Armenia must avoid becoming entangled in the ‘Russia vs West, democracy vs authoritarianism’ dilemma
Բենիամին Պողոսյան Benyamin Poghosyan

Benyamin POGHOSYAN^

The year 2023 marked a challenging period for Armenian-Russian relations, likely the most strenuous since Armenia gained independence. Following the 2020 Karabakh war and Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenia’s sovereign territory, the relationship between Armenia and Russia has experienced a notable decline. Armenia openly expresses dissatisfaction with Russia’s and the CSTO’s positions, contending that Russia has not fulfilled its alliance obligations. Simultaneously, Russia harbors suspicions about Armenia’s efforts to foster relations with the European Union and the United States, perceiving a gradual geopolitical distancing.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and the West further complicates the situation. Any attempt by Armenia to engage with the EU and the US is viewed in Moscow as a form of “betrayal,” with some Russian experts accusing Armenia of “following the path of Ukraine.”

Despite these tensions, economic ties between the two nations are rapidly developing. In 2024, bilateral trade turnover is anticipated to reach an unprecedented $6 billion, driven partially by a surge in exports from Armenia to Russia. The role of money transfers from Russia to Armenia and the influx of tens of thousands of Russian émigrés to Armenia after the Ukrainian war outbreak cannot be understated too.

Meanwhile, despite some predictions of Russia’s imminent defeat, the war in Ukraine persists. Following the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, Russia has gained initiative on the front. Military successes in Ukraine and the South Caucasus’s growing importance for Russia as a logistical hub connecting it with Asia and the Middle East may enhance Moscow’s role in the region.

In these circumstances, the continuous deterioration of relations with Russia poses a threat to Armenia’s security. Azerbaijan’s attempts to portray Armenia as the primary pro-Western state in the region intensify, aiming to strain Armenian-Russian and Armenian-Iranian relations while isolating Armenia in the region. Azer-baijan may seek to turn Armenia into a new focal point for the West-Russia conflict.

Azerbaijan leverages its own and Ankara’s increasing significance for Russia, intimating Russia that Armenia has betrayed Moscow, and that the best way to safeguard Russian interests in the South Caucasus is through Russian-Azerbaijani strategic cooperation. Amid geopolitical upheavals, Armenia must exercise extreme caution to avoid fatal mistakes. Over the past four years, Armenia’s security has sig-nificantly decreased, and any new misstep in foreign policy could have irreversible consequences.

Armenia should communicate a clear message to both Russian and Western partners, emphasizing its reluctance to become embroiled in the “Russia vs West, democracy vs authoritarianism” dilemma, whether real or perceived. In its interactions with Russia, Armenia should assert that it has no intention of supporting efforts to push Russia out of the region. Diversifying Armenia’s foreign policy does not equate to adopting an anti-Russian stance.

Furthermore, Armenia should continue deepening relations with the West while avoiding any anti-Russian gestures that do not serve its interests. Concurrently, steps should be taken to enhance Armenia’s presence in Russian expert and media circles, where Azerbaijan currently holds a dominant position, and uses it for anti-Armenian propaganda in Russia.

Irrespective of global developments, Russia will remain a pivotal player in the South Caucasus in the coming years, and a deterioration of Yerevan’s relations with Moscow will only exacerbate Armenia’s challenges.