dr. ing. Horaţiu MOGA
Abstract. The research aims to present a way of evaluating alternative futures in the foreign policy of a state. For the operationalization of the concept of future alternatives in foreign policy, operational code analysis and the poliheuristic paradigm of foreign policy will be used. This article evaluates the various variants of alternative futures with the help of the poliheuristic decision matrix concept and as variables that explain the switching between the various futures it uses the philosophical indicators and the instrumental indicators specific to the operational code analysis. The novelty of this article consists precisely in the explicit definition of rates and weights according to the philosophical and instrumental indicators of the operational code analysis. The applicability of the approach presented in this article is to a variety of fields such as international relations in general, geopolitics, security studies, political economy, public policies or the study of cyber warfare.
Keywords: poliheuristic alternative future approach in foreign policy; operational code analysis; poliheuristic rates, poliheuristic weights
INTRODUCTION
This research document aims to explain the alternative future of a foreign policy decision using the poliheuristic paradigm together with operational code analysis. The research aims to use dedicated foreign policy analysis tools to help evaluate possible alternative futures in disciplines such as: foreign policy analysis, international relations, security studies, geopolitics, etc. The prediction of the future is a matter very much discussed in the analysis of foreign policy, international relations, security studies, having a huge volume of accesses1 that provided various results. And in the field of poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy, various foreign policy results were predicted, being a field that gave us confidence regarding the theoretical approach of the field. The field was approached with various approaches, of which the most effective ones proved to be the approaches that, although they were explanatory, were oriented towards a qualitative discourse2. In this research, he focused on foreign policy research, appealing to the concepts of the poliheuristic paradigm of foreign policy, but operationalized through the indicators of operational code analysis. The research wants to deepen the foreign policy outcome through the prediction ability of the poliheuristic foreign policy paradigm and the ability of operational code analysis indicators to evaluate the post-event results in the foreign policy process. The paper begins with the definition of indications in the operational code analysis, continues with the description of the concepts from the poliheuristic paradigm of foreign policy and ends with the definition of alternative futures through a synthesis of the concepts from the two approaches. The present research links the concept of alternative futures to that of the variation of risk orientation, which evaluates the way in which the decision-making actor evaluates the various alternative futures and possible consequences of the foreign policy act. The concept of variation in risk orientation is linked to four other indicators that research the dynamics of foreign policy: the variation in the predictability of the political universe, the variation in control over historical development, the variation in the role of chance, respectively the variation in the importance of the moment of actions. Finally, the research provides a typology of poliheuristic rates that allows the researcher to evaluate alternative futures according to the type of risk proposed by the authors.
APPROACH
The research aims to define the main concepts used in the research. We will start by defining the operational code analysis indicators that will help us to opera-tionalize the poliheuristic concepts of foreign policy and then define the alternative futures that can shape the decision in foreign policy. The option to use operational code analysis indicators to operationalize is based on the great experience and explanatory ability that these operators have in foreign policy analysis3. That is why this experience is useful to quantify in the operationalization of the concepts of foreign policy dimension, foreign policy alternative, poliheuristic decision matrix and impli-cation of an alternative to dimension4. All these concepts are part of the field of foreign policy analysis that developed after 1970 in the United States as an alternative to the historical approach in the research of international relations5. Our research will first make an introduction to operational code analysis, then introduce the specific elements of the poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy and finally make the connection between the two approaches to define the concept of poliheuristic alternative future approach in foreign policy. Operational code analysis has a long tradition in the study of foreign policy6. The method has undergone several successive changes over time7 being characterized by two sets of beliefs that describe the belief system of an individual or state actor. The two sets of beliefs are: philosophical beliefs and instru-mental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs characterize the inputs that the actor receives from the environment in which he operates, and instrumental beliefs represent outputs that the actor gives to his environment. The actor’s beliefs according to the operational code analysis are the following8:
-
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS IN AN OPERATIONAL CODE
1.1. The Nature of the Political Universe (P-1): ‘What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?’. It has values like: High Friendly, Low Friendly, Mixed, Low Hostile, High Hostile.
1.2. Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values (P-2): ‘What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?’ It has values like: Optimism versus Pessimism.
1.3. Predictability of the Political Universe (P-3): ‘Is the political future pre-dictable? In what sense and to what extent?’. It has values like: Low to High.
1.4. Control Over Historical Development (P-4): ‘How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?’. It has values like: Low to High.
1.5. Role of Chance (P-5): ‘What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?’. It has values like: Low to High.
-
THE INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS IN AN OPERATIONAL CODE
2.1. Direction of Strategy (I-1): ‘What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?’. It has values like: Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual.
2.2. Intensity of Tactics (I-2): ‘How are the goals of action pursued most effec-tively?’
2.3. Risk Orientation (I-3): ‘How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?’. It has values like: Averse to Acceptant.
2.4. Importance of Timing of Actions (I-4): ‘What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?’. It has values like: Low Flexibility to High Flexibility.
2.5. Utility of Means (I-5): ‘What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?’. It has values like: Low to High.
Next, we will present the elements of the poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy. The poliheuristic approach is part of the schools of foreign policy analysis and has as its main characteristic the synthesis between the cognitive school and the ratio-nalist school of decision analysis9. The poliheuristic school is focused on decision analysis in two stages as follows10:
-
cognitively identifies the individual or collective actor and his management that implements the decision focused on “cognitive short-cuts heuristics” such as (Mintz, A., 2010): B01. “Focusing on short-term benefits rather than longer-term problems”; B02. “Preference over preference”; B03. “Locking on one alternative”; B04. “Wishful thinking”; B05. “Post-hoc rationalization”; B06. “Relying on the past”; B07. “Focusing on a narrow range of policy options rather than on a wide range of options”; B08. “Groupthink”; B09. “Overconfidence; over-estimating one’s capabilities and underestimating one’s capabilities”; B10. “Ignoring critical information; denial and avoidance”; B11. “Focusing on only part of the decision problem”; B12. “Turf battles leading to suboptimal decisions”; B13. “Lack of tracking and auditing of prior decisions and plans”; B14. “Poliheuristic bias”; B15. “Shooting from the hip”; B16. “Polythink”; B17. “Group polarization effect”. Also in this stage, the poliheuristic decision matrix focused on “cognitive short-cuts heuristics” B01-B17 is defined.
-
in the second stage of the poliheuristic analysis of the decision, the approach is a rational one, in which the ranking of the objectives and the alternatives of behaviors according to the gains and losses of the actor.
In the first stage, the cognitive one, the analysis tool is the poliheuristic decision matrix that defines the dimensions of an objective through which the state actor aims for a specific future. The dimensions of the objective in conjunction with the foreign policy alternatives help to define the alternative futures that the studied state actor can have in his vision. A useful tool in separating the importance of the dimensions of the objective with the help of the non-compensatory decision principle that establishes a hierarchy of the dimensions of foreign policy objectives11. In this stage of the study, we define the poliheuristic decision matrix with the help of the following elements: alternatives, dimensions, rates, weights and implications. Thus by decision matrix we define the study of the cognitive organization of information in the form of a table made up of lines that provide the dimensions of the objectives and columns that are the foreign policy alternatives. Each intersection between the lines and columns describe the consequences of the alternative futures of these alternatives for each goal dimension and are called implications.
Fig. 1
Source: constructed by author
The alternatives – are the variants of behavior that a state actor can consider in the foreign policy. Among the instrumental indicators, the most suitable for defining the alternatives is direction of strategy I-1, which can explain the focus of the alter-native on a certain dimension when considering the analysis of a future alternative. The alternatives can be defined as processes of transformation of the foreign policy behavior of a state that transits on the COPDAB scale12 for example from a variant of cooperation to one of conflict or vice versa, from conflict to conflict or from coope-ration for cooperation, escalation or de-escalation, etc. (see Fig. 1)
The dimensions – the purpose of a state actor consists of dimensions seen as independent from each other such as political, military, economic, civil society, the international system, with the mention that internal dimensions can strongly influence foreign policy behavior in the poliheuristic paradigm13.
Weights – can describe with numbers from 0 to 10 the hierarchical importance of the dimensions of the goal defined by the state actor in its foreign policy and thus can explain the orderly organization of these dimensions according to the non-compensatory principle14. As indicators of the system of beliefs that influence the hierarchical organization of the dimensions of the goal in foreign policy and of several alternative futures, we opt for the nature of the political universe P-1, which represents the input of the environment on the decision-making actor. This input can be high hostile, low hostile, mixed, low friendly or high friendly and determines the hiera-rchization of the security, military dimensions alternatively with the political, economic or social ones. In this case, the actor’s faith is strengthened by a second dimension of the actor’s faith prospects for realizing fundamental values P-2 (optimistic versus pessimistic), which determines the strengthening or erosion of faith in a given order of the dimensions with associated numerical values from 0 to 10.
Implication – is a description of the consequence that a certain alternative can have on a dimension and implicitly on an alternative future. In this research, the im-plications describe variants of escalation or de-escalation alternatives that can have variant impacts on the critical dimensions of the poliheuristic decision matrix (see Table 2).
Rates – define the score by which an analyst can evaluate an implication by values from -10 to +10. Rates that have negative values are considered non-critical and as a result are eliminated from the poliheuristic decision matrix. In this research, the evaluation of the rates will be done according to the variation from pre-event to post-event of the following indicators of the operational code analysis: predictability of the political universe ∆P-3, control over historical development ∆P-4, the role of chance ∆P-5, risk orientation ∆I-3 and importance of timing of actions ∆I-4. An event is described by a transition between two behaviors from the COPDAB INTERNATIONAL SCALE table (see Fig. 1) described by the direction of strategy indicator I-1 of a certain alternative. The ways to evaluate the variation of indicators ∆P-3, ∆P-4, ∆P-5, ∆I-3 and ∆I-4 that lead to consequences are calculated according to the relationships below15:
-
-
the variation of the predictability of the political universe ∆P-3 is 0 when its post-event value is Low and 1 when its post-event value is High. Expression (1) follows:
-
(1) |
-
-
the historical development control variation ∆P-4 is 0 when its post-event value is Low and 1 when its post-event value is High. Expression (2) follows:
-
(2) |
-
-
the chance role variance ∆P-5 is 0 when its post-event value is Low and 1 when its post-event value is High. Expression (3) follows:
-
(3) |
-
-
the risk orientation variation ∆I-3 is 0 when its post-event value is Aversion and 1 when its post-event value is Accept. Expression (4) follows:
-
(4) |
-
the variance of the moment importance of actions ∆I-4 is 0 when its post-event value is Low Flexibility and 1 when its post-event value is High Flexibility. Follow the expression (5):
(5) |
In the (Table 1) below created on the basis of all the binary possibilities of associations between the four independent variables the predictability of the political universe ∆P-3, the control over the historical development ∆P-4, the role of chance ∆P-5, and the importance of the calendar of actions ∆I-4 which determines the establishment for a given size of the decision options built by the dependent variable risk orientation ∆I-3.
Table 1. Risk type related by operational code analysis indicators
ΔI-3 |
ΔI-4 |
ΔP-3 |
ΔP-4 |
ΔP-5 |
Rate |
Risk Type |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
10 |
High Flex Risk Aversion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
||
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
||
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
||
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
Low Flex Risk Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
||
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
||
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
||
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
8 |
Risk Acceptance |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
|
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
|
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
|
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
|
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
|
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
|
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
Source: H. Moga, 2023
The decision rules that are part of the second step of the poliheuristic decision process are established according to the rates in (Table 1) which have values from 1 to 10. In (Table 1) we have defined three types of risk. High Flex Risk Aversion which is specific to rate 10 and a level of uncertainty of level one which can be described by continuous functions and the risk level allows decision delays in favor of its optimization16. Low Flex Risk Aversion which is specific to rate 9 and a second-level uncertainty level that can be described by discrete functions and the risk level allows discrete decision timings focused on alternative futures17. The rates from 1-8 are specific to Risk Acceptance and are specific to uncertainty level 3 or 418 and losses accepted in foreign policy19. In foresight research, it is considered that predicting is equivalent to researching the goal or goals of a certain actor and how he seeks to fulfill them20. That is why the reason to use the poliheuristic paradigm for foreign policy prediction is obvious. Thus, equating one alternative future of foreign policy with one field from the poliheuristic matrix is the next step.
Determining the decision rules represents the second stage of the evaluation of the foreign policy decision and based on the rates and weights entered in the poliheuristic decision matrix.
Table 2. Poliheuristic Decision Matrix
Escalade to |
Escalade to |
Escalade to |
Escalade to |
w |
|
Europa |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
Asia-Pacific |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
Africa |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
South America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
Final Choice |
32 |
24 |
12 |
3 |
Source: constructed by author
Thus, in (Table 2) we present, based on COPDAB actions, the probabilities of the Russian Federation in possible future strategic actions in four major geographical areas which are the dimensions of the decision matrix: Europe with a weight of 4 (most of the country’s material and human resources are present there), Asia-Pacific with a weight of 3 because the main strategic partners of the country are present there (the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Africa with a weight of 2 where the Russian Federation has various allies from the Soviet era and military and intelligence presence through the PMC Wagner group and the last area where it has certain allies from the Soviet era, but not an important military and intelligence presence, it has weight 1. For Europe, it is possible that the current tensions of the war in Ukraine escalate to a variant of open confrontation with the collective West through limited actions, it is also possible a conflict in the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Strait escalation COPDAB 14 (with assumed risk preparation for a prolonged conflict like in Ukraine (∆I-4 = 1) with possibility of good information collection (∆P-3 = 1), good projection of power (∆P-4 = 1) and knowledge of chances (∆P-5 = 1). In this case, according to (Table 2), the rate will be 8 and otherwise zero because we consider the rest of the information to be ignored by a prejudice of type B08. “Groupthink” made up of siloviki from the leadership of Russia. Similarly, if the objective is to trigger a crisis in the Asia-Pacific, the same system of beliefs works with a rate of 8 but a weight of 3. For the African dimension of the decision matrix present in PMC Wagner, but also the various resources from the Soviet period in several African states it provides the Russian Federation with a rate of 6 with assumed risk preparing for a prolonged proxy conflict like during the Cold War (∆I-4 = 1) with complicated possibility of information gathering due to the fiercest competition with great powers western competitors and BRICS allies (∆P-3 = 0), but a good projection of power (∆P-4 = 1) and knowledge of opportunities (∆P-5 = 1). Also for the last South American dimension, we assign a weight of 3 to the Russian Federation dictated by an assumed risk of preparing for a short-term and low-intensity conflict considering the sphere of Western influence of the USA (∆I-4 = 0) with the possibility with good information gathering due to a simpler area involving only the US as a competitor and China as an ally (∆P-3 = 1), a poor power projection due to the distance from Russian grants (∆P-4 = 0) and the knowledge of the chances due to the assets in the areas left over from the Cold War period (∆P-5 = 1)). The hierarchy of Russian go-vernment options and alternative futures is given by the product of the weight and the rate. So the first option is European with a choice factor of 8 x 4 = 32, the second choice option is Asia-Pacific with a choice factor of 8 x 3 = 24, the third choice option is the African one with a factor of choice 7 x 2 = 14 and the last one is the South American one with a choice factor 3 x 1 = 3. The rest of the alternative futures have a rate of 0 due to the prejudice B08. “Groupthink”.
CONCLUSION
In addition to other researches in poliheuristic analysis, this one more mea-ningfully integrates operational code analysis in its research structure. Our approach introduces a dynamic study of alternative futures by defining the indicators pre-dictability of the political universe ∆P-3, control over historical development ∆P-4, the role of chance ∆P-5, the importance of the calendar of actions ∆I-4 and risk orientation ∆I– 3 compared to the researches until now and their integration in the polieuristic decision matrix. The research started with the presentation of the elements of the operational code analysis and the elements of the poliheuristic paradigm and continued with the definition of these last elements according to the indicators of the operational code analysis. The consistency of our synthesis was exemplified by four possible alternative futures of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Our research is part of the research of security studies that the poliheuristic analysis of foreign policy promotes. The results of our research deepen the predictive ability of the poliheuristic paradigm by integrating operational code analysis indicators and allowing the evaluation of the rate and weights of the decision matrix. The use of four independent variables, the predictability of the political universe ∆P-3, control over historical development ∆P-4, the role of chance ∆P-5, the importance of the calendar of actions ∆I-4 gave us the opportunity to define a decimal scale of rates depending of conceptual risk defined by the dependent variable risk orientation ∆I-3. The novelty of this article consists precisely in the explicit definition of rates and weights according to the philosophical and instrumental indicators of the operational code analysis. The applicability of the approach presented in this article is to a variety of fields such as international relations in general, geopolitics, security studies, political economy, public policies or the study of cyber warfare. Current research is one that focuses on alternative futures, but in the future it is extensible in predictive or foresight studies focused on the scenario.
Expert Superior la Centrul Naţional de Informaţii Financiare Braşov, cadru didactic asociat la Universitatea Maritimă din Constanţa, dublu licenţiat în Electronică şi Ştiinţe Politice şi deţine un doctorat în Inginerie.
1 Mintz, A., Adamsky,D.D., (2019), How Do Leaders Make Decisions? Evidence from the East and West, Part A (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development), Emerald Publishing Limited.
2 Lockwood, J.S., (2013), The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP): A Method for Predictive Intelligence Analysis (Bloomsbury Intelligence Studies), Bloomsbury Academic.
3 Schafer, M., Walker, S., (2006), Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis (Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis), Palgrave Macmillan.
6 Schafer, M., Walker, S., (2006), Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis (Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis), Palgrave Macmillan.
8 Schafer, M., Walker, S., (2006), Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis (Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis), Palgrave Macmillan.
10 Idem.
11 Idem.
12 Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948-1978 (ICPSR 7767), [online] Available at: https:// www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/studies/7767> [Accessed 15 September 2023].
14 Idem.
15 Moga, H., (2023), Actions of Russian Federation on the EU and consequences of Russian belief system, GeoPolitica Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică şi GeoStrategie, XXI, No. 98, pp. 102-108.
16 Courtney, H., (2001), 20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World, Harvard Business Review Press.
17 Idem.
18 Idem.