dr. Yevhen MAHDA^

The Russian-Ukrainian war continues. It has already claimed the status of the main geopolitical event of the 21st century. Intensive combat actions in the heart of Europe have become a serious challenge to the world security system, and their results could significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of the continent. By laun-ching a large-scale aggression against Ukraine, Russia has challenged the civilized world, and today we must develop an adequate response.

It seems important to provide an asymmetric response to Russian aggression in terms of assessing actions in international relations resulting from the Kremlin’s actions. This is not only a litmus test for changes occurring in the international relations system but also an effective way to prevent the monopolization of informational influence, which Putin is betting on. By emphasizing the protracted nature of the war, among other things, we are demythologizing Russia, dismantling its myth of omnipotence and the ability to dictate terms to all participants in international relations. The Kremlin is adept at winning covert battles after the cessation of hosti-lities, so we must demonstrate the ongoing nature of the conflict, shaping an adequate informational perception of the confrontation, which has become the largest in the world in the 21^st century. Its logical conclusion should be the defragmentation of Russia through the realization of the right of its peoples to self-determination.

However, the author intends to start assesing the Russian-Ukrainian war based on two characteristics that are not widely spread in the modern information space. First, Ukraine is fighting for its own independence, relying on the historical experience of confrontation with the Kremlin. This is not only a desire to take revenge for the defeat in the liberation struggles of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of 1917-1921 but also an attempt to subject to functional review the implement-tation of the Pereyaslav agreements¹, which essentially gave the start to the subordination of the Cossack state to the Moscow tsardom. Ukraine is not rewriting history; it emphasizes the inevitability of the collapse of the Russian Empire, which today is known to the world as the Russian Federation. Just as the annexation of Ukrainian lands became a factor in the development of Moscowiya in the mid-17th century, so should the war with Ukraine in the 21^st century end in the collapse of its imperial project and disintegration.

These plans have a chance of being realized because Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression has an obvious anti-colonial character. The fact is that due to Russia and Ukraine being located on the same continent (the common border between the countries is now over 2,000 kilometers long), the relative proximity of languages and cultures, centuries of shared history, and active rewriting of historical events by Moscow, many people in the world have no idea about the true history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The use of anti-colonial rhetoric can help Ukraine become better understood by countries in Asia and Africa, where the struggle against metro-polises was also a characteristic. This will result not only in support in international organizations but also in an increase in demand for Ukrainian grain.

Regarding information, one fact should be noted: coverage of events in the Russian-Ukrainian war is significant for its perception by leading players in world politics and the influence of public opinion on political activity and military-technical cooperation with Ukraine by representatives of the civilized world. Russia and China, Belarus, North Korea do not depend on public opinion both within these countries and abroad. Therefore, the evaluation of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation as a clash between two transitional democracies can be excluded. We are dealing with unprovoked aggression by a nuclear state against a neighboring country, and the scale of the confrontation – the largest in the world by territory, a country against the largest European state – practically guarantees significant resonance from their collision.

On February 24, 2022, a new phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine began. It marked the failure of the Kremlin’s plans during the second half of 2019 – the beginning of 2022 to ensure the peaceful absorption of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin sees the possibility of returning Ukraine under Russian Federeation control as a prospect of obtaining operational space for further pressure on the West². However, Russia’s plans failed to materialize, and it became clear within a month after the start of the widescale invasion that Ukraine not only preserved its independence and avoided the occupation of the majority of its territory but also significantly increased its subjectivity.

Although in most modern states, the church is separated from the state, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a confrontation between states with the largest Orthodox denominations in Europe. If in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church takes exclusively a pro-government position³, in Ukraine, there is a confrontation between the auto-cephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, formed in 2019, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is the largest component of the Russian Orthodox Church. The nature of the conflict allows us to predict significant changes in world Orthodoxy after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

We recommend paying attention to the peculiar “role swap” between the presidents of these states. Volodymyr Zelensky, who lacked political experience before being elected as head of state, transformed into a symbol of Ukraine’s resistance to aggression after February 24, 2022, becoming one of the most popular politicians in the world⁴. And even recent events within Ukraine have not diminished his global influence. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin, who has been in power in various forms for over 20 years, is experiencing serious degradation, becoming politically passive. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the leader of the Russian Federation to respond to challenges⁵. Putin relies on the familiar narrative of “Ukrainian neo-Nazis”⁶ and “the West wanting to dismantle Russia”⁷. The brief, unsuccessful, yet eventful Wagner group coup attempt, which occurred at the end of June 2023, demonstrated Russia’s weakness and the weakness of its leadership. The presidential elections in the Russian Federation, scheduled for March 2024, will effectively reaffirm Putin’s position, apparently with the highest electoral turnout in its history.

However, this artificial and hybrid “democratic celebration” must receive proper evaluation from the civilized world, as Russia plans to hold them in the occupied territory of Ukraine. It is the largest territory in Europe to be occupied since World War II⁸. Putin’s challenge to the civilized world should not go unanswered, so the pre-sidential elections in the Russian Federation should not be recognized by the world.

It should be noted that at the beginning of hostilities on February 24, 2022, the political leadership of the Russian Federation did not declare war on Ukraine. Two factors – the desire to conduct a blitzkrieg and the reluctance to demonstrate formal equality with the object of aggression – forced the Kremlin to opt for the term “special military operation”. However, Vladimir Putin was forced to declare partial mobilization in September 2022⁹. Another interesting fact: even the military coup attempt by the Wagner PMC in the summer of 2023, which became the largest political crisis in Russia since October 1993, did not compel the Kremlin to declare a state of war or even a counter-terrorism operation. The Russian leadership hesitates to acknowledge existing realities and respond to challenges in accordance with Russian legislation, confirming the hypothesis of Russia as a failed state.

The paradoxical nature of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation on the inter-national stage, particularly at the United Nations, is striking. The voting in the UN General Assembly on the issue of pseudo-referendums, which the Russian autho-rities conducted in the occupied territories of Ukraine, demonstrated the attitude of the world community towards Russia’s actions¹⁰. It managed to gather a “coalition of outcasts” – Nicaragua, Syria, Belarus, and North Korea (in March 2022, Eritrea voted for the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine, but Nicaragua did not vote¹¹). Iran, which supplies kamikaze drones to Russia and uses them to strike critical infrastructure targets in Ukraine, can also be considered an informal but effective member of this coalition. Meanwhile, the activities of the UN Security Council, where Russia abuses the veto power, are increasingly criticized. Its peak came in April 2023 when Russia chaired the UN Security Council¹². This has led to growing discussions about the need to reform the UN Security Council and exclude Russia from its membership¹³.

However, it would be unfair to limit criticism exclusively to the United Nations regarding the inefficiency of responding to the Russian-Ukrainian war as a challenge to international relations. At least the OSCE and the International Committee of the Red Cross also belong to the organizations that have effectively remained on the sidelines of attempts to stop the war.

Already in April 2022, at the initiative of the United States and their NATO partners, the “Ramstein”¹⁴ format was created, allowing not only to discuss the pros-pects for strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine but also to coordinate new deliveries of military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that NATO countries provided Ukraine with assistance amounting to 150 billion euros¹⁵. “Ramstein” can be seen as a prototype of future changes in the international relations system, which testify to the global impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the world order.

Although the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of Finland and Sweden has been disrupted by the positions of Turkey and Hungary (Finland became the 31^st member of NATO¹⁶, and Sweden’s Euro-Atlantic path turned out to be somewhat longer than expected), the factor of Russian invasion of Ukraine can be considered decisive for the next NATO enlargement. NATO has significantly increased its border length with Russia, and St. Petersburg – Putin’s hometown – has found itself in the hypothetical zone of modern artillery systems’ impact¹⁷.

Interestingly, the fierce military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine has not become an obstacle to the transit of Russian energy resources through Ukrainian territory for the benefit of EU countries. The noticeable reduction in transit volumes does not seem to be fundamental. However, by the end of 2024, after the expiration of the transit agreement¹⁸, this phenomenon may cease.

It is worth emphasizing the humanitarian and economic challenges of the Russo-Ukrainian war. After February 24, 2022, millions of Ukrainian citizens were forced to leave the country’s borders or become internally displaced persons¹⁹. The verification of their numbers has not yet been completed. Russian aggression has provoked the most significant migration crisis in Europe since World War II, the consequences of which will be felt even after the end of hostilities. The Ukrainian government will have to make titanic efforts to repatriate its citizens, as the assimilation of Ukrainian internally displaced persons is an obvious goal for several European states.

The scale and global impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war have led to efforts to reconcile its participants. It is evident that in this matter, the palm of effort belongs to the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has repeatedly expressed his desire to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table²⁰. On February 24, 2023, China came forward with its peace plan, and China’s special representative, Li Hui, visited Kyiv, Moscow, and several European capitals in the spring of 2023²¹. The visit of a delegation of representatives from African countries led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa²² to Kyiv and St. Petersburg should be seen as an additional lever of pressure, backed by Beijing (China has significant influence over events in several African countries). Mediation efforts were also made by Pope Francis²³, President Emmanuel Macron of France²⁴, and Chancellor Karl Nehammer of Austria²⁵ between 2022 and 2023. Donald Trump’s loud initiatives²⁶ can hardly be considered realistic; rather, they seem to be components of the U.S. presidential campaign.

In a war between a nuclear power and a country that voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and their delivery means, the Kremlin has opted for various forms of nuclear blackmail. Deputy head of the Kremlin administration Sergey Kiriyenko²⁷, who led the Rosatom Corporation from 2005 to 2016, is likely responsible for this direction. Russian forces seized the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants in the first weeks after the large-scale invasion in 2022. The former is the world’s most famous decommissioned nuclear facility, while the latter is the most powerful nuclear power plant in Europe. In March 2022, the occupiers were forced to leave the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, but the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant became a subject of constant manipulation. Putin’s decree on transferring the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant to Russia’s ownership exemplifies the largest theft of an energy infrastructure facility carried out publicly²⁸. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains under the control of Russian occupation forces.

Russia did not limit itself to military measures. In the fall of 2022, the Kremlin conducted a massive information-psychological operation aimed at discrediting Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu²⁹, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov³⁰, and State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin³¹ accused the Ukrainian leadership of preparing to use a nuclear bomb in southern Ukraine. Similar insinuations were made by Vladimir Putin himself³². With the placement of Russian tactical weapons in Belarus³³, the Kremlin is also posing a potential danger to Ukraine. However, it seems that Lithuania and Poland are the main targets of psychological pressure in this case. Information manipulations surrounding nuclear weapons in Belarus, combined with conventional (tactical nuclear weapons) and unconventional (prospects of deploying Wagner PMC units in Belarus) threats, indicate the Kremlin’s plans to exert psychological pressure on countries that are well aware of the scale of the Russian threat. This assumption is confirmed, among other things, by public statements made by one of the ideologists of the current Russian government, Sergey Karaganov³⁴.

It is necessary to recall that in October 2022, Russian occupiers began regular shelling of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure facilities. In this way, they sought, on the one hand, to stop Ukraine’s export of electricity to EU countries and, on the other hand, to cause a blackout and communal catastrophe within Ukraine. While the first task was successfully accomplished through powerful missile strikes, the Russians failed to provoke a systemic blackout in Ukraine. It is worth noting that the Ukrainian experience in countering such attacks is widely studied by partner countries since attacks on energy infrastructure facilities have become a kind of Kremlin know-how. The strengthening of air defense systems has significantly reduced the negative impact of Russian shelling on the Ukrainian energy system during the winter of 2023/2024.

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station in the Kherson region, which occurred on the morning of June 6, 2023³⁵, not only became a massive technological disaster. The consequences of this tragedy for local residents, the environment, and the economy can be compared to the effects of using a tactical nuclear device without the direct use of weapons of mass destruction. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam exacerbated the problem of nuclear safety at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In an attempt to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russia caused an ecological catastrophe.

A significant aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian war has been the use of fakes and propaganda. For a long time, Russia and Ukraine were in the same ideological paradigm, created back in the days of the Russian Empire (the myth of the unified Slavic people). Russia has spent years systematically dehumanizing Ukrainians, using terms like “militants”³⁶, “Nazis”³⁷, continuing to demonstrate the limited legitimacy of Ukrainian authority by using the term “Kyiv regime.” At the same time, within Russia, there continues to exist a kind of “digital fortress,” which allows for a unified perception of the situation in the confrontation with Ukraine. Another significant aspect is the confidence of Russian officials that they are fighting in Ukraine against represent-tatives of the US and NATO³⁸.

After the large-scale invasion, Ukraine embarked on a course of monopolizing the information space by launching the telethon “Unified News.” Unfortunately, the state information machine failed to effectively counter the spread of anonymous Telegram channels in the domestic information field. However, Russia’s attempts to destabilize Ukrainian society through criticism of the state leadership did not have significant success. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s daily television addresses can be considered an effective means of communication, emphasizing the difference in his behavior from Vladimir Putin’s modus operandi. Zelensky’s video conferences with European parliaments and gatherings of Ukraine’s allies in various configurations have also been quite effective. However, the prolonged nature of the confrontation has led to inflation of Zelensky’s information influence, and he often makes mistakes in political positioning.

The war crimes of Russian occupiers have become one of the factors shaping the world’s perception of this confrontation. Geographic names like Bucha, Mariupol (the tragedy of the city on the coast of the Sea of Azov is immense), Izium have entered human history as examples of crimes against humanity. The name of the POW camp Olenivka in the Donetsk region, where over 50 Ukrainian defenders of “Azovstal” died as a result of an explosion in the summer of 2022, can also be mentioned³⁹. The nature and scale of the war crimes, based on the dehumanization of Ukrainians as part of Russia’s state policy, prompted the establishment of the International Group for Documenting Russian War Crimes in Ukraine, and preparations are underway for the establishment of an International Tribunal for their assessment⁴⁰.

The issuance by the International Criminal Court of an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin was a revolutionary step in its content⁴¹. Accusations of involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children are unique, and the fact of issuing a warrant significantly limits the geography of possible visits by the Russian president. Frankly speaking, the ICC decision is unique, as the warrant is issued for the arrest of the head of state with a nuclear arsenal, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This step demonstrates the systemic nature of the changes brought about in international relations by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Intensive dehumanization of the enemy and systematic use of fakes have become one of the features of Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. This com-ponent should receive an assessment from the world community as a component of aggression and an element of new political realities in the modern world.

During the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine became a candidate for EU membership⁴². Along with Moldova, in December 2023, two post-Soviet republics received invitations to negotiate membership, which promise to be lengthy. The interests of the EU coincided in time and space with the desire of Moldova and Ukraine to assert themselves as centers of influence in the modern world and their desire to complete European integration.

A troubling signal for Ukraine was the deterioration of relations with its Central European neighbors. If Viktor Orban did not conceal his own critical attitude towards Ukraine⁴³, then in Slovakia, the official position changed with the coming to power of Robert Fico⁴⁴. Another experienced politician, Donald Tusk, who headed the Polish government after the parliamentary elections, did not focus on improving relations with official Kyiv⁴⁵.

An important consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian war can be called the acceleration of the process of forming political nations in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Obviously, it is proceeding according to different scenarios but is significant in the continental context. Ending the Russian-Ukrainian war could accelerate it and contribute to the formation of an anti-imperial narrative.

Summarizing the initial impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on international relations, the following should be noted:

• It resulted from Russia’s aggressive plans, which were shattered by Ukraine’s resistance.

• The Russian-Ukrainian war became a litmus test for the effectiveness of in-ternational institutions.

• Russia commits a wide arsenal of war crimes and violations of international law.

• Even extensive sanctions against Russia have proven not very effective in reducing its aggression potential.

• The Kremlin seriously considers the internationalization of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

• Ukraine has retained its status as a full-fledged subject of international law.

• Internal transformations in Ukraine may become the main argument for increasing assistance to it.

• New regional alliances may become an alternative to NATO and EU enlargement.

• The world will remain turbulent even after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war.