Nicolae PARCEVSCHII^
Horaţiu-Nicolae GUŢĂ^

I. REFLECTIONS OF GINGHIS-HAN’S GEOPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND CURRENT RUSSIAN TELUROCRATIC IMPERIALISM

  Abstract. February 24, 2022 has completely changed the geopolitical and historical paradigm on a global level. On the geopolitical front alone, the invasion has put Russia back on the ‘chessboard’ of world geopolitics. Important political, diplomatic and military forces have been activated across the globe so that we can say that the phrase enemy image has been brought back into the political vocabulary of many world and regional leaders. But let us not forget that the phrase ‘enemy’ is not a consequence of the war itself, but merely the fruit of misguided political and diplomatic activity. Or diplomatic, political and military misperceptions arise when you don’t know the psycho-history of the person you declare ‘enemy’. It is well known that there is no such thing as an eternal enemy, just as there is no such thing as an eternal war. In military terms, the current phase is manifested in the definition of the concept of ‘doctrinal-strategic warfare’, which has emerged as a result of the deve-lopment of ‘hybrid warfare’. Finally, we can say that civilisation is tangentially crossing the Third World War, having its origins in the conflict of East-West civilisational doctrines, which began with conventional weapons, but which risks evolving towards nuclear weapons. In this article I will highlight aspects of Ginghis-Han’s geopolitics and how they influenced the psychohistory that predetermined the evolution of political life over 900 years in Russia.

Keywords: Ginghis-han, Russia, psychohistory, war, doctrine, strategy, conflict, 24 February 2022

THE PSYCHOHISTORY OF THE SUBJECT

We start our statement from the personalities of the Tsars Daniil Galitsky¹ and Alexander Nevsky, who ruled on the eve of the Mongol invasion of Slavic territories. As a result of an unequal alliance, both were finally conquered by the Mongols, Daniil Galitsky by “hard power” and Alexander Nevsky² by “soft power”. These two Russian kings rightly demonstrate that the invading Mongols already had a policy and even geo-politics well adjusted to the requirements of the time, geography and the supreme will of Ginghis-Han. Moreover, these kings and their territories simultaneously became vassals of the Mongols. Further, both the eastern and the western monarchs regained their independence also simultaneously.

But let’s look at the specifics of Mongol rule in these territories.

The perception of the Mongol Horde in the territories of the East Slavs was a special one. The Eastern Slavs integrated into the Mongol model of government and administration, even absorbing some aspects of the political genre. The Western Slavs, being vassals of the Mongols, remain, however, under the influence of the culture and religion of the Western countries. In this case we can speak of an existential dualism of the West and East Slavs, which in fact underlies the subsequent conflicts between Ukraine and Russia throughout history and up to the present. This dualism of per-ception would later be used by Reci-Pospolita in the integration of the West Slavs, then the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally by Gebels. But more importantly, the dualism of the Slavs during the Mongol invasion has direct reflections in what we call “the Russian invasion of 24 February 2022″.

Another moment of the Mongol invasion of the territories of the East Slavs is the transfer of the seat capital of the tsars from Vladimir to Moscow, by which the Mongols predetermined the consolidation of the Moscow tsarship, until the moment when the latter, with the direct help of the Mongols, began the oppression of the other Russian tsarships, initially under the vassalage of the Mongols, in later history vassal to the Moscow tsarship. Thus we see that the Mongols for 200 years did nothing but form a Slavic centre of central power in Moscow. That is, the dynastic right to rule was formed around the Muscovite kingship. During this time in the territories of the Western Slavs the dynastic initiative was taken by the Lithuanians, who in the future would form the Great Lithuanian Khanate (Reci-Pospolita) and who would fight wars with the Moscow Khanate throughout history (during the reign of John the Terrible³, Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov⁴, Peter I Romanov⁵).

Starting from the fact that on the territory of the Eastern Slavs there is only one ethnic group, that of the Slavs, in existential, cultural and even religious terms there is a differentiation of the Slavs into Eastern and Western Slavs. The East Slavs fell under the influence of the Great Lithuanian, Catholic and Protestant monasteries (which was the basis for the formation of the Roman Catholic confession in the western parts of Ukraine). Thus two Slavic ethnic entities emerge, both under Mongol vassalage, but with different mentalities, values, aspirations and political views. And here we come across the case when the Grand Kievan Knezate mentally splits into two knezates: the Grand Moscow Knezate and the Grand Lithuanian Knezate, which will become rivals for the possession of territories. The influence of the Horde on both kennates is similar, but the perception and tolerance of the Mongols is more pronounced in the Moscow kennate. In the territory of the Eastern Slavs we encounter an interference of the Mongol-Slav style of government and administration, the style of Gingis-Han and Andrei Bogolyubsky⁶. Subsequently this symbiosis of governing styles will underlie Russian monarchism and imperialism (until 2022).

During this time, feudal development continues in western Russia. In the Lithuanian Khanate the monarchical or absolutist style of government develops, which is more like a classical European kingdom (in its early stages) where the king as the central administrator represents himself and sees himself as the “first among aristocratic equals” with an important social influence (later on, the scholahta).

Sociologically we see a resonance between Lithuania, Galicia and Volani, the latter two already resonating with Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Poles. To this day, the epic of medieval knightly traditions has been preserved in western Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Eastern Russian monasteries, this epic is missing and the epic of the ‘Khan-king’, where everything begins and ends with the monarch, has taken root. The epic of the “knight” in the social-political construction brings a new perception of space in dependence on power and power in dependence on space.

In Western European countries, the classical structure of the city is the pyramid, in Russia it is the circle. In Western European countries, the classical city structure is the aristocratic fortress on the hill, with the houses of the plebs (people) at the foot. The entrance to the citadel is a narrow space where access to the aristocrat is limited in 3D space and where the aristocrat directs with his superior visual position the right and access to security of the plebs in case of attack. The verticality of European cities only means that the aristocracy inhabits a different floor not only of the social but also spatial hierarchy, educating a certain perception, awareness and action in its plebs (the absolute form represented by chastity in India).

Slav cities are represented by the circle in 2D space.

The kings (Tsar-Han) being situated in the centre (a single figure on the social chessboard), and the plebs on the periphery, which is structured around the centre. Thus we see that without both the periphery and the centre, the social circle cannot be built, where the monarchical tradition necessarily needs the plebs, and the plebs necessarily need the centre represented by the Khan. In the reference period, this takes place during the reign of the knight Alexander Nevsky (vassal of the Khan), similar to the Phanariot period in the history of the Moldovan-Vlavian kingships (interestingly, during the reign of John the Terrible, his pro-Turkish, pro-Turanian advisor Ivan Peresvetov proposes to the Tsar to take over the Turco-Fanariot model of government). The structure of the social hierarchy in the Mongols is similarly represented by the circle, in the centre of the circle in the Caravan-serai is the Khan, and the soldiers (the totally militarized people) on the periphery of the circle (later this model was tried to be taken over by A. Hitler through Ananerbe⁷ and other mystical theories).

This is how interference, tolerance and absolutist-monarchic tradition is formed through Russian-Mongolian symbiosis for 200 years.

The pyramid and the circle represent the mathematical expression of the hierarchy of social relations. Thus we can see that in Belarus and the Baltic States the pyramid-shaped social hierarchy structure has been preserved until now. At the psycho-historical level, certain ethno-psychological archetypes and differences in mentality and perception appear in the Slavs of Eastern and Western Russia in the Sinhizid period (this difference in mentality is also attested in the Moldovans on both sides of the Prut from 1812-2022).

But let’s return to the Mongolian subject and how it was governed during that period. If north of the 46th parallel of north latitude a Slavonic mentality prevailed even under Mongol vassalage, south of this parallel a free population, called proto-Czars, was formed, who had a fairly extensive area (up to present-day Bulgaria or the region of Dobrogea). It is important to mention that the proto-Cazaks (Orthodox Christians) did not enter into marriages with Slavic women, but preferred to have wives of Oriental-Muslim origin. This explains the phenomenon that a large part of the Zaporozhian and non-Catholic proto-Czars easily joined the Ottoman armies and fought against Russia, and even had the crescent insignia on their battle flags.

But a key moment in the Mongol period is that Lithuania was preparing to welcome Catholicism after a long historical period of paganism led by the Iagelon and Iagailo (later Polish-Lithuanian Unia) knezis. This is when the spiritual-religious crisis in this Union came into play: the dominant religion in Poland was Catholicism, which, being very aggressive in its crusades, perceived Orthodox Christians as internal enemies of the faith. But let’s draw a parallel between the spiritual-Catholic domination in the Great Lithuanian Khanate, which is just beginning to break away from the Sinhizids, and the religious tolerance of Sinhizid Shiite Muslims. This is where the greatest dilemma of perception and coexistence between Orthodox Christians, Catholics and the Shia of the Sinhizid rite arises. The Moscow Khanate is totally subservient to the Han and the overlord of the Mongol power. The Grand Duke of Moscow and Patriarch of Moscow is approved by the Mongol Khan through the so-called “paiţza”, a metal plate that they had to wear permanently on their chests as a sign of respect, submission and suzerainty. Moreover, this “paiţza” ensured not only their right to rule, but also their right to inheritance. Russia at that time paid the Golden Gate both economic and technological tribute through craftsmen and military tribute through soldiers. The holy Tsar Alexander Nevsky personally carried this tribute to the Golden Gate, which periodically reconfirmed the right to the Moscow kingship with the sign called “the peyazza”. Alexander Nevsky, on one of his expe-ditions to the Golden Gate, fell ill and died at the very site of the Caravan-serai, a fact recorded in old Russian chronicles. This did not prevent Alexander Nevsky from being canonised as a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church.

But it’s time to address the geopolitical mindset and religious tolerance within the multinational Mongol Empire.

What did the Mongolian Inn represent in spiritual terms?

First of all, the Khan was an explicit promoter of telurocracy, i.e. land power, through the absolutism of the power of all life and death in the empire (similarly, in Russia 2022 any manifestation of free thought is persecuted, V. Putin becomes an absolute monarch over everything in the country). Ginghis-Han and V. Putin can be nominated as classic representatives of Turan⁸.

If we refer to the Mongol army throughout the history of the Horde, the Mongols as an ethnic group constituted and represented the minority, the majority or core of the Mongol army being composed of the conquered peoples (Cutrigs, Utigurs, Barils, Savirs, Azeris, Pechenegs, Avars, Bolgars, Huns, Shkirs, etc.), but who accepted the laws⁹ of Ginghis-Han. Thus, the Turkic peoples are not only conquered, but also harmoniously integrated by the laws of the Great Han and, moreover, these peoples accept this domination as natural. All these ethnicities were Turanian by way of life and Ginghis-Han only copied the Turanian state forms, which had existed before him, he only brought this “edition” of Turanian, telucratio or “land power” to its final logic, well determined and subject to explicit state management by absolute power. Ginghis-Han’s empire represented the apex of telucracy, before him and not after him, no one did this, only the Russian emperors made a geographical retrospection after John the Terrible in the footsteps of Ginghis-Han to restore Turan and telucracy as a geopolitical context. Thus, we come up against the psycho-historical paradox, when Slavic peoples dominated by the Mongols for 200 years, direct their expansion to the east and the former lands of the Mongol empire.

In other words, Ginghis-Han not only contributed to the centralization and formation of the Muscovite tsarate (USSR, present-day Russia), but ensured the continuity of its existential principles for more than 1,000 years before that. Peter the Great later turned his expansions to Europe and the Black Sea basin, and V. Putin is merely attempting to re-enact what his predecessors did. Or what we are facing after 24 February 2022 is nothing more than a re-edition of the principles of Ginghis-Han implanted psycho-historically in the anthropolgical archetype over a huge territory from Korea to the borders of Europe and Middle Asia. Another important archi moment is that Ginghis-Han tried to become aware of and reflect upon his creaturehood in the form of an empire through the so-called Great Yasa (laws). Yes, Ginghis-Han, did not graduate from universities, did not have PhDs behind him. All this was replaced by the steppe academy and all the knowledge of the world assimilated from his predecessors. Obviously he possessed exceptional intellectual capacities if he could in explicit form reflect on the principles of “land empire”, or in contemporary transcription “land power” and telurocracy.

  These principles were as universal as the sky above the head of every earthly creature. The Father is Heaven, and the Mother is Earth. Heaven has no boundaries, heaven extends over land, and in this Ginghis-Han saw his existential purpose and aim, that is, the cohesion of all that exists on Earth under the integral Heaven of his faith and laws. The integral Heaven must extend above an integral Earth with one Han. The Ginghizid Empire in his vision must have a single ruler, just as the sun is the only one in the sky (i.e. here we also run into germinal globalism). Thus the idea of a global and universal emperor emerges. As the sun rules in the heavens, so the emperor must be one and rule on earth.

Ginghis-Han does not stop here, he also forms the intellectual concept of his empire, i.e. the empire must be sacral (contemporary of the second Constantinopol in Moscow) and to achieve this goal it must be accepted and admitted that millions of people can be exterminated if anyone opposes this sacral and absolutist-monarchical principle. Yes, Ginghis-Han categorically forbids reprisals against the clergy, regardless of religion. In his view the clergy are the people of heaven, who pray to heaven, turn their eyes to heaven as an integral element of his existential concept, i.e. ultimately pray for HIM as the representative of heaven on earth. That is to say, all who do not think and direct their gaze to heaven represent nothing to the Earth, where he is the only Han. The universal ginghizid principle places a single Heaven above a single empire (i.e. the concept of contemporary universal globalist religion emerges). This is where we find the Ginghizid tolerance of all religious denominations (a tolerance that is not found in any particular religious denomination). In other words, Ginghis-Han apriori does not admit inter-confessional religious conflicts, even after the Shiite Islamization of the Golden Horde.

Another basic principle of his laws is the Gingizid Ethic, which imposes a certain behaviour on his vassals by faith and total subordination to his superiors. This principle underlies the principles of contemporary state management.

According to Ginghis-Han, only leaders with a “long will”, i.e. strong (in con-temporary transcription I. Stalin, R. Erdoğan. V. Putin, Xi Jinping etc). People of “long will,” are totally faithful, absolutely subordinate and who do not betray the Inn (which occurs in contemporary Russia where V. Putin is reforming society under this principle). Cowards and traitors in his view must be exterminated on the spot, moreover, along with their wives, children and the whole clan that is guilty of raising a coward and traitor (if a woman marries a coward, she will give birth to cowards). This shows that Ginghis-Han, in the Mongolian ethical code, introduces the principle of the sunbeam, which spreads linearly and directly from itself to all earthlings representing the thought and will of the Han which reaches the vassals directly and linearly “said-done”, (the actual subordination in state management of V. Putin where all opposition is persecuted, and those who waver are dismissed from the services and thrown into the streets). In his vision the whole society is his army – all men are soldiers and wives and women take care of soldiers, and little boys are apriori born soldiers, i.e. society is an army (militarized societies during A. Hitler, I. Stalin, S. Hussein etc).

CONCLUSIONS

The little information, which has been exposed in this article shows how the Telucratic-Turanian and Eurasian concept has its roots in the time of the Golden Horde’s rule in Russia.

Russia as a state emerges, immediately after the collapse of the Horde, too many principles of governance from Ginghis-Han that have been preserved to the present day. Today civilization is going through the doctrinal-strategic war between thalasso–cracy “sea power” and telurocracy “land power”, of Ginghis-Han origin. This doctrinal conflict is not only theoretical but also existential, with a tendency to become global.

The rhetorical question arises: When will V. Putin’s political game ends?

The question is as broad and complicated as it is simple at first glance.

The conflict will end only when the thalassocrats start studying the origins of Russian geopolitics, otherwise the doctrinal-strategic World War III will move into its final phase with sophisticated weaponry.

II. REFLECTIONS OF PETER I’S GEOPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA AND CURRENT RUSSIAN TELUROCRATIC IMPERIALISM

  Abstract. The geopolitics and reforms of Peter I¹ are the result of trends that manifested themselves during the Shism after Boris Godunov², the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov³ and Tsarina Sofia⁴ when after the Great Moscow Sobor⁵ 1666-1667 the tendency to move away from the Byzantine sacred mission of Russia is attested, Turanianism and the “symphony of powers”⁶, as the essence of the Moscow period, towards absolutism and westernization in the time of Peter I with new political and geopolitical content. The culmination of these reforms is the reign of Peter I, who put an end to the domination of the Moscow doctrine of government and the transition to the Baltic doctrine with the new capital at St. Petersburg.

Since we are talking about the same country, the same people, the same geographical space, many psycho-historical aspects recur consecutively from the previous dynamics and dialectics. The dualism of the Peter I era (1682-1917), in addi–tion to the revolutionary reforms, in some respects represents a continuity of the Moscow era. It is this existential dualism of the Russian mentality that will bring Russia in front of the Revolution of October 1917, the struggle between Russian Westernists and Russian Eurasians will create a dramatic situation in Russian psychohistory in the period 1917-2022, the climax of which was manifested on 24 February 2022.

Keywords: Peter I, Russia, psychohistory, war, doctrine, strategy, conflict, 24 February 2022

THE PSYCHOHISTORY OF THE SUBJECT

The fundamental changes of the Peter I era are manifested in the following:

• refusal of Byzantium and Turanism (a concept regenerated by V. Putin, where we see a special relationship with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Both are proponents of Turanism in their own newsrooms);

• rejection of the concept that Russia has a universal eschatological mission⁷ (a concept revived by V. Putin);

• omitting the concept of the Second Constantinople, the Third Rome and the New Jerusalem of the Russian Rite (or Russian Zionism);

• omitting the mystical concept that the Russian people are God-bearers in the New Testament and Modern era⁸ (a concept revived by V. Putin);

• the emergence of the concept that Russia is a great European power, in the process of becoming and modernising along European models;

• the transfer of the capital to St. Petersburg and the transformation of the new capital into a separate anchorage, surrounded by the Byzantine-Turanian space and mentality of the periphery;

• the transition from the sacred function of the Tsar (symphony of powers) to secularism and absolutism;

• Old Rite Orthodox Christians are subject to drastic economic repression, in addition to religious and administrative repression, these issues are legally reinforced and Old Rite Christians become a subject of Russian religious apartheid (in modern transcription those who do not support V. Putin are second-class people and largely refer to the contemporary Russian intelligentsia, who emigrate and are subject to administrative and even criminal persecution);

• revision of Christian biblical canons and copyright of Polish Catholic biblical canons by Dmitry Lobanov-Rostovsky⁹ (later canonized), the placement of pro-Catholics and pro-Protestants in higher positions in the Russian Church (Stefan Iavorskii, a great clerical dignitary of the Russian Church of Jesuit origin). Rationalisation and pragmatisation of Byzantine Orthodox theological discourse and faith. At the same time, the Russian clergy were replaced by clergymen from the Galician Canons, who were already familiar with Catholicism and Protestantism. In other words, the contemporary Russian Church in the time of Peter I as a religious doctrine differs greatly from the canonical and apostolic Byzantine doctrines;

• the Patriarchal Institute is abolished and the supreme leadership of the Church is transferred to the Synod headed by the chief procurator of the Synod, a lay person (Moscow Russia was governed by the principle of “symphony of powers”, and during the time of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill, the Russian Church was worshipped by the absolutist interests of V. Putin, i.e. a new phenomenon – a return to Turanism and Byzantium without the “symphony of powers” on the one hand, and the preservation of lay power over the clergy on the other);

• the abolition and dissolution of the monastic institute takes place;

• a strong blow is dealt to the everyday and traditional way of life of the Russians, the prohibition of wearing beards, the obligation to drink tea and coffee, the aristocracy’s shift to western dress, the obligation to learn foreign languages – Dutch, German, French (thus at a certain point the Byzantine religious mentality disappears and the division of the Russian ethnic group into two separate sub-ethnicities – the aristocrats – the Alolingvi and the Rusolingvi people, who did not perceive and understand each other at the level of communication, this fact formed the premises of the Revolution of 1917. In modern transcription those who do not think in the language of V. Putin. The disappearance of the spiritual link between intellectuals and the absolute power of V. Putin. Social¹⁰ anomie appears. The social situation in Russia forms the prerequisites for a social revolution in the future, but it is premature to interpret such a situation as real at the present stage);

• the transformation of the traditionally conservative Russian aristocracy into a Europeanised one takes place, the rotation of the aristocracy in the act of government is introduced. Aristocrats are imported from abroad, in the army, medicine, science and administration. Physical substitution of the aristocratic elite and the archaic Russian clergy (as traditional bearers of the Byzantine-Turanian mentality) takes place;

• the penetration of Masonic lodges into the Russian social space takes place;

• the most important reform of Peter I is the military one, directly linked to the new geopolitical trends, the rejection of the Turanian Byzantium brings new paradigms, which were not specific to the predecessor countries, namely to fight wars with Turkey. For Peter I focuses on the northern geopolitical vector and the war with Sweden and King Charles XII. In other words Peter I enters Europe by force of arms according to the European principle “if you fight among yourselves, why shouldn’t Russia as a European state do the same”. Byzantine-Turanian Russia did not present a danger to Europe, Russia positioned on the path of European modernization will become a strategic adversary of Europe until today. We come back to the Russo-Swedish wars that ended with the absolute victory of the Russian army at Poltava (8 July 1709). Sweden was removed from the format of a European superpower of the time (which promoted the Swedish-Teutonic-Polish-Lithuanian union and thus Peter I imposed his will and geopolitical imprint on the Baltic countries with repercussions in the geopolitics of V. Putin, who promotes Russia’s historical right to these territories. And the geopolitical frustration of the Baltic countries is not without reason at this stage). After this defeat Sweden becomes a province of Europe, now with an advanced standard of living. We can say that Peter I reformed the thinking of the Swedes, who focus in the historical dynamics on their own existential paradigm, without military and geographical ambitions (like the Japanese after World War II).

In the next period of his reign Peter I turned his sights to the south and the Black Sea basin with the intention of reaching the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (i.e. a geopolitical trend that has nothing in common with genuine Byzantium and Turanianism).

In 1711 the battle of Stănileşti¹¹ took place, where the allied Moldovan-Russian armies were defeated and then the Prut Peace Agreement¹² was signed.

According to some stipulations of Russian military historians (of high military rank) this agreement has two parts, the first (secret, similar to Molotov-Ribbentrop) is signed by Peter I and Catherine I with the obligation of “eternal peace” between Russia and Turkey, and the second part officially stated, signed by Dukes P. Shafirov and M. Sheremetev and the representative of Turkey – Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha.

An important moment of this peace agreement is that Charles XII insisted on influencing the signing of this peace agreement, but failed (the discovery of Charles XII in Bender 1709-1711¹³). It is certain that after Stănileşti neither Peter I nor Catherine I fought wars with Turkey, the Russian tsar’s attention being turned to the northern geopolitical vector.

In 1718 Charles XII dies (assassination) as a result of a Masonic conspiracy inspired by Great Britain and Sweden withdraws from the Baltic and European geo-political theatre. (The Battle of Stănileşti produces reflections in our days through the special relations between V. Putin and R. Erdoğan, not only through the doctrine of archaic Turanism, specific to both countries, but also through the Prut Peace Agreement, through secularist diplomatic obligations).

Later Peter I’s successors actively participated in European geopolitics, including through the power of arms, and at a certain historical period Russia became a feared military power, which would provoke Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia to start the Crimean War (1853-1856).

Undoubtedly, the voluntarist policy of S. Khrushchev, the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, as well as the memory of the historical right concerning this peninsula have provoked the argument for its annexation in 2014. (Tmutarakan is a Russian kingship that existed in the 10th-11th centuries, with its center in the city of Tmutarakan (Taman). Mentioned in Russian chronicles and “The Story of Igor’s Regiment¹⁴“. In 1792, the Tmutarakan stone was discovered by archaeologists, and around it the ruins of the Tmutarakan settlement. Traditionally it is believed that the citadel encompassed the territory from Eastern Crimea to the foothills of the Caucasus and was an important political centre in the region.

Tsar of Tmutaracan Mstislav Vladimirovich, son of Vladimir – I from the Princess of Polotsk- Rogneda. Many historians believe that he was born in 983 and was the third son of Rogneda. His older brothers were Iziaslav, later a knight of Polotsk, and Yaroslav. In 1023, Mstislav started a war with the kingship of Kiev, his brother Yaroslav. Near the town of Listveni a battle took place between Mstislav and Yaroslav’s troops. Yaroslav was defeated and fled to Novgorod. However, Mstislav did not capture Kiev and as a result the brothers made peace at Gorodets. Following negotiations, Mstislav left the left side of the Dnieper retreating to Cernigov and Pereiaslavl. Undaunted by the fact that Mstislav became the Cernigov’s kingship, he regularly returned to Tmutarakan).

Respective V. Putin finds historical excuses and reasoning for annexing Crimea in 2014.

 The Tmutaracan stone with the inscription “In the summer of 6576, the captain Gleb measured the sea on ice from Tmutorokan to Korchevo (Kerci) at 14,000 fathoms”

CONCLUSIONS

The only countries with an academic discipline of “psychohistory” are the USA and Russia.

Moreover, NATO and CIA analysts use psychohistory in their strategic analysis to win the geopolitical rivalry with Russia. The fact that such analysis has not been carried out causes the geopolitical message against Putinist Russia to fail.

The universal law of psychohistory is rendered through the concept of psycho–historical cycles and the “golden section”, applied to historical and geopolitical events.

The consolidated opinion of European EU and NATO countries often does not take into consideration that V. Putin has a gingerly “said-done”, or “solar ray”, com-munication style.

On the other hand, he is a great connoisseur of Russian archives and history, of pages hidden from the eyes of the people. In terms of domestic policy, Putin is continuing Peter I’s strategy of modernising Russia, whether through militarisation, expansion and aggression in geographical areas under international law.

It is imposing on Europe the Eurasian doctrine, which has classic adherents and authors in Europe, and its aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine bears a pro-nounced pragmatic character, of telurocratic origin, embalmed with Turanianism and Byzantium. It is totally motivated and argued by its doctrines, and this motivation extends not only to the minds of the Russian people, but also to the minds of neighbouring peoples. Or the collective mind of Europe must realize that to speak with V. Putin from the position of the doctrine of “offensive Atlanticism” is ineffective and not very productive.

However, we note that in Ukraine and Russia the ethnic, psycho-historical and geopolitical mentality differs.

We must recognize that the fate of Ukraine is dramatically and tragically pre-determined by the misunderstanding of V. Zelensky’s misunderstanding of Ukrainian psychohistory, while V. Putin knows these issues very well and cleverly manipulates them regionally and geopolitically.

After October 7, 2022, a new paradigm in global geopolitics is emerging, linked to V. Zelensky’s statement about a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Russia. V. Zelensky falls prey to the psycho-historical reflections of V. Putin.

Russia at present remains free to choose its methods and means of action in European and global geopolitics.

III. THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICS OF V. PUTIN

Abstract. The subject of current Russian geopolitics is an enigma and a taboo for the average reader.

Enigma when we refer to the geopolitical agram-matism of the simple masses of readers, taboo when we refer to the solidary opinion of those who shape current geopolitics.

The trilogy of articles on Russian geopolitics is not only intended to dissolve this enigma and taboo, but also to provide a psychohistorical view of the events that preceded 24 February 2002 and which are rooted in the psychohistory of medieval Europe.

If we talk about V. Putin, V. Zelenski and A. Hitler, we find similarities not so much on a personal and psychological level as in what is the British thalassocratic geopolitics of the early 20th century logically expressed in World War I and World War II.

The current geopolitics of V. Putin draws not only from the geopolitics of Ginghis-Han or Peter I, but also from British geopolitics during Queen Victoria I (1819 – 22 January)¹⁵.

If we refer to similarities, then we will mention David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister (1863- 1945) who basically “created” A. Hitler¹⁶ and today the same subtle British geopolitics created V. Zelenski in conjunction with American geopolitics. And what we call the current geopolitics of V. Putin is a consequence of the psycho-history of British geopolitics, which is finalized at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, after which V. Putin conceives and decides the annexation of Crimea¹⁷ in 2014 and the territories of eastern Ukraine in 2022.

Keywords: V. Putin, Victoria I, David Lloyd George, A. Hitler, Russia, psychohistory, war, doctrine, strategy, conflict, February 24, 2022, psychohistorical victimology

 THE PSYCHOHISTORY OF THE SUBJECT

Since the end of the 80s of the last century, a degradation of the Russian geopolitical system has been observed.

This is not a new phenomenon in Russian history, such periods occurred during the “troubled times” (1598-1613) when the Poles established themselves on the throne of the Kremlin and especially the Revolution of February 1917¹⁸. All these periods are characterised by the shrinking territory of the Russian Empire (USSR). From a geopolitical point of view this represents a failure and a defeat of the existing state system, which ensured the integrity of the state (similar to the emergence of autonomous anchorages on the territory of Moldova¹⁹). The borders and surface area of states are an important geopolitical indicator of the expression of state power and sovereignty. According to Ginghis Han the surface of Russia was constantly increasing²⁰. After John III²¹, each Russian emperor expanded the area of the Tsar and the Russian Empire. As we can see the expansion of territory represents a secularist tradition of Russian rulers, but it is also deeply rooted in the mind of the broad masses and the genetic memory of Russians. The government of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin repre-sents a reversal of this Russian secularist geopolitical trend, by segmenting the territory of the USSR. In Russian psychohistory and geopolitics, the government of these two figures represents a colossal failure of Russian existentialism (in Moldova the government of M. Snegur²² and Maia Sandu²³). These events take place in the bipolar world when the conflict between thalassocracy and the current Russian anthropological and victimological²⁴ telurocracy becomes a subject of global geopolitics. And on the eve of 24 February 2022 (after the 2008 Bucharest summit) in the conditions when V. Putin decides to re-establish not only the bipolar doctrine, but especially the multipolar one. In V. Putin’s vision is that the territories separated from the Soviet empire and the Warsaw Treaty have begun to be seized by NATO and the EU (a fact that has not been heard, perceived and understood by the Atlanticists). Obviously this lack of perception predetermined the further actions of V. Putin in the context of Russia’s emergence from geopolitical frustration. In this context, we should mention the Galician phenomenon – Ukrainian-Veltic nationalism which is fuelled by neo-fascist elements (against the background of the revival of neo-Nazi culture throughout Europe). This is an important element of the legend of the 24 February 2022 military operation, with Ukrainian neo-Nazism at its core. Here we should mention that V. Zelinsky, being a supporter of thalassocratic Atlanticism, is starting the militarization and rearmament of the army and society under the banner of Ukrainian nationalist nationalism with a hint of local ethnic fascism. The Ukrainian president does not realise that he is in conflict not only with V. Putin or with the Russians as a polyethnic state, but with the archaic Turanian telurocracy of the Ginghis Han period and the geopolitics of Peter I. This makes V. Zelensky’s government particularly dramatic in its direct repercussions on the territorial integrity and tragedy of the people.

After bipolar dualism tends to recover on a planetary level, i.e. with the disap-pearance of the Warsaw Treaty, NATO continues its expansion eastwards, which does not satisfy V. Putin’s satisfaction, but the regional-political rivalry continues (although the ideological element is missing) between the two liberal-democratic systems, the western and the eastern. Here a new element of geopolitical rivalry appears – the accession of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to NATO (which in psycho-historical terms are perceived by V. Putin as constituent elements of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy, which has been separated from the archaic Kiev Duchy).

Advocates of the concept of the “unipolar moment“, led by US President George Walker Bush Jr. see the geopolitical situation in the 21st century under a single global power, the US, which will turn into the “era of unipolarity”.

During B. Yeltsin’s rule in Russia a de facto unique situation in history and geopolitics is formed – Russia falls under the rule of pro-Atlanticist agents of influence, thalassocratic ideological occupation and foreign rule (the last specific for Moldova and Romania on 24 February 2022).

The Russian telurocratic system in psycho-historical terms was linked to two factors – authoritarianism and absolutism of monarchical power on the one hand, and conservative traditionalism of the lower social strata on the other. Both represented a Byzantine model based on the central power vector even during the USSR, which was also transposed to the Warsaw Treaty states (even to Romania, which was not part of the Treaty). This is the basis for Russian geopolitical expansion in V. Putin‘s vision.

These moments were not perceived at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit, they were not perceived by President V. Zelensky, they are not perceived and understood by the current EU and NATO leadership.

After 1995 in Russia (and Moldova²⁵) a new phenomenon appears, that of oligarchism (financial aristocracy) which tends to place itself in the middle of the social ladder, between absolutism and the masses of the plebs, in order to liberalize and share power with the V. Putin (which led to their immediate persecution)²⁶. Vladimir Putin only tolerates the presence of oligarchs vassal to his absolute power. The rebels are expelled from the country and then included through liberal ideology in the anti-Putin geopolitical game by British thalassocrats (Boris Berezovskii, Vladimir Gusinskii, Mikhail Hodorkovschii). Oligarchy is the antithesis of monarchy and absolutism and in V. Putin’s view is that it must be kept under tight control. After 24 February 2022, the thalassocratic strategy imposes sanctions, blocking foreign accounts and assets of oligarchs vassal to V. Putin’s absolute regime in the hope of an oligarchic anti-Putinist revolution organized by the oligarchs. This is an absolutely erroneous perception, because by 2022 V. Putin is finalizing the vertical construction of his absolute power (under the conditions of a democracy vassal to the central power or mimicked democracy).

The first geopolitical foray of thalassocracy took place in Yugoslavia²⁷ (Yugoslavia was a small-scale model of Russia – USSR) where the technology of breaking up Russia was experimented.

Under the conditions of fierce oligarchism during B. Yeltsin (under oligarchic forced abdication), the latter takes an unexpected step, he refuses to recognize Chechnya as an independent state and starts the first Chechen war and stops Russia’s self-destruction. After Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkir, Ingushetia and post-Ural Russia, etc., were to break away from the central power of the Kremlin. Yeltsin’s appointment of V. Putin (much to the chagrin of the pro-Atlantic oligarchs). In 1999 Russia was on the brink of collapse.

The Second Chechen War (1999 to victorious end) stops the break-up of Russia to the displeasure of Russian thalassocratic oligarchism and Atlanticist external pressures. Repressions against local oligarchs begin in the wake of the Second Chechen War.

No one perceived this war as having a successful ending that would change the political and geopolitical paradigm not only of Russia, but also of the European continent. And here we return to the archaic Russian mentality, genetic memory, authoritarianism and absolutism of monarchical power on the one hand, and the conservative traditionalism of the lower social strata on the other.

The contemporary Russian people, at one time, perceive V. Putin as a saviour of Russia. From that moment on V. Putin assumes a geopolitical and psycho-historical legitimacy through the so-called “geopolitics of the V. Putin era”. Putin, in contrast to M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin.

First of all, he consolidates the vertical of power, he becomes an authoritarian in the Russian psycho-historical tradition and joins the gallery of the Tsars of Vladimir, in particular A. Nevskii, I. Terrible, Peter I, I. Stalin whose geopolitics consisted in the territorial expansion of Russia.

An important element of the Russian telurocratic doctrine in psycho-historical terms is the concept of the monarch’s struggle with the aristocracy (oligarchism) through the social pact with the Russian conservative plebs. V. Putin marginalizes the vassal oligarchs in the Union of Industrialists, where they are limited by political power (after the 2020 presidential election I. Dodon represents the Union of Russian Industrialists in Moldova, thus entering into the conflict of Russian telurocratic capitals with the capitals of the neo-oligarchs of the thalassocrats in the ruling party PAS. Thus we can say that the criminal cases brought against I. Dodon cannot be called political, but represent a struggle of capitals for the financial market in Moldova).

However, oligarchism (the financial aristocracy) holds a dualistic position of conflict with both the masses of the plebs and the absolute power of the monarch.

In psychohistory there are cases where the aristocracy has changed the historical paradigm in some countries (France, Great Britain, etc. countries) transforming absolute monarchical power into constitutional monarchical power (contemporary European kingdoms), including Great Britain (Atlanticist and telosucratic power in leading geopolitical positions).

In Russian psychohistory secularist geopolitics is formed by the Turanian telucratic symbiosis and the conception of the absolute geographical space of the land as a kind of archaic “land Power” of Ginghis Han.

CONCLUSIONS

Geopolitics of V. Putin at the present stage is characterized by the revanchism of the Eurasian doctrine, the carrier of the restorationist with the notions of “Russian sphere of influence” and “Russian world” as constituent elements of the concept. Opposing the attempts of Atlanticist penetration in the act of governing Russia, i.e. of external governance.

V. Putin after 1999 perceived Russia’s state of nominal sovereignty (specific to Moldova and present-day Romania) by moving to the state of real sovereignty and openly fighting with offensive Atlanticism. Forming coalitions with India and China (G2 or G3) with elements of “land power” and “sea power”.

Geopolitics of V. Putin’s geopolitics at the present stage foresees the formation of a multipolar world with these countries, through bilateral treaties or blocs, the accu–mulation of critical demographic, economic, financial, technological and military mass.

In other words V. Putin in the year 2022 becomes an active player on Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński’s “great chessboard” and comes into direct conflict with his doctrine, imposing a new doctrine of his own which can be called the “Putin doctrine“.

In the sociology of war and geopolitics there are two basic principles: lose a battle or lose a war. Russia lost battles in the Cold War, lost battles in the war with Napoleon and A. Hitler, was under Tatar-Mongol domination²⁸ for 200 years, but the wars overall it won.

Not to understand this psycho-historical and geopolitical reality is to understand nothing.

And finally, we must realise that Russia has its own development strategy 2026-2050.

There is no doubt that in this historical time segment we will encounter geopolitical news from Russia.

This article concludes the trilogy dedicated to the geopolitics of Russia and V. Putin, seen from a psychohistorical point of view.

Articles on psychohistory will follow.

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