Maritime Security Forum

The Romanian Armed Forces Acquisition Plan for the period 2027–2036 should be viewed not merely as a list of military acquisitions, but as an instrument for the Romanian state’s strategic adaptation to a structural shift in the European security environment. The document’s approval by the Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT) comes at a time when Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has confirmed the return of high-intensity conventional conflict to Europe, as well as the acceleration of forms of warfare based on drones, precision strikes, electronic warfare, layered air defence and logistical resilience.

From this perspective, the PIAR can no longer be treated as an internal technical document of the Ministry of National Defence. It has become an expression of how Romania defines its role on NATO’s eastern flank, its capacity to contribute to allied deterrence in the Black Sea region, and its ambition to translate defence expenditure into domestic economic and industrial benefits. Other relevant strategic documents, such as the Strategic Defence Review and the National Defence Industry Strategy 2024–2030, point in the same direction: modernisation cannot be reduced to the import of military equipment, but must include production capabilities, maintenance, innovation, software integration and industrial cooperation.

From procurement to capabilities architecture

The true value of PIAR lies in its ability to link procurement programmes into a coherent capabilities architecture. A modern armed forces is not merely the sum of the platforms purchased, but the result of the integration of sensors, command and control, munitions, logistics, maintenance, trained personnel and infrastructure. For this reason, the NATO categories used in planning – Engage, Protect, C3, Inform, Project and Sustain – are important: they compel planners to assess the role of each system within a complete operational chain, rather than in isolation.

The implications are significant. If Romania purchases tanks, howitzers, F-35 aircraft, Patriot systems, drones, radars or ships without simultaneously securing ammunition, spare parts, the communications network, training and cyber protection, the result will be a fragmented modernisation. If, however, these programmes are synchronised, PIAR can bring about a genuine transformation of combat capability, in which each investment amplifies the effect of the others.

Lessons from Ukraine: volume, adaptability and resilience

The war in Ukraine has changed the criteria by which procurement programmes are assessed. It is no longer enough for a system to be high-performing in its own right; it must be capable of being produced, repaired, supplied with ammunition and rapidly adapted during a protracted conflict. The Ukrainian experience shows that stocks are depleted rapidly, cheap drones can have a disproportionate impact, and air defence must operate in layers, ranging from long-range systems to VSHORAD and C-UAS capabilities.

For Romania, this lesson has two implications. The first is the need for volume: ammunition, spare parts, drones, sensors and close-in defence systems must be procured in sufficient quantities, not merely as a token gesture. The second is the need for industrial resilience: the domestic industry must be able to ramp up production in times of crisis, particularly in areas such as ammunition, propellants, armoured vehicles, maintenance, communications, autonomous systems and smart munitions.

From an operational perspective, the emphasis on C-UAS systems, MANPADS, radars, passive sensors, loitering munitions and command and control reflects a correct focus on the modern battlefield. However, the challenge lies not merely in choosing the technology, but in integrating it into a rapid cycle of detection, decision-making and engagement. Without this integration, even modern equipment may remain underutilised.

Funding: an opportunity, but also a risk of implementation

The allies’ commitment to increasing defence spending offers Romania a rare window of opportunity. If budget allocations increase gradually and predictably, the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) can transform multi-year programmes into stable contracts, with plans for delivery, training and maintenance. In the absence of predictability, however, there is a risk of delays, fragmented procurement and rising costs.

The target of 5 per cent of GDP for defence, agreed at the allied level and subsequently reconfirmed, marks a shift in the budgetary paradigm. It does not merely mean additional resources for procurement, but also places greater pressure on the state’s administrative capacity to transform available funds into executable contracts, on-time deliveries and genuine operational capabilities.

The structure of this target – 3.5 per cent of GDP for defence proper and 1.5 per cent for related areas, such as critical infrastructure, military mobility, cyber security and resilience – shows that defence can no longer be separated from general public policies. Roads, railways, ports, energy networks, data centres and logistical capacity are, in turn, becoming components of national security.

The implication for Romania is twofold: in the short term, increased funding may speed up delayed programmes; in the medium term, it necessitates the professionalisation of procurement, the reduction of procedural bottlenecks and the alignment of military investment with the domestic industry’s capacity to participate in production, maintenance and integration.

Annual planning: strategic flexibility or a risk of instability?

The PIAR has a ten-year horizon, but its annual update provides a mechanism for adapting to changing realities: developments on the front line in Ukraine, new NATO capability targets, the emergence of autonomous technologies, price fluctuations and the availability of European funds. In a volatile strategic environment, this flexibility is indispensable.

However, there is also a risk: frequent updates can create instability if priorities are changed too often or if programmes are launched without secure multi-annual funding. For the plan to be credible, it must combine strategic flexibility with discipline in implementation: clear priorities, realistic timetables, institutional responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms.

For this reason, the annual assessment of the security environment, the lessons learnt from recent conflicts, actual deliveries, budget execution and NATO and EU obligations is not a bureaucratic ‘ ’ exercise, but a tool for strategic governance. It should enable the rapid identification of stalled programmes, the reallocation of resources to critical areas and the avoidance of duplication between land, air and naval forces.

The six capability areas: a critical analysis

Organising priorities into the categories of Engage, Protect, C3, Inform, Project and Sustain is useful because it shifts the discussion from an inventory of equipment to operational effect. However, this classification is only relevant if programmes are designed in conjunction with one another. Strike capabilities require sensors and communications; air defence requires radars, interoperability and munitions; force projection depends on logistics; and sustainment is crucial in a protracted conflict.

Engage: manoeuvre force and precision fire

The ‘Engage’ category encapsulates the core of combat capability: modernised infantry, wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, 155 mm artillery, HIMARS systems, main battle tanks, F-16 and F-35 aircraft, loitering munitions and UAS systems with strike capabilities. Beyond the technical inventory, the strategic significance is clear: Romania is seeking to transition from a force largely dependent on ageing platforms to one capable of manoeuvring rapidly, striking with precision and contributing credibly to allied deterrence on the eastern flank.

For the Land Forces, the emphasis on the Piranha 5, MLI, tanks and artillery confirms the return of mechanised warfare as a credible planning scenario. For the Air Force, the transition from the F-16 to the F-35 involves not only the introduction of a new aircraft, but also a shift to a different operational paradigm: the F-35 functions as a sensor platform, enabling data fusion and integration into allied networks, not merely as a strike asset.

The Romanian Navy: The Black Sea as an integrated theatre of deterrence, protection and mobility

For the Romanian Naval Forces, the PIAR is particularly important because it transforms the Black Sea from an area of relatively static coastal defence into an integrated theatre of deterrence, surveillance and allied mobility. After 2022, Romania’s maritime space must be viewed simultaneously as a security frontier, a logistical route, economic infrastructure and an area of military competition. Consequently, naval capabilities cannot be developed in isolation, but must be integrated with air defence, aviation, land forces, port infrastructure and NATO command-and-control networks.

Coastal anti-ship missiles are at the heart of maritime deterrence. They can limit an adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre in the vicinity of the coastline and contribute to an allied interdiction architecture in the Black Sea. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the quality of the sensor network: coastal radars, drones, airborne assets, passive sensors, satellite data and allied intelligence. Without this integration, the missiles provide strike capability but do not guarantee the full detection-identification-engagement cycle.

The modernisation of frigates and the acquisition of missile-carrying vessels, OPVs and fast patrol boats must be assessed through the same lens of distributed operations. Naval platforms are no longer relevant solely in terms of tonnage or armament, but by their ability to function as nodes within a shared network of surveillance, command-and-control and strike capabilities. In an environment saturated with drones, mines, missiles, enemy sensors and jamming, survival and effectiveness depend on connectivity, a low signature, rapid response and constant logistical support.

In this equation, smaller platforms – well-connected in terms of information and equipped with precision-guided weapons – can play a disproportionately significant role. They can provide presence, patrols, maritime interdiction, protection of offshore infrastructure and rapid response, at relatively lower operational costs than major platforms. The prerequisite is that technical readiness, ammunition stocks and resilient communications are treated as integral parts of the same capability, not as secondary elements.

ASuW and ASW naval helicopters extend the naval force’s range of action and fill gaps in long-range surveillance, identification and response. Their value lies not only in the platform itself, but in their integration with the ships’ sensors, command-and-control systems and data provided by allies. For Romania, this means that naval aviation must be viewed as part of an integrated maritime architecture, not as an operational appendage to the fleet.

The defensive dimension is just as important as naval strike capability. The ports of Constanța and Mangalia, maintenance facilities, offshore energy infrastructure and logistical routes to the eastern flank are potential targets for aerial and naval drones, mines, cruise missiles, sabotage, cyber-attacks and electronic reconnaissance. Therefore, their protection must be planned as an ongoing mission, not as a crisis response.

The conclusion is that naval modernisation only makes sense if it goes beyond the acquisition of platforms. The priority must be to build a layered maritime architecture: distributed sensors, C-UAS systems, close-in air defence, electronic warfare, mine-countermeasures capabilities, fast patrols, port protection and inter-agency cooperation. In a contested Black Sea, the advantage will lie with the actor who sees faster, decides more coherently and strikes more accurately, not necessarily with the one who possesses the largest platforms.

Protect: layered defence as an existential priority

The ‘Protect’ category is perhaps the one most directly linked to the recent lessons of the war in Ukraine. Patriot, MSAM, SHORAD-VSHORAD, MANPAD, C-RAM, C-UAS, CBRN defence and cyber security cannot be treated as isolated programmes. Together, they must form a layered defence architecture for troops, critical infrastructure, air bases, ports, logistics centres and vulnerable urban areas.

The main implication is that Romania must avoid an excessive focus on long-range systems and invest heavily in close-in defence. Small drones, loitering munitions and cruise missiles can overwhelm defences if there are insufficient sensors, interceptors, anti-aircraft guns, electronic warfare systems and rapid-response procedures. Defence thus becomes a matter of density, interoperability and operational continuity, not merely the technical performance of each individual system.

C3 and Inform: information superiority as a force multiplier

C3 and Information capabilities form the backbone of a modern army. Brigade-level command posts, integrated battalion communications systems, tactical air defence centres, the military communications satellite, ISR sensors, radars, passive detection systems, UASs and ISR satellites define Romania’s ability to see, understand and react faster than the adversary.

Herein lies one of the most important implications of PIAR: the modernisation of combat platforms only makes sense if they are connected within a common network. Without resilient communications, data sharing, cyber protection and command-and-control interoperability with NATO, strike, defence and surveillance systems remain technological islands. In contrast, a mature C4ISR architecture can enable early detection, rapid target allocation and effective coordination between land, air and naval forces.

For the naval component, C3/Inform is crucial because the Black Sea is an environment where reaction times are short and targets can appear rapidly, including in the form of naval drones, high-speed craft, mines or long-range missile launches. The priority is not merely the acquisition of sensors, but their integration into a common maritime picture, combining coastal radars, passive sensors, drones, satellite data, allied intelligence and command-and-control centres. Without this common operational picture, anti-ship missiles, missile-carrying vessels and naval aviation cannot achieve their maximum deterrent effect.

At the same time, naval information superiority requires resilience to jamming, communications redundancy and interoperability with NATO structures. A modern fleet cannot operate effectively if data exchange is vulnerable or if target information circulates too slowly between sensors, ships, aircraft and coastal batteries. In this regard, naval C4ISR is the enabler that transforms disparate platforms into a coherent force.

Project and Sustain: mobility and logistics determine the duration of the campaign

Project and Sustain capabilities may seem less spectacular than aircraft, tanks or missiles, but they determine the force’s ability to reach the theatre of operations, remain there and continue the fight. The C-130H and C-27J aircraft, multi-role helicopters and wheeled transport platforms are components of a broader logistical equation: military mobility, resupply, medical evacuation, maintenance, ammunition transport and the rapid redeployment of forces.

For Romania, situated at the intersection of the eastern flank, the Black Sea and the support corridors for Ukraine, logistics is not an administrative detail, but a prerequisite for military credibility. Road and rail infrastructure, ports, airports, depots, stocks and maintenance capacity must be viewed as part of the same defence ecosystem.

For the Naval Forces, Project and Sustain are of particular relevance because allied mobility in the region depends to a large extent on ports, maintenance facilities, depots, fuel, rail infrastructure and road links between the coast and the interior of the country. Constanța is not just a commercial port, but also a strategic hub for logistical support to the eastern flank. If port infrastructure, its protection and links to land-based networks are inadequate, naval capabilities and allied support may be limited even before a major crisis begins.

In the context of the Naval Forces, ‘sustain’ must be understood as a combination of technical readiness, stocks of ammunition and spare parts, rapid repairs, mine-clearing capacity and the protection of maritime routes. Recent lessons show that ships can be taken out of action not only by direct hits, but also through wear and tear, lack of maintenance, disruption to supplies, or the blocking of access by mines and asymmetric threats. Consequently, naval modernisation cannot be credible without a logistical and industrial ecosystem capable of sustaining prolonged operations.

Ongoing programmes: continuity, but also a test of implementation

Programmes already launched – Patriot, Piranha 5, HIMARS, F-35, the 155 mm howitzers and the main battle tank – provide the PIAR with a foundation of continuity. They demonstrate that Romania is not starting from scratch, but also that the plan’s success depends on the ability to see complex programmes through to completion, involving phased deliveries, technical integration, training, maintenance and long-term operating costs.

The major risk is that the procurement of the platform will be treated as the end of the process, even though it is merely the beginning of the capability cycle. The F-35 will require infrastructure, cyber security, specialised personnel and integration into the allied architecture. The Patriot and future air defence systems require sufficient ammunition, maintenance and connectivity with radars and command systems. HIMARS and 155 mm artillery depend on stocks, supply chains and ISR coordination. In all these cases, the actual military effect only materialises once the systems are fully operational.

SAFE: European funding, industrial cooperation and pressure to absorb

The SAFE instrument introduces a new dimension to procurement policy: defence is also becoming a matter of European industrial policy. The 22 projects planned by Romania are significant not only for their financial value, but also because they can anchor Romanian industry within European production chains for munitions, drones, sensors, air defence systems, naval platforms, digital infrastructure and cyber security.

However, SAFE does not eliminate the classic problems of defence procurement. On the contrary, it makes them more visible: absorption capacity, project maturity, inter-institutional coordination, national co-financing, the involvement of local industry and adherence to deadlines become decisive criteria. If these projects are treated merely as sources of external funding, the impact will be limited. If they are utilised for technology transfer, local production and regional maintenance, they can generate lasting economic and strategic benefits.

The list of SAFE projects suggests several clear priorities: short- and medium-range air defence, counter-drone capabilities, smart munitions, UAS systems, logistical mobility, naval capabilities, C4ISR, cyber security centres and data infrastructure. This focus is consistent with trends observed in Ukraine and the Red Sea, where drones, sensors, guided munitions and network resilience have become decisive factors.

For the naval component, SAFE can serve as a means of accelerating projects that are difficult to fund through national sources alone: port protection, autonomous surface and underwater systems, maritime sensors, secure communications, C-UAS solutions, mine-countermeasures capabilities and the modernisation of maintenance infrastructure. The aim is not merely to purchase equipment, but to integrate Romanian industry into European production and support chains, so that the Black Sea becomes not just an area of risk, but also a rationale for developing a more robust naval industrial base.

The financial dimension: between available resources and implementation capacity

The total allocation of 16.68 billion euros through SAFE, of which approximately 9.7 billion euros is for the Ministry of National Defence (MApN), offers Romania a significant financial advantage. However, the available funds do not automatically translate into capabilities. They must be complemented by predictable national budgets, streamlined procedures, well-developed projects and sufficient administrative capacity for contracting and monitoring.

The political implication is that military modernisation can no longer be left solely to the Ministry of National Defence. The Ministry of Finance, the economy, infrastructure, technical education, research and industry must all contribute to this joint effort. A higher defence budget will only have a real impact if the state can manage large contracts, if industry can deliver, and if the armed forces can absorb the equipment received through personnel, doctrine and training.

New programmes: the Black Sea, autonomy and electronic warfare

Programmes currently in their early stages – autonomous underwater and surface systems, port protection, fast patrol boats, radars and passive sensors, engineering equipment and electronic warfare – point towards a battlefield that is more distributed, more automated and more reliant on the electromagnetic spectrum. For Romania, these areas are particularly relevant in the Black Sea, where threats may include mines, naval drones, anti-ship missiles, attacks on ports, jamming and persistent surveillance.

In this area, the advantage will not necessarily lie with the actor possessing the largest platforms, but with the one that best combines sensors, drones, strike capabilities, electronic warfare, infrastructure protection and rapid response. Therefore, the inclusion of autonomous systems and passive detection solutions represents a necessary adaptation. They can reduce vulnerability to strikes, extend surveillance and offer more flexible options than traditional platforms.

The analytical conclusion is that PIAR 2027–2036 has the potential to become one of the most significant military and industrial transformation programmes in post-1989 Romania. Its success will not be measured by the number of systems procured, but by the state’s ability to deliver integrated operational capabilities: layered air defence, precision strike, mobility, logistical resilience, information superiority, the protection of critical infrastructure and domestic industrial participation. Without coherence, the plan risks remaining a collection of expensive acquisitions; with effective governance, predictable funding and industrial integration, it can substantially alter Romania’s position within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Maritime Security Forum