Georgiana CONSTANTIN-PARKE^, PhD

Abstract. It does not escape most readers of political science that the realist view is not meant as a prescribe of violence but rather as a set of observations about reality and sources of conflict.

As such, the Melian dialogue can be seen as more than a dramatization of brute force and great power dynamics. It shows psychological complexities of individual and group thinking in times of crisis. A parallel can be drawn between the Melian dialogue and many instances of modern conflict, including, albeit not limited to, the war in Ukraine and US-Russia relations.

The article looks at the Melian like situation in Ukraine and asks questions regarding options and motivations which are not often discussed in current political environments.

Keywords: Realism, US, Russia, Melian Dialogue, Ukraine

THE MELIAN DIALOGUE¹

The Melian Dialogue appears in Thucydides’ work, The History of the Peloponnesian War. This was a conflict that lasted from 431 to 404 BC and had as its main combatants the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, a Greek city alliance led by Sparta. Melos, a small island, had chosen to remain neutral in the war. Athens invaded Melos and demanded the rulers surrender the island and pay tribute to Athens or be annihilated. The Melian Dialogue is a dramatization of what the negotiations between the two sides might have been like, according to Thucydides. It shows the conversation between the conquering Athenians and the Melians, during which the former clearly state their power advantage over the latter, particularly in the famous line spoken by the invaders: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”²

The dialogue has long been seen as the ultimate example of the realist mindset’s cruel perspective on human nature and the world because of its direct and uncomfortable language. It is seen as an example of the ruthlessness of man against man, a “homo homini lupus”³ scenario which not only puts no faith in the goodness of man, but also encourages one to either use human nature as an excuse to be cruel or live in perpetual fear of its unkind potential.

Many reproaches are made on the “extreme realism” presented in the Melian dialogue. One of the scene’s critics is Walzer, who uses the Dialogue as a way of criticizing realism. In fact, his book Just and Unjust Wars starts with a chapter entitled “Against Realism,” in which he describes realism as the main problem in international relations. His is still an influential part of the literature critical of realism and the cruelty shown by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue. He calls realists the “defenders of silent leges.”⁴ He scrutinizes the saying “All is fair in love and war” and details its meaning: “That means that anything goes – any kind of deceit in love, any kind of violence in war.”⁵ However, it will have occurred to Walzer that this was an observation, not an instigation, especially since he makes it clear that realists have “discovered” (as opposed to created) these awful truths about humanity, or, as he puts it, the fact that “inhumanity is simply humanity under pressure.”⁶

Even though the Athenians’ words do elicit a response of fear for the safety of the Melians, there is also a different perspective which makes itself obvious during the dialogue. An interesting view is put forward by Bosworth⁷ in an article emphasizing the humanitarian aspect of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue. He stresses that the often-misunderstood dialogue is placed strategically by Thucydides and is not meant to justify or explain Athenian imperialism, as “it is not staged at Athens before the sovereign assembly, where the morality and expediency of the expedition against Melos might have been fully expounded. It comes at a point at which the fate of the island is already decided – by Athens at least. The expedition has been voted, its composition determined, its generals commissioned by the demos.”⁸

Bosworth stresses that even though the army was ready to fight and there looked to be no escape for the Melians, the generals still sent envoys to make representations, which could only, considering the circumstances, have been an effort to save the people of both sides from unnecessary loss of life. He brings in Hobbes’s arguments in support of his opinion as well:

“Howsoever, if the Athenian people gave in charge to these their captains, to take in the island by all means whatsoever, without power to report back unto them first the equity of the islanders’ cause; as is most likely to be true; I see no reason the generals had to enter into disputation with them, whether they should perform their charge or not, but only whether should do it by fair or foul means; which is the point treated in this dialogue.”⁹

Bosworth notes that the two generals going to Melos disregarded the orders they had been given from Athens at their own peril and that they would have “remembered the fate of the generals . . . who were exiled and fined for their presumed failure in Sicily, or, more pertinently, the generals at Potidaea who were censured negotiating a settlement without reference to the demos.”¹⁰ Thus, instead of the generals being cruel, inhumane, gloating imperialists who could not wait to tell their victims what type of harm they would be inflicting on them, it is quite possible they were, in fact, defying express orders given in a state of war by trying to save the people of Melos and their own soldiers from pointless harm and loss of life. That is not to say that we can know for certain whether the Athenians cared for the lives of the Melians as a matter of principle, were simply trying to avoid losses on their own side, or both. But the fact of the matter is that the opportunity to save their people and themselves was offered to the Melian rulers. They did not take it.

The other key issue was that the Melian elites did not permit the participation of the very people whose fates hung in the balance during this important negotiation, or rather, during this offering of an alternative to annihilation. Thus, the Melians present during the dialogue “were the members who had a vested interest in retaining independence of Athens, and they refused to introduce the envoys to a plenary assembly where some of the members at least would be sympathetic to capitulation.”¹¹ As such, all that remained was an audience of people who were set on refusing any offering coming from the Athenians. Bosworth notes,

“Harsh their language undoubtedly is, but it has a humanitarian end, to convince the Melian oligarchs of the need to capitulate and save themselves and the commons the horrors of a siege. If they acted sensibly, there would be no bloodshed, or even damage to property. In that context the rhetoric is not extreme.”¹²

The Athenians explained to the Melians that survival was nothing to be ashamed of, and it should have been their greatest priority.¹³ There was no lack of honor in caring for the lives of their people. Bosworth notes that the first exchange between the Melians and Athenians shows an interplay between “practical realism and emotive moralizing,”¹⁴ where the Melians, instead of focusing on the situation as it was, decided to protest it. Could the Melians not have understood that they were not on equal footing with their conquerors, and the negotiation was not about whether they would submit to Athens but an offering of a lesser evil? Might they have been so removed from reality? Or were they simply not willing to trust their enemies when they came with the promise of survival?

During the exchange between them, one might even note that the Athenians’ tone was almost as emotional as the Melians’, but only from the perspective of the conquerors trying to be lenient.¹⁵ Unfortunately, these conquerors were discussing with an elite which would have lost their independence under Athens.¹⁶ It is strange, however, that the Melian elite did not consider that unless they submitted, they might lose more than just their independence. Lunstroth notes that

“Anyone who has prepared thus far, the Melians think, intends to finish the business for which he has prepared. It is an accepted form of negotiation to prepare for the worst but be willing to settle in order to reach a negotiated end. Lawyers are familiar with this principle in preparing for trial and being open to settle even after trial has begun. Perhaps we are seeing the introduction of a tragic series of evaluations made by the Melian elites, small miscalculations that lead to their destruction.”¹⁷

Such a miscalculation might have been spared the Melians had they brought along more of their own people and considered matters together. In the dialogue, one of the points made by the Athenians was that empires tend to be quite lenient to those they have conquered, as they automatically become part of the empire.¹⁸ Yet the Melians argued that Sparta would come to their aid, despite the Athenians’ explanations that this would not happen. The Athenians described their desire to annex Melos and the needlessness of violence and bloodshed, but again, the Melians argued that it could not be advantageous for their side to be enslaved.¹⁹ Extremely outnumbered and with a conquering army at their doorstep, one has to ask oneself if the Melians still could not see the precariousness of their situation. Was there really no other option in their minds?

Now, this is not to say that it is right for a nation to be conquered by another. Nor does this mean that it is right, good, or just for the strong to make the laws and impose them on the weak. Rather this is simply an observation of what is generally true of human nature and, by extension, international relations. This is an observation of reality, albeit through this piece of fictional work.

Bosworth concludes that “Thucydides considered that the Melians ought to have surrendered immediately, on the best terms that they could negotiate.”²⁰

The Melians’ conclusion was one lack of regard for the options. It came, however, under what some might see as the guise of honor and righteousness:

“Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”²¹

The Athenian response was one of detachment from a situation they could now not avoid:

“Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived.”²²

In the end Melos was devastated, the women and children were enslaved, and the men were killed.

While paying tribute to Athens might not have been desirable or even something which their honor would have easily let them do, they at least would have survived, and perhaps eventually would have found a way out of their undesirable situation.

It is also true, however, that they might have considered this option presented by the conquerors to be a false one. Who was to say they would not be murdered or enslaved anyway? Might as well fight to the end than die without trying, right? Perhaps.

This fictitious dialogue emphasizes the complexity of human relations and emotions as well as the experience of international and great power relations.

THE UKRAINIAN DIALOGUE

While not identical, a similar dynamic can be seen today in the case of Russia, the US, and Ukraine²³.

On the one side there is Russia, a great power looking to secure its national interest and safety, on the other there is the US, one of the greatest powers, looking to keep NATO relevant and/or perhaps to secure a weakening of what it sees as its geopolitical rival, Russia. If weakened and, dare one say it, broken up, Russia would have the “Holy Grail” of resources to offer other dominant states. And, perhaps with the right maneuvering, the US might even get a big part of those resources secured for itself.

If not weakened, then Russia can still play a pivotal role in the strengthening of the NATO alliance by once more becoming the reason for its existence and further expansion. Either way, the US gets to hold on to power and relevancy on an international level for a little longer, despite the increasingly obvious national and international sentiment of having outlived its glory days. Militarily, the US is still tremendously powerful and focused. So, this is the card it can play best. For how long and to what end, it remains to be seen.

Finally, in the middle of the great power tug of war, there is Ukraine. The country is currently taking the brunt of multipolar interests and its leadership is showing, besides the desire to survive, a disregard for any options which might ensure the safety of its people, despite this coming at the cost of some of its land (a bargain which many countries have taken historically to ensure their survival)²⁴. Is this wrong? Is this right? Only time (and the number of sacrificed lives on all sides) will tell.

THE EAST – WEST DIVIDE

The US’ relationship with Russia can be seen from a prism of great power dynamics. Each country is looking out for its own interests and prosperity, only engaging in proxy conflicts with each other at this time, never directly, and generally collaborating in order to form mutually beneficial relations. They both will make use of less powerful countries to reach their desired goal, whether engaging them in commerce or by military.

The relationships between these two geopolitical giants can also be seen from a perspective similar to Huntington’s “West and the rest” sentiment, where Russia stands as the heartland of Orthodox civilization, despite being a torn country itself (between Eastern and Western aspirations)²⁵. Ukraine, in Huntington’s view is a cleft country, as the civilizational divide between the West and Orthodoxy²⁶ runs through its very heart.²⁷ And the US, of course, stands as (still) the most powerful Western country.

The complexity of international relations, much like inter-human relations, leads one to note that circumstances are seldom black and white, and in the conflict between two great powers such as Russia and the US, things only get increasingly blurry.

A few things are clear, however

National security concerns for Russia will lead it to take the steps necessary for it to secure its existence. Whether one believes that NATO has a small border with Russia in comparison to the country’s total mass or that the promise of no more expansion of the alliance was made to Russia (or not), the fact remains that a strong military treaty is allowing new members in all the time. And this military pact was built to stand up to Russia. The more it grows in strength the greater the damage it can do to the country against which it was built.

Whether Russia intended to be part of the pact or not, at this point, is irrelevant. This is because it does not seem as if, at least from an onlooker’s perspective, Russia is being treated as an equal dialogue partner or a potential collaborator. It is being treated, according to the prevailing narrative²⁸, as an enemy²⁹ of the US.

Of course, it makes sense that the old political guard in the US would be more comfortable with a clearer defined enemy (like a state) than, say, a vague and somewhat blurred at this point, terrorist threat. Fighting against a state is easier than fighting against a seemingly physically sourceless ideology. This is true despite the fact that most of the US populace still sees Russia as an ideological adversary.

This is not to say that Russia is innocent of aggression or that it has done right to invade any of the countries it has in the past. It does, however, point to a more than black and white scenario on the world stage.

Whether the US’ attitude toward Russia was the right one, or whether, instead of insisting for decades that they are enemies, the US could have helped prevent Russian aggression through closer collaboration, is not clear at this point in time. And it might remain unclear for a long time, as political tectonic plates keep shifting.

What we do know right now though is that we are at a crucial moment in history, when changes in the international arena are bound to rewrite the future of international relations for decades, if not centuries to come.

Bibliography

1. Bosworth, A.B., “The Humanitarian Aspect of the Melian Dialogue,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 113, 1993.

2. Constantin, Georgiana, “The Responsibility to Protect: An International Security Imperative or a Futile Attempt at Conditional Sovereignty?” Ph.D. diss., University of Bucharest, 2018.

3. DeTrani, Joseph R. “Putin works to get China, North Korea to view U.S. as an enemy” April 3rd 2024, The Washington Times, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/apr/3/putin-works-to-get-china-north-korea-to-view-us-as/

4. “Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin.” Youtube. February 6, 2024. Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo.

5. Global Conflict Tracker, Ukraine, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine

6. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007.

7. Lunstroth, John, “Linking Virtue and Justice: Aristotle on the Melian Dialogue,” International Legal Theory 12, no. 99, 2006.

8. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley. Digireads.com Publishing, 2011.

9. United Nations’ Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, “Marking Two Years Since Russian Federation’s Full-Scale Invasion, Secretary-General Stresses Charter, International Law Guides to Peace in Ukraine”, United Nations Website, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15601.doc.htm

10. Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed. New York: Basic Books, 2015.

11. Zamora, Karen; Handel, Sarah Handel; Kelly, Mary Louise. “The Republican Party has grown much more supportive of Russia in recent years”, February 13, 2024, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2024/02/13/1231221273/the-republican-party-has-grown-much-more-supportive-of-russia-in-recent-years