo-Saxon Classic Theories of Geopolitics and the Emerging Successor Geopolitical Approach”, Civitas Gentium, Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies, School of Economics and Political Sciences, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, September 2016, Vol. 4, no 1.
38. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “Russia’s Emergence from the Ice. Climate Changes and the Principles of the New Geopolitics”, Foreign Affairs, Hellenic Edition, issue no 19, October, 2013.
39. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “The Arctic Ocean and the Geopolitics of Maritime Transportation”, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note (EMPN), Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA), The University of Nicosia, No 46, January 2020.
40. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “The Emerging Phenomenon of a “New Cold War” [sic] with the Russo-Ukrainian War as Strategic Springboard”, GeoPolitica, nr. 1 (102), February 2024, ‘Ion Conea’ Geopolitical Association, Bucharest.
41. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “Ukraine’s geopolitical identity as a diachronic fundamental element in the Russo-Ukrainian relations and the heritage of the New Cold War”, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note (EMPN), Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA), The University of Nicosia, No 72, March 2022.
42. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “The Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis and Turkey”, South-East Europe Energy Brief-Monthly Analysis, Institute of Energy for South East Europe, (IENE), issue no 129, April 2014
43. Sotiropoulos, Ioannis, P., “Between Two Major Geopolitical Crises. The Impact on South East Europe. Part I: The Ukrainian Heritage”, South-East Europe Energy Brief-Monthly Analysis, Institute of Energy for South East Europe, (IENE), issue no 139, July-August 2014.
44. The Daily Star, “China tells Bangladesh to ‘reject bloc politics’”, The Daily Mail, 02 June, 2022, Dhaka.
in: China tells Bangladesh to “reject bloc politics” | The Daily Star
45. US Energy Information Administration.
in: International – US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
46. Vasquez Maegan, LeVine Marianne, “Trump says US should stay out of Syria conflict as Assad regime teeters”, The Washington Post, 07 December, 2024, Washington.
in: Trump says US should stay out of Syria conflict as Assad regime teeters – The Washington Post
47. Westad, Odd Arne, “Has a New Cold War Really Begun? Why the Term Shouldn’t Apply to Today’s Great-Power Tensions”, Foreign Affairs, March 2018.
48. Wirjawan, Gita, Interview with John Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer: Is China the Real Winner of Ukraine War?” (Transcript), The Singju Post, 14 December, 2023, Khongman.
in: John Mearsheimer: Is China the Real Winner of Ukraine War? (Transcript) – The Singju Post
49. Yang, Stephanie, “Trump is threatening to raise tariffs again. Here’s how China plans to fight back”, Los Angeles Times, 10 December, 2024, Los Angeles.
in: Trump is threatening to raise tariffs again. Here’s how China plans to fight back – Los Angeles Times
50. Zhang Ellen, Yao Kevin, “China ready to go deeper into debt to counter Trump’s tariffs”, Reuters, 11 December, 2024, Toronto.
in: China ready to go deeper into debt to counter Trump’s tariffs | Reuters.