Landmark UKRAINE.
Novus ordo seclorum is dead.
Long live novus ordo seclorum!

Ioannis P. SOTIROPOULOS, PhD^

Continued from GeoPolitica Magazine no 105 (4/2024)

The BRICS

The BRICS, in particular, constitute a revisionist project of global economic impact, as their founding members are also powerful and influential members of leading international organizations.¹ They seek to create a new global alternative system of economic and trade operation alongside the existing American-born and Western-centric system that has the US dollar as its supreme tool, i.e. they promote an alternative system of interbank transactions, the conduct of their trade transactions, among themselves, in their national currencies, dedollarization in favor of a new, possibly digital currency, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank, which lends to emerging economies.

It is a fact that with the onset of the Ukrainian crisis and the imposed economic sanctions on Russia, the need for greater economic autonomy for Moscow became even more pressing, particularly in the international interbank sector. As a result, efforts have focused mainly on creating an alternative international payment system with the ultimate goal of reducing systemic dependence on the US dollar and existing international interbank transaction systems such as SWIFT.²

Regarding dedollarization, this is extremely challenging endeavor, particularly in the medium term. Nevertheless, “According to the Washington Post, the United States has imposed more than 15,000 economic sanctions on a third of the world. And the consequences are now visible. According to the International Monetary Fund, the US Treasury’s foreign exchange reserves in dollars and securities fell to 58.9% in 2024, compared to 70% two decades ago.”.³ On the other hand, US dollar is still the dominant currency for world trade, while the Chinese Yuan is limited to 1.23% of global reserves and 4.69% of global transactions, according to the statistics of the Atlantic Council.⁴

 Graphic no 2: The Ten BRICS

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2024,
World Bank, Chinese Foreign Ministry

At the recent 16^th annual summit in Kazan in Russia, between 22-24 October 2024, among other things, the enlargement of the organization, effective from 1 January 2025, was approved. Indeed, to the five members (the founding members of 2006-Brazil, Russia, India, China-and South Africa that joined in 2010), five new members were added namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while there are 34 sovereign states that have expressed interest in joining the organisation.⁵ The ten BRICS countries now represent 45% of the global population, 30% of the global territory, 37% of the global GDP, and 20% of global trade activity. (See Graphic no 2) Despite the powerful and influential image given by the combined sizes of their members, the lack of depth and premature enlargement will result, apart from new opportunities for exercising international influence and acquiring of privileged geopolitical positions, in new internal strife and disputes, confrontation and divisions on international and regional issues, etc.

Finally, the BRICS project seems quite challenging, though very difficult, “… as the US dollar has some unbeatable advantages, such as international recognition and the status of a ‘safe haven’, full freedom of capital movement by its issuer (except in cases of sanctions), a strong economy, an internationally competitive capital market, and, of course, the military power of the US which supports everything else.”.⁶ On the other hand, what is certain is that Russia and personally President Putin, who established the club in 2006, noticeably enjoys the understanding of a large part of the world that sees him as the spearhead for an effort to emancipate the ‘once weak states’, which still experience marginalization in international relations.

Russia

At the strategic level, Russia benefits from China’s strategic depth in the diplomatic, political and economic global affairs, as well as the close bilateral economic and trade relations, which are based on the exports of Russian energy mixture to China. In the common calling for a Greater Eurasian Partnership,⁷ it seems that an even closer and enduring relation with China could be upgraded into a real strategic partnership, that could attempt to homogenize the Eurasian continent under the high supervision of Moscow and Beijing, radically changing the geopolitical balance, eventually leading to a hot conflict between the powers of the status quo and those of revisionism. Unlike China, which is geographically isolated in the ‘corner’ of Southeast Asia, Russia as a geographical entity can be described as the most privileged country of the World Island.⁸ As it extends from East to West, from the Pacific Ocean to Eastern Europe and from North to South from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Central Asian steppes sharing common borders with China, it is distinguished by its continental accumulated dynamics (Pivot Area / Heartland), and deterministically influences and potentially controls all geopolitical developments and geostrategic ambitions of the states of the World Island (Eurasia and Africa). Thus, given the further tightening of China’s maritime underbelly by the Western Community, cooperation with Moscow is the only peaceful solution for Beijing, giving it geographical strategic depth towards the northwest, and a gateway to Western Eurasia, in order to carry out its extroverted economic, business and cultural initiatives.

The ‘Near Abroad’

The imperative nature of this cooperation for Beijing, further enhanced, since Moscow’s main geostrategic priority is to ensure permanent and strong influence in the geographical area which coincides with the geographical area of the former Soviet Republics. This is the famous concept of ‘near abroad’ (ближнее зарубежье), (blizhneye zarubezhiye), the central principal of the Russian foreign policy since 1994 “according to which it perceives the geographical area surrounding Russia, which coincides with the former Soviet Republics, as its privileged geostrategic terrain and rightful sphere of post-Soviet influence”.⁹ (See Map no 10) Having a large Russian population in most of them, “Kremlin deems the new republics within its sphere of influence”,¹⁰ acting accordingly, as current history has evidenced “by the interventions in Georgia, in 2008, in Ukraine in 2013 and 2022, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the integration effort of Belarus, which is [still] in progress.”.¹¹ The recent statement of Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova [Мария Владимировна Захарова], Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Federation, on 18 December 2024, that Russia will adequately respond to any provocations in Transnistria and ensure the protection of its citizens and military contingent^12, is representative of this concept.

 Map no 10: The ‘Near Abroad’

Source: Arsenal Research, A Beginner’s Guide to the Post-Soviet ‘Near Abroad’

The definitive application of the concept of ‘near abroad’, is found in the modus operandi of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance modelled after NATO that was formed in 2002, succeeding the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of 1992. Thus, apart from the collective action against any aggressor to any member of it, the Article 7 of the Chapter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation states: “The Member States shall take joint measures to achieve the purposes of the Organization to form there under the efficient system of collective security providing collective protection in case of menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sove-reignty and exercise of the right to collective defence, including creation of coalition (collective) forces of the Organization, regional (united) groups of armies (forces), peacekeeping forces, united systems and the bodies governing them, military infrastructure. The Member States shall also interact in the spheres of military and technical (military and economic) cooperation, supplying of armed forces, law enforcement agencies and special services with necessary arms, military, special equipment and special means, as well as in the spheres of training of military cadres and experts for the national armed forces, special services and law enforcement agencies.”¹³ The balance point of the CSTO appears in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan), while it is also extended to the Caucasus (Armenia). The six members are completed by Belarus and Russia. The Organization conducts military exercises, undertakes many peacekeeping duties, but one of its most important initiatives is the start of cooperation with the SCO, which will broaden the horizon of interest and deepen the relations of the participants in the two organizations.¹⁴ More importantly, the cooperation CSTO with STO, brings China and India (SCO members) into military cooperation with the CSTO, albeit fragmentary, creating the conditions for greater self-sufficiency, autonomy, and coherence towards the completion of the Greater Eurasian Partnership project.

The Arctic Zone

Moscow has always shown particular interest in the Arctic Zone and the Arctic Ocean, for objective reasons. The area north of the Arctic Circle makes up the 8% of the total area of the globe and the 15% of its ground territory,¹⁵ and is resided by 2 million Russian citizens.¹⁶ At the same time, the Arctic Ocean has historically been the richer source of pure protein for the Russian nutrition. With the acceleration of the melting of ice¹⁷ in the Arctic Ocean, Moscow is making the most of the geopolitical gift that climate change gave her. Many research studies have been, among others, concluded that “It is certain that the Arctic Zone, focusing on the Arctic Ocean and its peripheral seas, from a low-interest periphery of the globe, is going to be upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively in all areas of human, private and public, activity in the near future, more likely in the next two decades to come.”.¹⁸

Especially for the geopolitics of maritime transport, according to Ioannis P. Sotiropoulos, “The fact that the Arctic Ocean tends to become rapidly navigable, almost year-round, which is prohibitive in recent decades, on the one hand reduces the distance between ports of departure and arrival, on the other hand travel time, launching new transit services, and more. Indeed, new shipping and maritime transport have been planned, with the North / North-East Route already [then] having begun for several hundred maritime routes.”.¹⁹ The 4 new routes with the first 3 having actual current application are: 1) The North / Northeast Sea Route, which is entirely under Russian control, and ends at the Bering Sea / Bering Straits, where the continents of Asia (Russia) and America (USA) are united, 2) The Northwest Passage Route, which is controlled by Canada. But the exit is controlled by the US (Alaska), and it also ends at the Bering Sea / Bering Straits, 3) The Arctic Bridge Route, which connects Churchill with Murmansk and 4) The Trans-Polar Sea Route, which passes through the North Pole and it also ends at the Bering Sea / Bering Straits.²⁰ (See Map no 11 and Graphic no 3)

 Map no 11:
The new routes opened for navigation and maritime transport in the Arctic Ocean

Source: Humpert, M. & Raspotnik, A., The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route. Arctic Yearbook, 2012, pp. 281-307

“The first two, i.e. The North / Northeast Sea Route and the Northwest Passage Route are the most interesting in terms of facilitating the current trips with new cheapest and safest routes. Thus, the journey of a ferry departing Rotterdam and the port of destination San Francisco via the Northwest Pass is shortened by 1/3 compared to the traditional route so far. Also, of great benefit to the use of the Northwest Passage is that the New York-Tokyo distance through the Panama Canal is 18,200 km, while the Northwest Pass is 14,000 km. crossing northeast of Baffin Island and north of Somerset and Victoria, while the traditional one through the Panamanian canal. In the same vain, a freighter departing from the port of Rotterdam and ending at Yokohama using the new North / Northeast Sea Route, along the northern Russian coastline, shortens its journey by 3,900 nautical miles by reducing it by 33 days of navigation, with the consequent beneficial effects, primarily on fuel costs, crew compensation, and on all mechanical and all kinds of ship damage.”²¹ Also, “Sailing through the North / Northeast Sea Road avoids the straits of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, geographically significant congestion points, and in addition, transport is made more secure as their routes do not cross dangerous routes [due to pirates assaults] of the Straits of Aden and Malacca.”²² (See Table no 1, Map no 11 and Graphic no 3)

Table no 1: The shortcut from Rotterdam to Japan, China, South Korea and Vietnam
via new North East Route

Source: Farre et al., Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure, 2014

 Graphic no 3: Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage shortcuts
compared with currently used shipping routes

Source: GRID, Arendal, an UPEN Partner. Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage
compared with currently used shipping routes | GRID-Arendal

The transit of goods through the North / Northeast Sea Route, which is entirely under Russian control, further elevates Russia’s geopolitical identity, forcing the Western Community to enter into some kind of transit agreement with Moscow, in order to benefit from the shortcut in its trade routes for Japan, South Korea, China and Viet Nam. (See Table no 1) It was as early as in 2011 that the Russian Ministry of Transport inaugurated the new Office for the Northern Sea Route, which, in accordance with Article 234 of UNCLOS on ‘Ice-Covered Areas’, is authorized, among other things, to monitor the proper implementation of the provisions on the protection of man-made pollution from vessels within the Russian EEZ. Few years later, in 2015, Russia announced plans to develop the Northern Sea Route for the period 2015-2030, while for the 2024, according to the Prime Minister of Russia, Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin [Михаил Владимирович Мишустин] the total volume of “…cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route is steadily approaching 40 million tons. We expect that by the end of the decade it will exceed 100 million tons…”.²³ Regarding Moscow’s stance on issues of security and control of the North East Route, the head of Russia’s National Center for Defense Management, Mikhail Mizintsev, stated in 2018: “To eliminate the legal loophole for the use of the Northern Sea Route, inter-ministerial work has been organized to improve Russian legislation. This will lead to an update on the nature of the passage of foreign warships. The work will be completed by the start of the sailing season in 2019.”.²⁴ In terms of exploiting the Arctic’s raw materials and energy mix, President Putin, while visiting a research base in the Yakutia region in 2010, stated that “…according to preliminary estimates, the reserves discovered to date [2010] are worth about $5 trillion, including oil, natural gas, lignite, gold and diamonds”,²⁵ extending the interest of the Arctic states to the zenith. Regarding the energy reserves of hydrocarbons and natural gas, according to the US Geological Survey, the hydrocarbon reserves constitute 10.5% and those of natural gas 25.5% of the world’s reserves, with the numbers expected to increase, reaching 22% of the world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon and natural gas reserves.²⁶

The exceptional geopolitical importance that Moscow attaches to the NSR and to the exploitation of the Arctic’s new deposits is demonstrated by the investments it intends to make immediately.

Indeed, the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, on 4 July, 2023, “… has unveiled plans to invest 2 trillion rubles (about $24.58 billion) in the development of its Northern Sea Route (NSR) until 2036, and a draft law prepared by the government has already passed the first reading in the State Duma… Speaking at a strategic session on the ‘Development of the Northern Sea Route,’ Mishustin emphasized the crucial role of the NSR in enhancing transportation connectivity for the remote territories of the country… He also mentioned notable achievements, such as the presence of three nuclear-powered icebreakers, including the world’s most powerful icebreaker, the Arktika.”²⁷, while he stated that “…the Utrenny marine terminal in the Gulf of Ob is scheduled to host a floating LNG production plant in August…. As part of this initiative, five meteorological satellites will be launched ahead of schedule this year to provide continuous surveillance and assistance across all Arctic routes.”.²⁸

Graphics no 4a and 4b:
The energy mixture reserves of the Arctic Zone with epicenter the Arctic Ocean

Source: Keil, Katherine, “The role of arctic hydrocarbons for future energy security”,
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, NAPSNet Special Reports, 07 January, 2014.

This seismic geopolitical shift generates new developments for the geo-political supra-system, since Russia can now gain access to warm navigable seas for most of the year. By building a first-class maritime fleet, in at least 10-15 years it will develop an amphibious geopolitical character of Continental Power and Sea Power as well. In this case, its exit areas, i.e., the southwestern Arctic Ocean in the triangle, Svalbard Islands, Port of Narvik and Greenland, and the area south of the Bering Sea up to the Aleutian Islands and the Port of Vladivostok, are being upgraded tremendously, constituting potential new theaters of intense confrontation between Moscow and the Western Community.

But China also shows exceptional interest in the Arctic region. Together with India, both nuclear powers were admitted as permanent observers to the Arctic Council by decision of the 8^th Ministerial Meeting of its states in Kiruna. With absolute political and diplomatic mastery, permanent observer status was also granted to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Italy, while the European Union, as a supranational organization, was admitted ad hoc, broadening international participation and alleviating possible negative impressions regarding the admission of the first two states, especially China.²⁹ The granting and securing of observer status did not happen by chance, but as a natural consequence of Beijing’s diligent effort to build economic and diplomatic relations with Arctic Council states for mutual benefit. Although China’s interest in the region began with scientific research into geophysical phenomena,³⁰ which have an impact on the climatic and ecological balance of the Himalayan mountain range ecosystem, very quickly included in the scope of its interests, in addition to environmental ones, the fishing and energy reserves of the Arctic, as well as the expectation of multiple gains, as a result of the shorter and safer shipping routes it provides, ultimately focusing directly on the geopolitical surplus value that the set of advantages of the Arctic geopolitical subsystem presents. Moving forward rapidly, in August 2012 Beijing sent the largest Chinese icebreaker, the ‘Snow Dragon’, to dock in Reykjavik³¹, while following an official visit by the country’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to the country in 2012, and it concluded the geopolitically significant Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Icelandic government. With the aim of further penetration, China concluded with Greenland, very important from a geopolitical point of view, agreements there for the creation of joint ventures that include state-owned Chinese companies, for the research, extraction and exploitation of mineral resources, in specific areas of the country. The project was accompanied by the blessings of Copenhagen, since anyway, constitutionally Nuuk has been absolutely sovereign since 2009, in the management of the Justice and Mineral Resources sectors of Greenland.³² Given the aforementioned Chinese mobility, it becomes evident that Beijing places significant importance on the Arctic Zone. This aligns with its strategic development efforts and initiatives to strengthen ties with the region’s economically vulnerable states, such as Iceland and Greenland, which are in urgent need of economic recovery through the introduction of robust foreign investment programs.³³ Given that Beijing is looking for opportunities to secure energy resources and raw materials all over the world, and recognizing Moscow’s primacy in the Arctic Zone, it is partnering with Russia with the aim of expanding existing agreements for an additional energy mixture, also expecting the conclusion of new ones regarding new shipping and trading routes and potential new markets for its products. Nevertheless, it struggles to establish itself as an acknowledged economic factor in the geopolitical system of the Arctic Zone with the Arctic Ocean as its epicenter.

The militarization of the Arctic Zone

With more than 20% of the total undiscovered global hydrocarbon reserves hosted in the Arctic Zone and specifically in the Arctic Ocean, the majority of which is within the Russian continental shelf and therefore fall under Russian sovereignty or within the Russian EEZ, i.e. exclusive Russian exploitation, it seems reasonable for Moscow to formulate a policy in order to protect its economic interests in relation to the safe and unhindered promotion of the product on the international market. In this sense, Moscow creates new and improve the existing infrastructures related to access, extraction and safe transportation of the Arctic energy resources that are its responsibility. At the same time, the regional road, rail and air network, as well as natural gas and oil pipelines, are being expanded and modernized, which will bring significant economic and social development to the region. Finally, to the extent that the overall project is of the greatest national interest, Moscow develops on the one hand modern surveillance and control infrastructures to control its arctic sea and land frontiers and on the other, adequate security forces for the most important infrastructures of the project.³⁴ Recently, Rostec’s subsidiary Kurganmashzavod delivered the first batch of the TM-140 all-terrain vehicle that is designed for operations in the Far North to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. According to the representatives of Rostec, “The TM-140 is a snow and swamp-going vehicle specifically designed for off-road conditions. This is a high-mobility vehicle with cross-country capability on up and down slopes up to 30° and floating capability at a speed of 4 km/h. These benefits can expand significantly the opportunities of rescue teams using the vehicles in hard-to-reach areas…. The snow and swamp-going vehicles made by Kurganmashzavod have traditional hallmarks inherent with Russian vehicles-dependability and easy maintenance. Vehicles of this type have more than once proved their high performance. For example, the all-terrain vehicles underwent field performance testing in the Far North conditions. The test has proved high mobility of the TM-140 as well as dependability and high performance at low temperatures.”.³⁵

 Map no 12: Russia’s Militarisation of the Arctic

Source: Die Studienförderung der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Moreover, Rostec, also launched the Mi-171A3 helicopter production. According to the Head of Russian Helicopters division Alexander Danilov, “The Mi-171A3 is created to service remote and hard-to-reach facilities. The maximal takeoff weight of the helicopter is 13,000 kg. The flight range with main fuel tanks is over 850 km. The helicopter can be operated in different climatic conditions, including the Arctic Region. … The Mi-171A3 is the flagship of the Mi-8 family embodying the whole experience of helicopters development by our holding. This helicopter is a versatile platform that can be used not only by oil and gas companies but also by airlines specializing in cargo, corporate and VIP transportation.”.³⁶ The costly state investment in vehicles and helicopters such as the TM-140 and Mi-171A3 respectively signifies Moscow’s firm commitment to the geographical complex of the Arctic Zone centered on the Arctic Ocean, with the aim of expanding its economic, military, and cultural influence in the geopolitical system of the Arctic Zone. Eventually, the rapid development of air, naval and military forces, directly leads to the militarization of the Arctic region, which, although in no way comparable to that during the Cold War, is nevertheless going to disrupt the balance of the geopolitical subsystem, irreparably.

Sino-Russian joint military exercises

Regarding military cooperation, Moscow and Beijing mainly express it through numerous military and aeronautical exercises, which take place in important for them geographical spots globally.

 Map no 13: Sino-Russian Joint Military exercises from January 2022 to August 2024

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies

More precisely, according to the Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian, “The roadmap [the military cooperation roadmap has been suggested by the Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to his counterpart Chang Wanquan in a meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization on 7 June, 2017, in Astana³⁷] makes top-level design and general plan for the military cooperation between China and Russia in 2017-2020. It shows the high-level mutual trust and strategic cooperation; it is conducive for both sides to face new threats and challenges in the security field and to jointly safeguard regional peace and stability. In the next step, the two sides will formulate a concrete plan to promote the military cooperation.”,³⁸ Their aim is to “enhance their joint military capabilities” while the nature of the cooperation concerns “security exercises and patrols.”.³⁹

 Diagram no 3: China – Russia Military Exercises from 2004 to 2024

Source: Center of Strategic and International Studies

As it is clear, the collaboration is growing geometrically, while according to the Council on Foreign Affairs, in the last two years Moscow and China have conducted about 20 joint military exercises,⁴⁰ which mainly concern aeronautical exercises. In terms of their geographical scope, their depiction on the map creates a geographical crescent starting from the Baltic Sea to the Arabian Sea, South China Sea, East China Sea and Sea of Japan, and concluding in the Bering Sea and Western Pacific. (See Map no 13)

Their aim is not only to ‘show the flag’ in places where their national security interests are held, but also to demonstrate their volition for joint military action, reminding the Western Community (US, EU, Japan) that they have the intention and are operationally ready to defend their interests by force, in crucial points of the globe. According to Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China and Russia seem to be creating ideal conditions for Russia to enhance China’s independent military capabilities in peacetime and to serve as a strategic rear in wartime.”.⁴¹ But most importantly, they “…have joined forces in a series of dynamic land exercises and pulled nations from the SCO and BRICS into their growing network of combined drills.”.⁴² This nature of involvement expresses at least, the multi-level consensus, if not unity, in a common Sino-Russian geostrategic undertaking of high strategy, that of the Great Eurasian Partnership, since it combines economic, political, cultural and military means in a palimpsest Eurasian multi-mechanism leading by Moscow and Beijing.

The Syrian issue

With the recent victory⁴³ of the Sunni rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)⁴⁴ in Syria, and the fall of the Assad regime, Moscow not only limits its geopolitical power and influence in hard and soft power in Syria, but also suffers a momentous blow to its strategic structure in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region, a fact that will have immediate consequences on its geostrategic planning. The Russian bases in the port of Tartus and the Khmeimim airbase near Latakia have been emptied of warships and submarines, aircraft and helicopters, and modern missile defense systems.⁴⁵ For their continued existence under the new regime, some kind of negotiation must have already begun with the new regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, as well as Turkey, which organized and backed, along with Qatar, the Sunni resistance groups in the lightning operation against Assad.⁴⁶ In any case, Moscow’s foothold in the classic Middle East is declining and its influence is trending negatively towards a historic low. Additionally, if the Russian bases are closed, Moscow’s regional influence in the medium term would primarily depend on its relationship with Tehran.

At the same time, to the extent that Israel has neutralized the Tehran – Hezbollah axis, and destroyed the overwhelming majority of Syrian weaponry⁴⁷, it has ensured its country’s security in the medium term. Consequently, the US can release significant resources from the Middle East, something that began during the Obama presidency in 2011, and transfer them to the wider Indo-Pacific region in the context of countering China’s effort to break through the outer or insular, maritime crescent of Mackinder geopolitical model.

On the other hand, the outcome in the Middle East will have a direct impact on the case of the Ukrainian peace process, once it begins. Moscow will seek to reap more from this, after the enormous geopolitical loss it has suffered in Syria, in a kind of mitigation of the geopolitical damage it is suffering. Even if an agreement is reached for the bases to remain, it will come at a high price, its terms will be far removed from the previous ones, while the current Syrian regime will be hostile to even dangerous for their smooth operation. Alternatively, Moscow could transfer them to Libya, possibly in Tobruk, and/or Benghazi in eastern Libya that controlled by the Moscow-backed Libyan warlord, Field Marshal, Khalifa Belqasim Omar Haftar [خليفة بالقاسم عمر حفتر], Head of the Libyan National Army, who during the Libyan civil war seeks Russian military assistance in order to ensure, mainly, anti-aircraft defense. This endeavor would have an exorbitant cost in tactical resources and time, keeping Moscow out of straight contact with the Mediterranean in the medium term, nevertheless is a single path for Russia.

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Ukrainian war is a pivotal event in the history of international relations, marking the end of Pax Americana and the rise of a multipolar world. This conflict has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the capitalist model and the strategic overextension of liberal democracies, leading to a shift towards a more anarchic international system dominated by structural realism.

Strategically, the war has united the Western Community, particularly the European Union and the United States, but at a significant cost. Germany, for instance, lost access to cheap Russian energy and had to initiate a substantial national armaments program. NATO has been strengthened with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden, and defense budgets are increasing. However, the confrontation with Russia has pushed it closer to China, a move criticized by experts like Professor John Mearsheimer.

In the aftermath, new geopolitical dynamics are emerging, characterized by a systemic confrontation between the liberal Western Community and the revisionist Sino-Russian alignment. This new era will see significant geopolitical shifts and strategic plans from the most powerful actors in the international system.

In the current geostrategic alignment between Russia and China, their national interest is expressed through a relationship of complementary interdependence. Likewise, in the context of the Western Community, the US and the EU navigate the international arena with a traditional relationship that has deep historical roots. Despite the ups and downs, it seems more authentic and closer than the Sino-Russian one, because it is based, on the one hand, on very much alike cultural foundations, and on the other, on its given historical asymmetry. In other words, the complementary interdependence experienced by the US and the EU differs from the Sino-Russian relationship in that, among other things, it has been forged through history, not only sharing many important and complementary interests, but primarily because in the security realm it has evolved over time into an indispensable partnership with a long-term horizon.

On the contrary, despite the common strategic pursuit of Moscow and Beijing for redistribution of power in the geopolitical supra-system, the Sino-Russian relationship cannot be interpreted as an indispensable partnership, because apart from the very short duration of its existence, it also lacks catalytic elements for its internal cohesion. Indeed, on the one hand, Russia and China have a far different culture, and on the other, there is no asymmetry similar to that of the US – EU relationship, which would highlight the stronger partner, indisputably. Despite the fact that Beijing is more dynamic, extrovert, and energetic, it has an imperative need for the Russian geographical advantage (BRI, Arctic), the limitless amount of the Russian energy mixture (energy-intensive economy), the gigantic Russian military weaponry, including high-edge systems (joint military and aeronautical exercises), and diplomatically expects Moscow’s support on the crucial Taiwan issue in the international organizations and fora.⁴⁸ Besides, they share common interests, both in bilateral relations and for the time being, also in the geopolitical supra-system, which clearly define their revisionist posture vis-à-vis the current status quo. Consequently, the clear geopolitical rivalry and the growing economic competition between the ‘two alliances’ will irreparably shake the balance of the geopolitical supra-system, without this meaning that there will be a hot confrontation, while nobody can rule out such a possibility. No major power leader is ignorant of this. The outgoing, Democratic, 46^th President of the United States, Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. stated in his remarks before the Business Roundtable’s CEO Quarterly Meeting, on March 21, 2022: “As one of – as one of the top military people said to me in a secure meeting the other day, 60-60 million people died between 1900 and 1946. And since then, we’ve established a liberal world order, and that hadn’t happened in a long while. A lot of people dying, but nowhere near the chaos. And now is a time when things are shifting. We’re going to-there’s going to be a new world order out there, and we’ve got to lead it. And we’ve got to unite the rest of the free world in doing it.”.⁴⁹ Besides, the incoming, Republican, 47^th (also 45^th) President of the United States Donald John Trump, in an interview for Time Magazine, on 12 December 2024, stated on the Ukrainian issue: “The numbers of dead young soldiers lying on fields all over the place are staggering. It’s crazy what’s taking place…”, while for the possibility of a war against Iran during his second term, he stated “anything can happen.”.⁵⁰ At the same time, President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin [Владимир Владимирович Путин], challenges the Western Community to a ‘contemporary duel of knights’ with the city of Kiev as the arena of confrontation: “Let Western experts propose to us, and let them propose to those in the West and the US who pay them for their analysis, to conduct some kind of technological experiment, high-tech duel of the 21^st century. …. Let them determine some target for destruction, say in Kyiv, concentrate all their air defence and missile defence forces there, and we will strike there with Oreshnik and see what happens. … We are ready for such an experiment, but is the other side ready?”⁵¹. Completing the world’s powerful quartet, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of China since 2012, Xi Jinping [习近平] having time and international developments flow in favor of Beijing, from ‘the distant 2020’, assured the United Nations in a pre-recorded video message for the 75^th anniversary of their founding: “We will never seek hegemony, expansion, or sphere of influence. We have no intention to fight either a Cold War or a hot war with any country”,⁵² while on his New Year’s address for 2024 he stated: “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”.⁵³

Over the last century, historical development has evolved from the empire system and colonialism, the multi-polar world of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s period, the devastating confrontation between the sovereign national states of World War II, the Superpower’s bipolarity of the Cold War, to globalization under the American dominance of Pax Americana. On the threshold of the second quarter of the 21^st century, the time has come, for the next landmark evolution of the geopolitical identity of the globe’s active supra-system, to a real multi-polar world, where Realpolitik and Structural Realism oblige sovereign states to adapt their geostrategic plans on a self-reliant theme.

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