prof. univ. dr. Cristian BARNA

Abstract. The goal of the paper is to establish to what extent tailored propaganda persistently targets different features of memories (real, idealized history, recycled themes from old soviet propaganda) from multiple media channels – TV, radio, social media – and by highlighting the efforts to strengthen Russian collective identity.

In the post-Cold War era, Russia perceived itself as a victim of “containing Eurasian Rimland”, perception anchored in the “historical failure” of the USSR in the Cold War.

Eurasianism, the geopolitical theory transformed into state policy by Vladimir Putin, promotes the imperial nostalgia, according to which the destiny of the Russian Federation is to reconstruct the Great Space, fact which implies gaining political and economic control and exerting strategic influence upon the Eurasian territories lost in certain historical periods.

In his European “Rimland” the proximity to a Russian-phobic Europe, fearsome of traumatic reminiscences of the Cold War, represents a worrying factor for the Russian Federation who cannot tolerate “tight frontiers” that will not allow it to implement an “in-depth” defense strategy.

Hence, Russia seeks to be surrounded by “buffer areas,” such as Kaliningrad, Belarus, Ukraine, Trans-Dniester, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, upon which it can exert its influence and gain access to the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Caspian Sea, forcing its way through the Euro-Atlantic “Rimland” consisting of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Georgia, located in the near proximity of the Russian “heartland.”

In this context, new theories and practices regarding war and risk management have emerged. As such we are witnessing the operationalization of a new type of unconventional warfare for which experts have used different labels: “deniable conflict”, “hybrid warfare”, “invisible occupation”, “privatized conflict”, “next generation conflict”, “masked conflict”, “shadow war”, or “maskirovka” (meaning any military tactic that incorporates camouflage, concealment, deception, disinformation).

Depending on the target audience, distribution channel, cognitive concepts used, the affective valence, intensity, and target, there can be distinguished five types of dominant speeches (main narrative domains):

Offensive: Russia seeks to demonstrate that, although it no longer rules the physical space (temporarily), it permanently rules the psychological one and that it can

achieve this purpose even in conditions of absence. The method used is probably considered an example via proxy for other former USSR states, who manifest similar political tendencies.

The messages conveyed aim to polarize the society and radicalize (regardless of opinion) the population, in order to destroy the social cohesion and proliferate “outbreaks” of contradictory opinions, so as to generate tensions and social uprisings, which will annul the capacity of reaching consensus, maintaining internal control and formulating a coherent viable foreign policy. The target includes not only the individual, but also the relational component – the social network created within a society, breaking the connections between individuals and between individual and society. One of the consequences is the absence of democracy or poisoning of the democracy mechanisms (non-participation, fragmentation, political de-legitimization, radicalization, upraise of extremist, marginal or non-democratic powers (dictatorship), upraise of pro-Russian or nostalgic parties, decrease of pro-Occidental support).

A main goal is to activate, stimulate, induce, proliferate, and maintain social conflicting tendencies (inter-ethnic, historical, religious, societal, and social) with the purpose of destabilization of the civil society and thus favoring scenarios that imply a civil war, separatist movements and state disruption. The alternative for these scenarios becomes coming back in the Russian sphere of influence, at least under the form of condominium.

Defensive: focused on the Russian population and Russian ethnics from the former USSR republics. It has at least two distinct approaches – patriotic and protective (meant to counteract the independent information from Occidental sources). The defensive propaganda with patriotic content aims at securitization from a cultural perspective (Slavism), idealizing the leader and projecting its image as a catalyst and unifying force within the Russian society and among the Russian-speakers from the former URSS republics, increasing the self-esteem until narcissism, promoting conservatism, focusing on rejecting Western liberal movements and using, with an increasing frequency, a series of Soviet propaganda themes, speculating collective obsessions (imminent war, conquest, disruption, defense of “Rodina”, the great war for defending the country, etc.). An aspect implied refers to significant proliferation, in the last years, of entertainment productions with military and patriotic subjects (exposing events from Second World War, Cold War and Russian history in a highly patriotic key).

The subjects are illustrative for the transaction proposed by Putin to a Russian nation captive in a policy it can no longer influence – creating a “reloaded” version of Soviet utopianism (cornucopia, greatness, superiority, center, empire, hegemon), which demands a leader (messianic like) with a proportional mission, whose support from the masses must be total.

The finality is gaining a new militant ideological content (“Putinism”), which will ensure the galvanization of the Russian society and will contribute to reconstructing the offensive imperial attitude. Accepting and offering legitimacy to the message is a means obtained mostly by adopting and including certain memes from the ideological currents that marked the (expansionist) Russian history – ethnic orthodoxy, tsarism, and communism.

The central message conveyed in this context by the Russian church is a “symbolic crusade”, based on a hybrid mix between Russian messianic current and “Putinist” propaganda, on the basis of fervent and militant ethnic nationalism.

Adaptive: with the purpose of ensuring control over the population by promoting programs of cultural, political and identity suppression, as well as by implementing bio-political measures. Securitization and cultural and cognitive ruling are accomplished by integrating the nationalist element, favoring the Russian ethnic element, ensuring prominence in the social domain, invoking arguments and historical heritage, ethno-cultural discrimination – elements adopted and adapted from the school of ethno-psychology from the Soviet period. The analysis of the Russian propaganda offers a series of clues regarding the action mechanisms (frequently presented under the form of “grey” incite, politically non-assumed, and especially apparently not officially accepted), which facilitate the physical elimination (migration) or biological, psychological, and moral degradation.

Intimidation: The West is the target of a victimization campaign that seeks to assign responsibility for the potential negative outcomes of a conflicting situation. The frequent use of this vocabulary in an aggressive rhetoric, of partially imminent scenario and reiteration of similar subjects from the Cold War seek to generate a reaction of fear, inhibition, and insecurity, amplifying the consequences. One of the most evident strategies adopted, mentioned under various forms, is the one referring to social movements meant to destabilize the society, which have as a starting point Russian, pro-Russian or Slavic ethnic groups (respecting the rights, autonomy) or facilitating the access of the parties that represent those groups in the national political arena.

Concluding this study, by dominating the mental space, Russia adds a geo-psychological strategic dimension (through its capacity of redesigning mental maps) to the expansionist geopolitical (offensive) phenomenon. “Soft power”, in this case, is efficiently weaponized (“a la russe” – militarized), becoming a dimension of the conflict (hard power).

In this context, informational warfare represents a new weapon destined to destabilize the social balance and dissolve the governing capacity of a state, elements followed by fragmentation and disintegration.

The idea of territorial expansion (the geopolitical obsession of the Russian Empire) can be counteracted by the decay on the temporal axis (the absence of desirable future in propagandistic messages), transforming the idealized past in a ghost of the future (regression of the temporal arrow), replacing the positive expectations (vision, progress, development, freedom) with nostalgia (nostrum/algos – regress). The major vulnerability of the “Putinist” strategy is the long-term sustainability, a fact revealed also by the disproportionate attention towards losses, which will further amplify the offensive component and determine a force position. Propaganda has a strategic role by distracting and covering events that emphasize risks, losses and vulnerabilities, as well as promoting ethnic nationalism as an emotional shield that annuls any structured internal discussion (and rational) about strategy and leadership.

Propaganda also represents a communication environment (cognitively and emotionally altered, but which can be decoded by the involved parties), its study representing a useful process for understanding intentions and interests of the adversary. The structure of the cognitive-emotional maps and their evolution in comparison with the conflicting events offer a series of clues regarding sensitive points (red flags), partisan vantage points, intention of the parties, weaknesses, and strategy. The existence of subjects highly debated in this unrestricted language in Kremlin (neutrally or controversially presented) offer some useful hints to develop a plan for progressive de-conflict.

The synergy between informational and cyber conflict amplifies the effects of the psychological aggression, by demonstrating the ubiquitous presence of the aggressor – the demarcation line lies in the mind of every individual, unwillingly attracted towards a scary reality.

Considering the experimental character of the hybrid war, the possibilities of evolution towards future forms of conflict must be analyzed (alternatives, necessary capabilities, inception and finality, spin-offs), role and applicability within NATO, as well as identifying prevention and counteracting methods, obtaining superiority in the cyber-informational arena. Recent events have demonstrated that although it was perceived as a minor equivalent of a military conflict, informational aggression must be included in the taxonomy of military strategies and security policies.

Looking back at the rich tradition of Soviet propaganda school, we consider one must realize to what extent the media infrastructure that allows Kremlin access to a global audience will allow that the techniques of the cyber-informational warfare be used for other objectives of Russian foreign policy. Internally, the intention seems to be the re-ideologization of the regime, securing the image of the leader and of its loyal ruling apparatus, “defensive” aspects which should not allow the development of symmetric actions (under the form of “destabilizing” media campaigns).

Another aspect worth taking into account refers to establishing responsibilities for severe consequences (crimes, limiting freedom, radicalization, spreading panic within the society), deliberately induced by state propaganda.

Also, if we accept that propaganda is a “permissive component” of “contactless” conflicts, then we consider that the role and responsibilities of media institutions in matters of prevention, maintenance, amplification or limitation of an informational conflict must be established. It is left to discuss how the integrity and credibility of the press can be protected, considering it is one of the essential components of a democracy.

This kind of conflict is characterized by erasing the demarcation line between a military classical conflict and peace, involving the civil population, using the civil and corporate infrastructure, impossibility to react symmetrically or to attain quantitative or qualitative parity, are difficult to prove (offering a “return address”, etc.).

Although informational conflict does not have the capability to break the strategic balance, it has an inherent potential to amplify the “strategic uncertainty” and the unpredictability degree in international relations.

Considering the complexity of the above-mentioned aspects, we propose several subjects meant for reflection:

• Identifying the most efficient indicators (online and offline) that will allow an extended and fast evaluation of the emotional status of the population that is under prolonged informational stress.

• Identifying the individual and societal vulnerability points in the case of informational warfare (profile of risks groups) and the neuropsychological mechanisms responsible with deviant behaviors and negative attitudes (radicalization, emphasis on sociopath tendencies, addiction to psychotropic substances) or of coping mechanisms.

• Identifying the ways through which national health systems can be involved in counteracting the effects of informational warfare and accomplishing resilience integrated strategy within the political-military elites and society.

• The role of neurosciences in +4th generation conflicts (objectives, work metho-dology, benefits and competitive advantages, practical applications within military and financial-economic informational conflicts).

• Identifying the specific operations of an informational warfare that can be mo-deled and that are relevant – propaganda and opinion and influence dynamism, exerting “fear epidemic” and the impact upon political options, the impact of societal factors in increasing resilience, explaining different behaviors induced by propaganda messages, depending on the beliefs of the receiver (ethnical, religious reasons), modeling efficiency of the counter-propaganda mechanisms, etc. (computational psychiatry and sociology, sociophysics, agent based modeling).