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Donald Trump’s return to the political scene could revolutionize NATO defense cooperation, especially in Germany and Poland. Trump’s victory in the presidential election on November 5, 2024, could open up new possibilities in the security policy of European countries, leading to various scenarios for cooperation within the alliance. In the face of the growing threat from Russia, transatlantic relations could gain a new dimension and present NATO members with new challenges that are still difficult to predict. In light of global political tensions, relations between the United States and Europe could undergo significant changes, raising concerns about the stability of most NATO countries in terms of not only military but also economic security. Unfavorable changes in relations between the United States and Western European countries could result from differences in their political camps. Western Europe is dominated by strong center-left politics, which in many respects is at odds with the conservative administration of the new US government. This divergence of interests and different approaches to decision-making in the context of defense and security could ultimately lead to destabilization and significant weakening not only in Western Europe but all of Europe.

Trump demands that Western European partners increase defense spending, which may be challenging to achieve in the face of rising sovereign debts, high inflation, an aging population, and low population growth. Further weakening of diplomatic relations with the US could lead to uncertainty in Europe, affecting stability in the European Union member states (EU).

In turn, cooperation in key areas such as defense and trade could be seriously weakened, with far-reaching consequences for Europe. In the face of all these challenges, the future of strategic aspirations in defense and security matters in NATO countries could become even more uncertain.

What could defense, security, and economic policy look like in the countries of the European Union, using the example of Germany and Poland under Donald Trump? Here are a few scenarios.

Scenario 1
WEAKENING TIES AND DETERIORATION OF US – GERMAN RELATIONS

If the early Bundestag elections in Germany, which will be held at the end of February 2025 and not in September, are won by the center-left parties and a coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU; center-left) with Social Democrats (SPD; Left) or the Green Party (Grüne; Left) will be formed, relations between the US and Germany could deteriorate significantly again. Four key factors could cause this development:

First, the withdrawal of US troops from Germany by the new US president could significantly weaken security in Germany and throughout Europe. Germany plays a key role as one of NATO’s main military-strategic points in the region. The presence of US forces strengthens Germany’s security and that of all of Europe, including NATO’s eastern flank, enabling a rapid response to threats from Russia and the Middle East. An example of this is the stationing of American nuclear arsenals, such as those at Büchel Air Base, which are intended to deter potential aggressors, including Russia.¹

However, the presence of American troops is significant for ensuring security and rapid response. Over 35,000² American soldiers in Germany are deployed to 36³ different military installations.

The Ramstein Air Base plays a crucial role as a foundation for military stability. The US European Command (EUCOM)⁴ is responsible for commanding and controlling US forces in Europe, seeking to protect and defend the United States and its NATO allies and partners. Its mission is to focus on deterrence, peacekeeping, and conducting military operations.

The presence of the US African Command (AFRICOM)⁵ in Germany also supports cooperation with partners in combating transnational threats and responding to crises. This integrated approach contributes to stability in Africa by strengthening security forces and helping to neutralize factors leading to conflict.

Therefore, withdrawing American forces from Germany could dramatically affect NATO security. Reducing the US military presence could discourage Germany from greater cooperation in the defense area, which, in the long run, would weaken the entire structure of the alliance. Such a move could also encourage potential aggressors like Russia to intensify their activities in the region of NATO’s eastern flank, and stability and security in this key area could then be seriously threatened.

Second, the absence of a US military presence in Germany could also prompt the new German government to rethink or reduce defense spending. Several factors could lead to this. The ruling parties could start to exert pressure for savings in defense and security, which would lead to significant financial constraints in this sector. In the absence of a direct threat to Germany, for example, from Russia, Berlin may be less inclined to increase defense spending or even cut it all the more so if the US focuses on NATO’s eastern flank and moves most of its troops from Germany to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania.

Differences in the approach to security policy may become even more visible between the new center-left government of Germany and the administration of Donald Trump, as the center-left authorities may prefer a “more balanced” or “minimalist” approach to defense, which may clash with Trump’s more “aggressive” policy. The new US president expects increased defense and security spending in transatlantic countries that have so far contributed the least to financing armaments while at the same time intending to save more money for these purposes in his country. Trump plans for European countries to have a more significant influence and contribution to NATO, encouraging them to be active and leading instead of relying solely on the US. He also expects these countries to significantly increase their defense spending and intensify their involvement in modern military technologies, which will ultimately strengthen NATO.

Germany, which had finally reached that level of spending a decade after the 2014 Wales summit, when NATO countries pledged to pay 2% of GDP on defense, faces serious challenges. A lack of economic growth, rising public debt, falling employment, an aging population, and a growing number of people on social benefits, mainly due to illegal migration, could undermine the country’s military capabilities.

Such a situation could lead to stagnation in the modernization of the German military and a significant decline in its ability to adapt to new threats, ultimately weakening transatlantic defense capabilities in Eastern Europe.

In the face of these challenges, Germany may find it difficult to invest in its defense and security in the way that a re-elected US president, Donald Trump, would like.

Third, Germany may intensify its search for new defense partners in response to a potential weakening of security relations with the United States. Moreover, it may focus on strengthening cooperation with other European countries, such as France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, which will allow for the creation of new alliances and increase their defense autonomy. At the same time, Germany may strengthen cooperation within the European Union by developing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)⁶, which will help compensate for a possible weakening of US support and increase its involvement in the European Army. Additionally, Germany may consider establishing cooperation with global partners, such as India, Australia, Japan, and China, to strengthen its military and defense capabilities and diversify its sources of support. Such actions may be crucial for Germany in adapting to the changing landscape of international security and securing its defense interests in the face of growing geopolitical (military and economic) tensions.

Fourth, there may be difficulties in forming a German government, which could complicate transatlantic relations and threaten German security while destabilizing NATO’s eastern flank. A key factor that could hinder forming a government coalition could be the conservative party Alternative for Germany (AfD; conservatives). This party currently ranks second in the election polls but will probably not be considered for forming a government in the Bundestag. If other parties, such as The Left (die Linke; far left) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP; central-left), Allianz Sarah Wagenknecht (BSW; far left) do not cross the electoral threshold, and support for the Social Democrats (SPD; left) and the Greens (die Grüne; left) proves insufficient to build a stable coalition, Germany may face severe challenges of so-called political impotence.

Failure to form a government in Germany will mean losing political stability, negatively affecting cooperation with NATO allies. This state of affairs could weaken Germany’s defense capabilities, which is particularly worrying in the context of seriously growing geopolitical tensions in the world, Europe, and, most importantly, Eastern Europe. Political stability in Germany and a strong economy are essential for practical cooperation within NATO and the entire European Union. Its absence could weaken Germany’s defense capabilities and other transatlantic countries on NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, unnecessarily exposing them to growing threats.

In addition, US – German cooperation in the era of Donald Trump and the new German Chancellor may encounter obstacles in defense and the economic sphere. Center-left governments in Germany may lead to a decrease in investment in the US, while they may increase it in China. Nevertheless, it will be crucial for Trump to strengthen trade relations with the European Union, mainly because of the instability of the US economy at the very beginning of his term after the takeover of the Joe Biden administration. The United States will require both exports and imports from Europe, including Germany, in the context of the planned end of trade cooperation with China and the introduction of high tariffs. As a result, Europe may gain importance in Trump’s economic strategy, and relations with it will be crucial for US monetary policy.

However, if diplomatic relations between Washington and Berlin are unfavorable, the European situation may become quite complex. Germany is crucial for the European Union’s stability as an economic engine driving other EU countries. For example, Poland makes almost half of its exports and imports from its German neighbors. A weakening of the German economy could lead to serious economic difficulties in Poland and other European Union countries, causing a domino effect that would negatively affect the entire European structure.

Scenario 2
NEW CHAPTER: INTENSIFYING US – GERMAN COOPERATION

If the victorious CDU party were to form a coalition with the AfD after the Bundestag elections in Germany, relations between the US and Germany could improve significantly and differ from the first scenario described above. Such a development could bring several benefits. First, the coalition could deliver on promises to increase defense spending, which would fit with US expectations to strengthen NATO and respond to threats from Russia. Second, stronger security cooperation could promote closer military cooperation between the US and Germany, leading to greater unity within NATO and a more effective countermeasure to Russian ambitions. Third, a common approach to foreign policy, based on strong relations with the US, could ensure better coordination of actions in the international arena, which would consequently contribute to stabilizing the situation in Europe.

Ending the war in Ukraine, which Donald Trump promised during his campaign, could prove beneficial for the AfD party, which promotes the idea of “Germany First,” which is similar to the American “America First.” If Trump manages to negotiate peace with Russia, the new conservative German government and the US administration could intensify efforts to rebuild relations with Moscow, focusing on economic and trade cooperation.

For Germany, ending the war could bring significant benefits, allowing access to cheaper energy resources, such as gas, which could support the German economy in the face of rising energy prices. Greater availability of Russian resources could contribute to stabilizing the energy market in Germany and Europe.

From the perspective of the United States, cooperation with Russia could significantly increase security, especially in limiting China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. The key would be to prevent potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan, which could oblige the US to take military action in this area. In addition, limiting Chinese influence on the American and European markets would be necessary for the stability of the American economy and would promote the return of “Made in the USA” production and Germany to “Made in Germany” again. Such cooperation could benefit the United States, Germany, and Russia while stabilizing the situation and creating a new balance in international relations.

Scenario 3
A LASTING POLISH-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP
AND FURTHER COOPERATION IN THE NEW ERA

With Donald Trump’s current center-left government in Poland returning, defense relations between Poland and the US could take on new significance. As a key US ally in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland will undoubtedly seek more significant support in the face of threats from Russia. Changes in US policy could affect decisions regarding the deployment of US troops in Poland, which could increase the number of soldiers and military equipment.

In the context of the modernization of the Polish army and the purchase of American weapons, Poland has a chance for further cooperation. Despite differences in their approach to politics, the center-left government in Poland could maintain good relations with the US, which would counteract any potential tensions in German-American relations in the case of the center-left government in Germany. Poland borders Ukraine, Belarus, and Kaliningrad (a Russian enclave), meaning it cannot always rely on its German neighbors, who are known for their complicated history.

One might think that only a conservative PiS government could cooperate with the new conservative Trump administration effectively, but Donald Tusk from the center-left party will not change his perception of threats either, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. After it ends, like Trump, he will strive to improve relations with Russia, which is understandable given Poland’s strategic location in the region.

Investments in defense, including increased spending for this purpose, will continue. Maintaining the level of defense spending above 4% of GDP, as is currently the case, will remain a priority, even if a representative of the center-left party takes the office of President of Poland in 2025. Poland’s security and defense depend not so much on the political parties’ electoral programs (whether right-wing or left-wing) but primarily on society’s beliefs, which, based on its history, strives for good relations with the United States, even at the cost of worsening relations with Russia, if necessary.

Scenario 4
UNITED IN ACTION: INTENSIFYING US – EU RELATIONS

In recent years, the European Union has seen an increasing number of conservative governments, reflected in the results of the last European Parliament elections in 2024. The three significant conservative political groups of the European Parliament have emerged, starting to catch up with the center-left. These include the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), which consists of the Polish PiS party, the Patriots for Europe Group (Patriots), representing France with Marine Le Pen and Hungary with Orban’s party, and the Europe of Sovereign Nations Group (ESN), which includes the Polish Confederation (Konfederacja) and the German AfD.

The increasing number of conservative factions and their growing participation in elections increase the likelihood of fruitful cooperation with Donald Trump’s government. It is also worth noting that the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS+) alliance is becoming an increasingly important alternative in the geopolitical landscape. In response to this development, conservative factions in the European Parliament and the Trump Republican Administration could work together to counter the influence of the BRICS+ countries, especially in introducing a new currency that could threaten the dominance of the US dollar. If the US dollar loses value, the euro could also suffer, reminiscent of the effects of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, when the global financial system experienced a domino effect. The growth of the BRICS+ in this context becomes a challenge and a serious threat to economic stability worldwide. A weakening of the US dollar and the euro would be a disastrous option, leading to severe financial consequences that could ultimately threaten the security and defense of some NATO member states and the entire alliance.