Horaţiu MOGA, PhD^

Abstract. The research aims to explain why, within the Special Military Operation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the Russian military-industrial complex did not fail as a result of the crisis of semiconductors and especially microprocessors.

The present article supports this explanation based on the OSINT research of some Western and Russian information sources involving the poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy. The research explains using OSINT methods and poliheuristic foreign policy analysis why the expectations of the political, military and economic factors in the Collective West were refuted by the reality on the battlefield. OSINT analysis involves comparative research of Western and Russian sources and subjecting them to a critical analysis based on poliheuristic foreign policy analysis to verify their validity. The comparative analysis through the prism of the poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy, of the two OSINT sources of information explains why the decision-makers of the Collective West, based on inaccurate, incomplete information or wishful thinking, erroneously evaluated the dependence on semiconductors and microprocessors of the military complex – industrial of the Russian Federation.

This research aims to bring to light the failure of decision, gathering and evaluation of information in one of the important fields (that of semiconductors and microprocessors) of a competition between the great powers that has the character of a hot war.

Keywords: OSINT, semiconductors, microprocessors, electronic engineering, poliheuristic approach in foreign policy

INTRODUCTION

The research tries to explain why the political, economic, military and social decision-makers in the Collective West wrongly assessed the defeat of the Russian Federation in the Special Military Operation or the war of aggression of the Russian Federation on Ukraine through the narrow field of microprocessors and semiconductors.

Since the first days of the Special Military Operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, two of the important decision-makers from the Collective West (President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen¹ and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo²) have described the Russian military-industrial complex is in a deep crisis of semi-conductors and they predicted the rapid collapse of it, of the Russian army and finally of the Putin regime and the Russian Federation as a result of the sanctions imposed on Russia.

The explanation of the decision error in which the two Western decision-makers, the Western mass media, but also the upper levels of analysis, decision and gathering of information from Western governmental apparatuses, but also from prestigious governmental organizations such as NATO, EU, World Bank and IMF is explained in this research only by analyzing the narrow field of microprocessors using OSINT analysis on Russian and Western sources combined with critical thinking analysis provided by poliheuristic foreign policy analysis.

The research field of our article is foreign policy analysis, more precisely poliheuristic analysis. This paradigm was defined by the Israeli political scientist Alex Mintz as a meeting of cognitive and rational decision analysis schools³ and is based on quick decision, incomplete or erroneous information focused on prejudices such as⁴: B01. “Focusing on short-term benefits rather than longer-term problems”; B02. “Preference over preference”; B03. “Locking on one alternative”; B04. “Wishful thinking”; B05. “Post-hoc rationalization”; B06. “Relying on the past”; B07. “Focusing on a narrow range of policy options rather than on a wide range of options”; B08. “Groupthink”; B09. “Overconfidence; over-estimating one’s capabilities and underestimating one’s capabilities”; B10. “Ignoring critical information; denial and avoidance”; B11. “Focusing on only part of the decision problem”; B12. “Turf battles leading to suboptimal decisions”; B13. “Lack of tracking and auditing of prior decisions and plans”; B14. “Poliheuristic bias”; B15. “Shooting from the hip”; B16. “Polythink”; B17. “Group polarization effect”.

Foreign policy decisions are generally the object of research in this paradigm subject to various constraints such as short time, incomplete and inaccurate information or wishful thinking of the decision maker⁵. In this way, we try to explain the decisions of the Collective West through the narrow field of information that it possessed about the microprocessors used by the Russian military-industrial complex.

In general, in the research about the Special Military Operation of the Russian Federation or its war of aggression against Ukraine, the researchers from the Collective West had an approach that described in a linear way and without any constraints the victory of Ukraine supported by the Collective West over the Russian Federation. All these predictions, if they proved realistic in 2022, events disproved them in 2023 and especially 2024.

The present article explains through the medium of prejudice of type B04 “wishful thinking” how the information gathering, analysis and decision factors of the Collective West failed in the correct assessment of the situation of the production of microprocessors and semiconductors necessary for the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.

The evaluation of the decision based on the prejudice B04 “wishful thinking” takes place on an inductive basis based on the OSINT analysis of Western and Russian sources related to the field of semiconductors and microprocessors produced and used by the Russian Federation. The final evaluation of this inductive analysis of the facts and sources through which the Collective West went in its decisions regarding the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation and its semiconductor and microprocessor sector explains the error in which the foreign policy decision-makers found themselves.

APPROACH

This section presents the concept of the analysis of the decision of the Collective West that targeted the sector of semiconductors and microprocessors used by the military industrial complex of the Russian Federation. The multitude of newspaper articles, websites, news shows and podcasts considered that the semiconductor and microprocessor sector of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation is completely dependent on the Collective West and that Russia does not have the ability to design highly complex microprocessors that can be integrated into systems sophisticated engineers.

Analyzes of this type were provided by journalists who had no training in the technological, industrial field or even basic knowledge in the field of electronics, mathematics, physics, solid physics or the study of semiconductor materials.

In their research, in Western open sources there was a confusion between current generation semiconductor circuits on thin layers usable in consumer electronics and high processing frequencies and those on thick layers usable in the military and space domain but with frequencies in the range from tens megahertz to one gigahertz. These knowledge gaps of many journalists or analysis factors with only humanistic training determined the propagation of some erroneous conclusions in the reports to the decision-makers over which the ideological prejudice of wishful thinking related to the Russian Federation as a “petrol pump with nuclear weapons” or “Snowy Nigeria” that guided the neoconservative decision-makers in the USA and their satellites in the Collective West. The poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy is able to give evaluations of an individual decision prejudice or composed of several prejudices⁶. In our research, the evaluation given by various analysts from the mainstream press of the Russian military semiconductor and microprocessor sector, in addition to the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, is based on prejudice B09 “overconfidence; over-estimating one’s capabilities and underestimating one’s capabilities” as the premise of prejudice B04 “wishful thinking”. In our research, the overconfidence of the Collective West is based on the assessment that analysis factors from the mainstream media, think-tanks, government intelligence agencies make based on the technological difference between thin layers vs thick layers and not based on the function that each type solves of technological approach within a complex technological project. It is true that the technologies with thin layers are not mastered by the Russian Federation but only by the Collective West and partially by the People’s Republic of China and are specific to the fields of consumer goods such as: household appliances, smart TVs, computers and laptops, mobile phones and others gadgets. Instead, the field of thick semiconductor technologies is equally dominated by the Collective West, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. This is specific to semiconductor circuits that work in environments subject to cosmic radiation or radio-electronic warfare, large mechanical or thermal shocks and need larger surfaces for rapid heat dissipation. This game-changer was underestimated by the analysts of the Collective West. Although most of the lithographic machines of the Russian Federation are patents from the Soviet period, few being more modern Western technologies, this state has proven self-sufficient in the field of semiconductors and military processors that are necessary for its own military industrial complex (this will be detailed in the results section). The limit of this work is that it does not want to evaluate the entire spectrum of elements that produced the B04 “wishful thinking” series of decisions of the Collective West. It is limited only to the field of microprocessor-type semiconductors and no more. We do not consider that our research is exhaustive and gives an overview of the B04 “wishful thinking” decision of the Collective West during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

RESULTS

The results reached by this study are contrary to the statements in the Western mainstream media and are based on public information about the manufacturers and designers of semiconductors and microprocessors in Russia. This fact demonstrates the ability of the Russian Federation to support an industrial sector of manufacturing thick layer semiconductors with military valences independent of Western supply sources.

As is known internationally, there is no complete microelectronic cycle in any of the countries. Each has a specific specialization in the global semiconductor economy. Thus, the USA and the UK dominate the design software market, the Dutch and the Japanese build lithographic machines, and the Taiwanese and South Koreans dominate the final production of semiconductors. Throughout this global chain, the Russian Federation controls the production of synthetic sapphire crystals through the Stavropol Monocrystal company, these are needed in the production of watch screens, LED screen substrates and other specialized chips of Apple, Samsung and LG. Another area of specialization of the Russian Federation is the production of rare earth gases such as the neon required in the production of DUV type lithographic machines. Neon is collected as a by-product of the Russian steel industry. Other rare gases that are produced by the same Russian steel industry necessary in the manufacture of semiconductors worldwide are: argon, helium, krypton, xenon.

As we explain above in this article, the Russian Federation has a long tradition in the manufacture of semiconductor components on thick layers with endurance to cosmic radiation, radio-electronic warfare, mechanical and thermal shocks that are created to serve the country’s military-industrial and aerospace complex. In the Russian Federation there are mainly four important locations that produce semiconductors:

• The Zelenograd Mikron plant⁷ is the most important producer that has the most modern equipment both from the Collective West and from China and can tackle technological processes on thick layers of dimensions: 250nm, 180nm, 90nm and 65nm. It produces a variety of products that mainly serve the civil requirements of the Russian Federation.

• Angstrem (and Angstrem-T), Zelenograd⁸ is the main facility specialized in the design of circuits with high resistance to radiation in thick layers on sapphire support that incept from 1200nm, 600nm, 350nm, 250 nm, 130nm, 110nm and 90nm. This is the main producer of military and space components in the Russian Federation.

• The RAS Systems Research Institute, Moscow⁹ is specialized in the production of microcomputers with a strict military purpose and endurance to cosmic radiation on technologies of thick layers of 500nm, 350nm and 250nm. He is one of the collaborators of Voronezh NIIET in the production of gallium nitride transistors. It produces the famous 32- and 64-bit radiation-resistant KOMDIV military processors, digital signal processors and Neuromatrix neuroprocessors.

• Integral Minsk¹⁰ is located in Belarus, was established during the USSR and owns 800nm, 500nm and 350nm thick layer technologies or 500nm, 250nm and 180nm BiCMOS technologies.

Among the designers of semiconductors and microprocessors we can mention:

• Milandr Zelenograd¹¹ has a vast experience of more than two decades in the design of radiation-resistant circuits in sizes of thick layers from 680 nm that decrease towards 180 nm. It has in its product portfolio static SRAM memories 1645RU2T of 64 Kb or 1645RU5U of 4 Mb; the 1886BE10 radiation resistant 8-bit microcontroller; programmable ROM memories of 1645RT2U of 256 KB and 5576RT1U of 1 MB; dual-core ARM Cortex-M4F processor with separate basic operating modes and hardware duplication with a clock frequency of 100 MHz, SRAM 32 KB, ROM 128 KB, a wide range of analog interfaces and peripherals.

• SPC Elvis, Zelenograd¹² is main designer of Russian Federation in field of digital signal microprocessors. Approach sizes of 90nm, 180nm and 250nm technologies with a radiation dose of 330-500Krad. Their implementation is done at Mikron Zelenograd.

• NIIMA Progress Moscow¹³ generally produces all the equipment required for the GLONASS satellite navigation system. And this company works with Mikron Zelenograd to implement its products.

• Other design companies in the field of semiconductors are: MCTS, Baikal Electronics, Design Center “Soyuz” Zelenograd, NPK Tekhnologicheskiy Tsentr MIET Zelenograd, Multiklet Ekaterinburg, NIIET Voronezh and Planar from Minsk which in the Soviet period produced lithographic machines.

From the analysis of the sources provided by the producers in the Russian Federation as well as the events described online by Western or Ukrainian sources, it can be deduced that although it does not manufacture civilian consumer electronic products, the Russian Federation has a mature, technologically independent, self-sufficient sector of microelectronic products on thick layers and sovereign. The research tries to elucidate the antithesis between the overestimation offered by many analysts from the Collective West to the need that the military industrial complex of the Russian Federation has for thin layer semiconductors and the underestimation of the ability of the Russian Federation to produce thick layer semiconductors by neglecting some elementary notions of semiconductor physics due to ignorance, lack of scientific education and technological illiteracy.

This article tries to shed some light on the wrong direction in which the Collective West has been oriented through the modest means of studying a narrow and cutting-edge field of military production of advanced technology based on microprocessors.

The argument was made on various manufacturers of general purpose microprocessors, signal processors, neural processors or microcontrollers which explains the maturity of the thick layer semiconductor technology sector in the Russian Federation to design, implement and develop advanced electronic systems that can work in environments with various types of constraints: mechanical, thermal, electromagnetic, cosmic radiation, etc. The explanation of the analyzed elements was based on an inductive analysis of the OSINT sources which explained overestimation and underestimation items expressed by the analysts of the Collective West.

This study can be the starting point for other specialists in foreign policy analysis to do “political accounting” studies of the policies of the Collective West or the Kremlin during the Special Military Operation.

CONCLUSION

Our article started from the critical note on the evaluation given by the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the US Secretary for Commerce Gina Raimondo on the production sector of semiconductors on thick layers in the Russian Federation. We highlighted that in the mainstream media, think tanks and analysis agencies, the assessment of the Russian thick layer semiconductor manufacturing sector was generally carried out by unqualified personnel or the qualified had a marginal to negligible role. The methodology used was based on the comparative analysis of both Western and Russian OSINT open sources through the prism of critical thinking provided by the poliheuristic foreign policy paradigm. We analyzed manufacturers of various types of microprocessors and microcontrollers manufactured by the thick layer semiconductor sector in the Russian Federation in order to highlight the self-sufficiency in the field of semiconductors and military processors that are necessary for the military-industrial complex of this country.

The present article is generally part of the study of foreign policy analysis that connects the technological factor to the political decision. The current research wants to be a pioneering work in the ability of the Collective West to overcome the decision impasse in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This article aims to bring to light why the erroneous decisions animated the Collective West in its relationship with the thick layer semiconductor production sector in the Russian Federation and in general with the Russian government through the narrow field of military microprocessors. The basic explanation of the decision of the Collective West as prejudice of type B04. “Wishful thinking” presupposes a prejudice B09. “Overconfidence; over-estimating one’s capabilities and underestimating one’s capabilities” is the basic contribution of this article to the research field of the polyheuristic paradigm in foreign policy analysis. The research can be extended to study other foreign policy items that led to the stalemate of the Collective West in the Ukrainian crisis. This fact can be done in other fields that may or may not have a technological character, but precautions must be taken not to lead to wrong “political accounting” analyses. The research can expand in the future on the development of the two lithographic machine projects of DUV 350-130 nm sponsored by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation respectively EUV 28-2 nm of Rosatom which will help to manufacture semiconductor devices both on thick layers and on thin layers in the Russian Federation.

References

1. Ursula von der Leyen; https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/05/11/russia-sanctions-effect-military/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

2. Gina Raimondo; https://www.commerce.gov/news/speeches/2023/12/remarks-us-secretary-commerce-gina-raimondo-ukraine-defense-industrial-base. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

3. Alex Mintz, Karl DeRouen Jr.; Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

4. Uzina Zelenograd Mikron; https://www.tour.mikron.ru/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

5. Angstrem (şi Angstrem-T), Zelenograd; https://www.angstrem.ru/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

6. Institutul pentru Cercetarea Sistemelor RAS, Moscova: https://www.niisi.ru/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

7. Integral Minsk; https://en.integral.by/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

8. Milandr Zelenograd; https://www.milandr.com/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

9. SPC Elvis, Zelenograd; https://elvees.ru/index.php. Accesat în 02.06.2024.

10. NIIMA Progress Moscova; https://i-progress.tech/en/. Accesat în 02.06.2024.