David HAYWARD
Make no mistake, the Chinese are far too clever for many of us. Inscrutable in fact. The Pacific islanders and Chinese-Indonesian diaspora are gratefully holding out their hands for readily available, bountiful Chinese cash.
The steppingstones about to threaten Australia’s sovereignty and promote Chinese hegemony in the western Pacific, including the Indonesian archipelago, are numerous and are briefly enunciated as follows:
Kiribati, PNG (Alatoa), Solomon’s (Manasseh Sogavare), Cook Islands, Timor Leste (Laut Timor), and Vanuatu (Sato Kilman), plus five privately owned islands. (1) Daydream Island is owned by China Capital Investment Group (CCIG). (2) China Bloom snapped up a portion of Keswick Island also in Queensland’s Whitsundays region for $20 million on a 99-year lease almost two years ago. The remaining 80 percent of the island 34 km from the coastal town of Mackay is national park. (3) South Molle, still owned by China, has been put up for sale by CCIG. (4) and (5); Other Queensland islands controlled by Chinese companies include St Bees and Lindeman Islands.
Some close friends (anonymous) have made the following comments:
“I was in Port Vila last week (September 2023), and all the locals could talk about was ‘what the Chinese had just taken over’ by way of businesses etc. Everywhere we went. They are pissed off, alarmed and resent these smartly dressed groups of ‘civilian’ Chinese strutting around the shopping and business areas. Not shopping, but clearly casing the joints, controlling what they already own. Obvious as hell. The locals also freely cheered we Australians, including chanting ‘Aussie, Aussie, Aussie’ as the ship pulled out to which the entire ships’ passengers responded with ‘Oi, Oi, Oi’ with much camaraderie. Interesting observation. The ordinary people hate the Chinese.”
[Retired Lieutenant Colonel].
And again:
“When it’s all over for Australia and China controls everything, what would be a good country to relocate to? I was thinking Thailand. I am seven years away from retirement.” [Australian Tourist]
Finally, an additional note on Vanuatu sent to me today:
“There was talk of Chinese in January when I was there. Two days later, a cyclone flattened it. So, the Chinese probably helped with repairs with lots of $$$. They opened a new supermarket at the turn from ship road into town and undercut the local one downtown, so it closed!! Chinese duty free has been there forever, before 1970 when I first went. But it’s Espiritu Santo where lots of cash has gone and Vanuatu can never repay that. Rebuilt wharfage from WW2 at Luganville where Michener wrote South Pacific. New roads and mining manganese up in Bay of Peter and Paul, at top we think. Drive between Luganville and Hog Harbour (aka Champagne Bay) and property after another all written in Chinese. Luganville is a million dollar port and provides access to the President Coolidge wreck. We saw them enlarging the wharf. Very deep water. The USA used it during war.”
[Leading businessman]
See picture of dancers on Santo below, with Chinese shipping containers in the background….
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to make overtures to New Zealand, an exemplar strategic partnership and trade agreement, destined to become a jewel in Beijing’s hard-core CCP imperial crown. PM Chris Hipkins visited China for a week in June 2023. “The meeting with Xi will be the most significant diplomatic engagement of Hipkins’ tenure as prime minister thus far.”1 Only a change of go-vernment might yet save the day. See pic below.
Add to the mix. “Darwin Port is operated by Darwin Port Operations Pty Ltd which is part of the Landbridge Group. The Landbridge Group is a large private company based in Rizhao city in Shandong Province in China, operating businesses in China and Australia. The Darwin Port operates commercial wharf facilities at East Arm Wharf and the cruise ship terminal at Fort Hill Wharf.” 2
“The Port of Darwin is strategically positioned as Australia’s nearest port to Asia and the nation’s ‘northern gateway’ for Australasian trade. It is also a key support hub for the expanding offshore oil and gas fields in the Arafura Sea, Timor Sea and waters off the coast of Western Australia. It is the only port between Townsville and Fremantle with full access to multi-modal transport services. Darwin Port provides world class pilotage and harbour control systems and a seamless supply chain capable of handling containers and general cargo, bulk liquids, bulk materials; live exports and heavy lift oversized cargoes. Darwin Port also services cruise ships and naval vessels at the Fort Hill Wharf facility.”3
No wonder the Albanese Government has reviewed the 99-year lease. Allegedly according to some military analysts, one of the clauses in the Landbridge 99-year lease stipulates Royal Australian Navy (RAN) warships will not be guaranteed access to Darwin Port beyond 2040 or earlier. It is not certain if this particular clause is enforceable.
There could be more…
China is about to buy 21 atolls making up the Conflict Islands, in the Coral Sea, close to PNG and less than 1,000 km from the Australian mainland.
Globally the People’s Republic of China (PRC) owns or controls an enormous number of islands, atolls, reefs and islets. For example, further afield from Australia, in China’s Near Seas, Shanghai controls the following islands: Changhai, Changshan, Changxing, Chongming, Hengsha, Jiangyanansha, Jiuduansha and Xiasha. Fujian Pro-vince owns / leases and administers the following islands: Gulangyu, Luci, Meizhou, Niushan, Pingtan, Fujian, Xiamen, Dongshan, and 43 islands in Haidao Township. The list of Chinese islands in the Pacific area and in China’s Near Seas, is categorised by administrative Province. The list almost seems endless. Refer to Wikipedia, List of Islands of China. Very frightening and somewhat ignored by ordinary Australians.
China’s long term naval stratagem: to change the dynamic of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from coastal defence to wider maritime roles beyond the so-called First Island Chain (Kamchatka (Russian: полуо́стров Камча́тка), Poluostrov-to-Borneo line), to the Second (Japanese archipelago-Benin-Marshall Islands-PNG) by 2020 and ultimately to the Third (Aleutian Islands-Hawaii-Oceania-New Zealand) Island Chains by 2050 or earlier. The late gen. Liu Huaqing (Chinese: 刘华清), appointed Commander of the PLAN (1982-88), was the principle architect of the planned rapid expansion of the Chinese Navy’s presence in the western Pacific.
LIU HUAQING’S (刘华清) MASTER PLAN FOR DOMINATION OF AT LEAST HALF OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME A REALITY
(See Liu’s photo taken in 1955 below.)
China wants to take maritime control of almost half the Pacific Ocean to counter what it sees as U.S. hegemonic imperialism. Liu Yazhou, two-star general in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and political commissioner at the National Defense University (Beijing) infers the duel of the 21st Century will be fought around the SCS and beyond. He writes: “America- tough but young – and China – a strong and ancient nation – separated by the vast distance of the Pacific Ocean, are playing the largest game of global power in human history. The outcome will certainly set the world down a path to a new age.”4
It must not be forgotten that the PRC also has gained significant inroads in the Indonesian archipelago, comprising an estimated 18,000 islands.
“Indonesia finds itself today the centrepiece to two increasingly rivalrous bilateral relationships: the Australia-China relationship and the United States – China relationship. The 2021 establishment of the AUKUS security pact, as well as the 2017 revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), are formal responses from the respective member states of both to China’s rising star in the Indo-Pacific region.”5
“Since the dawn of this century, Indonesia has become an increasingly consistent target of Chinese economic statecraft and elite capture. China’s consistent focus on Indonesia is reflected in AidData statistics, which reveal that between 2000 and 2017, Indonesia was the number one recipient of Chinese development finance in Southeast Asia, both in terms of foreign aid and other official flows (OOF), the latter being loans and export credits priced at or near market rates.”6
“Being the second-largest donor of foreign aid to Indonesia after Singapore, China has also financed and developed multiple infrastructure projects in the country to create more growth in its economy, particularly in the utility, transportation, industry and tourism, with surging inflows of aid in recent years.”7
“The largest populations of Chinese-Indonesians (viz, a total of around seven million ethnic Chinese people or 3.3% of the total population in Indo-nesia) are now mostly in the cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Pekanbaru, Semarang, Pontianak, Makassar, Palembang and Bandung.” 8
According to figures released by Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or BKPM), China was the second greatest contributor of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Indonesia for the first half of 2022, contributing US$3.6 billion. China has consistently contributed large amounts of FDI to Indonesia over the past half decade, serving as Indonesia’s third greatest FDI contributor in 2017 (US$3.4 billion), 2018 (US$2.4 billion), and 2021 (US$3.2 billion), and its second greatest in 2019 (US$4.7 billion), 2020 (US$4.8 billion), and the first half of 2022 ($3.6 billion). 9
These direct investments total to over $19 billion for the period 2017 to mid-June 2022. Itself a clear indication of the PRC’s ultimate strategic intentions beyond those already demonstrated in its Near Seas (Nan Hai and Dong Hai). China’s maritime planners are moving westwards in the Pacific Ocean and southwards through the Indonesian archipelago. Thus constituting an encirclement pincer movement for which Australia will eventually suffer and become isolated.
It is not known how much more direct investment China will be able to pump into the Indonesian archipelago in years to come. Perhaps, another guess estimated $20 billion or so by 2030 or earlier. Indonesian officials are suspicious, but it seems there is little they can do to stem the CCP inspired financial tide. By 2049, it is possible that the PRC will be able to directly invest between $50 billion and (say) as much as $100 billion in Indonesia. Heaven forbid.
The Albanese government must vigorously oppose the Chinese master plan.
The largest Chinese funded infrastructure projects are the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Central Sulawesi, the Kayan River Hydroelectric Power Plant in North Kalimantan, and the Jakarta-Bandung HSR.
“They provide illustrations of China’s preparedness to fund projects from which other countries might otherwise shy away, not because China necessarily believes them to be viable projects that promise good returns on investment, but rather because they enable China to maintain a long-term physical presence in Indonesia.” 10
The shining star in China’s repertoire for suitable island stepping stones in the Indonesian archipelago is of course Timor Leste. Australia has alienated this island by spying on its government during negotiations of the Timor Sea Treaty in the period 2004-12. Some defence analysts believe Timor-Leste could become a Chinese naval base. “A top defence analyst has warned nations in the Pacific and beyond should be concerned about a new strategic partnership between Timor-Leste and China announced last week.” 11
Basically the original quarrel had first evolved in 2006 because Timor Leste equitably wanted a better share of undersea oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. The so-called Gap Treaty was eventually replaced by the Maritime Boundary Treaty signed on 6 March, 2018 in New York.12.
Some diplomatic differences still exist today between Australia and Timor Leste. These have provided opportunism for China to strengthen many ties with Timor Leste to the strategic disadvantage of Australia.
Overall, the Chinese Oceania Blue Book also provides an early outline of China’s maritime strategy to achieve CCP hegemony in the Pacific Region. It’s a worry. 13
A recent 252-page academic paper titled China Rising and the Emerging Carrier Arms Race in the Indo–Pacific: Strategic Competition and Balance of Power, authored by Tung-Chieh Tsai and Tony Tai-Ting Liu at the National Chung Hsing University, Taichung City, Taiwan; is most interesting, from the forever vigilant and insightful Taiwanese point of view. 14
To quote:
“The geopolitical context that has emerged in the Indo–Pacific brings considerations for the development of maritime power to the forefront, especially the aircraft carrier. In terms of the military balance of power between states, the aircraft carrier is central to a states’ ability to project power. The projection capability of the aircraft carrier entails that a carrier group can play an active role in deterrence and regional balance of power.” 15
Some military pundits assert that the PLAN will build at least another seven aircraft carriers this decade, certainly by 2049. This will increase the PLAN Pacific fleet to ten aircraft carriers to project global maritime power and match numbers of aircraft carriers deployed by the U.S. Navy.
By contrast, the U.S. Navy cannot operationally deploy a comparable number of aircraft carriers in the Pacific region alone. The fleet is deployed in all Oceans and Seas worldwide on largely humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. [This does not take account of how many more aircraft carriers the U.S. is likely to construct or for the lead time for new carriers, from sea trials to operational readiness].
“China has so far established diplomatic relations with 10 Pacific Island Countries (PICs). In November 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji and held a group meeting with leaders of PICs having diplomatic ties with China, where the two sides agreed to establish a strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development. In November 2018, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Papua New Guinea (PNG) and had another group meeting with leaders of PICs having diplomatic ties with China, where China-PIC relations were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership featuring mutual respect and common development.
The two sides have maintained frequent exchanges at the top and other levels. Multiple leaders of Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, PNG, Cook Islands and Niue have visited China. Exchanges and cooperation between government agencies, legislatures and political parties have flourished.
Dialogue and cooperation mechanisms have continued to improve. In 2006, the two sides established the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, which is the highest-level dialogue mechanism on economy and trade between China and PICs and has so far been held three times. In October 2021, the first China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held via video link, which issued the Joint Statement of China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Since the start of COVID-19, the two sides have held two special meetings of vice foreign ministers on COVID response.” 16
“The two sides have also established other bilateral and multilateral dialogue mechanisms, including Joint Economic and Trade Committee, Agri-culture Ministers’ Meeting and Forum on Fishery Cooperation and Develop-ment, and a series of cooperation mechanisms, including the Reserve of Emergency Supplies, Climate Action Cooperation Center and Poverty Reduction and Development Cooperation Center.” 17
The West must immediately stop feeding the angry Dragon to prevent it bursting out of its geopolitical containment cage, beyond the First and Second Island Chains. The overspill will be disastrous for the West. Supplying our formidable adversary is a lesson we have failed to learn from previous wars (i.e. we unwittingly aided Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin).
If China is contemplating a land invasion of Australia, then island hopping is strategically feasible. Remember the PRC desperately needs copious quantities of iron ore, to convert to steel to feed its insatiable war machine. By exporting iron ore, coal, and strategic minerals to China we are unconsciously arranging our own demise. We only have ourselves to blame for the catastrophe about to eventuate.
The degree to which the PRC is intending to systematically influence PICs and islands in the Indonesian archipelago is profound and very complex. It is clear that the Albanese government is seen as fighting a rearguard action with very limited financial resources, compared to those of Chinese largesse.
China’s diplomatic, economic and military overtures are an integral component of its perceived one-hundred year marathon, due to be completed by 2049.18
Steppingstones to Australia indeed!!!
Analyst, Mentor and Author The Chinese diplomatic, economic and militant strategic noose, inherent with coercive debt diplomacy, following the guidelines stipulated in the Oceania Blue Book (Chinese: 澳洲管理领导学院) and in fashionable conjunction with the expanding Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), is gradually tightening around Australia. Associates – Management Consultants. Defense Australia
1 Source: nzherald.co.nz
2 Internet source: Darwin Port https://darwinport.com.au › about › about-darwin-port
3 Ibid.
4 Mingfu Liu; The China Dream – Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era; Foreword by Liu Yazhou, Beijing Mediatime Books Co. Ltd., CN Times Books, Inc., 2015; ISBN 978-162774-140-8
5 Source: China’s Power Play in Indonesia: Infrastructure Investment and Territorial Incursions; article by Daniel Peterson, Moussons, Aide et investissements chinois en Asie du Sud-Est (2000-2022), social research on S.E. Asia; Open Edition Journals, 41, 2023, pp. 223-247
6 Ibid.
7 Source: Wikipedia
8 Ibid.
9 Source: “Investment Realization: FDI & DDI – Quarter II (APR-JUN) 2022”, Kementerian Investasi /BKPM, 20 July 2022, https://www.trade.gov.tw/App_Ashx/File.ashx?FileID=7E62A8D05C440F44, accessed 26 March 2023.
10 Ibid.
11 Source: Laura Grassby, Digital Reporter, Sky News Live, October 1, 2023
12 Source: Australia’s maritime arrangements with Timor-Leste | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au)
13 Source: Oceania Blue Book: Oceania Development Report (2013-2014)(Chinese Edition) Paperback – 31 July 2014; Chinese edition by Wang Xue Dong Yu Chang Sen, Chang Chen Guang (Author)
14 Source: The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, June 2023, 231–251 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2288 3/kjda.2023.35.2.004. Downloaded from Academia.edu.
15 Ibid.
16 Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China; Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet: Cooperation Between China and Pacific Island Countries, 24 March, 2022
17 Ibid.
18 Refer to The Hundred-Year Marathon – China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower; authored by Michael Pillsbury, St. Martin’s Griffin, New York, 2016; ISBN 978-1-250-08134-6 (trade paperback).