Introduction
Today’s US-NATO sponsored wars are part of a military and foreign policy agenda extending over a period of more than half a century.
In this regard, the NeoCons’ Project for the New American Century’s blueprint formulated in 2000 should be viewed as the culmination of a post-war agenda of military hegemony and global economic domination as initially formulated by the State Department in 1948 at the outset of the Cold War.
What these 1948 State department documents reveal (see below in Annex) is continuity in US foreign policy from “Containment” during the Cold War to today’s doctrine of “Pre-emptive War”.
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is in many regards a continuation of the Truman Doctrine, namely a hegemonic “long war” waged by US-NATO at a global level. Military actions are to be implemented simultaneously in different regions of the world (as outlined in the PNAC):
“Fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars”
Needless to say, successive Democratic and Republican administrations, from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Barack Obama [and now Joe Biden] have been involved in carrying out this hegemonic blueprint for global domination, which the Pentagon calls the “Long War”.
Kennan’s writings point to the importance of building a dominant Anglo-American alliance based on “good relations between our country and [the] British Empire”. In today’s world, this alliance largely characterizes the military axis between Washington and London, which plays a dominant role inside NATO to the detriment of Washington’s European allies. Kennan also pointed to the inclusion of Canada in the Anglo-American alliance, a policy which today has largely been implemented (under NAFTA and the integration of military command structures). Canada was viewed as a go between the US and Britain, as a means for the US to also exert its influence in Britain’s colones, which later became part of the Commonwealth.
Of significance, Kennan underscores the importance of preventing the development of continental European powers (e.g. Germany and France) which could compete with the Anglo-American axis:
Today, standing at the end rather than the beginning of this half-century, some of us see certain fundamental elements on which we suspect that American security has rested. We can see that our security has been dependent throughout much of our history on the position of Britain; that Canada, in particular, has been a useful and indispensable hostage to good relations between our country and British Empire; and that Britain’s position, in turn, has depended on the maintenance of a balance of power on the European Continent.
Thus it was essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of England, and enter—as in these circumstances it certainly would—on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia. Seeing these things, we can understand that we have had a stake in the prosperity and independence of the peripheral powers of Europe and Asia: those countries whose gazes were oriented outward, across the seas, rather than inward to the conquest of power on land. (George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951)